l. XIX, No. 1
-March, 1973

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLI(ADMINISTRATION

(Journal of the Indian Institute of Public Administration)

PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

Single Copy
Rs. 7 or £ 1.25
or U.S. $ 3

Annual Subscriptio
Rs. 25 or £ 4
or U.S. $ 9.50

(*The views expressed in signed articles are personal opinions of the contributors and are in no sense official, nor is the Indian Institute of Public Administration responsible for them.*)

Articles, comments, correspondence and reviews may kindly be sent *in duplicate* to the Assistant Editor, the Indian Journal of Public Administration, and enquiries and subscriptions may be addressed to the Registrar, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road (East), New Delhi-110001.

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The Indian Institute of Public Administration was established in March 1954 under the presidentship of Late Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. The Institute has been recognized as the National Section for India of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Regional Branches of the Institute have been established in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, Pondicherry, Punjab, Haryana & Chandigarh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal; and Local Branches at Ajmer, Baroda, Belgaum, Jammu-Srinagar, Kolhapur, Nagpur, Patna, Poona, Ranchi, Sangli, Sirohi, Shillong, Udaipur, Ujjain, and Vallabh Vidyanagar.

The Institute's ordinary membership is open to all persons above 25, who are actively interested in or concerned with the study or practice of public administration, the annual subscription being Rs. 25. Associate membership, without the right to participate in the management of the Institute's affairs and with a membership fee of Rs. 12 per annum, is open to bona fide post-graduate students and persons below 25 but otherwise eligible. Corporate Members are admitted on such conditions as may be specified in each case.

The services offered by the Institute to its members include free supply of the Institute's journal and selected research publications, a reference and lending library, information and advice on administrative problems, and participation in the Institute's activities.

Vol. XIX, No. 1 January-March, 1973

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CONTENTS

Vol. XIX, No. 2 April-June, 1973

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CONTENTS

Vol. XIX, No. 3 July-September, 1973

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SPECIAL NUMBER
ON
MULTI-LEVEL PLANNING

CONTENTS

Edited, Printed and Published by T. N. Chaturvedi for the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, and Printed at Delhi Printers, 21, Daryaganj, Delhi-110006

Editor

T. N. CHATURVEDI

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Vol. XIX Oct.-Dec., 1973 No. 4

CONTENTS

Edited, Printed and Published by T. N. Chaturvedi for the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, and Printed at Delhi Printers, 21, Daryaganj, Delhi-110006.

THE INDIAN JOURNAL
OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Vol. XIX January-March, 1973 No. 1

INDIAN BUREAUCRACY : A CASE FOR REPRESENTATIVENESS

Haridwar Rai and Sakendra Prasad Singh

CRITICISMS of Indian bureaucracy seeking to focus attention on its unresponsive ethos and its unrepresentative character have become frequent in recent years. What has lent plausibility to the charge is the national commitment to build an egalitarian, socialist society, the realization of which is not possible unless the bureaucracy is fully committed to the goals and the political processes through which they are formulated. Moral integrity and even academic standards are no longer the only yardsticks, as they have been for well over two decades since Independence, by which an efficient bureaucracy is to be measured. Reliability has ceased to be mechanical; it can no longer be measured according to a pre-established code. It becomes a problem of group psychology. It has to be considered whether the bureaucracy, with its present social background, can enthusiastically support and sincerely carry out the government policy aimed at a large-scale radicalization of the socio-economic structures of the country. The high echelons of bureaucracy, in particular, come from a rather restricted social group and may most likely tend to have 'restricted social views'. It may, therefore, be maintained that though the opinion about the attitudes of civil servants may be impressionistic in view of the lack of empirical data, bureaucratic responsiveness can no longer be considered in isolation from bureaucratic representativeness. No doubt, the data on the social background of civil servants do not lead us to the conclusion that these origins automatically produce certain attitudes and a certain social or political philosophy. But it can certainly be inferred, as a result, whether civil servants constitute a small, self-contained circle or a broad cross-section of the community. Hence, the desirability of a representative

bureaucracy drawn from all the socio-economic groups of the community. Literally, it may mean a civil service in which every economic class, caste, region or religion in a country is represented in exact proportion to its members in the population. However, the American proponents of representative bureaucracy interpret it less literally. To them, it means a bureaucracy drawn from all social, racial or religious groups on the basis of ability. It is not necessarily to consist of all these groups in exact numerical proportion to produce a copy of the total society.[1] The present study is concerned with examining if a case can be made out for a bureaucracy representative of all social groups in our community.

Bureaucracy always functions within a political context. Theoretically, it is possible to treat the administrative and political tasks as two distinct and distinguishable functions. It is the political machinery which sets national objectives and priorities, decides upon important policies, adopts development plans, allocates resources and provides bureaucracy with the necessary guidance for action. It is the responsibility of bureaucracy to execute the policies and plans decided by the political leaders, to get things done in accordance with the political directives. In accordance with the theory of the supremacy of political process, the civil servant is considered politically neutral. He maintains continuity in government and administration and serves as a link between an outgoing and incoming government. In the post-war period, the existence of a politically neutral but durable civil service in a number of countries did perform the function of maintaining continuity in spite of many changes in political leadership.

In recent years, however. the tendency has been away from the sharp dichotomy between politics and administration. Bureaucracy has become increasingly involved in politics, in the sense of policy-making. In the developing countries, in particular, the extent of bureaucratic involvement in politics is exceptionally high.[2] Among the reasons responsible for this are the increasing complexities and the increasingly technical character of the many government functions. Consequently, there are inescapable items of delegation and zones of sub-policy, where the political executive does not come into the picture at all or, at least, where the latter has to rely heavily on the civil servants to provide it with knowledgeable advice. In a complicated situation, policy making and policy execution are interrelated and affect each other. Policies often have to be modified and revised in the course of execution, taking into account the experience gained. Besides, policies are often subject to various interpretations. In such cases,

[1] V. Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy : A Reassessment", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXI, No. 4 (December, 1967), p. 1010.

[2] Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development : A Paradoxical View", *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 121.

the administrators responsible for the implementation of a policy can use their own discretion in its interpretation. In view of the crucial role of the administrator in these areas, those responsible for political decisions or those having the authority for final decision and legitimation of policies will naturally insist that the administrators should be acceptable to them from the political point of view. The value structure of the civil servant is always an important factor in the ultimate outcome of a political decision, making 'feasibility' and 'political' considerations almost indistinguishable.

TREND TOWARDS RESPONSIVENESS

The concept of political responsiveness of the civil service has been in vogue in some countries for quite some time. In France, for example, there has been an insistence on the political loyalty of the civil servants, particularly of those at the higher echelons, to the regime of the day since the early 19th century. There has been a traditional lack of confidence in bureaucratic neutrality which is exemplified by an institution known as the *Cabinet Ministerial*. Every Minister, on assuming his office, appoints a personal staff of trusted collaborators who act as intermediaries between him and the permanent bureaucracy. Some members of the *Cabinet Ministerial* may as well be higher civil servants, others may come from outside the civil service. The existence of this institution and the growth in the number of its personnel reflects the doubts that politicians entertain about the loyalty and reliability of the higher permanent officials in their departments.[3] Even in India, certain key appointments at the civil service level have been influenced by the ideological preferences of the Ministers concerned.[4] This trend cannot be characterized as a mere violation of the concept of civil service neutrality. Rather, it will have to be explained in terms of political involvement of the bureaucracy to secure responsiveness and commitment.

The question which merits our attention is what does responsiveness and commitment of bureaucracy consist in. According to some, the concept of committed bureaucracy connotes a bureaucracy which is professionally dedicated to its task and is prepared to go all out to achieve the socio-political objectives of the government based on the philosophy of party in power.[5] Commitment, both in the professional and purposive senses, is sought to be emphasised.[6] Such an argument underlines the importance of the civil servants undertaking their responsibility with a sense of enthusiasm, mission, and what may be called 'empathy', rather than in a manner

---

[3] T. B. Bottomore, "The Administrative Elite", Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), *The New Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 362-63.

[4] M. K. Chaturvedi, "Commitment in Civil Service", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, pp. 41-42.

[5] P. R. Dubhashi, "Committed Bureaucracy", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, p. 35.

[6] M. K. Chaturvedi, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

as to emphasize the 'system-maintenance' role of the bureaucrats. They are required to be committed to the national goals and be sensitive to the political processes. In fact, the bureaucracy is advised to discard its traditional affiliations with the dominant socio-economic groups and accept the whole society, specially its weaker sections, as its main clientele.

Some Traditional Devices to Secure Bureaucratic Responsiveness

Some devices to secure bureaucratic responsiveness and to inculcate a sense of responsibility have been tried in the United States with a view to equalizing opportunities and giving equitable treatment to each of the major interest-groups affected by government programmes.[7] The idea has been that the successful implementation of such programmes is possible only when the views of all the groups in the community are made known to it. One of the devices is 'public notice of intention' to issue rules and to take up programmes, giving interested parties opportunity to offer objections. But even this does not hold out a guarantee that the department concerned will give appropriate weight to all the points of view expressed.[8] Another technique which has been in vogue for a long time is the creation of advisory committees on which the different interest groups are represented. It is claimed that the advisory committee can make known to the administrator points of view of which he otherwise might not be aware. The members of the advisory committee can save the department some mistakes by warning against these difficulties.[9] In practice, however, the advisory committees often fail to function as they should because the more powerful interests represented on them may dominate their deliberations.[10] Indeed, there is hardly a fool-proof method of assuring that the administrator 'equalise opportunity' to safeguard interests. Even the role of the legislator may not be effective enough to persuade the department to ensure that it acts in the public interest. In many instances, however, conclusive evidence will be lacking to prove that the department has failed to act in the public interest.[11] Therefore, one may conclude that no amount of external corrective will make bureaucracy truly responsive. Even the formal devices of parliamentary and judicial control are of distinctly secondary importance. Responsiveness, in fact, cannot be secured through 'governmental forms or

---

[7] *See* Arthur A. Maass and Lawrence I. Radway, "Gauging Administrative Responsibility", Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1953, p. 445.

[8] Felix A. Nigro, *Modern Public Administration*, New York, Harper & Row, 1970, p. 430.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Emmette S. Redford, *Administration of National Economic Control*, New York, Macmillan, 1952, p. 262.

[11] Felix A. Nigro, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

systems of checks and balances'.[12] What is important is the attitude of the decision maker himself. One powerful force influencing the decision making is the social environment of the decision maker—the kinds of people in society with whom he identifies himself. The senior bureaucrat generally tends to associate himself with groups 'at his own level of power and status or somewhat above it'.[13] He is predisposed to give more weight to he ideas of these groups than to those of lower status.[14] In such a situation, responsive and responsible bureaucracy cannot become a reality.

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND METHOD OF RECRUITMENT

The source of recruitment to the bureaucracy is restricted to the dominant social group with its high echelons belonging generally to the upper strata of society and giving an impression of class affiliations. There is a complaint that it has failed to respond to the aspirations of the lower, weaker classes. It is, therefore, contended that its members should be drawn from all the classes of the community so that it can become really representative. After all, the state is composed of several social groups and classes. No institution can rise above the quality of its personnel. The ultimate possibilities of solving problems of government lie in the nature of men and women who compose its institutions.[15] The convention of impartiality can be maintained only when the members of the directing grades of the civil service are thoroughly committed to the larger goals the state is seeking to achieve. It is, therefore, felt that the civil service, as now constituted, would be much less representative of a community which is committed to a rapid and radical socio-economic reforms of fundamental nature intended to benefit its lower strata. Nor is there much in the social background and experience of the bureaucratic elites to enable one to believe that, as a group, they would be able to participate creatively in the development of a programme for the lower classes. Kingsley has remarked that bureaucracies are responsible to the extent they are broadly representative of all the classes in a State.[16]

An important factor making for unresponsive bureaucracy is the mode of selection of personnel. The conventional mode is not able to introduce as much degree of dynamism in the administration as is necessary.[17] The

---

[12] J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy*, Ohio, Antioch Press, 1944, pp. 278-80.

[13] David Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, New York, Wiley, 1966, p. 285.

[14] Felix A. Nigro, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[15] H. Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, Bombay, Asia, 1961, p. 709.

[16] J. Donald Kingsley, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

[17] A. R. Tyagi, *The Civil Service in a Developing Society*, Delhi Sterling, 1969, p. 171.

selection is restricted by several requirements operating more or less in favour of the middle class.[18] Four important requirements relating to educational qualifications, age, intelligence and eagerness to compete deserve our notice.

Educational Qualifications

There is much emphasis on educational qualification in our recruitment system. This qualification is a pre-requisite condition. No candidate is eligible to enter the competitive examination without it. In most of the cases, the educational qualification prescribed is a university degree. The only services where an Intermediate or a Higher Secondary or a High School certificate is enough to qualify for the competition are of junior clerical and junior executive categories. Even where the minimum qualification for the service is not a university degree, the larger number of candidates are graduates. Thus, practically all the white-collar services attract graduate candidates. This has created real complications. The question of opportunities for school and university education for different classes of children becomes relevant here. In most of the industrial and developed societies, the differences in the proportion of school-leavers in different economic classes are not very large. They are rather small at the junior school level and somewhat larger at the secondary school level. But the difference is more striking in regard to university education even in industrial societies. The proportion of the university trained, in the middle class, is often a hundred times the proportion in the working class.[19] The proportion in India must naturally be much higher than this. The cost of a college education comes very high in a poor country. A family must give up a potential earner during a student's protracted period of study. Thus, the mere requirement of university education for those taking up the competitive examinations helps to guarantee some measure of wealth.[20] Agricultural and industrial working class as well as the lower sections of the peasantry simply cannot afford it. In fact, candidates from weaker social and economic groups of society are still unable to get university degree. They generally have to content themselves with the school certificates. This being the situation, they continue to be deprived of the opportunity to enter the higher echelons of the civil service. Opportunities for higher education are not equally available to all the sections of the population even in advanced countries, though the situation in India is worse. According to Kingsley, the opportunity for university education for the middle class boy was about 35 times that for the working class boy in England; and according to

[18] V. Subramaniam, *op. cit.*, p. 1017.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 1018.

[20] Richard P. Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress*, Calcutta Firma, K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1969, p. 60.

Hodges, three to four times in the U.S.A.[21] In other western countries, the ratio might be in between the two, whereas in India, it may be well over 100[22]. Thus, any system which recruits university graduate is bound to give a striking advantage to the middle class at the expense of the working class and the peasantry.

Age

The question of age is directly related to the general affluence and consciousness of the parents of the new recruits. In practice, most countries follow a modified British system of recruitment. The traditional British system of recruitment to the Administrative Class is based on a competitive examination of University Honours standard open to those between the ages of 20 and 25. It is clear that the British system favours the middle class whose members put their children through University before 21 or 22.[23]

Intelligence

Intelligence is an inherent quality as well as a quality that is acquired. Inherent quality needs opportunity to develop and flourish. Acquisition is solely dependent upon adequate and favourable opportunity. This opportunity factor definitely weighs in favour of the middle class boys. Lower class boys seldom get an opportunity to develop their quality. A very few of them might be seen going ahead even in the face of great difficulties. The relatively great importance of skill in English in competitive examinations points to the same conclusion. A household in which members speak English will, with some notable exceptions, be a household which is a wealthy and high-status one. The better private schools and private tutoring, both again sources of advanced skill in English, also cost money. Thus, the middle class children acquire an edge on others in regard to greater verbal ability.[24]

Eagerness to Compete

Finally, eagerness to compete is a point that naturally favours the middle-class boys. There is little doubt that they, by the very nature of their class, are more aware of the existence of professions and salaried jobs in the civil service. They also realise that they have to look after themselves by competing for life's prizes. As against this middle class competitive individualism. the working class boys suffer by their proneness to, and training in, cooperative efforts.[25]

---

[21] Quoted by V. Subramaniam, *op. cit.*, p. 1018.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Richard P. Taub, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

[25] V. Subramaniam, *op. cit.*, p. 1018.

The middle-class boys, thus, enjoy all the advantages separately and their combined advantage, which is the product of the separat advantages, is conspicuously greater than that of the lower class boys This phenomenon accounts very much for the unrepresentativeness o bureaucracy in developing societies. The percentage of the sons from middl class occupational categories, however, does not differ very much betweei U.S.A. (81 per cent) and India (96 per cent for the Administrative servic and 86.6 per cent for the Accounts service). But in the former, thes categories constitute something near 60 per cent of its working population Thus, the degree of over-representation is of the order of 1.35. In India on the other hand, they constitute just about 9 per cent of the working population and the degree of their over-representation is near 10.[26] A survey research shows that, in 1960, 55 of the 72 IAS trainees (76.4 per cent) reported parental income of more than Rs. 300 per month, with almost half of that group reporting parental income of more than Rs. 900 pei month. These figures almost certainly underestimate parental incomes as high income-tax rates discourage accurate reporting of income. The study also revealed that the IAS officers generally come from the wealthy, urban and educated classes. It also found that the elites in other occupational areas—the engineers, politicians and even the educators are more like the IAS group than many of its members would be willing to admit.[27] In fact, the sons of the middle class occupy over 80 per cent of the posts of the higher civil service in several countries regardless of their stage of economic development, because of possessing a combination of advantages.[28]

BUREAUCRACY AND CLASS AFFILIATIONS

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that bureaucracies are generally unrepresentative. The main problem is whether the bureaucracy—the highest echelons of which are usually recruited from the upper and middle strata and which is organized to regulate different norms, and whose members possess values that do not correspond with those of the radical politicians—would be willing to implement radical reforms, envisaged by a labour or socialist government. The problem was not very important so long as the social and economic values of the bureaucracy and the governing politicians did not seriously conflict. It becomes crucial, however, when a new political movement takes office and proposes to enact reforms that go beyond the traditional frame of reference of previous governmental activity or which upset the existing set of relations within the bureaucracy. It is specially important today when the explicit formal goals of many democratic states are changing from the *laissez faire* police

[26] V. Subramaniam, *op. cit.*, p. 1050.
[27] Richard P. Taub, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.
[28] V. Subramaniam., *op. cit.*, p. 1018.

regulations of society to those of a social-welfare planning state.[29] A study of the history of bureaucracy suggests that the civil service would always be class-bound in its orientation, would never be willing to implement social change, and would sabotage any large scale political and social programme.[30] When feudalism was on the decline and aristocracy tended to be in the ascendant, the bureaucracy became very closely associated with the aristocracy and to some extent incorporated into it. It continued to be alienated from the more differentiated middle groups and oppressive toward them and toward lower groups.[31] The direct relationship between class affiliations of members of a bureaucracy and the policies of the government has been demonstrated in the English Civil service. J. D. Kingsley has shown that as England changed from an aristocratically controlled nation to a capitalist state, its civil service changed correspondingly. The aristocrats, who once dominated the British civil service, gradually gave way to members of the middle class.[32]

BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Bureaucratic apathy toward a socio-economic change is not a new thing. During its short rule (1929–31), the Labour Government in Britain found that many of its radical reforms could not be carried out because of bureaucratic resistance. George Landsbury, first Commissioner of Works in the Second Labour Government, strove for many reforms, particularly in the field of unemployment, old-age pensions, and education. But he found the road blocked at every turn by the civil servant. He soon came to feel the futility of his position and concluded that if a socialist government was to succeed, dependence could not be placed on civil servants who are not socialists.[33] In Weimar Germany, the Social Democratic Party, which held majority power from 1918 to 1920, was not able to make fundamental changes in the power and economic structures. Participants in that government reported that the bureaucracy played a major role in obstructing changes.[34] Even the National Socialist (Nazi) Party, with all its dictatorial machinery complained that the bureaucracy did not meet their standards.[35]

---

[29] Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Rigidity of a Neutral Bureaucracy", Donald C. Rowat (ed.), *Basic Issues in Public Administration*, New York, Macmillan, 1961, pp. 442-43.

[30] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Essay on Comparative Institutions*, New York, John Wiley, 1955, p. 181.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[32] Quoted by Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

[33] Charles Aikin, "The British Bureaucracy and the Origin of Parliamentary Policy", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXIII (1939), pp. 40-41.

[34] Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

[35] Arnold Brecht, "Bureaucratic Sabotage", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, CLXXXIX (January 1937), p. 87.

The 'Review of the Foreign Press' published by the British Government during the Second World War contains numerous instances of the fulminations of the Nazi hierarchy against the permanent civil service, specially the old-line officials, for their unbending will. Hitler also burst out in the Reichstag on April 26, 1942, against the civil service.[36] The New Deal provides other glaring examples of bureaucratic resistance to reform. White and Smith point out that party leaders of the Roosevelt Administration privately complained of the difficulty of 'deflecting the bureaucracy from its ancient ways'. They found the public service machine tending to continue in a straight line in disregard of the deviating influences of different public policies.[37] James Farley observed : "Some of the greatest troubles the President had were caused by subordinate officials who were in sharp disagreement with his policies and, rightly or wrongly, were sabotaging the job he was trying to accomplish."[38] On the principle that new ideas require new blood, the Roosevelt Administration was forced to assemble almost a whole new set of officials to carry out the New Deal reforms.

In a case study of a socialist government in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, it was found that many of the reforms initiated by the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (a political party) had been modified in implementation by the bureaucracy.[39] The problem was not much different in the Soviet Union despite the use of coercive measures to enforce proper bureaucratic behaviour. Five years after the October Revolution, Lenin complained : "We now have a vast army of government employees but we lack sufficiently educated forces to exercise real control over them. Actually, it often happens that at the top where we exercise political power, the machinery functions somehow, but down below, where the state officials are in control, they often function in such a way as to counteract our measures."[40] Likewise, the attitude of the brilliant men of the ICS towards change was definitely negative. At the Secretariat level, all proposals for change were received with suspicion and, if possible, discouraged.[41] The IAS also accepted some legacies of the ICS, including its claim to exclusiveness and class consciousness. People who worked very closely with the higher civil service testify to the lack of substantial change in the attitude of the higher civil servants during the past two-and-a-

[36] Herman Finer, *op. cit.*, pp. 809-10.

[37] L. D. White and T. V. Smith, *Politics and Public Service*, New York, Macmillan, 1939, p. 57.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[39] S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism*, Berkley, University of California Press, 1959, pp. 255-67.

[40] Quoted by P. K. B. Nayar, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[41] *See* Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India", Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), *Administration and Economic Development in India*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1963, pp. 58-60.

half decades.[42] It was to meet this kind of resistance to change that since the days of Karl Marx, some socialists have been suggesting that a successful socialist state must destroy the old state apparatus and erect a new administrative organization. In recent times persons who have served in or studied socialist governments have suggested that one crucial reason for their failure to proceed more vigorously toward the attainment of their goals has been the bureaucratic conservatism of old civil servants.

DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND UNREPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

The necessity to face up to the problem of bureaucratic resistanoe to change becomes urgent when a radical party comes to power. "The theory of civil service neutrality breaks down when the total goals of the state change." A change from the Liberal to the Conservative Party or from the Democratic to the Republican Party has not required a civil servant to make any major adjustments. The functions of the departments and of the government, as a whole, remain fairly constant. "The socialist state, however, which has as its goal a reintegration of societal values, giving priority of governmental services to groups that had been neglected and securing a large measure of government control may fail in its objectives if it leaves administrative powers in the hands of men whose social background and previous training prevent a sympathetic appreciation of the objectives of the new government....The planning state will require men wholly committed to the purpose the state is undertaking to serve...."[43]

Experience shows that the career, merit bureaucracy has not fared well on this front. In Britain, for example, the introduction of competitive examinations went on with the enlargement of the franchise. This led some to look upon selection by performance tests and representative democracy as complementary and even corollary. This also raised expectations that these two in combination should lead to a representative and, thus, a committed bureaucracy. But such expectations were unrealistic. The development of bureaucratic structure amply testifies that the representativeness and the commitment of a bureaucracy and its selection by performance testing are logically separate.[44] The existence of a career bureaucracy without corresponding strength in the political institutions does not necessarily lead to administrative effectiveness. Without firm political guidance, bureaucrats have weak incentives to provide good service, whatever their formal, pre-entry training and professional qualifications. Hence, the career, merit bureaucracy in a developing country not only fails to accomplish the administrative goals set for it but also stands in the way of

---

[42] P. K. B. Nayar, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

[43] Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

[44] V. Subramaniam, *op. cit.*, p. 1011.

olitical growth.[45] Moreover, the recruitment of officials strictly on the asis of ability and qualifications could only be established when public ffice became accessible in principle to all citizens, instead of being reserved or members of a particular social stratum. In other words, recruitment o public office by competitive examination, or on the basis of educational ualifications only brings about a real equality of opportunity if those of qual ability have equal chances of preparing themselves for the public ervice by obtaining the necessary diplomas or the necessary training for he entrance examination. But the history of institutions of higher education hows that they have been largely reserved for individuals from the upper trata of society.[46]

It is imperative, therefore, that in a pluralistic society, the basic bjective must be to create a representative bureaucracy. If the bureaucracy f a nation is not to a large degree representative of the class strata within t, it cannot be loyal to the interests of the less privileged groups and specially, vould not properly serve a progressive, socialist government. The essential ase for representative bureaucracy is that a civil service, which includes nembers of all classes, ensures that "all their different values and interests re articulated and hence brought to bear upon the decisions taken and olicies formulated by it".[47] Greater the power of the civil service the tronger the argument becomes. Kelsall rightly holds that attitudes and ympathies of the civil servant, such as 'smugness and complacency' and lack of touch with working class problems', are those of the middle class ie is drawn from. He has unconsciously imbibed a sense of superiority o the working class. As he has no experience of 'misery, hunger, squalor, ureaucratic oppression and economic insecurity', his perception of such roblems lacks depth. He suggests that the greater representation of the ower classes through various means would make for a truly representative nd, thus, responsive civil service.[48] Norton E. Long goes as for as o say that representative bureaucracy is a better sample of the mass of he people than a democratic legislature. He points out that important nterests, which are unrepresented or malrepresented in the legislature, eceive more effective and more responsible representation through administrative channels. It can save democratic process from being bogged own and can come to be recognized as the 'great fourth branch of Government'.[49]

---

[45] Fred W. Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[46] T. B. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

[47] Subramaniam, *op. cit.*, p. 1013.

[48] R. K. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 955, pp. 189-193.

[49] Norton E. Long, "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism" *The American Political cience Review*, 46 (1952), pp. 808-18.

If changes in the mode and sources of recruitment of the administrative elite result in its members being drawn in substantial numbers from all social classes and strata, the social bonds which unite members of bureaucracy cannot any longer arise merely from the similarities of social origin which is responsible for their class affiliations. In the changed conditions, their uniting bonds are likely to be formed principally by the occupation itself and by the educational experience which leads up to it. In this case the higher civil servants may become more conscious of themselves as occupational elites than as members of a traditional social class.[50] As a result, bureaucrats with different social backgrounds may influence each other by formal and informal contracts, consultations and exchange of experiences. Thus, the basic argument stated in different ways and in different contexts is that bureaucrats carry their class attitude and prejudices into their official life. Therefore, only when all classes are properly represented in the civil service, their different needs and interests will find due consideration.

SUGGESTIONS FOR MAKING BUREAUCRACY REPRESENTATIVE

This brief analysis establishes a case for a representative bureaucracy. But how to secure such a bureaucracy? This deserves the attention of politicians, sociologists, political scientists, and, last but not the least, of higher civil servants themselves. The establishment of this kind of a bureaucracy involves long-range policy-decisions having far reaching socio-economic consequences. However, some immediate steps may be taken to make the existing bureaucracy more responsive and responsible. To begin with, adequate educational opportunities should be created for the sons of the lower and weaker sections of the community. For this purpose, the system of scholarships needs to be considerably liberalised, and a coaching system for preparing the sons of the weaker sections for the civil service competitive examinations needs to be instituted. Adult and able-bodied persons of such classes should also be provided with a minimum of employment opportunities. It would enable them to send their children to schools and colleges, keeping them free from the anxieties of assisting their parents in obtaining the bare minimum necessities for their families. This is important because a large fraction of the population of rural India still continues to be in want of the three basic needs. Efforts in this direction may bring about a marked change in the social origins of the aspirants to the civil service.

Secondly, promotion policy needs reorientation so that candidates recruited at the lower level may get adequate opportunity to rise up to the highest level. Thus, 20 to 25 per cent of junior class II posts may easily be

---

[50] T. B. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

filled by promotion from class III. Further, there should not be any practical difficulty in filling about 70 to 80 per cent of the senior class II posts by promotion from junior class II. Similarly, 40 to 50 per cent of class I posts may be filled by promotion from senior class II. This liberalized system of promotion may go a long way in giving the civil service a representative outlook.

In respect of long range measures to secure a representative bureaucracy, the comprehensive formula of Van Riper is worth consideration. According to him, it is possible to develop such a representative bureaucracy at least in three ways : through (*a*) 'the closed system', (*b*) 'the spoils system', and (*c*) 'the opportunity system' of the Pendleton Act of 1883. He holds that within a democracy, dedicated to the values of both liberty and equality, the opportunity system carries with it major advantages over others. It is no bar to competence in the way that the spoils system may be. Again, it is less susceptible to corruption. It is not as likely to generate irritation and resentment as the closed system is. And, of the three, it is most likely to produce both a fully representative as well as an intelligent civil establishment.[51]

Miller and Rein also, like many others, view the issues of representativeness in terms of the neglected and discriminated groups in society. These are the groups fighting for inclusion, for social honour, and for individual respect. In a society 'which has grown large and unwieldy', they say, 'there will not be many other places more significant in the effort to democratise' than the bureaucracy. They, however, recognize the difficulty involved in bringing together ideals of efficiency and democracy. Really, it may not always be possible to bring together, without conflict, the ideas of efficiency, humanity, and democracy. But they do not regard surrender to efficiency as the highest social value.[52] Democratic and humanitarian considerations demand that adequate involvement in the form of non-professionals will have to be conceded to accommodate these groups. It implies that recruitment norms of civil service agencies will have to be drastically changed. The new expectation is that agencies will make a strenuous effort to bring into their employ unskilled and low-educated people. To bring in many such people, it will become necessary to change job classifications and requirements so that it becomes possible to employ them in large numbers. First, old jobs will have to be reconstructed so that people with low skills can perform those. Secondly, new kinds of jobs will have to be structured, which fit the social service demands for

---

[51] Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service*, Evanston, Row Peterson, 1958, p. 554.

[52] S. M. Miller and Martin Rein, "Participation, Poverty, and Administration", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (January-February, 1969), pp. 24-25.

various kinds of 'bridge and linking activities' which non-professionals can provide particularly well.[53] Further, it will be necessary to cut down 'the commitment to credentials' and the emphasise the possibilities of performance after training of individuals.[54] Training will naturally assume greater importance as it can become a substitute for change. But the training has to be relevant to the people who will be performing these jobs. A good deal of attention will have to be paid to developing training which is appropriate to this objective. Traditional training procedures are likely to be inadequate. The question of promotion is linked, as we have seen, with the main issue. Civil service agencies will have to provide procedures and possibilities for rapid upgrading for the people who are coming in at low-level jobs. We cannot expect orthodox examinations nor traditional educational credentials to be adequate ways of offering quick promotion routes for those who come in as non-professionals. It is imperative that we begin to rethink the way people learn and grow on a job and develop into higher responsibilities. Thus, given will, determination and foresight, we can evolve coherent, workable formulae to secure representative bureaucracy and can thereby strengthen the 'great fourth branch' of our democratic machines.

---

[53] S. M. Miller and Martin Rein, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[54] *See* S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, *Social Class and Social Policy*, New York, Basic Books, 1968, Chapter 5.

SOME ASPECTS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION*

P. P. Agarwal

PLAN implementation cannot be considered in isolation from formulation of programmes with which it is intimately concerned. Effective implementation really begins at the formulation stage when various decision-making groups in the public and private sectors are drawn into the process of preparing plan. It is a continuing procedure beginning with consultation, leading to emergence of consensus and ending with agreed decisions. This is how programme for action is evolved and which can be realistically implemented.

Apart from the need for existence of political will bent on successful plan implementation, it is administrative capacity, more than anything else, that determines the realization of plan goals. Administrative improvements in plan implementation must be preceded by clear thinking on this as to who takes the decisions that affect development. Government intervention as well as the operation of market forces are both involved in the direction of economic activity, especially in a mixed economy as ours. So, one has to locate the role of Government in the development process. The planning process has to permeate the entire decision-making apparatus of Government and of the private sector if rewarding results are to be obtained. Development administration in this context has to deal not only with normal functions of Government but several additional functions. These additional functions arise out of management of public enterprises, process of modernization and technological change, and increasing complexity in administering enlarged social services.

Decision-making by development administrators in relation to planning is an arduous task. It is rendered harder by weak economic administration, incomplete or questionable data and ambiguous theoretical guidance. Decisions, nevertheless, have to be taken at the time of plan formulation and implementation.

In a mixed economy, it is essential to keep in mind that national development planning is not an activity which can be isolated from other functions of Government or those of the private sector. There are several

*The article reflects personal views of the author and not those of the Government of India or the Planning Commission.

organizational arrangements within Government and outside. It is through the decisions taken by those working in these organizations that the plan gets prepared. Such decisions will cover questions like what. when, how and where they will produce, consume, save or invest so that the whole development process moves forward at the desired pace. Instead of a mere budgetary approach to decisions, Government's role today has broadened to the evaluation of a meaningful set of coordinated projects with a strategy built around them. An investment programme which includes a coordinated set of projects forms one aspect of planning which has to be complemented with another approach. This latter approach takes the form of arriving at a consistent overall framework but may lack a detailed list of profitable investment projects. An integration of both these approaches is needed to make a successful plan. The overall plan framework and the projects have to be looked at together and a view has to be taken of both short-term and long-term projects and that of the public and the private sectors.

Plan implementation would, therefore, call for a number of important decisions to be taken at various levels of policy and programmes. Government covers multitude of ministries at the Centre and in the States and agencies—governmental and private—at Central, State and local levels. There are other institutions also, such as the Reserve Bank, transport authorities, and public enterprises, which have an important role to play in the decision-making process in planning and implementation. Having identified the participants in the public and private sectors in plan implementation, the administrator must have a clear idea as to how to coordinate activities of these disparate elements and to synthesize implementation. Managing of functions of Government in relation to plan implementation usually relates to building up of productive sectors and social overheads, maintaining public services, influencing attitudes, shaping institutions, conserving the use of resources and ensuring higher levels of employment. It also relates to the testing of alternative allocations of resources on an analytical basis under various assumptions concerning political, social and economic processes of evaluation of the costs and returns of alternative resource-uses—at different projected levels of resource-availability—monitored by the practical parameters of acceptability and feasibility. Government either functions through its own agencies and performs some of these tasks or gets these done by others by offering suitable inducements. Government, thus, performs a variety of roles in plan implementation, and these roles keep on changing continuously.

Planning cannot succeed unless planners consider it an integral part of their task to establish the kind of administrative systems which can formulate and carry out development plans realistically. But this is rendered

difficult by the persistent gap between the kind of administrative reform which is needed and that which is possible.

Basic to proper implementation of plan programme is pre-investment planning. This needs to be carefully undertaken before embarking on any large industrial project. Such a task would involve an analysis of availability of resources, resource potential, identification of programmes and their projects and their preliminary formulation followed by feasibility studies covering such aspects as demand analysis, technical development, cost estimates, profitability analysis, assessment of national project reports in order to provide for realistic time-table for construction and requirement of materials, and manpower and training of personnel. All these steps are necessary to ensure that the projects move successfully towards the achievement of end objectives. In this process, there can be difficulties in various stages but the project operation plan can be conceived to take care of these issues. Without such a base of planning, the management of a project may not be meaningful. Planning, thus, will be a continuous function with accompanying changes in depth and scope so that the management of a project can review and up-date project plans frequently and impart the element of flexibility in the plans. The project effort can be sub-divided into tasks and sub-tasks even though the scope of planning will vary with the extent and scope of a project. A change of scope in a project may lead to a major change in the larger national programme leading to a change in the planning effort. Thus, a planning task may relate to periodic review of project planning in order to analyse development of schedules of the project. Scheduling will include both backward planning of events and forward planning of time spans required from the starting date; by using well known techniques, like Systems Analysis, CPM, PERT, etc., it is possible to achieve this successfully as an instrument for better project planning.

Another task of importance is the need for efficiency and economy in project construction. There is need to improve contracting procedures as many of the projects are undertaken through contracts. Effective management, in order to ensure proper integration of contract activities with the achievement of overall objectives of project plans, will have to be ensured. Improvement in efficiency and reduction of costs shall form a continuing objective of project management.

An essential condition for the success of plan implementation is the need for requisite efficiency in administration so that it is possible to get increased output from investment in programmes. Administrative efficiency and innovations will continue to play a great part in our planning process and underline the need for taking steps to improve standards. Improvement of a vast administrative machinery spread throughout the country at the Centre and in the States will have to be a continuous process.

Our administration affects the lives of millions all over the country. At all stages in the planning process, it is necessary that the level of efficiency is able to meet the requirements of plan implementation. Implementation, in its widest sense, in this context may involve not only application of techniques hitherto unused, but, more importantly, an approach concerned with achievement within time and cost parameters.

The need to re-organize planning and administrative procedures to achieve responsive action and initiative at each point in implementation needs to be stressed all along. There are a number of elements which weaken administration in this context. Firstly, the objectives of policy and criteria and tests to be adopted are often not stated explicitly. They are set out in a form which leads to ambiguity and a consequent need for referencing to seek clarification of the interpretations. It is, therefore, necessary that thinking on general aspects of policy should be carried on to a degree of precision and sharpness required for effective implementation. Secondly, there is sometimes insistence on elaboration of the operational aspects of a plan on the part of those charged with proper implementation. This, if stressed, should not be regarded cumbersome but viewed as an important requirement for plan implementation. The operational plan, thus, must indicate the exact stages as also detail out the path along which implementation is to be done. For example, the priority assigned to each part of the job, sequence in which each of these needed to be taken up and the requirements in terms of men, money and material should be supported by reliable study. In case only tentative indications are feasible, this should be clearly stipulated. Again, as implementation progresses, greater precision will be generated and uncertain features will be replaced by more definite data. It should be well understood that inadequate operational plans have been, perhaps, the weakest link in our implementation. Partly, it may be due to the new pattern of the projects and programmes being attempted and to the fact that, in our traditional administration, operational aspects were left to be worked out by others. In view of the complexities of projects and programmes, their new order and social compulsions, and the stresses on availability of resources, only detailed operational plans can today ensure effective implementation. Finally, it even appears that in plan implementation we are insisting on employing old tools for new tasks of implementation. Many of these old tools, even though time tested, need to be adapted and improved and, if possible, supplemented as quickly as possible by management techniques and concepts. In the entire area of planning, implementation should be increasingly supported and tested on the basis of reliable data, reliable reporting and reliable budgeting and evaluation. In short, a systems approach to planning and implementation must replace the older, traditional instruments of implementation. Implementation of plan policies and

programmes which, in today's context, are geared to social purposes has to be a specialized function.

The existing system of reporting on progress and shortcomings in implementation has not been found to be effective. Progress reports should enable the authorities concerned to anticipate problems and to judge progress with reference to pre-determined programmes and objectives. It is difficult to develop a system of reporting especially for evaluation of achievement of important policy objectives. On the other hand, it is somewhat easy to review and evaluate plan progress and programme. The framework of policies which go hand in hand with plan implementation has to be worked into details from time to time. If the policies are found to be defective in relation to achievement of plan objectives, they have to be suitably modified. Such a searching analysis of policy alternatives is difficult to attempt but has become inevitable in the light of complexities in economic planning and management.

It should be mentioned here that it may be very difficult to measure actual progress and that probably no single measurement of progress may suffice for all purposes. A preliminary analysis will indicate that the measure of progress is dependent on the purposes—financial and technical—for which it is used. The inter-relationship and inter-dependence of schedules is not sometimes clearly understood leading to lack of appreciation of slippages in time and cost. It is not uncommon to come across a project where written schedules are non-existent. This may be because when schedules change frequently (whatever the reason), the validity of the schedules as an element of control and implementation is seriously disturbed.

The statements of expenditure as an indicator of performance can be misleading. One is reminded of the observations of the late Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, in Parliament in the course of debate on the Draft outline of the Third Plan. He stated : "We have often talked about how much money has been spent or why it has not been spent. It has always struck me that we are looking at things in a very imperfect way; the question is what has been done and not how much money has been spent. May be, the quantum of money spent is an indication of what ought to have been done or might have been done, but the real thing is what actually has been done." How pertinent this observation is even today in regard to progress and implementation of the plan and programmes !

For ensuring better plan participation, it is necessary to have a close look at the annual plan procedures with a view to streamlining them. It may be advisable to modify the process of deliberation by the various sectoral working groups which are often required to complete their reports in a few sittings at the time of the individual State's annual plan discussions.

This could be replaced by a standing arrangement of a continuing working groups which may be in deliberation all along. The working groups could undertake preparatory work in respect of their sectors before States formulate their annual plan proposals.

The lines of authority and decision-making in the administrative structure also create a few problems for plan implementation. The distribution of subjects between Union and States, according to the Constitution, gives limited power to the Central Government in its pursuit of economic and social goals. Through different forums and agencies, the Union Government is able to carry a dialogue with the State Governments over a wide field. This involves a great degree of advisory relationship. The quantum of available resources for development of the States enables the Centre to give a measure of direction to the development process in the States. In this background, an important reform needed is to improve the planning capability of States so that those who hold responsible posts in development planning and administration in States are properly equipped and motivated to ensure achievement of the economic and social objectives of the plan.

Augmentation of planning capabilities at various levels is an essential pre-condition for rational planning process. It is clear that viable national development plans and programmes can neither be drawn up from nor implemented through scientific calculations of economic and social behaviour, following rigorously the disciplines of econometrics and behavioural science. Nor can the planning process spring from a heavy compilation of pseudo-scientific guesses. Rather, through trial and error, economic planning and programming is evolving slowly and painfully from the experiments at either extreme described above towards a middle ground wherein a continuing and flexible process is fashioning an increasingly useful instrument for economic and social change. This experience of plan formulation and implementation has to percolate to various decision-making levels, the framework of which is constituted by States, regions and districts. Efficient and effective execution of Plan programmes pre-supposes a systematic identification of sectors which can be relevantly planned and implemented at these levels. Thus, a programme to be effective must correspond with the local conditions, potentials and priorities.

While the Planning Commission has laid considerable stress on multi-level planning, the machinery at State and district levels has been rather slow in coming. This may become a blessing in disguise if the delay makes for the emergence of an integrated relationship between the two levels. Eventually, our effort is to move towards sustained planning, implementation and reporting from even lower levels, such as the block. It is only in this fashion that it will be possible to organize a two-way traffic between the

State Planning Boards and the planning and executive authorities in the districts. This should make for planning to be realistic and responsive—realistic so as not to make promises which are beyond local performance and responsive in the sense that district and block plans are not just handed down on a take-it-or-leave-it basis but are the result of joint thinking and allow local adjustments.

A critical review of plan implementation in the past two decades of planning throws out certain guidelines for adoption in future. These include the following :

Need for Careful Planning/Formulation of Programmes by Government Agencies

The time taken to draw up programmes after a thorough study of the issues involved will always be a rewarding investment since any inadequate appreciation of problems, local or otherwise, may result in avoidable delays in implementation. For instance, in a study of the working of a Beggar Home in one State, it was found that statutory requirements of notifying the application of 'Prevention of Begging Act' to a particular district were overlooked although the Beggar Home was located within that district. This resulted in legal difficulties and consequent delays in the functioning of the home.

There is also need for detailed planning in all aspects relating to a project under implementation or planning because failure to realize the necessity to look into minute details may later prove costly. Instances can be multiplied where, for want of detailed project planning, many matters were taken for granted which did not materialize at the stage of implementation. In other words, the structure of potential implementation was not in keeping with the assumptions developed during the stage of planning.

Some of the above mentioned problems are intimately related to the sequence of plan operations. In the matter of plan implementation, among the most neglected aiea is the preparation of time schedule of operations. There are long delays in this exercise which can be identified both in the field and in the Secretariat. Take the case of issue of sanctions as part of project work. Even if sanctions (or progress) are obtained expeditiously, they are frequently issued without ensuring that the necessary personnel and the material are available for implementating the programme. As an illustration, one may cite the example of sanctions in respect of personnel needed for planning. After the sanctions for posts are obtained, the reverse exercise of framing *ad hoc* rules incorporating qualifications and type of personnel required is started. Framing of *ad hoc* rules itself, being a complicated process, takes time. Thus, frequently, sanction of posts takes almost half a year and the other half is taken in framing the *ad hoc* rules. This

can obviously be self-defeating. It is, therefore, essential that the administrative operations, such as sanction of posts, framing of *ad hoc* rules and filling up of posts should be properly planned and the time sequence adhered to rigidly.

Appointment of Project Personnel

Lack of proper synchronization of various stages of implementation of projects may result in avoidable losses. Availability of staff and equipment as an input is not properly planned and sometimes can be provided much ahead of the need or *vice versa.* In the course of a study of a sheep and wool extension centre in a State, it was noticed that an electrically operated carding machine was provided to a sheep-rearing village which had no electric supply. In another case, it was noticed that provisions of amenities, such as a community hall, to a newly built Harijan colony had been made even before the Harijans had occupied the houses. While such illustrations can be multiplied, it is worth noting that the staff component is as much a vital consideration for ensuring attainment of goals as appropriate equipment. Sometimes, on grounds of erroneous economy, great effort is put in pruning the staff requirements or delaying the appointment of suitable staff to implement a project. The deleterious effect of these steps on the overall aspects of implementation is obvious.

Delegation of Responsibility

The need for appropriate delegation of responsibility to lower levels consistent with available abilities and skills to shoulder responsibility should always be underlined. This is indeed one of the most important aspects of plan implementation. It is necessary to reiterate this because delegation is often conceived as a mere ritual without any understanding of its implications. In a scrutiny of the scheme of old-age pension in one State, it was noticed that according to the formulated rules, the district Collectorate was scrutinising all the applications for old-age pensions for issuance of eligibility certificates whereas the scheme itself was to be implemented at the Government level. The procedure resulted in considerable delays, leading to denial of potential achievements of the objectives of the project.

Consideration of Project Economy

Reluctance to incur even small additional outlays on existing programmes may frustrate the realization of project benefits. In one particular instance, on account of failure to provide a single lathe, a vertical drilling machine and a valve seat grinder, estimated to cost approximately Rs. 10,000, a district service station for agricultural machinery, was not able to undertake any repairs. Yet at the same time, the Agriculture

Department of the State was continuously spending large sums on repairs of its machinery in the same district through private workshops. It may be argued that this situation is somewhat beyond ordinary notions of project economy and involves a balanced input-output consideration for projects. Be it as it may, it cannot be denied that at the decision-making levels initially the problems do often arise on grounds of merely restricting expenditure in project outlays.

Need for Cost Consciousness

There should be cost consciousness in framing programmes so that it permeates throughout the different levels of implementation. It is often noticed that important programmes are conceived on the basis of 'no profit, no loss' when the formulators of the projects and programmes have no idea about the inherent costs which need to be taken into account for computing the profit and loss figures. Indirect costs, such as depreciation, interest on capital and cost of supervision are not taken into account while framing the proposals. This underlines the need for a realistic appraisal of the inherent costs which will ultimately determine the profitability or otherwise of a programme. Here, it also needs to be mentioned that in some cases there are even attempts for underestimation leading to upsetting of planning schedules in respect of fund releases and also embarrassment in Government departments. It is important to avoid this because cost estimates, including operating cost estimates and benefit forecasts in the feasibility study, determine the economic soundness and justification of a project. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the estimates are realistic so as to form the basis for ensuring the economic feasibility in the project. A concern for cost consciousness will ensure, to a large extent, achievement of programme goals within stipulated cost parameters.

Involvement of People in Programme Implementation

The role of people in implementation of plan policies and programmes must not be underestimated. Development planning, which embraces implementation of plan programmes, involves not only the preparation of a compendium of projected public and private decision-making covering the relevant aspects of production, consumption, savings and investment but a change from old patterns to new modes of behaviour and new techniques of production. This is possible only with the active participation of the people as well as the acceptance of the new modes by them. Social awareness and acceptance of the various programmes is, thus, as important an element as their economic viability.

Popular acceptance of the programmes varies a great deal with the degree of popular appreciation of the benefits which they will confer on

particular groups of people, such as farmers, technicians or scheduled tribe This, again, depends in part on the specific programmes and the appe they have as much to the self-interest as to the imagination of the potenti beneficiaries. At the same time, there must be in popular mind a goc image of the administrator as one engaged in honest and earnest pursu of development at the grassroots. Here, the roles of local leadership and mass media of communication are no less important than the singl minded devotion of the implementing authorities to their development task.

Selection and dissemination of information to various sections people is a precondition for involving the people in implementation of pla programmes. How various programmes will affect particular sectio of the people and in what manner : this question must percolate the think ing of all our administrators interested in proper implementation. Sim larly, an assessment of the programmes which require to be undertake has to precede its launching in the area.

A social and economic development plan, by definition is the blu print of a dynamic process. Unless the implementation takes cognizance the dynamic character of the plans and programmes and unless these a managed according to the twin principles of efficiency and justice, there very likelihood of a 'gap' arising between the plans and their implementatio The need of the day is to eliminate this gap.

DISABILITIES OF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT

P. R. Dubhashi

SECRETARY to Government occupies a pivotal position in the administrative system, both in the States and at the Centre. He is the principal adviser to the Minister in policy making, programme formulation and in dealing with all issues and problems arising out of administration of these policies and programmes. He is also fully responsible for finalizing all briefs and drafts to help the Minister in his legislative work—answering questions, call attention motions, and debates on demands for grants—and on other occasions.

The Secretary is assisted by Additional and Joint Secretaries and a number of Deputy and Under Secretaries in discharging his onerous duties and responsibilities. He is also in close touch with Heads of Departments (*i.e.*, field organizations of Departments) in order to see that programmes and policies of Government are carried out effectively.

The Secretary is responsible for overseeing the entire range of activities pertaining to his Department. He has to keep his finger—all the time—on the pulse of the Department. He has to keep a watch on matters of central importance, drive 'a stream of tendency' though the affairs of the Department and constantly initiate changes and improvement, big and small, in the working of the Department.

In practice, however, he is rarely able to do justice to his responsibilities and play his role as envisaged in the administrative system.

More often than not, he finds himself smothered by the Secretariat routine of unending stream of files, interminable phone calls and a series of meetings—one following another or sometimes one overlapping another, some fixed in advance and many without any advance notice and without agenda. And in the meanwhile, there are visitors always waiting—some with prior appointments and some without! Day after day, he finds himself 'tied to this routine—like a slave to a chariot'. Every day he finds himself in such a whirl of rush, that he is practically 'obsessed by what he has to do next'. What is more than anything else lacking in the life of the average Secretary to Government is the 'reflective mood'. He does not have time to reflect upon the main problems of his department, and upon the main

directions in which the department is going on and the new direction it needs.* He is unable to concentrate or study anything in depth.

These basic disabilities arise out of the excrescence of the trivial in the Secretariat. From all corners of the State, the trivialities converge on the Secretariat—request of a village for an approach road or an irrigation tank or a drinking water well or a claim of another village for electrification even though not covered by the normal rules or a sanctioned plan or some service claim of a minor functionary or some complaint against another demanding his immediate transfer to be sure—each of these may be an important matter in itself. But it falls within the ambit of a local authority. Its resolution requires local knowledge not available in the Secretariat. Often times, it comes to the remote Secretariat precisely because it does not stand a chance on a close scrutiny or indeed has already been rejected by the local authority. However, once it comes to the Secretariat, a new file is opened with a new number, creating an outlet for the energies of the Babus in Secretariat busy with the notings and inward and outward entries; such services are rendered with equal solicitude, irrespective of the fact that one matter may be of vital importance to public welfare and another with no or negative benefit to the public at large.

Trivialities enter into the Secretariat system in a small way, *e.g.*, in the garb of a petition presented to a minister and passed on by him to the Secretary with his remarks. But taken together they lead to a veritable flood of files which, crossing various levels in the Secretariat, finally find their place in the pile of files stealthily but relentlessly growing on Secretary's desk while he is busy elsewhere attending meetings. When at long last, he does come back to his room, he finds himself in the position of King Canute, frantically but unsuccessfully beating back the waves of files surging forward on the ocean of the Secretariat work.

The load of trivialities leads to more than one harmful effect. It takes away the precious but limited time of the Secretary, bulk of which ought to be available for reflection and concentration on the real work of the Secretariat—policy and programme formulation and review. It leads to distortion of priorities. It creates unnecessary paper work. It takes away the time of field agencies on reporting while they can never have enough time to devote to the work of execution of sanctioned programmes. That is worse, it tends to sap their initiative when they discover that matters to be dealt with at their level are taken up at the Secretariat level.

* I have taken some of the phrases from "How to Live on Twenty Four Hours a Day" by Arnold Bennet—a dramatist, novelist and critic—as reproduced by *Readers' Digest*, December, 1972.

The remedy, of course, lies in ensuring that this routine and trivial work never reaches the Secretariat—or even if it does, it never goes to the Secretary. But this is more easily said than done. Democracy takes this work though numerous channels to the 'sanctum sanctorum' of the Secretariat.

In all matters, big or small, trivial or important, the Secretary is enjoined by the Secretariat manual to give free and frank advice without fear or favour. But rarely does one come across a listner to an unpalatable advice, however sound or wholesome it may be or good in the long run ! (अप्रियस्य च पथ्यस्य वक्ता श्रोता च दुर्लभः ।) On the other hand, there are always people who are prepared to show their commitment by proffering convenient advice or by being their 'master's voice'. A person who was once a minister honestly felt—"What is the use of the Secretary who does not reflect the will of the Minister ?" When such becomes the philosophy of Government, there is no place for a Secretary who offers objective and impartial advice.

It is well said that no person can serve two masters. But an incumbent of the Secretary's post has to be an exception to the dictum. This is because while the allocation of work amongst Secretaries is based on administrative considerations and remains more or less steady, that amongst Ministers is governed by political expediencies. The latter may well require prolification of the ranks of Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers-in-charge of a fraction of the Secretary's assignment. This puts the Secretary in the unenviable position of being simultaneously available and responsible to two or three Ministers and if there were to be some area common to them, Secretary may find himself constantly exposed to misunderstanding, friction and working at cross purposes. As it is, administration has become a tangled web of pulls and pressures, strains and stresses. Unsound administrative arrangements only add needless complications, making unified, single-minded and coherently directed pursuit of goals and objectives almost impossible.

The division of work in our administrative system between the Secretary and Head of Department is that between policy making and execution. The Secretary helps the Minister in policy making while the Head of Department is responsible to Government (*i.e.*, Secretary and Minister) for policy and programme execution. However, in the practical process of administration, thanks to its action-minded but unsophisticated characte1, the distinction gets blurred and the Secretary may find, specially if he is a stickler for rules and procedures, the Minister issuing instructions directly to the Head or even joint Head of the Department. This may put the Secretary in extremely invidious and embarrassing position. He may find these instructions contrary to standing rules and procedures and yet would be in no position to

contradict them. The long-term result is a slow but sure erosion of the authority of the Secretary, making his position so untenable that ultimately he would be unable to ensure strict enforcement of policies. The Heads of Departments would make it a regular habit to approach the Minister directly for all things, by-passing and behind the back of the Secretary.

This habit of direct approach to Ministers has become more pronounced with intense politicization of public administration, including that of Civil servants themselves who, notwithstanding strict injunctions against any resort to outside pressures for redress of their real or imaginary grievances, do not hesitate, in the slightest degree, to violate their instructions because they know they can do so with impunity, provided they approach the right quarters.

With all his responsibilities, the Secretary cannot pick up the instruments of his choice, thanks to the centralized system of personnel management in the Secretariat which is in the hands of the General Administration Department, headed by the Chief Secretary. In the nature of the case, the General Administration Department cannot consult each Department before making postings. But the consequence is that for all men from Class IV upwards who have to help him, the Secretary has to depend on the choice of another agency. And yet he is expected to deliver the goods ! Administration is getting more and more complex requiring specialized expertise which the clerically oriented Secretariat Service is rarely able to provide.

Surely there is much to pause and ponder regarding the position and role of the Secretary in our system of public administration at the State level, specially in the context of politicization and the consequent administrative aberrations and growth of administratively unsound structures and practices.

INTERCHANGE OF PERSONNEL: A NEW DIMENSION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

V. Subramanian

UTILIZATION of human resources to their optimum level is one of the most important tasks of public administration. This task assumes a special significance in respect of those resources which are particularly in short supply. Notable amongst them is managerial talent. It is, therefore, incumbent on public administrators and leaders of business and industry to harness managerial talent to its optimum capacity. For doing this effectively, we need to shed the present compartmental system of administration and to adopt in its place a constellational system, with interchange of personnel as one of its chief operating principles.

A supreme example of successful functioning of constellational administration was our victory over Pakistan and the emergence of Bangla Desh as an independent nation. This stupendous result was made possible by the pooling of expertise at all levels, the coordinated activity of the civil and the military administration of two different nations linked by ties of friendship, the precision and timeliness with which all movements were characterized and the disciplined loyalty of business and bureaucracy, the politicians and the people, combatants and civilians. It was a vivid demonstration of the principle of interchange and coordination of personnel, *par excellence.*

Origin of Policy of Interchange

There have been sporadic attempts in some countries to interchange personnel at certain levels of authority between different sectors of administration by the induction of people from outside into Government or by the lateral entry of persons engaged in industry and business into Government or by the deputation of officers of Government to the public sector and cooperative organizations. However, as a policy of administration, interchange of personnel does not appear to have been adopted anywhere on any large scale. The Fulton Committee which reported on the British Civil Service in July 1968 advocated such a policy for the first time. Its recommendation was categorical. It stated :

> "Determined efforts are needed to bring about the temporary interchange of staff with private industry and commerce, nationalized industry

and local Government on a much larger scale than hitherto. We acknowledge the undoubted difficulties. But the value of interchange both to the service and the other employments concerned, is so great that energetic efforts should be made to overcome them. We think that a considerable expansion of interchange is feasible. War time experience proves beyond doubt the value of such movement in promoting mutual knowledge and understanding. Coming at the right stage, experience in a changed environment can also be of decisive importance in the individual's development. Interchange should be a two-way process (though not necessarily head for head) covering both administrative and specialist staff from the level of Higher Executive Officer and equivalent upwards".

A similar recommendation was made in the report of the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission (India) on "Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale".

Rationale of Interchange

The reason why these two eminent bodies advocated a system of interchange is apparently the realization that public administration is no longer a problem merely of how to enforce law and maintain order, but a sophisticated exercise in economic and social development for which specialized knowledge and equipment are necessary. This knowledge and equipment have to be imported from industry or business or even from the academic profession. On the other hand, business institutions and industry can no longer content themselves merely with the goals of efficiency and productivity or the maximization of profits, however important and fundamental these considerations may be. A higher objective related to the good of the community has to inspire their activities. Universities can no longer content themselves to remain only purveyors of economic theories divorced from reality, nor preach public administration in isolation from the practical situation prevailing outside. The Government, public and the private sectors and universities have, in fact, a good deal to teach and to learn from each other. The hierarchical and compartmental system of administration must yield place to a constellation system for which the philosophy of interchange is indeed a *sine qua non.*

Important Aspects of Interchange

While the principle of interchange of personnel is, thus, of vital significance in the development of a sound system of public administration, the literature available on this subject is quite scanty. In our country, at any rate, there has hardly been any systematic attempt to analyse the various pros and cons of the principle and to work out a feasible scheme of interchange. The Maharashtra Regional Branch of the Indian Institute of

Public Administration has, therefore, rendered a signal service to the cause of public administration by holding a seminar on February 12 and 13, 1972, to discuss the problem of interchange of personnel between Government, public sector, private sector and universities. Thirteen papers, highlighting various aspects of the principle of interchange of personnel, were submitted to the seminar. In a paper on "The Rationale of Interchange", Shri D. R. Pendse spelt out the methods and programme of interchange, the pitfalls and difficulties to be avoided, and the manner in which a positive programme of interchange was possible. According to him, three factors were absolutely necessary if the policy of interchange is to yield the best results. The first is that intersectoral mobility must be sponsored and encouraged by the employer; secondly, the interchange must be for a specific period say up to 3 years, at the end of which the loaned officers should revert to their original employment; and thirdly, the secondees must be among the most capable and outstanding people in the organization. The absence of such officers in the parent organization must be felt as a real loss and not "good riddance of bad rubbish". The advantages of such secondment are mutual, immediate to the organization to which the employee is seconded and ultimate to the seconding organization. There are, of course, difficulties in this system. The secondee may like to make his career in the new organization or conversely find it difficult to adapt himself to the new climate which may make exacting demands on his patience and tact. A distrust between him and his colleagues in the new organization might make him either pessimistic or incapable of delivering the goods. All the time, perhaps, there is a lurking fear of becoming unwanted in his parent organization. Out of sight may soon become out of mind and ambitious as well as crafty people are not wanting in any organization to take advantage of the situation and keep the secondee permanently out by making him a dispensable commodity. Shri Pendse, however, concludes that while the difficulties of interchange are real, the advantages of such a policy are positive. The risks are certainly worth taking because the gains are of a long term nature.

In discussing the policy of interchange between Government, public sector, private sector, and universities, the following aspects are important :

(1) validity of the concept of interchange;

(2) spheres and areas of interchange;

(3) levels and period of interchange;

(4) limitations and risks in the execution of a programme of interchange and remedial measures; and

(5) removal of disparities, if any, in emoluments.

We shall consider each of these aspects in detail.

Validity of the Concept of Interchange

Some people ridicule the idea of interchange as not being feasible at all. They quote in support the following verse from the Gita :

श्रेयान् स्वधर्मो विगुणः परधर्मात् स्वनुष्ठितात् ।
स्वधर्मे निधनं श्रेयः परधर्मो भयावहः ॥

"One's own duty, though devoid of merit, is preferable to the duty of another well performed. Even death in the performance of one's own duty brings blessedness; another's duty is fraught with fear."

These persons apparently do not understand the implications of the programme of interchange. It is not intended that a blacksmith should be trained to be a ballet dancer or a scavenger to be a surgeon. What is intended is an interchange of allied skills so that one sector of administration could benefit by the experience of another. In a pungent article, in "The Opinion" entitled "Metamorphosis—temporary and at will" (Issue dated 15th February 1972) Shri A. D. Gorwala has said that "the ethos—dharma so to speak—of each profession is different, and any attempt to combine different *dharmas* necessarily leads to *adharma*, good neither for government nor for business—a dhobi's dog in fact, finding satisfaction or security neither at home nor at the washing ghat". One can only say that this is an uncharitable view of the principle of interchange and does not recognize the trend of the times, namely, the necessity to import into administration sound management techniques found useful in business or to import into industry and business, social objectives without which the practice of management becomes a sterile adventure in profit-making. Fortunately, people of Shri Gorwala's line of thinking appear to be in a minority of pessimists who may wish to elevate their prejudices into valuable experience for others' consumption.

Interchange is not intended to involve a supplanting of personnel of one organization by that of another. It is intended, in the main, to share expertise which may be scarce and to bring to bear upon an organization the experience which has been found useful and profitable in another. Undoubtedly an indiscriminate application of the principle of interchange is neither feasible nor desirable. However, a programme of interchange between allied fields is bound to be of great use. Numerous instances could be quoted of spheres in which such a programme would be feasible and useful. These would be introduction of computer technology into Government administration; improvement of hospital administration by the systematic application of management and accounting techniques designed to improve medical efficiency, inventory control, proper utilization of doctors' time, etc., etc.; association of high level governmental officers engaged in personnel

administration, planning, and economic advice with the working of private organizations; association of practitioners of public administration with university departments of politics and public administration, etc. etc. In the words of the late Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, "the transfer of men for accomplishment of tasks is one of the best practical ways of transferring technology, know-how, and an operating culture".*

Spheres and Areas of Interchange

An example of interchange with which we are fairly familiar in India is that of persons in the service of Government being deputed to man positions in the public or the cooperative sector. The practice of personnel from Government being deputed to the public sector has come in for caustic comments and severe strictures. It is alleged that these persons are only "birds of passage" who are more interested in the furtherance of their own prospects than the future of the organizations which they come to serve. They are considered obscurantist in aims, antiquated in techniques, and dilatory in despatch of business. As against this, a few eminent men, who at great sacrifice have left the private sector to head public sector organizations, have spoken with warmth of the dedication and single-mindedness of purpose of the personnel deputed from Government. A programme of interchange of personnel between Government and the Public Sector in similar spheres of industry or business, and indeed, in such similar spheres between Government, public sector, and private sector is certainly feasible as observed earlier. For example, there is great advantage to be gained by Government officers dealing with the steel or mining industry being associated with public or private sector organizations concerned with the actual production of steel or the exploration of mines and *vice versa*. Such a programme is not only bound to help the bureaucracy in seeing the realities in the blast furnace and in the coal pits but also enable the personnel concerned with the steel industry or the mining operations to understand the social purpose in the formulation of Governmental policy in these spheres. A programme of interchange between the universities and the other sectors of public administration could also be useful, though in limited spheres, such as economic planning and advice, practice of organization and methods and work-study, improvement of technology, introduction of line-management techniques to students of management institutions, etc. While working out a programme of interchange between Government and other organizations, it would, however, be wise to remember the differences between these two types of institutions without adopting the extremist attitude either of Paul Appleby, who considers that "the dissimilarity between Government and all other forms of social action is greater than any

*Lecture delivered at Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad in December, 1969.

other dissimilarity among those other forms themselves", or of Simon, Smithburg and Thompson who acclaim that "large scale public and private organizations have many more similarities than they have differences". The truth appears to lie somewhere in the middle.

Levels and Period of Interchange

If the concept of interchange is valid in theory and capable of being translated into actual practice, the questions that follow are : What are the appropriate levels at which such interchange will have the best results, what should be the frequency or intensity of the experiment, and what is the period for which the interchange should be allowed ? Obviously, the intention of interchange is not for clerks and assistants to peregrinate between the various areas of administration, nor is the induction of an outstanding individual, like a Homi Bhaba, a John Mathai or a Triguna Sen into ministerial office likely to produce the long-term results which we desire from a programme of interchange. It is therefore, necessary to bear in mind the following considerations in regard to the levels of interchange and the intensity of the experiment :

(1) There is obviously no advantage in interchange being tried at lower than middle management level. Similarly, if the scheme is confined to top management, the advantages are likely to be only peripheral. To have any impact, the scheme will have to be tried at the middle-management level and above where persons generally have the desire to imbibe and the capacity to impart.

(2) The experiment should be confined to fields which are related and/or comparable. Nothing is to be gained by the interchange of personnel between Messrs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. or the Department of Steel in the Government of India on the one hand and Messrs. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. on the other, or between Messrs. Hindustan Levers Ltd. on the one hand and the Ministry of Transport and Communications on the other. The examples might border on absurdity but they have been given to highlight the point about comparable and related fields.

(3) Regarding the intensity of the experiment it is obvious that the "one swallow in summer" attitude would have no meaning. A sizable number of persons should be involved in the programme. There might be a difference of opinion about the view that the experiment should be tried on a massive scale, but discretion would dictate that we do not err on the other extreme and try the experiment in a marginal fashion.

As regards the period for which such interchange should be permitted, there is great advantage in making it limited for the following considerations :

(1) To enable as large a number of persons as possible to get themselves benefited and also to benefit the parent organization as well as the organization to which the person is seconded.

(2) To preserve the integrity of the organization and to enable it to develop its own personnel who would naturally come under the influence of the secondees.

(3) To prevent heart-burning and dissipation of morale in consequence of the permanent and large scale induction of 'outsiders'.

Based on these considerations, it would be safe to conclude that interchange should be tried at the middle-management level and above; that it should be confined to fields which are related and/or comparable; and finally, that the programme, in order to be successful, must embrace a sufficient number of persons so that it will be possible to draw valid results for the adoption of the principle of interchange as a general philosophy.

Limitations and Risks in Execution of Programme of Interchange and Remedial Measures

A reference has earlier been made to the hierarchical and compartmental system of administration which is prevalent today in Government as well as, to a slightly lesser extent, in business. A break-through is required in order to arrive at a coordinated and optimum utilization of scarce technical and managerial know-how. The programme of interchange, which is being suggested for the purpose, is, however, largly an uncharted sea. While it would be timorous not to embark on the programme because of its difficulties, it would be pedantic and indeed foolish not to be aware of its limitations and risks. The most important among them are as follows :

(1) Considerations other than capability may influence selection of personnel for secondment.

(2) The secondee might face an unfavourable environment, particularly if he has too many ideas (fresh or conventional) which the borrowing employer and his permanent group find it difficult to digest.

(3) An independent secondee may be a source of friction under the borrowing employer, and as a remedy both the borrower and the secondee may only look forward to the early termination of the interchange.

(4) The home-coming process in interchange can never be well-regulated because secondees who are comfortably ensconced might stay on indeterminately or they might be found inconvenient and edged out.

Devising of proper remedial measures to overcome these limitations and risks is indeed of essence of the successful functioning of a policy of interchange. The author therefore, had made in this behelf the following suggestions for the consideration of the participants of the Seminar on Interchange of Personnel which was organized by the Maharashtra Regional Branch of IIPA at Bombay :

(1) It might be desirable to have for each State or for convenient groups of areas of interchange, a high-level committee of eminent and independent persons from private industry and business, universities, public sector and Government, which will be responsible for making the selections of the secondees looking to their qualifications, experience and reputation.

(2) The grounding period, whether in Government, public sector or private sector may in some cases be quite long, with the result that the secondee would find it difficult to enter upon his work in an active manner unless he has knowledge of the peculiarities, whether in policy or procedure, of the organization to which he is seconded. This teething period can be made smoother if the persons selected for secondment can be given a short training course to enable them to absorb the peculiarities of the organization which they will be expected to serve.

(3) The high level selection committee should also be charged with the responsibility of periodically reviewing the progress of the arrangements for interchange, the benefits transmitted to the parent organizations and the organizations to which the officers have been seconded, the difficulties that inhibit the satisfactory execution of the arrangements, whether any psychological barriers exist preventing a successful execution of the programme and if so, what remedial action is possible. The Committee should consider, in case the programme is a success in some areas, how it can be extended in the same areas or introduced in new areas of administration. In order to inspire confidence in the administration of this programme, the Committee should be allowed to function with complete autonomy and a convention should be established whereby its advice or recommendations should be accepted without question or demur. The Committee might even suggest the exclusion of certain areas completely from the ambit of this programme, *e.g.* where official secrets are involved, where embarrassments are likely

to be caused on account of diplomatic privileges, or where maintenance of law and order is the prime function. There is no reason to think why a meaningful programme of interchange cannot be worked out with the help and guidance of this Committee. It was indeed gratifying that the Bombay Seminar on the subject, while generally endorsing the desirability on interchange, also expressed approval of the above mentioned safeguards.

Removal of Disparity in Emoluments

Finally, we should consider one aspect of the programme of interchange which is fundamental and likely to ruin it at its very start, if ignored. This is the question of emoluments. While one may not deny the need for idealism to animate a programme, it cannot also be forgotten that a good principle can founder on the rock of a very small difficulty. In fact, the question of emoluments is not unimportant. As explained by Shri N. M. Wagle, Chairman of M/s. Greaves Cotton & Co. Ltd. at the Bombay Seminar, an odd executive nearing his retirement age or with limited family commitments might be willing to accept a reduction in his effective remuneration; but, as a general rule, it will be necessary to ensure that capable men selected for deputations are not penalised financially It is also true that there is a great disparity in the emoluments and perquisites available in the private sector on the one hand and the universities and the Government on the other. This disparity in emoluments will have the effect of inhibiting the traffic in the direction of the less affluent sectors, namely, Government and Universities. On the other hand, there will be not only no obstruction, but even a positive inducement to a flow of traffic in the direction of the private sector, as the remuneration in this sector is comparatively attractive. Therefore, in formulating and executing a programme of interchange, this factor of differential remuneration has to be carefully borne in mind. Some solution to this problem may be found on the following lines :

(1) A suggestion has been made that the private sector should continue to pay the difference in remuneration between what is available in that sector and what is available in government in the case of a person from the private sector being inducted in government. The wisdom of this solution is, however, arguable since it may not be considered desirable for government to be indebted to the private sector as that might compromise the position of the individual also.

(2) Another suggestion is to adopt the American pattern of transferring the pension fund from one employer to another or, if the employee so desires, to allow him to take out the fund and invest it to give him an income.

(3) A third suggestion is that the secondee should, in case he goes to an organization in which the scales are lower, retain his own scale and draw the higher emoluments in case the organization to which he goes has higher scales of pay.

From this it would follow that organizations may have to make special provisions for paying the secondee higher emoluments than would have been available to him had he been an employee of that organization. To ensure that the programme of interchange does not result in frustration to the secondees, it is necessary that the suggestions made above are considered and a solution found to the problem of disparity in emoluments.

CONCLUSION

The various sectors of administration, namely, Government, public sector, private sector, and universities each have their own share of human resources. The problem of interchange is a problem of the equitable as well as the most worthwhile distribution of these scarce resources. A skilful apportionment of human excellence is called for in order that each of these vital sectors contributes effectively to the public good. In the ultimate analysis, the success of a programme of interchange depends not only on the various factors which have been discussed at length above, but also on individual attitudes and aptitudes. Certain important qualities have to be taken into account here. Some of these are : (*i*) capacity to master the essentials of a job, (*ii*) having the right sense of priorities, (*iii*) capacity to analyse the essentials of a situation, and (*iv*) marshalling resources for implementation of policy, and using them in an effective manner. Another important quality is that of sincerity. What is required, in order to make administration of any type successful, is the commitment of the individual to a policy of success of that administration.

The term 'commitment' in relation to civil servants has been indiscriminately used to mean all sorts of things. But, in the larger context, no results are attainable without a sense of commitment. In the economy of a country like ours, commitment of any individual, whether working in Government or public sector or private sector or universities, can only be a commitment to social justice, a commitment to higher and better production, a commitment to the more equitable distribution of the produce, a commitment to the enrichment of the 'quality of life' at all levels, a commitment to the abolition of destitution, so that a sixth of the human race can live in comfort at home and in goodwill to all those abroad. To the extent that a policy of interchange is able to evolve a better and more effective utilization of the human resources available in the different spheres of public and private administration, the idea of commitment could be transferred into the reality of achivement.

WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKING*

Dipankar Sarkar

WORKERS' participation in management of enterprises, both in the Public and Private Sectors, has been a controversial subject which has been under discussion and experimentation for quite some time. In this article the subject is proposed to be discussed in the context of the Public Sector Undertakings of the Government of India, especially those which are industrial production units.

Results of the operations of an Undertaking are dependent on the various inputs which go into the operations. The most complicated among the inputs is the manpower, because men are not an inert substance, like machinery, materials or money, which can be used, abused or misused in any manner. In a country like ours, which is wedded to democratic socialism, the workers have become conscious of their well-being as well as their importance. In the present day conditions in this country, the establishment in any Undertaking, and a Government Undertaking in particular, can no longer be changed by the management at will. The workers become a permanent acquisition of a Government Undertaking and, therefore, their existence and aspirations can hardly be overlooked by the management. If some excess material is procured or excess capacity is created on account of faulty planning, there is scope for correction by way of disposal of surplus materials and capital equipment. Such a freedom does not exist in the area of human resources in the Government Undertakings and, therefore, the all available manpower will have to be put to the best use in order to secure the most optimum results.

The objective of workers' participation in the management is to derive maximum benefit from the manpower input, by ensuring better cooperation from the workers and more harmonious relations between the management and the workers. In a developing economy, capital and material resources are scarce and the demand and necessity of the end-products to be produced by utilisation of these resources is very high. The Public Sector Undertakings are expected to reach commanding heights in the country's economy and

*This article was awarded a consolation prize of Rs. 100 in IIPA's Prize Essay Competition in 1972.

for this purpose, large amount of taxpayers' money, as well as the country's foreign exchange resources, have been invested in these Undertakings. The unsatisfied demand accentuates the inflation spiral and the vicious circle of cost of living chasing the wage level and the latter, in turn, chasing the former, continues. This throws the planning process out of gear and brings in its wake all round misery by arresting the country's progress towards development. In this context, importance of finding out the style of management of Public Sector Undertakings, which will secure the best efforts from their human resources and thereby the best utilisation of the nations capital and material resources allocated to these Undertakings, hardly needs any emphasis.

FACETS OF MANAGEMENT

When we talk of management from the point of view of workers' participation therein, it is essential to keep the entire function of management in view. The management function is not confined to decision-making only, as is commonly assumed, but its horizon is much wider than making selection from alternative choices. The basic ingredients of management can be divided into the following four broad categories :

(*i*) *Planning, i.e.,* decision-making with reference to the past experience the present situation and the anticipation regarding the future. Planning is, therefore, an embodiment of the past, a product of the present, and a prophet of the future. The alternatives available, the cost of such alternatives in terms of inputs and the results expected from each alternative, are analysed and the best alternative is chosen for achieving the maximum output at the minimum cost.

(*ii*) *Organizing, i.e.,* providing the requisites for execution of the plan by making available the right kind of men, materials, machinery, money and organization at the right time and at the right place. This calls for action on the part of management for in advance of the stage of actual operations.

(*iii*) *Controlling, i.e.,* ensuring the actual utilization of the resources according to the plan when the plan is under execution, so that any deviation or shortfall from the plan can be set right by taking corrective action on a concurrent basis. This constitutes the day-to-day function of the management.

(*iv*) *Motivating, i.e.,* providing the necessary leadership to the human element involved in production so that the employees are inspired to achieve higher results. Such motivation should not be in abstract form, drawing upon the good qualities of human nature, like patriotism bringing forth the highest sacrifice in a battlefield. It should be

institutionalized by appropriate management action which rewards the efforts through benefits, monetary or otherwise, which should not only compensate in a satisfying manner the efforts already put in, but also promise higher benefits for still better results.

The participation of the workers in management, in order to be successful, will have to cover the entire gamut of management as described above, instead of confining its scope to any one or the other of the individual facets. The extent to which workers can take part in various aspects of management has not been studied in depth in our country and various opinions are prevalent in regard to the capability of workers to participate in planning, organizing and controlling operations. Even when it is conceded that workers can be effective in all the above mentioned three areas, the last area, *viz.*, in the matter of motivation, the workers' possible contribution has been generally overlooked. Rather, it has very often been thought that the participation of workers in planning, organizing and controlling will automatically lead to the necessary motivation. The fact, however, is different, because motivation itself is gradually becoming more and more important function of management. Various sophsiticated techniques have been developed in respect of planning, organizing and controlling operations, while the field of motivation is still to be covered by intensive research into the various aspects of human behaviour. In many Government Undertakings, it is the motivation which has been seriously lacking and the management has not been found equal to the task of carrying the workers with it. As a result, inspite of all the huge investments, the desired results are not coming forth.

STEPS TAKEN SO FAR

The first step towards involving the workers in the management process started when a study group was constituted in 1956 to examine the systems of workers' participation in management in Europe. This study group recommended the setting up of Joint Management Council wherein the workers will get an opportunity to participate in management. This subject was thereafter discussed in several conferences and seminars in 1957 and 1958 and then the constitution, functions and responsibilities of the Joint Management Council were decided upon. Such Joint Management Councils were set up in a few Undertakings, both in Private as well as Public Sectors. A study of the working of these Councils has revealed that the objective of joint management has been hardly achieved.

The failure of the Joint Management Council has been due to a lack of understanding of the basic intentions both on the part of the management as well as the workers. The management side jealously guarded their right of management and wanted to keep the workers only informed through the

Council. They did not see that it was not enough to discuss with or consult the workers before taking decisions, since that did not really involve the workers in the management process. The workers, on their part, mistook the Joint Management Council as another platform for collective bargaining. They did not realise that collective bargaining was the job of the Trade Union whereas in the Joint Management Council they were expected to take part in the management process, which was not confined to personnel management only. This lack of understanding of the concept of joint management on the part of both the management and the workers has mainly contributed towards the failure of the Joint Management Council.

The next step, which has been taken by the Government in order to associate the labour with the management of Government Undertakings, is through nomination of a prominent Trade Union Leader as member of the Board of Directors of the Undertakings. It is doubtful whether this step has contributed significantly towards securing the involvement of workers in the affairs of the Undertaking. The Labour Director, with his pre-occupation with the Trade Union movement in the country, naturally looks at problems against that wider context and thereby becomes somewhat removed from the realities of situation in a particular Undertaking. The Labour Director, no doubt, appreciates the managerial problems in their true perspective but his basic loyalty to the trade union movement very often inhibits his opinion and action. Also, it is not always possible for him to function as a channel of communication between the top management and the workers or to act as an arbitrator between the two parties since he has to function under severe constraints. Such constraints become more acute when there is a difference in a trade union's affiliations between the Labour Director and the Workers' Unions in a particular Undertaking.

The next step which has been contemplated by the Government is nomination of a worker of an Undertaking as a member of the Board of Directors to provide representation of the workers at the highest level of management. The scheme for appointment of worker-Directors in the Public Sector Undertakings is briefly described below.

There should be a duly recognized workers' union in the Undertaking and the office-bearers of the Union should be predominantly workers of the Undertaking. The relation between the management and the recognized Union should have been cordial, that is there should be a tradition of mutual settlement of disputes. The recognized Union should sponsor names from amongst the workers of the Undertaking for appointment as Director. In the case of multi-unit Undertakings, the workers' representative in the central board of management may be selected by rotation from each unit, provided each such unit has a recognized Union.

Election of workers' representative for nomination as Director has not been favoured and the selection of worker-Director is sought to be made from a panel of three names suggested by a recognized Union. The workers to be included in the panel should have attained the age of 25 years with a minimum service of 5 years in the Undertaking. No disciplinary action should be pending against the workers at the time of their appointment as Director and they should not be persons who would attain the age of superannuation during their tenure of appointment as Director. Although no minimum educational qualification has been prescribed for workers to be nominated as Director, the workers are expected to have adequate knowledge and experience of working of the industry and of the employer-employee relationship.

The worker-Director should continue to be a worker on the shop-floor during his tenure as Director and be subject to the normal discipline applicable to any other worker. The worker-Director will, however, be entitled, in addition to his remuneration as a worker, to the fees and allowances admissible to other part-time non-official Directors of the Undertaking.

The appointment of a worker-Director should be for a period of two years which can be extended for a further period of two years provided the worker continues in employment and the Union which has nominated him continues to be recognized. The worker-Director will cease to hold office before the expiry of the full term, if he ceases to be a worker or if the Union nominating him ceases to be recognized. If recognition is withdrawn from one Union and is accorded to another Union, the newly recognized Union will be called upon to furnish a panel of workers for selection of the worker-Director.

This scheme of workers-Director has been proposed to be tried initially in one or two Public Sector Undertakings, other than Defence and strategic Undertakings, where the Undertaking does not have multiple units and multiple trade unions.

The efficacy of the scheme of nomination of one or two worker-Directors in the Board of Directors is still to be assessed. Although it is a welcome step towards worker's participation in management, it is apprehended that the scheme is not likely to achieve the desired results. This is because the worker-Directors will constitute a small minority in the Board of Directors and cannot, therefore, be expected to carry the entire Board along with them in all cases. It is possible that the worker-Directors will only try to champion the cause of the workers in the Board, leaving the other areas of management to the rest of the Board. If such a partisan attitude is displayed, it is inevitable that their views will be mostly overruled by the majority decision in the Board. This will relegate the function of

the worker-Directors to a very unenviable situation where they can at the most record dissenting notes in the proceedings of the Board of Directors. Outside the Board, they will have to face the workers who will not easily understand the intricacies of the Board's problems and responsibilities and it will be a job for them to explain their inability in the matter of realization of the workers' demands in spite of remaining in the Board of Directors. This is bound to lead to a sense of frustration not only amongst the worker-Directors but also the workers in general and create a situation where the workers and the Union may not be willing to participate in the process of management through nomination of one or two worker-Directors in the Board. It will be soon realized that such functioning of worker-Directors does not deliver the goods, as expected by the workers, but they become involved in the management and thereby become responsible, at least in a way, for the results of the operations. It is, therefore, doubtful if the nomination of worker-Directors in the Board of Directors will lead to any better understanding or more harmonious relationship between the management and the workers of Public Sector Undertakings. Even if it leads to some improvement in the sphere of industrial relations by establishing one more channels of communication between the management and the workers, it is not likely to make a significant contribution towards better motivation of the workers.

A BRITISH EXPERIMENT

It may be worthwhile to mention here the experiment made in U.K. by inclusion of non-managerial employees as members in the Board of Directors. The "shop-floor to Boardroom" experiment has been made in the British Steel Corporation which is a nationalized undertaking. It was decided to give representation to the employees up to and including the level of assistant department head in the Board of Directors of this Corporation. Thus all employees, except the uppermost one per cent of the total strength of about 270,000 employees of the Corporation, were to be represented. Out of 120 nominations from the trade unions, the Trades Union Congress selected about 30. Thereafter, the Company and the Trades Union Congress made a final selection of 12 Directors on the four Group Boards of the Company. The Group Boards were later re-organized into six product divisions.

The 12 men nominated to the Board of Directors were drawn from various categories, like shop workers, clerical grades, supervisors, technicians, etc. They were considered representatives of the major trade unions in the industry. One thing they all had in common was considerable experience as trade union officers. Quite a few of them had important roles in local community activities.

The 12 persons were appointed for a three-year term. They continued in their regular jobs but enjoyed the same status and conditions as other Directors They were, however, required to resign from trade union offices held by them. To start with, these Directors served on Group Boards, other than those governing the Groups in which they worked, but this policy was changed later on and the worker-Directors were allowed to serve on any of the Group Boards.

The worker-Directors were given an intensive 5-week training on the problems and policies of the Company as a whole, as well as general economic problems and they were also made familiar with the usual management techniques and procedures. The worker-Directors were asked to assess their roles after about 9 months in a one-week seminar and it was decided that job description would be laid down for the worker-Directors, setting forth their specific reponsibilities as Directors.

It has been felt that the worker-Directors have made a useful contribution in management and have been able to highlight the overall point of view of the labour force.

ATTITUDES OF WORKERS

Participation of workers in management of Public Undertakings, in whatever form it is practised, will not lead to any positive result unless there is a change in some of the prevalent basic conceptions and attitudes of the workers of such Undertakings.

The first misconception relates to the exact character and role of the Public Sector Undertakings. The worker does not distinguish between a Government Undertaking and a regular Government Department. The input-output relationship in the regular Government Departments is not very apparent to the minds of the general public, nor the objectives of the different arms of the Government are clearly understood the public. This nebulous idea about the functions of the Government is extended to the Government Undertakings since the Undertakings belong to the Government. That a Government Undertaking has got a role distinct from the functions of the Government is totally overlooked and the activities of the Public Sector Undertakings are thought to be like those of a regular Government Department. Since the output of the Government as an administrative or welfare agency cannot be comprehended in its entirely by the worker, he assumes that the Government Undertakings also are not required to produce any quantified results.

The next misconception is regarding the role of the Government as the owner and employer of a Government Undertaking. It is not realized

that the Government, as the owner of a Public Undertaking, has a very specific and limited objective and responsibilities in the matter of running a particular Undertaking. It is thus confined to provision of goods and services in a particular field, on commercial principles. As a result, employees of Public Sector Undertakings confuse between the Government's role as the owner of the undertaking and the Government's role of governing the country. This thinking amongst the workers of the Government Undertakings leads them to identify themselves with regular Government servants and look for the various safeguards and benefits associated with service in Government Departments. It is, however, forgotten that the regular Government servants are also governed by the various rules and codes imposing on them various obligations and restrictions.

Another aspect is that the Government, being the owner of all the Public Undertakings, is taken as automatically responsible for ensuring parity in the matter of wage and benefits between all the Undertakings, especially those located in a particular region. What is overlooked in this connection is the fact that each Government Undertaking, engaged in a particular activity, has its own distinct capacity to generate surpluses, both in regard to the quantum and the time cycle. The economics of each industry is different and a Public Sector Undertaking in any industry is subject to the laws of this economics. In fact, a Steel Plant in the public sector has got more things in common with a steel plant in private sector rather than with a chemical industry in public sector. Each Government Undertaking has, therefore, its own distinct capacity to provide wage and other benefits to its workers and it is not possible to maintain absolute parity between all the Government Undertakings in this matter. But the position unfortunately is that the best of everything is expected by the workers in Public Undertakings. For example, the workers in a public sector steel plant will no doubt expect the remunerations and benefits as per recommendations of the Wage Board for the steel industry but will not, at the same time, refrain from demanding parity with another Government Undertaking engaged in a different branch of industry, if some things are more favourable there. They may also agitate for parity with regular Government employees if the Pay Commission or Government happen to give to the Government servants benefits at a higher level in some area.

Many of the Public Sector Undertakings have been set up with a view to providing the infrastructure for industrial growth and have been located in particular areas for balanced development of the different regions of the country. It is but natural that the Government will be guided by such extra-commercial considerations in its decision regarding the Public Sector Undertakings. The Government, in its principle of functioning as an ideal employer, provides many social benefits to the employees of the Government Undertakings. But the exact character of these measures is, more often than not,

misunderstood by the workers of Government Undertakings. Just as citizens of the country expect the services of the Government as a matter of course and become indignant if such services are non-existent or inadequate, the workers of the Public Undertakings also expect the benefits from the employer as a matter of course and they come to believe that they are only at the receiving end of the benefits with no obligation of giving any return to the employers. This thinking has led to various demands in matters of housing, education, medical benefit etc., being pitched at a very high level.

A job in a Government Undertaking is often viewed as a 'womb-to-tomb' insurance for the worker and his family. Workers of Government Undertakings cannot and should not claim higher benefits from the Government, as a Government and not as the owner of an Undertaking, in comparison to the citizens at large in the country. As an illustration, it can be mentioned that if primary and middle school facilities are provided in the township of a Government Undertaking, the Government acts there as a benevolent employer and the workers cannot expect the Government to cater for higher education also, because it is the obligation of the State Government to provide such facilities to the entire community including the workers of the Public Undertakings. Incidentally, there is often an attitude of apathy or indifference on the part of the State Governments arising out of the thinking that the Government Undertakings, being properties of the Central Government, do not cast any obligation on the State Government regarding civic and social amenities.

Another misconception which is prevalent among the workers is that the Government should be concerned with the welfare of the employees of the Undertakings and not the efficiency of the enterprise. For example, optimum man-power for maximization of production and profits is not recognized as a necessity in the case of a public sector undertaking and it is thought that such Undertakings should provide more and more employment opportunities to the community without any regard to the economics of operations. If, as a result, the Undertaking goes into the red, the deficit should be made good from the Exchequer and the Undertaking should continue to operate even if it is not economically viable. In this respect, the private sector undertakings are in a slightly better position as their workers have the awareness that economic health of the Undertaking should not be so disturbed that the Undertaking cannot survive. But there is no such feeling amongst the workers of the Government Undertakings who assume perpetuity of the Government Undertakings just like the Government itself.

TRADE UNIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS

It is also necessary to look into the trade union movement in the public sector undertakings. As is known, the trade union movement, in the country

as a whole, is yet to come to total maturity but the trade union movement in Government Undertakings has developed certain peculiar features.

The trade union leadership in public sector suffers from most of the misunderstandings and wrong impressions which have been discussed above and these are reflected in the various demands made by them. As already mentioned, the demands for wages and benefits are very often based on the highest available in Government, public sector and private sector. Similarly, the benefits in kind are demanded on the basis of Government's role as a welfare State rather than as owner of a commercial undertaking. There are instances where a trade union has agitated for implementation of the Wage Board recommendations and later also asked for benefits awarded by the Pay Commission, wherever these were more as compared to that of the Wage Board. Demands have also been made without any reference to the economics of the operations and the normal commercial principles of running an industry.

Unlike in private sector, the trade unions do not have to face the problem of workers being affected by job insecurity or by discontinuance of the Establishment itself. There is an implicit conviction that the Government is obliged to run the Establishment whatever be the cost and the output. This has made the trade union leadership comparatively irresponsible in the public sector. Cases are not wanting where a Government Undertaking has come to the verge of disaster on account of unreasonable and uncompromising attitude of the trade unions and their leaders.

The trade unions are under the strong influence and control of the political parties. The political turmoil, therefore, has its inevitable impact on the trade unions and their activities. The Central Government Undertakings have been treated in many places as local symbol of authority of the Central Government and agitations have been launched by trade unions on regional or political issues directed against the Central Government, although the Government Undertakings, in their own operations, do not have even the remotest connection with such issues. There have been cases where demonstrations have been held by trade unions against top management of a Government Undertaking to lodge the protest of some political parties against Central Government actions in political plane, such as deployment of Central Reserve Police in a particular area. Such actions disrupt the working of the Public Undertakings with the attendent lost of production and revenue, while the cause for which the agitations are launched is hardly served.

The trade union leadership in the public undertakings harps on the same concept of owner versus worker, as in the case of private sector

enterprises. The leaders make the workers think that the management is capitalist and its sole aim is to exploit workers for its own personal gain. The very measures taken by the Government as an ideal employer are used as instruments to whip up resentment amongst the workers for the Government's inability to give the maximum possible benefit. The benefits demanded are entirely out of consonance with the general pattern of social benefits sought to be given by the Government to the people at large. The trade union leadership does not contribute in any way to, and, in fact, tries to hinder, the development of awareness among the workers in the Government Undertakings that these Undertakings are the property of the nation and while everybody in the Undertaking is an employee, everybody is also a part of the ultimate ownership of the Undertaking.

PRESENT SITUATION

The Government undertakings have been facing serious problems in matters of industrial relations and have to work under several constraints, many of which are not applicable in the case of private sector enterprises. While the Government has been striving to become an ideal employer in the case of public sector undertakings, there is no corresponding response from the side of the workers. It is a far cry to think of the workers in the public undertakings as ideal employees, not only conscious of rights but also alive to their responsibilities. In fact, the responsibilities are much more in the case of those who are working in the Public Undertakings, as these are meant for producing goods and services to meet vital needs of the economy for planned development of the country.

The situation, as it prevails today, presents a rather dismal picture. The workers in the Government Undertakings are disgruntled and the management is frustrated. There is hardly any sense of belonging to the organization among the workers. Huge national investments continue to remain sub-productive. It is, therefore, essential that the motivation of the employees in public sector undertakings should be given paramount importance. If such motivation is to be generated through the workers' participation in the management, ways and means will have to be found for reorienting the basic attitudes of the workers and then involving them in the management process not in a piecemeal or isolated way, but in a total and complete manner. The steps so far taken have touched only the periphery of the problem and do not appear to have the potential to meet the demands of the situation. The workers will have to imbibe the basic philosophy of the public sector undertakings and the Government's rights and obligations *vis-a-vis* their own and this will happen only if they are brought into the management in a big way.

A SUGGESTED EXPERIMENT

A method by which the objective can be achieved is by placing management of a Public Undertaking in its entirety in the hands of workers. This can be done if the Government nominates all the members or at least a majority of the members of the Board of Directors of the Company from amongst the workers. If this is done, the workers will have a real hand in conducting the affairs of the Undertaking and will thereby participate in the management in all its aspects, *i.e.* planning, organizing, controlling and motivating.

The principles already enunciated for nomination of workers in the Board of Directors of Public Sector Undertakings can be followed in selection of all the Directors. A system of initiation of the Worker-Directors into the Director's role for management of the Company, so that he knows about the problems to be faced and the results to be achieved, should be arranged. Thereafter, periodical evaluation, as has been done in the British experiment, should be instituted.

Advantages of the Proposal

The advantages of the system suggested above are obvious. The workers, being in complete control of the management, can no longer remain in the camp of opposition to the management set-up. This is bound to lead to improvement in industrial relations in the Undertaking. Management of the Undertaking being in the hands of workers will ensure identification of the workers with the organization and this will generate necessary motivation amongst the workers. Thus, usual employer versus employee or management versus worker conflict should come to an end.

Trust begets trust and a climate of confidence should set in where it is conspicuous by absence. The right of management will create the sense of responsibility if the normal laws of human response are to be true. This process will thus automatically develop responsible leadership amongst the workers. The workers, who conduct the affairs of the Trade Union or Cooperative Societies, have, in many cases, displayed high leadership qualities and are able to motivate their following to purposeful action.

The workers, with their own representatives conducting the affairs from the Board level, will take a balanced view of the interests of their own well-being and the well-being of the Undertaking. The short-term problems will be approached with a long-term outlook and localized problems will be dealt with on overall considerations. A happy blend of hopes and aspirations of the personnel with the corporate objectives of the Undertaking will lead to the realization that to give is to take and prosperity can come only through perspiration.

Possible Objections

It will be said that it is too risky a venture to entrust the complete management of an undertaking to the workers. The Undertaking may run into serious problems and difficulties and the Government may be put into serious loss to retrieve the situation. As it is, many of the Government Undertakings are a serious burden on the Government and the economy and huge losses are being incurred. The new approach, even if unsuccessful, will make only a marginal addition to the already high volume of losses.

It will be argued that the workers with their qualifications and background will not be suited to the top management role of decision making, since the decisions will have to be based on various considerations of a complex nature. This argument does not hold water on closer scrutiny, because the technical support in all the specialized areas of commercial management, financial management, personnel management or technical management will be provided by the experts of the Undertaking in the same manner as it is at present being provided to the Board of Directors. If necessary, the Board of Directors can include one or two management experts who can provide the Board with necessary guidance in regard to the managerial aspects, but the overall responsibility of management will rest with the Board of Directors consisting of workers' representatives in a majority.

The administrative Ministry in control of the Public Undertaking and its associate finance will oversee and monitor the operations of the Undertaking and regulate the basic and policy issues. For this purpose, the Articles of Association of the Company will have to be framed suitably. There will also be a monetary control through the scrutiny and approval of the periodical capital and revenue budgets of the Company in course of which the Government can step in and provide necessary directions to the Board of Directors.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Public Undertakings have continued to grow in size as well as in number and more and more areas of the economy will come under its purview. Any step which secures workers' motivation for giving their best should be welcome.

The experiment suggested will have to be initiated only on a very small scale. The Undertakings selected for the purpose of this experiment should not belong to any of the following categories:

(*i*) Vital and strategic Undertakings from the point of view of national economy or security;

(*ii*) Undertakings which are established in new fields of industry;

(*iii*) Undertakings which are still in the gestation period; and

(*iv*) Undertakings which have got multiple units located in different areas or multiple Trade Unions having different affiliations, as these factors will create problems regarding the homogeneity and unity of purpose amongst the members of the Board of Directors.

It is not impossible to select one or two Undertakings which are suited for the new experiment. It is not essential that the existing state of industrial relations has to be cordial in such an Undertaking, since one of the major aims of the experiment is to improve the climate of industrial relations and develop the motivation through active participation in the management.

In the management of public sector undertakings, various experiments have been conducted by the Government and the policies have been modified from time to time. The deputation of Government servants to the Government Undertakings, which was once the order of the day, has now come to a virtual end and the Undertakings are building up their own cadre. In the case of some Undertakings, the Board of Directors has been reconstituted on the basis of whole-time Directors responsible for particular functional areas, instead of part-time official and non-official Directors. A labour leader has been appointed as the Chief Executive with the status of a Director in one Undertaking. Since industrial relations and motivation of the workers are proving to be a serious handicap to most of the Public Undertakings at present, no experiment is too bold and unconventional to be discarded without a trial.

PANCHAYATI RAJ—A SURVEY

S. V. S. Juneja

The seeds of Panchayati Raj were planted in 1948, in the village of Mahewa, in the district of Etawah (U.P.) about 250 kilometres south-east of Delhi. The inspiration for the Etawah Pilot Project came, perhaps more than from any other single person, from Albert Meyer, an American who was Planning and Development Adviser to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for several years after 1948. The objective of the project was "to formulate a practical programme for the functional planning and physical rebuilding of rural community life in such a way as to improve its quality and performance : negatively, to remove as far as possible the handicaps to proper development of the individual and the community; positively, to foster such a development."[1] Shri Nehru put it thus : "...in other words, to build up community life on a higher scale without breaking up the old foundations".[2]

The project at Etawah started with a unit of 64 villages, grew in three years to include over 300 villages in the same district and was reproduced at four other centres in Uttar Pradesh. It also drew official visitors by the hundreds from other States in India, and from all over the world, who came to see the original project and its offspring, to try and learn from them and to apply the lessons of Etawah to projects of rural development in their homelands. It became, in course of time, "a symbol of successful rural development, initiated by an enlightened popular government, and carried through without compulsion among a peasantry known for its conservatism".[3]

Meanwhile, the Committee set up in 1952 to find out what had gone wrong with the "Grow More Food" campaign by which the government had set such store, came to the conclusion that the campaign had incorrectly, in their view, been treated as an insular endeavour for agricultural development. "....the lesson to be derived from the working of the Grow More Food programmes", said the Committee, "is that all aspects of rural life

---

[1] Albert Mayer, McKim Marriott, Richard L. Park, *et. al.*, *Pilot Project, India : The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh*, Los Angeles (Calif.), University of California Press, 1958, p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[3] *Ibid.*, Preface.

are interrelated and that no lasting results can be achieved if aspects of it are dealt with in isolation". This, even in the Indian context, was by no means a novel finding. In 1928, the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India had expressed their conviction that "of all the factors making for prosperous agriculture, by far the most important is the outlook of the peasant himself...no substantial improvement in agriculture can be effected unless the cultivator has the will to achieve a better standard of living and the capacity, in terms of mental equipment and physical health, to take advantage of the opportunities which science, wise laws and good administration may place at his disposal". This would be determined by his environment and it follows, therefore, that the success of all the measures designed for the advancement of agriculture must depend upon the creation of conditions favourable to progress.

In seeking a tool to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee, the government chose the Etawah model, which thus became the prototype for Community Development projects and National Extension Service all over India.

With the expansion of the programme to cover the whole country, certain changes were made, but the essential characteristics were retained : the aim was coordinated development with the help of an extension organization, consisting of specialists of all important 'development' departments, working under one leader—the Block Development Officer—and guiding the common, multi-purpose village level workers. The development 'blocks' were, it was ultimately decided, to begin as 'pre-extension' blocks with limited staff and not very substantial funds; the primary aim being to prepare the ground for a more 'intensive' phase of work. This came with Stage I, which brought with it a full complement of staff and an enhanced budget provision. Five years later, the block was to enter Stage II. This involved reduced personnel and financial provision in the expectation that, by this time, there would have been created a ferment in the minds of the populace and an enthusiasm that would bear the project along in spite of a reduced government commitment in terms of men and money.

In Stage I, a block received about Rs. 1.2 million, allocated according to a 'schematic budget' which specified the purposes for which the money could be spent. Typically, this covered personnel and establishment charges, animal husbandry, agricultural extension, health and rural sanitation, irrigation, social education, communications, rural arts and crafts, and social welfare. The general rule was that money would be available for 'approved' projects if a 'matching' contribution was forthcoming from the community that would benefit; the intention was clearly to use government funds to stimulate action for 'self-help'.

The Block Development Officer was to implement this scheme, co-ordinating the work of perhaps six or seven Extension Officers (also known as Assistant Development Officers), each of whom was to be a specialist in a particular field, which tallied fairly closely with the 'schematic' division of the budget. The Extension Officers were to advise and guide the multi-purpose Village Level Workers (VLW), of whom there might be 10 in a block, each VLW covering an area of about 10 villages and about 6,500 people. The VLW was to be the primary agent of the programme and the channel for the two-way flow of information—information regarding new techniques from the government's laboratories and experts to the cultivator, and information regarding the cultivator's problems and needs to government—which was regarded as one of the essential attributes of the programme.

An advisory committee was established for every block consisting, *inter alia*, of the Sarpanchs of the Gram Panchayats falling within the area of the block, all members of the State Legislature, elected from the area of the block and some others representing the cooperative societies, the co-operative bank, etc. The committee advised regarding the allocation of funds, within the limits set by the 'schematic' budget and, unless there were very good reasons to the contrary, the committee's recommendations came, over a period of time, to be regarded as having the force of directives. The Sub-divisional Officer of the revenue department at first presided over the committee; he was later replaced by a 'non-official' chairman, elected by the members of the committee from amongst themselves.

ORIGINS

This then, very briefly and in the barest outline, was the system that came to prevail over the length and breadth of India over the next few years. It received much praise, but clearly not everybody regarded its functioning and achievements with undiluted approbation. In 1957, the Cabinet Committee on Plan Projects (COPP) (which had been constituted by the National Development Council) appointed a team to study the whole Community Development (CD) programme and the National Extension Service (NES) and to report on the content of, and priorities within the programme with a view to ensuring greater economy and efficiency in its execution.

The team, headed by Shri Balwantray Mehta, submitted a report which has already led to far reaching changes in the administrative structure and which may in retrospect come to be regarded as one of the seminal documents in the history of Indian administration. The team was of the view that "one of the least successful aspects of the CD and NES work is its attempt to evoke popular initiative....An attempt has been made to harness local

initiative through the formation of *ad hoc* bodies, mostly with nominated personnel and invariably advisory in character. These bodies have so far given no indication of durable strength nor the leadership necessary to provide the motive force for continuing the improvement of economic and social conditions in rural areas."[4] It went on to say, "So long as we do not discover or create a representative and democratic institution which will supply the local interest, supervision and care necessary to ensure that expenditure of money upon local objects conforms with the needs and wishes of the locality, invest it with adequate power and assign to it appropriate finances, we will never be able to evoke local interest and excite local initiative in the field of development."[5] The team rejected both the existing District Boards ("neither the tradition nor the resources...too large a charge to receive their detailed attention") and the Block Advisory Committees ("generally nominated and never invested with the powers of decision... they are unrepresentative...") as unsuitable. The institution it sought to establish should be "statutory, elective, comprehensive in its duties and functions, equipped with necessary executive machinery and in possession of adequate resources...power should be exercised and such machinery controlled and directed by popular representatives of the local area".[6]

To the fears of inefficiency and corruption that some felt might result from a devolution of power to such bodies, the team replied that the inefficiency of existing local government bodies was due to "too large a jurisdiction, too few powers and too scanty finances, accompanied by an absence of close relationship with the village panchayats and of wise guidance by Government or by political parties".[7] The bodies proposed by the team would, it was hoped, be free of these defects. Further, the team felt corruption could be eliminated only by "constant and intelligent vigilance on the part of the citizens".[8] This the team's proposals also sought to ensure.

The team came to the conclusion that the block offered an area "large enough for functions which the village panchayat cannot perform and yet small enough to attract the interest and service of the residents"[9] and recommended the establishment, at the level of the block, of statutory bodies to be called Panchayat Samitis. The Samitis would be constituted by

---

[4] Committee of Plan Projects, *Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1959, Vol. I, p. 5.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[7] Committee on the Plan Projects, *Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, op. cit., p. 8.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

indirect election from among the Panchs of the village panchayats (provision being made for the co-option of women, members of the scheduled castes and tribes and representatives of cooperatives functioning within the area of the Samiti) and would be reconstituted every five years. The functions of the Panchayat Samitis would, to begin with, include "the development of agriculture in all its aspects, including the selection of the seed, its procurement and distribution; the improvement of agricultural finances with the assistance of the government and of cooperative banks; minor irrigation works; improvement of cattle, sheep, goats and poultry; promotion of local industries; supply of drinking water; public health and sanitation; medical relief; relief of distress caused by floods, earthquakes, scarcity, etc.; arrangements in connection with local pilgrimages and festivals; construction and repairs of roads which are of local importance (other than village panchayat roads); management and administrative control of primary schools; the fixation of wages under the Minimum Wages Act for non-industrial labour; the welfare of backward classes and the collection and maintenance of statistics....In addition, it will act as the agent of the State government in executing any special schemes of development or other activities in which the State government might like to delegate its powers to the local authority."[10]

To enable the Samiti to discharge these functions adequately, funds would be forthcoming from various sources, including a statutorily prescribed percentage (not less than 40 per cent for the Samiti and the village panchayat together) of the land revenue realized from the area of the block, a cess on land revenue and a water rate for water supplied from minor irrigation works. The Samiti would also be empowered and encouraged to levy a tax on professions and trades and on entertainments (*e.g.*, cinema shows) and tolls on roads and bridges. These would supplement its income from the rents of property owned by it and the proceeds from the periodical fairs and markets held within the jurisdiction of the Samiti. It was also expected that the government would make available to the Samitis grants-in-aid as well as a share (to be determined) of the motor vehicles tax realized by the government.

The elected members of the Samiti would discharge deliberative or 'policy making' functions. The executive functions of the Samiti would be exercised, under the leadership of a principal executive officer, by technical staff in charge of the different departments, such as agriculture, roads and buildings, irrigation, public health, veterinary services, cooperatives and primary and social education. The more important posts would be "centralized on a Statewise basis and should be transferable",

---

[10] Committee on the Plan Projects, *Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, op. cit., p. 9.

the officials concerned being drawn from the corresponding State cadres and lent to the Panchayat Samitis. The village level employees of the Samiti, like the Gram Sewak (VLW) and the primary school teacher would be recruited by the Zila Parishad (District Council)—more regarding this later—and assigned to the different Samitis.

The team went on to say that, in their opinion, the Panchayat Samiti would need "guidance in technical as well as administrative matters...we suggest that the technical officers of the Panchayat Samiti should be under the technical control of the corresponding district level officers, but under the administrative and operational control of the chief administrative officer" of the Samiti and "the budget of the Samiti will have to be approved by the Zila Parishad". Also, "a certain amount of control will inevitably have to be retained by the Government.... It may also be necessary that the Collector should be vested with certain powers to suspend a resolution of a Panchayat Samiti when he apprehends a breach of peace or where the action proposed... by the Panchayat Samiti is *ultra vires* of the Constitution or contrary to the law of the land".[11]

The elective village panchayats would continue to function and the VLW, who would act as the 'development secretary' of the panchayat, would assist it in formulating and executing its plans for development. The village panchayat would be responsible for the "provision of water supply for domestic use; sanitation; maintenance of public streets; land management; maintenance of records relating to cattle; relief of distress; maintenance of panchayat roads, culverts, bridges, drains, etc., supervision of primary schools; welfare of backward classes; and the collection and maintenance of statistics".[12]

The funds of the village panchayat would come from taxes on property, local fairs and markets and on carriages and carts, octroi and conservancy taxes, water and lighting rates and from grants from the Panchayat Samiti.

Having assigned most of what they considered to be the important functions of local government to the village panchayats and the Panchayat Samitis, the team felt there was no place in its scheme of things for any higher administrative or executive body, other than the State government itself. According to the team "The district board...become(s) superfluous...." However, "to ensure the necessary coordination between the Panchayat Samitis, we suggest a Zila Parishad of which the members will be the presidents of the Panchayat Samitis, all members of the State Legislature and

[11] Committee on Plan Projects, *Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, op. cit., p. 14-15.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Parliament... whose constituencies lie within the district and district level officers of the medical, public health, agriculture, veterinary, public health engineering, education, backward classes welfare, public works and other departments. The Collector will be the chairman of this Parishad and one of his officers will be the secretary."[13] It was not contemplated that the Parishad would have executive functions. Its duties were to consist of examining and approving the budgets of the Panchayat Samitis, coordinating and consolidating the plans of the blocks (*i.e.*, Samitis) within its jurisdiction, allocation of funds between the Samitis where these were received from the government for the district as a whole and, generally, supervising the activities of the Panchayat Samitis.

"Development cannot progress without responsibility and power", said the team, who felt that their recommendations were "essential for democratic decentralization, which alone can lead to effective rural development".[14]

ESTABLISHMENT

The structure of Panchayati Raj, as it emerged from the legislation in the different States, has been substantially in tune with the main recommendations of the Balwantray Mehta team. Yet—and this has been one of the aspects of the scheme that has come in for some criticism—there are discernible differences from State to State. One State has even disregarded the case—which the team argued at considerable length—for the Panchayat Samiti as the pivotal institution in the scheme and has vested the Zila Parishad, which has jurisdiction over a whole district, with powers in most things that matter, in spite of the team's detailed examination and specific rejection of, as being too remote from the mass of the people, the case for making the Parishad the most important body of Panchayati Raj.

It may, therefore, be of some use to look at the broad outline of Panchayati Raj as it has come to be in the different States.[15]

Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat

The Gram Sabha is the general body of the village panchayat and consists of all eligible voters in the jurisdiction of a Gram Panchayat, in effect

[13] Committee on Plan Projects, *Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, op. cit, p. 19.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 22-23.

[15] The discussion is based largely on C. Srinivasa Sastry, "Structure and Pattern of Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Oct-Dec., 1962, and *Panchayati Raj at a Glance*, Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation (Department of Community Development), Government of India, 1965.

the entire adult population of the villages is covered by Gram Panchayat. The Sabha is established as a statutory body in most States. Legislation has generally prescribed at least a minimum number of meetings every year, and has vested the Sabha with the power to consider the accounts and administration of the Gram Panchayat and to approve in its meetings proposals for taxation and plans for development involving such things as voluntary labour.

The Gram Sabha comes closest to the team's concept of 'participating democracy' and constitutes the base of the Panchayati Raj system. It has, however, been found that the Sabha has not functioned effectively. It has not, except in rare cases, been meeting regularly; it has been able neither to exercise the appropriate supervision over the Panchayat nor provide the latter with the guidance envisaged by the legislation establishing the Sabha.

The Gram Panchayat, which is the executive organ of the Sabha, is elected by the latter body. The size of the Panchayat varies between five and nine members in Punjab and between five and fifteen members in Tamil Nadu, and between sixteen and thirtyone members in Uttar Pradesh. The members of the Panchayat are elected, generally on the basis of territorial 'wards', by secret ballot in all States except Assam, Jammu & Kashmir, and Uttar Pradesh. All but four States reserve a specified number of seats for women; all but four States—almost the same four—provide special representation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Five States provide for direct election, by the Sabha, of Srapanch (*i.e.*, president) of the Panchayat; in others, he is elected by the members of the Panchayat from amongst themselves.

The functions of the Panchayats, which number over 203,000 and cover 94 per cent of the villages and 95 per cent of the rural population of India, and which some have sought to classify as either obligatory or discretionary, include municipal administration, cultural, social and development activities, sanitation, conservancy, crop cutting experiments, promotion of cottage industries and the registration of births and deaths. In some States, their responsibilities include making arrangements for local watch and ward. The main emphasis, however, is on 'development' activities, such as agriculture, animal husbandry, cooperation, minor irrigation, village industries, primary education, local communications, sanitation, health, and local amenities. There is also generally an enabling provision permitting the Panchayat to function as an agent of the State government or a higher level Panchayati Raj body for such functions as the latter may see fit to transfer to the Panchayat.

To enable them to discharge these functions, Panchayats are empowered to tax their members, though there are variations regarding the

types of taxes that the Panchayats can impose. They are generally required to impose taxes on property, animals, vehicles and professions and trades, as also a cess on land revenue or on the rent of agricultural land. They may also levy taxes on shops, realize octroi fees, and impose rates on water and electricity where these facilities are provided by the Panchayat. In Bihar, Gujarat and Maharashtra, Panchayats are empowered to collect the land revenue and receive a commission on all collections. In all, except five States, Panchayats receive, as a grant from the State government, a part of the land revenue collected from within their jurisdiction.

Anchal Panchayat

West Bengal alone has Anchal Panchayats, which have jurisdiction over a group of Gram Panchayats and are responsible for the local watch and ward, supervision over Nyaya (*i.e.*, judicial) Panchayats and the management of the State government's properties within its area.

Panchayat Samiti

The Panchayat Samiti's jurisdiction is co-terminus with that of development block, except in three States where the area of the Samiti coincides with that of the taluk or tehsil. In six States, the Sarpanchs of the Gram Panchayats are *ex-officio* members of the Samiti. In some others representatives of the Samiti are elected directly by the Gram Sabha or by the Sarpanchs from amongst themselves. Generally, there are also provisions for the reservation of seats for women, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as also for representation of cooperatives and for co-option of members with special experience in specified fields. The members of the State legislature, whose constituencies fall within the area of the Samiti, are generally members of the Samiti; in nine States such members have no right to vote. In Bihar, the local member of Parliament is a non-voting member of the Samiti.

In all States, the Samiti has been entrusted with functions falling generally within the category of 'development'. This in fact, means, implementation of community development programme. The Samiti has been vested with specific responsibility in the fields of primary education, health and sanitation, and communications. The Samiti is also required to exercise some supervision over the Gram Panchayats within its jurisdiction : in three States, the Samiti can offer suggestions regarding the budget of the Gram Panchayat, while in four States the budget of the latter body must be approved by the Samiti.

The Samiti draws its resources mainly from the funds allocated for the block budget and the funds earmarked for specific schemes which may be

transferred for execution to the Samiti as agent of the State government. The Samiti generally receives, as a grant from the State government, a share of the land revenue. It is also empowered to levy certain taxes, for example, in Gujarat, it may enhance the stamp duty, fixed by legislation. by up to 15 per cent.

The Samiti functions through standing committees dealing with specific aspects of the Samiti's work, such as finance, production programmes, and social welfare. Implementation of the decisions of the Samiti and its committees is the responsibility of the Block Development Officer, who functions as the chief executive officer of the Samiti, and the block staff. The President of the Panchayat Samiti is paid a salary in eight States, while in two he is also entitled to rent free accommodation.

The only real exception to the above pattern is Maharashtra where the Samiti, in effect, merely advises the Zila Parishad on proposals for development work in the area of the Samiti and performs such other functions as the Parishad may wish to delegate to it.

Zila Parishad

The third tier of the Panchayati Raj structure is the Zila Parishad, which exercises jurisdiction over the area of a district, except in two States. In one, it functions at the sub-divisional level, while in the other, twelve districts have been reallocated to form, for the purposes of the Zila Parishad only, twenty-one 'development districts'.

The Presidents of the Samitis within the area of the Parishad are *ex-officio* members of the Zila Parishad in all States. In some States, the Samitis elect an additional representative to the Parishad, there is also provision in three States for direct election, by all members of the Gram Sabhas, to the Parishad. Provision also exists for the usual reservation of seats for what are known as the 'weaker sections' of society (*e.g.*, scheduled castes and tribes, etc.) and for co-option of members possessing particular qualifications or experience which may be considered to help the Parishad in its work.

The position of the members of the State and Central legislatures and of the district Collector may be especially noted as it is particularly relevant to subsequent discussion. In Andhra Pradesh, Assam and Rajasthan, the members of the legislature are members of the Parishad, who may vote and may also hold office in the Parishad. In Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh they may vote, but they are not allowed to do so in Gujarat, Orissa and Punjab. The Collector is a member of the Zila Parishad in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Mysore, Orissa,

Punjab, and Rajasthan. He is, *ex-officio*, Chairman of the Parishad in Tamil Nadu and Mysore and that of all the standing committees of the Parishad in Andhra Pradesh.

The functions of the Zila Parishad vary considerably from State to State. In several States, the Parishad has specific executive responsibilities with regard to such matters as the establishment and expansion of secondary education and of vocational and industrial schools. In Maharashtra, of course, the Parishad is the most important institution of the Panchayati Raj system and is vested with executive functions in various fields, including community development and advising the State government in certain matters.

In most of the remaining States, however, the Parishad has no specific executive functions and is essentially a body concerned with exercising supervisory and coordinating functions with reference to the working of the Panchayat Samitis within its jurisdiction. This most often takes the form of scrutiny (in three States) and approval (in seven States) of the budgets of the Samitis and in offering general advice on matters pertaining to the functioning of the Samitis (in eight States).

In some States, the Parishad is empowered to levy taxes or to enhance those already imposed by the Panchayats and Panchayat Samitis. However, the funds of the Parishad come mainly from the share of the land revenue and other local taxes assigned to the Parishad by the government. While the funds earmarked for specific schemes to be entrusted for implementation to the Samitis are included in the budget of the Parishad, the latter body has little to do except distribute them to the Samitis according to the allocations made by the State government.

To enable the Parishad to exercise intelligently its function of supervision, the staff of the 'development' departments at the district level has been placed at its disposal. Their function is to provide technical supervision and guidance to the staff of the Samitis and Panchayats in the various projects that these bodies might undertake.

In six States, the chairman of the Parishad receives a salary; in two, he also receives rent free residential accommodation.

Supervision and Control

It may be mentioned here that in all the States, the legislation setting up the Panchayati Raj bodies has vested the States governments with powers of supervision and, to some extent, control over the functioning of the different organizations. These powers are to be exercised only in special circumstances (*e.g.*, where the action of the Samiti, etc., may be such as to

give rise to an apprehension of a breach of peace, or where it may be clearly against the law or the Constitution) ; the decision as to whether such circumstances have arisen will be of the State government or other designated authority. These powers include the power to suspend or cancel resolutions of the Panchayati Raj bodies and, in extreme cases, even to supersede these bodies altogether. There is also provision for the designation of authorities to 'inspect' the work of these bodies.

APPRAISAL

We have seen the aims which the Balwantray Mehta team held out as desirable of achievement and also the team's proposals regarding the institutional framework within which these aims might be best achieved. We have also seen the structure of Panchayati Raj as it actually emerged from the discussion that followed the report of the Balwantray Mehta team and from the varying emphasis that different States placed on different aspects of the team's recommendations; much of the difference was admittedly the result of the different experiences of the States in the matter of 'local self-government' before 1947 and, especially, after Independence. The pattern adopted in each State can perhaps be regarded as the result of an assessment regarding the powers and functions of local government bodies, based on the history of development of such bodies within the State over many years and of the newer, more recent and comparatively short experience of working of community development programme, again, essentially as it functioned in each State.

It would be useful to examine how far Panchayati Raj has succeeded in achieving the aims set for it by the team. Where there is an apparent gap between aim and achievements, it may be asked what caused the gap. Was it due to any contradictions or unworkable features flowing, for example, from defective legislation resulting from an inability to foresee how the system envisaged would, in practice, be obliged to function ? If the system can be regarded as being internally reasonably consistent, can its shortcomings be attributed to deviations from the pattern envisaged by the team ? If any gap exists in spite of a reasonable resemblance between what the team envisaged and what was actually put into effect, can the failure be sought in the speed (or lack of it) with which it has been sought to implement the scheme or, more fundamentally in the very concept of a 'participating democracy', the desirability of the achievement of which was one of the chief motivating factors behind the recommendations of the Balwantray Mehta team ?

Here, it is proposed to accept the basic premise of the team's recommendations as valid. The economic and social development of the overwhelming majority of the people of India, who live in its rural areas, was

the object which the community development programme had hoped to achieve. It was an objective worthy in itself and justified devotion of time and energies of both the people and their representatives in an effort to make the process both more rapid and more sure. It is also proposed to assume as correct the team's assessment that such progress could not be achieved unless the large mass of the people was enabled to involve itself in the process; such involvement would have little meaning unless it could take the form of a greater and more direct participation of the people, or their elected representatives at different levels, in the making of decisions affecting their lives than had hitherto been the case. However, a discussion regarding the efficacy of grass-roots democracy as a vehicle of rapid social and economic change would perhaps take us too far afield. Given these assumptions, it is proposed to examine how far the performance of the institutions of Panchayati Raj has measured up to the expectations both of its creators and of those who have been active participants in its functioning.

Before examining the record of each tier of the system, we may note a more general—and more fundamental—criticism of the structure emanating from Shri Jayaprakash Narayan, whose position in public life and whose experience of and devotion to the concept of Panchayati Raj would entitle his views to great respect, if not always to acceptance.

He has been greatly disturbed by what he calls the "utter confusion (in) the relative importance of the three. . . tiers of Panchayati Raj".[16] It has been noted that in some States the Panchayat Samiti is the pivotal organization, while in Maharashtra the Zila Parishad exercises most influence and power. In most of the States, other than Maharashtra, the Zila Parishad has merely coordinating and supervisory functions. The Gram Panchayats seem with notable exceptions, to be ineffective. Yet in Panchayati Raj, as it had been earlier conceived of, each tier was to be equally important within its own sphere of activity. "It is all a question of competence and scale of operation. The Panchayat Samiti is not more important than the village Panchayat and the former not less important than the Zila Parishad. . . . Each should have *all* the powers it needs to do all that is important to do in its own sphere".[17]

The other equally basic criticism levelled by Shri Narayan concerns the concept of the Panchayati Raj bodies as agents of the State governments, which is apparent in much of the legislation. The Constitution, Shri Narayan argues, saw the village Panchayats as units of self-government and not as agents of the State governments—except perhaps in the sense

[16] Jayaprakash Narayan, "The Role of Political Parties in Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration* Oct.-Dec., 1962.

[17] Jayaprakash Narayan, *op. cit.*

that the State governments, which are autonomous, self-governing bodies within the constitutional framework of the division of powers between the Centre and the States, are agents of the Central government. The Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads, exercising wider powers than the village Panchayats, could with even less justification be regarded as agents of a higher authority. However, this is perhaps a criticism more of the Balwantray Mehta team for, in this matter, the present structure of Panchayati Raj seems to reflect fairly faithfully the sense of the team's recommendations.

At the same time, Shri Narayan feels constrained to remark that "by more devolution of power from above the organs of Panchayati Raj would not come automatically to acquire the necessary competence to wield power entrusted to them... the competence for self-government and self-management has to be developed by a process...of training, education and experience... when such competence has been created, power would not have to be given from above, it would be taken from below, even from unwilling hands".[18]

Village Panchayat

To come to more specific matters, it has already been noted that the Gram Sabha has not proved to be the effective embodiment and instrument of grass-roots democracy that it was intended to be. Many Gram Sabhas have not been able to summon up enough interest in their own responsibilities to justify even the minimum of two meetings a year that legislation has generally prescribed and it has been suggested that "in almost every state, the role of the Gram Sabha... is only ceremonial and formal".[19]

It has been noted that the Gram Panchayat has been entrusted with a wide range of functions. The general experience has been that most of these functions are well beyond the capacity of the great majority of the Panchayats. This lack of capacity has two facets, financial and, for want of a better word, 'managerial'. Most of the Panchayats have generally imposed certain of the taxes they have been empowered to levy, such as taxes on dwellings, vehicles, and professions; realization of fees from the periodical markets, if the village is large enough or well-situated enough to be the site of such a market, and sometimes a cess on the land revenue collected from the village. There are, however, problems regarding the evaluation of dwellings for the purposes of tax, vehicles (mainly bicycles, bullock carts and tractors) tend to be few (though they are rapidly becoming less so) and the land revenue assessment is, it has been clear for

[18] Jayaprakash Narayan, *op. cit.*

[19] *Ibid.*

some time, becoming increasingly irrelevant in view of the enhanced capacity of the farmer resulting from the rising prices of agricultural commodities. In any case, local pressures have generally ensured that the rate of the tax is close to the minimum indicated in the statute. The share of the land revenue made available to the Panchayats by the State government has also not proved substantial in absolute terms.

The other disability has been one of personnel. The Panchayat has only one agent at its disposal, the Panchayat Secretary. This functionary may be secretary to five or six panchayats, generally a few miles separating each and often he does not have even a bicycle to help him cover these distances. Municipal administration, cultural and social activities, sanitation and conservancy in half a dozen villages are certainly more than what can be accomplished in the time at his disposal, they also often tend to be more than his education and training qualify him for.

In some States, the VLW combines the functions of the secretary of the Panchayat and of the village level agent of the community development organization. Where this is the case, the 'development' activities that are covered by the 'schematic' budget of the block may receive the attention they need. However, the remaining functions inevitably languish for want of funds without which almost nothing can be done.

The village panchayat is also supposed to be the basic unit for planning for community development and much has been said and heard about the process of 'planning from below' based ultimately on the 'village plan', which in turn is made up of the 'plans' of the individual families inhabiting the panchayat area. The VLW is generally unable to spend with each family in his jurisdiction—about ten villages—the time required for drawing up a meaningful family plan. The nature of the 'plan' is also such—requiring each family to estimate, for example, its requirements of seed, fertilizer and pesticide for a whole year, to indicate its targets for sowing of particular crops, changes in cropping patterns, breeding of poultry, etc.—as would call for a degree of foresight and sophistication unlikely always to be available at this level. There are also, inevitably, the overriding constraints of supply—of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and so on—which affect all planning from the Centre, through the State, to each district, block and village, and to which all plans must be adjusted.

It has been suggested that one of the main causes for these inadequacies is that the jurisdiction of the village panchayat is too small for effective planning and execution of either the municipal or the 'developmental' functions; this criticism has in fact been directed at the higher levels of Panchayati Raj also. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. Here, it may perhaps suffice to say that while—without the

additional resources that only a larger jurisdiction can bring and the larger number and better qualified personnel that such resources can attract—there seems little possibility that the panchayat will be able to initiate any wide-range plans for economic development, it could—given the interest and enthusiasm of its members —become an effective forum for discussion of and solution of purely local problems—social and economic.

There is another criticism that may be noted. It has been suggested that, where the older relations of power within the village continue unchanged, the new 'statutory' panchayats have little influence and commanded less respect; all matters of importance still being, in effect, referred to and decided by the older, traditional panchayats, which reflect more faithfully the village power structure. It is difficult to say precisely how widespread this situation may be. That it exists is doubtlessly true. However, the factors—such as spread of primary and secondary education, knowledge of the outside world brought by the ubiquitous and inexpensive transistor radio, establishment of industries either within or close to the village and the increasingly rapid change to a money economy—that would work to disturb the traditional power structure in the village have become progressively more widespread and pronounced in their effect. It would, therefore, perhaps be reasonable to assert that the old power structure will change where it has not done so already, and that criticism of the Gram Panchayat on this score will be rectified by time itself—about its speed we cannot tell at this moment.

Panchayat Samiti

The team saw in their proposed Panchayat Samiti the pivot of the whole system of Panchayati Raj and thus it has emerged, so far as legislation could effect it, in almost all the States. Yet, many questions are being asked. The first of these concerns, in the case of the village panchayat, matters relating to financial resources and personnel. The question is much more pertinent, however, when addressed to the working of the Samiti than when it concerns the village panchayat because almost all the States have specifically declared their intention to make the Samiti a powerful and effective instrument of economic and social progress and have, therefore, presumably sought to vest it with the powers they considered necessary for the discharge of these functions, the village panchayats have, by implication, if not explicitly, been regarded as institutions of secondary importance, useful perhaps as providing a forum for the discussion of strictly local problems, the importance of which is not to be decried by any means, but whose inability to initiate a great deal of economic activity is not expected to vitiate the larger aims of Panchayati Raj.

The funds available to the Panchayat Samiti come mainly from those available under the schematic block budget. In stage I of the life of the block, this provides what may be regarded as adequate funds for the sort of development the founders of Panchayati Raj perhaps had in mind. However, five years after the start of the stage I phase, the block moves into stage II, when funds in the schematic budget are greatly reduced. This is done on the assumption that the preceding five years would have set in motion a process of change that will, hopefully, prove self-sustaining and for the continuance of which there will, therefore, be no need for the catalyst that the substantial block budget is designed to provide. There will, of course, be available to the Samiti the funds for such of the 'departmental' schemes as the State government may decide to delegate to the Samiti for implementation. The reduced complement of staff available to the Block Development officer is expected to provide the 'technical' guidance necessary for the execution of these projects. Clearly, however, a great deal will depend on the number, nature and scope of the projects that the State government sees fit to have implemented through the agency of the Samiti. Should the government decide against the transfer of most of its projects to the Samiti—for example, for reasons of scope (the project may extend over an area greater than the jurisdiction of a single Samiti) or technical complexity (the project may call for engineering or other skills beyond the capacity of the block level staff—the latter body may well find itself with few direct functions and little palpable activity.

Clearly, the Samitis must learn to fend for themselves in the matter of funds. This is also the only way for them to achieve the independent role most of them seek. Yet, despite the competence given to them by law, few Samitis have shown a readiness to tax themselves to an extent that will result in the availability of funds adequate for the proper discharge of the functions they are expected to perform. This reluctance to tax themselves is mainly a reflection of local pressures which the Samitis have, by and large, so far proved unable to resist. The Sadiq Ali Committee,[20] in its report on the working of Panchayati Raj institutions in Rajasthan, estimated that taxes imposed by the panchayats in 1963-64 amounted to Rs. 4.2 million, the most important source of income being the cess on land revenue. However, only 55 per cent (Rs. 2.3 million) of the tax imposed was actually collected. This may be compared to loans and grants made by the State government which came to Rs. 99.6 million. The internal effort of the Panchayat Samitis was thus insignificant. Deprived of most of the stage I funds, the Samitis are also likely to be left with resources inadequate to enable them to attract service personnel

[20] *Report of Study Team on Panchayati Raj*, 1964, Jaipur, Government of Rajasthan (Panchayat and Development Department), 1964.

with required technical qualifications, background and experience. Without such personnel, the State governments are unlikely to prove overly eager to entrust the Samitis with the execution of schemes of economic development, even when these may lie completely within the jurisdiction of a particular Samiti.

This disinclination to entrust complex projects to an agency not regarded as fully able to bring them to a successful conclusion may perhaps be reinforced by what some regard as the inevitable logic of economic progress and development "for a democratic government to pursue belief in the desirability of extending decentralization is not at all the same thing as pursuing the search for manifold ways in which to produce more effective and more satisfactory public administration".[21] To this end, "there should be care to maintain clear capacities for control at more broadly responsible levels of government. . . in the long run, as India succeeds, the nature of an advancing, complicating civilization will require the transfer of a large part of this community activity into governmental bureaucracies with technical competence in knowledge and technical materials which will produce enormously more per manpower".[22] It has been pointed out that even in Britain, where the local bodies have a tradition of useful service longer than in most countries of the world, they have been gradually deprived of many of their functions. "One by one, trunk roads, hospitals and public assistance programmes have been taken out of their purview. Responsibility in respect of education has been shifted to higher tiers of local authorities, and gas and electricity undertakings have been wholly taken away from their sphere of control. These local bodies are completely by-passed when creating new townships. In the matter of town and country planning, a more or less regional arrangement is already in operation, even within the framework of the present local bodies".[23] Again, "far larger units of administration than those afforded by countries or county boroughs are needed for such services as town and country planning, technical education, hospitals, sewage disposals, electricity and gas".[24]

The trend towards centralization in India is apparent at various levels. The process by which the Five Year Plans have come to be formulated, and the fact that the State Plans are an integral part of the national plan has given the Central government vast powers, both in the sphere of

[21] Paul H. Appleby, "Some Thoughts on Decentralized Democracy", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Oct.-Dec. 1962.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] L. C. Gupta, "Decentralized Implementation : Some Administrative Problems", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, April-June, 1965.

[24] W. A. Robinson, *The Development of Local Government*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1954.

programming and in the matter of financial resources. This has been enhanced by the allocation to the Centre, under the Constitution, of the more elastic and progressively more important sources of revenue, such as income tax. While there has been, since 1967, a greater inclination on the part of the States to assert their own views, the States still continue, by and large, to confine themselves to schematic and financial planning, leaving such matters as growth rate of economy, contribution of private sector, and effect of planning on employment and growth of individual incomes to the Central government.

The State governments, in turn, are induced to raise the maximum resources feasible by the prospect of higher outlays and 'matching' grants from the Centre. This has the result of centralizing local financial resources in the hands of the State governments as opposed to district and lower level authorities. Given a more or less fixed State Plan (for each Five Year period) the tendency has been for even detailed planning, as distinct from overall policy guidelines, to be done at the State headquarters; this tendency has been reinforced by the nature and size of the projects involved, especially those concerned with the infrastructure of the economy.

As a result of all these factors, even those Panchayat Samitis that have had a very respectable record of achievement—for example during Stage I—are likely to find their field of effective action more limited in future. Some observers of Panchayati Raj have, in fact, gone so far as to say that the sphere in which the influence of the Panchayat Samiti has been most marked is political, rather than economic. "It had been expected that Panchayati Raj would primarily be a development mechanism and make up the shortfalls of the community development programme.... In practice it has emerged primarily as a power mechanism".[25] Thus, it happens that a build-up for power almost from the bottom upwards is coming about. The local leader is developing strong links with the State leaders, particularly Ministers who...patronize him because they know he is more or less to serve as a vote bank for his area. Thus Panchayati Raj has brought about a political framework for the development of a pattern of closer contact between local and State leadership".[26]

This of course, raises the issue of what the place of political parties is in the scheme of Panchayati Raj. This is an issue on which opinion seems to be sharply divided. The best known representative of one of the opposing schools of thought is perhaps Shri Jaya Prakash Narayan. He is of the view that the problems and tasks of the Panchayati Raj programme

[25] M. V. Mathur, *et. al.*, *Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan*, New Delhi, Impex India, p. 280.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

do not admit of 'party' solutions. "Parties and their programmes and policies are hardly relevant to them. When questions concerning education, agriculture, industry, water supply, roads, etc., come up before the Panchayat, opinion regarding them does not and cannot follow party lines".[27] Further, "...if the village were to cope with the tasks facing it and go forward, there must be united effort on the part of its people... such effort was impossible unless a spirit of unity and community was developed... It is clear that introduction of party rivalries and divisions into Panchayat elections would destroy all chance of such spirit being created".[28]

On the other hand, the view has been expressed that those who feel like Shri Narayan are indulging in "wishful thinking.... The plain fact is that we cannot have elections without political parties coming into the picture. It is simply inconceivable that politics can be kept away from power".[29] Shri Namboodripad, former Chief Minister of Kerala, while accepting that there might theoretically be a case for political parties keeping away from the institutions of Panchayati Raj, goes on to say that "political parties will naturally be averse to any step that will keep them away from the seats of power.... The use of the power transferred to the organs of Panchayati Raj is therefore as much a political question as the exercise of power at the Centre and in the States."[30] Finally, these are the views of a foreign observer : "The tiered structure of Panchayati Raj virtually forces the local parties to enter village politics. Wherever there is power, there must be politics."[31]

That in Panchayati Raj political parties are to stay seems clear. Proposals to keep them out have generally met with the comment that while the proposal was good in principle, it was not practical. The approach of one party to the question was described as follows : "The Congress will not contest the elections, but will try to see that Congress is in majority in the Panchayats".[32] The attitude of several others has been at least as ambivalent. It would seem realistic in the circumstances to accept that political parties will inevitably interest themselves more and more directly in the working of Panchayati Raj and to see how best they can contribute to its more effective functioning. Here, "the issue seems to be not how

---

[27] Jaya Prakash Narayan, *op. cit.*

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Harish Chandra Mathur, "Panchayati Raj and Political Parties", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Oct.-Dec., 1962.

[30] E. M. S. Namboodiripad, "Political Parties and Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*. Oct.-Dec., 1962.

[31] Myron Weiner, "Political Parties and Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Oct.-Dec., 1962.

[32] Quoted by Harish Chandra Mathur, *op. cit.*

to get the parties out of the panchayats, but rather how to get the parties to provide good government at the local level".[33]

Zila Parishad

The inadequacies of the block level agency—the Panchayat Samiti—as an organ of economic planning and action have been indicated. It is suggested that the successful planning and implementation of meaningful schemes of local development will require, first of all, financial resources on a scale considerably greater than what the Panchayat Samiti is likely to be able to muster. These will be required, both to pay for the schemes taken in hand, as well as to be able to support an establishment of technical personnel with skills commensurate with the requirements of the programme. The implementation of a significant programme of economic development will also presume the systematic organization and rapid disposal of work, very largely through a system of committees entrusted with particular aspects of the programme. Such a system will require from its members an educational background, familiarity with at least the elements of the committee system, a knowledge of financial procedures and a skill in the coordination of different administrative bodies that, at present and in the near future at least, is likely to be forthcoming only at a level higher than that of the Samiti. The overhead costs involved in the maintenance of an administrative and executive apparatus are likely to form a fairly (perhaps undesirably) high proportion of the total expenditures of a Samiti, and there would almost certainly be considerable 'economies of scale' for the community from operating with a larger unit. Such economies are likely to be reinforced by the greater facility of coordination likely to result from the need for communication, for example, in the State of Uttar Pradesh, between the State government and only 54 districts rather than between the government and about 500 Panchayat Samitis. (The logic of this argument seems not to be restricted to any one country. Already, in Britain, there is a demand for elected Regional Councils and in Yugoslavia the number of Communes has been reduced from ,866 in 1947 to 581 in 1963, the number of districts being reduced from 27 to 40.)

If the inadequacy of the block as a unit for local government is accepted, the argument would seem to point to the district as the most suitable jurisdiction for the local authority. The district in India, varying in area from about 2,000 to about 4,000 square miles and in population from about one million to about three million people, is large enough to ensure area coordination and integrated development. It also has the advantage of a settled pattern of administration with a fairly high degree

[33] Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*

of internal consistency and of administrative inter-relationships. The long history of the district has resulted in a powerful community consciousness among the people living in the area of the district and an adequate citizen awareness of administrative processes in the district. There is the added advantage that many, if not most, State and quasi-governmental agencies take the district as their unit of operations—at the very least, for accounting purposes—and enjoy settled administrative relationships within the area.

Yet, today, except in Maharashtra, the Zila Parishad—the district level institution of Panchayati Raj—is entrusted only with vague functions of supervision over the Panchayat Samitis within its jurisdiction, with powers of coordination that generally extend no further than a formal approval of the Samiti's budget and the equally formal distribution of funds already earmarked by the State government's departments for the specific projects transferred for implementation to designated Panchayat Samitis. Where the Zila Parishads have inherited from the old District Boards direct responsibility for the maintenance of certain dispensaries—calling them hospitals would generally be a euphemism—and roads, the need for improved communications and health facilities has led some State governments to transfer to themselves more and more of these facilities. Even with respect to primary and secondary education, the influence of the government, through continued dependence on State grants and in the person of the District Inspector of Schools, is increasingly felt. Thus, though the Chairman of the Zila Parishad is, by virtue of the government's directions, to be accorded a position of significant status, protocol-wise, within the district, the body that he heads does not possess powers or functions commensurate with the status that he seeks to enjoy. Yet, unless this gap can be bridged, Panchayati Raj cannot—as it is hoped and has been suggested in the earlier discussion—expect to achieve its objectives.

It is here that the position of the Collector and what is to become of him, becomes of vital importance. Any discussion on enlargement of powers of Zila Parishad must take into account the changes that this must inevitably bring in the future functions of the Collector. It was felt that with the introduction of Panchayati Raj and the transfer to representative bodies—like the Panchayat Samitis and, in much smaller measure (except for Maharashtra), to the Zila Parishads—of many of the functions hitherto exercised by the Collector, the office of the Collector would, for all intents and purposes, be rendered superfluous and redundant. Even if this did not happen immediately, a process had, it was thought, been set in motion that would eventually bring this about. That this has, in fact, not come about is due partly to the nature of the legislation that created Panchayati Raj. In almost every State this has accepted, in the words of an order of 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh government, a *dependence on the Collector* "to

see that a proper climate is created for the success of Panchayati Raj". This has been reflected in the provisions making the Collector a member of the Zila Parishad in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Orissa, Punjab and Rajasthan He may attend meetings of the Parishad in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In Tamil Nadu and Mysore, the Collector is the Chairman of the District Development Council—as the Zila Parishad is known in these States. In Andhra Pradesh, he is Chairman of all the standing committees of the Parishad; he has a similar position with respect to the most important standing committee in Assam. The technical staff of the Samiti, while administratively responsible to the Samiti, are also 'technically' responsible for results to the district level heads of the 'technical' departments concerned. (It is not proposed here to go into the problems—there are many—that this somewhat awkward arrangement creates, but with time and experience of working the new system, they have proved surprisingly tractable.) These district level officials have been made members of the Zila Parishad. Yet both the Panchayati Raj institutions and the State government continue to look to the Collector to ensure that these officials function effectively and take adequate interest in the projects initiated and executed by the Panchayati Raj bodies.

Support for this attitude has been forthcoming from the highest level. Addressing the Indian Institute of Public Administration in October 1964, the Prime Minister, Shri Shastri, stated the following : "In regard to developmental activities . . . the District Collector is there, but there are also, at the district level, officers of other departments . . . but they are not under the direct control or supervision of the District Collector . . . . The result is that there is no proper coordination."[34] A few days later, he said to the National Development Council, which takes final decisions in matters of economic planning and which consists, *inter alia*, of the Chief Ministers of all the States, "I would suggest to all the Chief Ministers present here today that they should restore to the District Collector the status of a coordinator of all government activities in the district and confer upon him the responsibility for guiding all the efforts undertaken on behalf of Government, Central and State. . . ."[35]

We have, therefore, an arrangement by which the Collector continues, to some degree at least, to be regarded as responsible for results in fields which have ostensibly been transferred to Panchayati Raj bodies. At the same time, he has been vested, by the legislation that created Panchayati Raj institutions, with powers of supervision over these bodies. These include powers of 'inspection' of their work in most States. The Collector

[34] *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Oct.-Dec., 1964.

[35] Quoted by P. K. Dave, "The Collector, Today and Tomorrow", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, July-Sept., 1965.

is empowered in several States to cancel or suspend the implementation of decisions of village panchayats and of Panchayat Samitis. In two States, he can set aside the decisions of the Zila Parishad also. There are also, in the legislative enactments of almost every State, provisions empowering Collectors to exercise certain 'emergency' powers, which include the suspension of resolutions of the Zila Parishad or Panchayat Samiti if, in his view, their implementation is likely to cause danger to human life, health or safety or is likely to lead to a breach of peace; also included is the power to direct the execution of certain projects or implementation of particular decisions. It must, of course, be mentioned that, except in the unlikely event of completely irresponsible conduct by the Panchayati Raj bodies, most of these powers are likely to remain unused. But their very existence tends in a manner, imprecise yet very palpable, to confirm the position of the Collector as being apart from and, in some way, above the institutions of Panchayati Raj.

Thus, we have a position whereby the declared intention of the promoters of Panchayati Raj to transfer effective authority to elective local bodies has been frustrated by their reluctance to see and accept the logical conclusion of their own ideas. As a result, the Collector who, it was thought, would like the Communist State wither away, is established as, at best, friend, philosopher and guide to the Panchayati Raj bodies or as arbiter, inspector and, at worst, supplanter. That he has been able to continue to function in this position is due in part to the traditional authority associated with the office, which often continues to command acceptance of a position of leadership not always backed by legal authority or administrative sanctions. In part, it has been due to the change that has been taking place over the past two or three years in the formerly monolithic political structure in the country, where one political party had an overwhelming majority in both Parliament and the State legislatures and had thus been responsible for the administration throughout the country. The developing situation has thrown new light on the position of the Collector and the manner in which his functions may be exercised. (This is discussed in somewhat greater detail in the next section of this paper.) However, the result of the lack of precise definition of the role of the different factors involved has been that the successful working of the highest of the new three-tier popular institutions has been made far too dependent on the development of a close mutual understanding between the Collector and the Chairman of the Zila Parishad. This is an unreliable foundation for so important a structure.

LOOKING AHEAD

What of the future ? There seems to be at least one very simple solution especially to the problem facing the Zila Parishad. Assuming that

we agree that the pivotal institution should be at the district level, most of what it is desired to achieve through Panchayati Raj at the institutional level could be accomplished by a single step : the designation of the Collector, divested of such powers over the Zila Parishad as he now possesses, as the Secretary or chief executive officer of the Parishad. This would require no major change in the law and, at one stroke, would transform the situation. The Collector's substantial legal and executive powers would be unaffected but, as he would now be responsible for the exercise of these powers to the Parishad rather than to the State government, they would serve to enhance the authority of the Parishad rather than detract from it as at present. Such a course was, in fact, considered by a committee set up by the Maharashtra government under Shri Naik (now Chief Minister of that State), but was not favoured by the committee, which took the view that the Collector was burdened with work almost beyond the limits of time and energy; it preferred, therefore, to transfer that part of the Collector's work that was concerned with 'development' to the Zila Parishad, which would now have, as its chief executive officer, an official of status and experience similar to those appointed to the post of Collector. It was felt that, even after being relieved of this work, the Collector would be left with functions and responsibilities that would be considerable.

One justification[36] for the decision to retain (separate from the Zila Parishad) the status of the Collector has been that this will keep open the 'independent' source of information that the Collector, whom the government has traditionally regarded as its 'eyes and ears', has so far provided. This implies a certain disinclination to rely too much on the information that the ruling political party's own cadres have provided regarding conditions in the remote rural areas. (It is doubtful how far this can be regarded as a realistic assumption). Also implicit would seem to be the feeling that while the Zila Parishad might be an adequate source of information regarding the Samitis, there might be none except the Collector who could keep the State government informed regarding the true state of affairs within the Parishad itself.

State governments have also baulked at taking any measures that would fetter the discretion of the Collector in the maintenance of law and order and in his control over those two basic elements of the State's administration, the police and the revenue establishment. Indeed, at every moment of crisis, be it hostilities with a foreign power, civil disturbance, drought, flood or other natural calamity, the government has turned to the Collector as the one sure instrument of effective action within the country. (Admittedly, when things have seemed to be going well, the tendency has been in the

[36] A. L. Fletcher, "The Collector in the Nineteen Sixties", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, July-Sept., 1965.

reverse direction. The pendulum has thus swung often from reliance on the Collector's capacity for swift coordinated action in an emergency to an appreciation of the greater long run benefits for democracy of the perhaps slower results obtained by the popular local authorities—and back again). It is suggested that the process of economic development in India will not be completed without considerable social upheaval; the break up of what is left of the joint family, an accelerated movement of people to the cities from the rural areas, a quickened pace of urbanization, the aggravation of the existing city slums, at least an initial growth in the number of unemployed, almost certainly an increase in crime in the areas so affected. Much of this is, already apparent and the trend is clearly upward (perhaps 'downward' might be a more appropriate word). In these circumstances, and if the past is any guide at all to the future, the State governments are likely to lean more and more heavily on the Collector and the traditional district administration for maintaining the peace without which the fruits of whatever economic development may take place are likely to be lost. It is difficult to see any of the States deciding to make the Collector responsible, in the exercise of his functions in this field, to any authority but the State government—certainly not to an elected authority at the district level, particularly when that authority may be controlled by a political party other than that responsible, for the time being, for the State administration.

This is probably the crux of the problem for the future. For twenty years after Independence, the Congress in effect ruled at the Centre and in the States and was assured of a dominant position in the large majority of any elective local authorities that might be established. Proposals for 'democratic decentralization' could then be examined only in the light of considerations, such as the desirability of a closer association of the people with the taking of the decisions that affected their lives so directly, and free of any disturbing thoughts of the possibility of this placing in the hands of opposition parties a potent weapon of political power. The Balwantray Mehta team's recommendations and the legislation establishing Panchayati Raj were products of this period.

In 1967, the picture changed radically. While retaining power in the Centre, the Congress lost control of nearly half the States. For the governments of the States, whether controlled by the Congress or by other parties, the prospect of hostile parties controlling many local authorities was now a very real one. It did not exclude the possibility of control of a local authority, not just by a party ideologically opposed to the party in power in the State, but by an organization declaredly intent on undermining the whole political system itself. (Similarly, the Communist-dominated government in Kerala presumbly is not particularly happy at seeing many local authorities within the State being run by opposition political parties.)

This must throw completely new light on any proposals to devolve any additional power on the Zila Parishads or Panchayat Samitis and it is here suggested that, in the changed political climate, proposals for the enlargement of the powers of the local authorities at the expense of those of the Collector are unlikely to be pressed. The prospect of an opposition party wielding, for its own purposes, the considerable powers at present exercised by the Collector as an agent of the government, is something that few political parties are likely to be able to contemplate with any degree of equanimity. As things stand at present, though the Collector may not be available to the party in power for the advancement of its own, strictly 'party' ends (it must regretfully be admitted that this has not always been the case but, broadly speaking, the statement may be regarded as indicating the factual position), he is, at least, equally denied to the opposition parties.

This would clearly be of particular importance at the time of elections to Parliament and the State legislatures. In the circumstances of rural India—remote villages, poor roads and inadequate means of transport, and only 25 per cent of the population being literate—such an election has involved a massive organizational effort in which it has fallen to the Collector to mobilize the personnel and resources of all governmental agencies, Central and State, at the district level. The assurance that the population have had that this vast machinery would function impartially and that the elections would be fair, as far as the administrative arrangements were concerned, has perhaps gone a long way to ensure general acceptance of the results of these elections. Deprived of this assurance, it is doubtful whether the peaceful transitions that have been accomplished in the past could as easily be repeated in future.

If then, as has been implied, the Collector is likely to continue to exercise the powers and perform the functions that are his today, it can only mean that the Zila Parishad will (even in Maharashtra) continue to languish. It may be invested with seemingly effective powers of 'supervision' and 'coordination', but the substance of power will escape it. The Chairman of the Parishad is likely to be given greater status—and perhaps perquisites—as the head of the highest of the three popular institutions of Panchayati Raj in the district, but (and especially if he happens to belong to a political party in opposition to that in power in the State) it is likely that he will still, as he sometimes does today, have to seek the intervention of the Collector to coax from the State government additional funds for development projects in the district, or for enhanced allotment of essential consumer commodities that may be in short supply at any time. In short, we may have a Zila Parishad adorned with a semblance of authority, but without its substance.

The Gram Panchayat, for reasons that have already been discussed, is likely to continue as a forum for the discussion of local problems and the ventilation of local grievances, its capacity to effect local improvements largely dependent on the enthusiasm and ingenuity of its members, as the funds at its disposal are never likely to be great. Yet, within these limitations, there seems no reason why the Gram Panchayat should not be able to play a constructive role.

The future of the Panchayat Samiti lies largely in its own hands—*i.e.*, its willingness to tax its members and its capacity to realize these taxes. With this it may overcome the obstacle of inadequate resources, if not of a too confined jurisdiction. A reputation for financial responsibility and efficient execution of its own projects would probably go a long way to persuade the State government to transfer to the Samiti for implementation such of its projects as may lie within the jurisdiction of a particular Samiti and thus continue the direct association of the Samiti with the process of economic development, even after the flow of stage I block funds has dried up.

Assuming that the Panchayat Samiti continues to have a role in the economic field, it can be said that it is likely to be considerably more influential as an instrument of political power than as a source of economic development. No longer is the local member of the State legislature (the MLA and, to a lesser extent, the MLC) the recognized political leader in his constituency. The Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti has emerged as a potential, and often real rival and even Ministers of the State Government ignore an influential Chairman at their peril. His position as the elected head of the Samiti and the favours he is able to dispense as a result, make him the most influential political figure in the area, a veritable 'vote bank' for the aspiring politician. However, the favours he can distribute will derive largely from the projects that the Samiti will implement. These can continue, after the block funds cease to be available, only if the Samiti can exert itself to raise its own resources. The Chairman of the Samiti is thus likely to bring to his job a high degree of motivation (as are, for much the same reasons, the members of the Samiti). This may well be a most potent factor working toward the more effective functioning of the organization that the makers of Panchayati Raj regarded as pivotal to the whole structure.

LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE IN TRAINING

Ram Prakash

AN important development of recent years is that management content in the training programmes foı civil servants has significantly increased. The curricula range from broad and general behavioural aspects to specialized and quantitative ones. In the first category fall subjects, such as managerial functions, approaches to organizational behaviour, styles of leadership, methods of motivating men, and communication, and from among the operational research tools, the courses include techniques, like PERT, Inventory Control, Performance Budgeting and Project Formulation.

OBJECTIVES

The ultimate purpose of these training programmes is usually to improve the performance of the civil servants. The attitude towards work and methods of work are identified as the two most important aspects which determine the overall efficiency of bureaucrats in achieving our social and economic objectives. An important assumption is that requisite general skills have already been taken care of at the time of recruitment. It is quite logical, therefore, that our management courses are built around the core of two objectives, *viz.*, (*i*) to develop such attitudes as are thought to contribute to effective performance of civil servants; and (*ii*) to create awareness about modern techniques for solving various problems confronted by them.

ATTITUDE DEVELOPMENT

Defining Attitude

The civil servants who come for training usually belong to the age group 25 to 45 and by that time they have already developed a somewhat fixed frame of mind. As such, in this context, the term attitude development has a hidden remedial implication of changing the attitude of bureaucrats by management training. Attitude is "a disposition or readiness to respond to a situation with a prepared reaction". It includes orientation towards people at top and other members of the organization, outlook towards individual motivation and performance, reaction to changing environmental conditions and view of public and many such aspects.

Recent Studies

A large amount of research has been conducted on the relationship between training and attitude change. In the following paras a reference is being made to two such studies—one conducted by H. C. Mathur State Institute of Public Administration, Jaipur (SIPA) and another by Manchester Business School, England (MBS).

Sipa Analysis : A survey questionnaire was administered to 84 civil servants in Rajasthan on random sample basis. Out of these, 44 were trained in an eight-week foundational course held at the Institute and the rest 40 held equivalent positions as untrained officers. The course aimed at building the right attitude of mind and broadening the outlook of the officer trainees. An analysis of the replies received showed complete satisfaction with the training programme. As many as 87 per cent felt that the programme was beneficial to them; 70 per cent found the knowledge of civil service, accounts and audit rules most beneficial. Over 60 per cent (*i.e.* 62.5 per cent) thought that knowledge of public administration was most useful and 35 per cent appreciated the opportunity of meeting officers from other departments. Nearly all the participants—95 per cent—wanted that their colleagues should also attend such a course. Replies to questions meant for examining whether the course was able to change their perceptions and outlooks were obtained from both the trained and untrained officers. The pattern of responses exhibited great similarity in the views of trained and untrained officers. This led to the conclusion that training had made little impact on the mental outlook and general attitude of trainees.* This confirms the popular belief that it is difficult to change attitudes after a certain age. Gita lays down,

सदृशम् चेष्टते स्वस्या: प्रकृते ज्ञानवान् भ्रापि
प्राकृतिम् यान्ति भूतानि निग्रह किम करिष्यति ।

(पाठ ३, श्लोक ३३)

That is all people including the learned and wise ones are constrained to act according to their nature. Any effort to make them act differently cannot be helpful.

MBS Analysis : The other research study by MBS was conducted in May 1969 on "Are attitudes changed by training ?" Its findings produced a qualified 'yes' in answer. The study was carried out on people attending a 12-week management course at Manchester Business School

---

* H. C. Mathur State Institute of Public Administration, *Civil Service Training: Some Issues & Problems*, SIPA, Jaipur, pp. 28 to 40.

for middle level managers. Here, a different methodology was adopted to investigate the relationship between characteristics of people and the amount of attitude change occurring in these people while attending a management training course. 'Flexibility' was chosen as the characteristic of people to be studied on the hypothesis that flexibility is a measure of propensity to change, of any type, including attitudes. The measure of flexibility used was one developed by Pym (1966)* and consists of six statements to be stated on Likert-type scales. The measure of attitude change was arrived at by summing up the difference between the ratings of agreement with nine statements made before and after the course. Questionnaires containing the measures described above were given to 51 members of the course at the beginning and the end of the programme. In 42 of the 51 cases, both questionnaires given at the beginning and at the end were returned. The analysis of these replies showed that great attitude change occurred in people of medium flexibility who numbered 26 out of 42; 16 people fell into extreme categories and showed little change in attitude—low flexibility group tends not to change, and high flexibility group has changes even before the course.

Important Issue

The results of the two studies raise an issue. Whether relatively more favourable results were obtained by MBS as compared to SIPA due to better training techniques, course contents and other learning facilities or the change in attitude was noticed merely because two different methods of investigation were adopted in these studies ? A satisfactory answer to this question cannot be given as comparable data on all aspects are not available. The methodologies of the two studies do not seem to affect substantially the results achieved in view of the fact that significant differences have been noticed in teaching techniques of the two Institutes which have a direct bearing on attitude change.

Different Techniques

One notable distinction in teaching techniques, which merit attention, is that in the Institute at Jaipur, like other Institutions in India, great reliance is placed on lecture and syndicate discussions in the training programmes whereas in MBS the emphasis is on project-based instruction. In the project-based-instruction system, the participants are given a comprehensive account of a live case and are divided in different 'interest groups' lobbying for their own survival and operational effectiveness in the class room. A nearness to real situation is created in class room and

* Pym, D. 1966 "Effective Managerial Performance in Organisation Change" *The Journal of Management Studies* (3), 1 February, 1966.

opportunities are provided to apply various management devices like management by objectives managerial grid, Kepner Tregoe, Coverdate, and role playing. The deadlines are fixed for the groups to come out with their policy recommendations and these are further discussed in the whole class.

Relative Merits

Experience in this regard has been that a carefully selected project-based instruction method is very effective in creating an environment for learning experieace and reducing a bit of rut and habitual way of thinking. Even otherwise, it is common knowledge that self-discovered learning sticks to the mind most and has a tendency to bring more or less permanent change in behaviour. This technique involves a great deal of individual and group participation. Such participation helps the trainee to select his own educational goals, teaches him to respect other people's ideas, assists in self analysis, helps him to forget his own immediate problems and permits him to benefit from the breadth of experience of his classmates. By participating in describing and analysing a problem situation and by proposing, criticizing and defending solutions to it, the trainee usually carries away more new ideas and habit patterns than he could absorb by a strictly passive experience, such as listening to a lecture. It is possible for people to listen to lectures and even take extensive notes, without ever reflecting upon what is being said. Worse than this is the fact that lectures offer the students no opportunity to experiment with new behaviours in a safe environment.

Motivation Aspect

Project-based instruction method has been found useful in self motivation of participants. A management teacher finds broadly three types of participants. *Metamorphosists* are very enthusiastic to learn and have a high-motivated frame of mind. *Tangentialists* do not feel themselves involved and regard class room as shadow activity and waste of time. Third category is of *Incrementalists* who want to learn some techniques but do not let their whole system to be called in question. Motivating the tangentialists and incrementalists to make minimum use of a training programme is always an important problem of a management tutor, catalyst, and trainer. These two groups have been found very active in project activities, because working in 'interest groups' gives numerous opportunities for their involvement and participation. This accelerates the process of their learning experience and modifying behaviour on job.

Recruitment and Training Strategy

Change in attitude is not a once-and-for-all exercise, it must be a continuous process and this effort is well worth making. However, our training

strategy must also take into account the weightage given to different personality traits at the time of recruitment. It is a serious mistake to hire officers who have a high need to exercise authority and then teach them that authoritative methods are wrong and that they should be consultative or participative. A management development programme cannot be effective if such officers are taught to adopt styles that are artificial and inconsistent with their unique personalities.

EXPOSURE TO MODERN TECHNIQUES

The Necessity

The second objective of training is based on the belief that better techniques and modern tools are available for use and that performance can be improved upon if training programmes are organized to create awareness of these techniques among the civil servants. It is common knowledge that current level of development and enlarged scope of complex governmental activities call for an increasing degree of specialization in modern techniques on the part of civil servants. Training is an important instrument for creating an awareness and application of the various management tools.

Difficulties Experienced

In organizing such training programme, every institute has to depend very much on outside experts. The trainers in these courses do not have sufficient awareness of the local conditions and problems of the participants. The techniques are explained with a high degree of abstraction and insufficient practical insight. This bewilders the participants about the practical application of these techniques. Experience has shown that awareness to these techniques cannot be created by mere discussion. Trainers must establish a relevance of the management techniques to the problems which are faced by civil servants so that the training becomes an action-oriented activity and generates generous use of management know-how.

The Remedy

The problem can be solved by preparing a shelf of live cases from different states demonstrating the application of well-tried tools and by developing faculty in the concerned Institute for being able to teach advanced modern management techniques. The development of cases showing practical application of various tools is one of the most challenging assignments to the trainers. This task can be effectively undertaken by establishing or reinforcing research units with qualified staff attached to various training institutions.

ASSESSMENT OF A TRAINING PROGRAMME

Importance

Evaluation to test the overall validity and effectiveness of a training programme is very important. Unless a management trainer builds his feed-back around direct exposure to reality, he cannot be sure of a good training programme. Programmes without proper feed-back (evaluation) are stakes of a desperate gambler.

Popular Method

Evaluation forms are usually given to the trainees during last session of the course and are collected on the completion of a course. The forms are descriptive and contain many questions related to various aspects of the course and general facilities in a institute.

Drawbacks

Experience has shown that immediate reaction of participants in a well-planned programme is generally one of interest, enthusiam, and appreciation. However, while this is important, it does not in itself prove that the programme will be translated into improved performance on the job. Trainees require at least two to three months after course completion before they can realistically assess and evaluate the value of techniques learnt in the class room. Moreover, 'one shot' evaluation on final day of the course does not provide opportunities for improvement during the running period of the course. The format of the questionnaire usually leaves much to be desired. The replies to the questions do not indicate an entirely 'black and white' answer to the questions posed. These are often couched in ambiguous terms. As a result, the trainers find it difficult to interpret the findings for diagnostic purposes. Many questions have little relevance to the educational objectives of the course. Sometimes, a lack of proper assessment by government department about training needs and training objectives reflect on the efficiency and effectiveness of the course. In one case, where data were collected, seven participants out of 32 pointed out that the course was not very much relevant to their present jobs and three of these did not see it even relevant to their future jobs.

The Better Approach

The above mentioned findings bring out the need to have a proper pre-course analysis of training needs and training programmes. A simple form, seeking personal details, educational qualifications, employment experience, description of present responsibilities, brief statement of job problems and expectation from course, and a short biographical note of the

prospective trainee has been found very useful in assessing the usefulness of the course to the trainee. For efficient and effective evaluation delayed feed-back measures from trainees and their immediate supervisors, several weeks after the course completion, seems to be very valuable for trainers.

In addition to pre-course and post-course analysis, a topicwise assessment, in place of 'one-shot' evaluation on the final day of the course, has been found very useful for obtaining trainees' immediate perception of the course. This provides opportunities for adjustment to meet the training needs of participants. The information collected as per the form given below, which was designed by MBS, was found quite revealing when utilized to judge course effectiveness of courses, one for Defence Officers in Delhi University and the second on Project Formulation in the Institute at Jaipur.

EVALUATION FORM

Name of Course :

Name of Topic :

Please rate this part of the course on the following dimensions by ticking the appropriate position (between the vertical lines : ! ! ! ! ! ....) and return on or after..................

Not very interesting	! ! ! ! ! ! !	Very interesting
Did not learn very much	! ! ! ! ! ! ! !	Learnt a lot
Not very relevant to my present job	! ! ! ! ! ! ! !	Very relevant to my present job
Not very relevant to my future career and jobs	! ! ! ! ! ! !	Very relevant to my future career and jobs

How satisfied, generally, are you with the way course is going ?

Not very satisfied	! ! ! ! ! ! !	Highly satisfied

Please write any comments you may have on the back of the form.

An analysis of information obtained through form on page 88 sometimes gives quite interesting results. In one case, a participant may not find the course interesting but may learn a lot. In another case he may not learn very much but may find the course interesting and at the same time he may not be much satisfied. Such a situation is understandable when we keep in mind the indifference of some to the course and the large variety of knowledge of experience which participants possess. But, on the whole, this topic-wise evaluation and point-ranking system helped in : (*i*) identifying the areas of the course which were not effectively dealt with and which were not very useful for trainees; (*ii*) analyzing the standards of performance achieved in various parts of the course; and (*iii*) in determining the degree of effectiveness of the course as assessed by participants.

CONCLUSION

There is a great scope for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of our management training programmes for civil servants. The adoption of project-based-instruction method, collection of shelf of live cases from different states in our country, demonstrating application of modern techniques, and modification of our evaluation system on scientific lines will go a long way in bringing attitude change and creating awareness to modern management know-how. All these will help in achieving the ultimate objective of improving the performance of bureaucrats for realising our social and economic objectives.

INSTITUTE NEWS

The 18th Annual General Meeting of the General Body of the Institute was held on, October 28; *Shri Asoka Mehta*, Chairman of the IIPA Executive Council, presided.

After the presentation of the Annual Report by the Director, there was a lively discussion on various aspects of working of Institute during the year and wide-ranging suggestions for improvement and greater involvement of the members in the activities of the Institute were made.

The subject for discussion at the members' Annual Conference held on October, 29 was : "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan". Besides the discussion paper, which was prepared by *Dr. S. R. Maheshwari* of the Institute, the following papers were contributed by members of the Institute :

(1) "Administrative Aspects of An Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan—Some Aspects of Administration of Human Resource" by *Shri Tribhuwan Nath Chaudhary*, lecturer, Department of Labour & Social Welfare, University of Bhagalpur;

(2) "The Administrative Approach in the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Shri P. R. Dubhashi*, Secretary, Development, Housing, Panchayati Raj & Cooperation, Government of Mysore, Bangalore;

(3) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan—The Challenge in the Plan to Economic Policies and its Implications to Administration" by *Shri Y. A. Fazalbhoy* of Bombay;

(4) "Administrative Aspects of Primary Education in the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Shri B. P. Gupta*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Birla Institute of Technology, Pilani;

(5) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Shri V. S. Murti*, Head, Department of Public Administration, University of Nagpur;

(6) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Shri W. G. Naidu*, Training Officer (Management Department), Heavy Electricals (I) Ltd., Bhopal;

(7) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Shri M. V. S. Prasada Rau*, Deputy Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad;

(8) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Shri P. K. Ray*, Assistant Grade 1, Damodar Valley Corporation, Calcutta;

(9) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth

Five Year Plan—Lack of Bureaucratic Response" by *Dr. (Mrs.) Inder Prabha Sharma*, Lecturer, M.G.N. College of Education, Jullunder;

(10) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Dr. Sudesh Kumar Sharma*, Reader in Public Administration, Panjab University;

(11) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *Dr. Sakendra Prasad Singh*, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Bhagalpur;

(12) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *J. K. P. Sinha*, Assistant Director, Institute of Public Administration, Patna University;

(13) "Administrative Approach to the Backward Classes Welfare Programme under the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *S. P. Sinha*, Assistant Director, Bihar Tribal Welfare Research Institute, Ranchi;

(14) "Administrative Aspects of an Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan" by *V. Subramanian*, Secretary, Revenue & Forests Department, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay; and

(15) "Some Notes on Administrative Aspects of Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan with Special Reference to Bihar" by *Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Varma*, Head, Department of Political Science and Director, Institute of Public Administration, Patna University.

* * *

Shri D. P. Dhar, Union Minister of Planning, Government of India, was unanimously elected chairman of the Executive Council of IIPA in its meeting held on October 28, 1972. Two newly elected Vice-Presidents of the Institute are : *Shri D. P. Dhar*, and *Shri Uma Shankar Dikshit*, Union Minister of Health & Family Planning and Works & Housing. The re-elected Vice Presidents are : *Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, Shri V. P. Naik, Shri C. Subramaniam*, and *Smt. Sushila Rohatagi*.

Other changes in important committees/sub-committees of the Institute are :

Executive Council—Eight newly elected members of the council, who will hold office for two years are : *Shri K. Venkataraman, Shri M. Subramanian, Shri M. K. Chaturvedi, Shri B. C. Mathur, Dr. R. S. Arora, Shri P. A. Menon, Prof. Shanti Kothari*, and *Shri W. G. Naidu*. Four sitting members again coopted for a two-year term are: *Shri Asoka Mehta, Shri P. L. Tandon, Shri B. Venkatappiah*, and *Prof. S. M. Hasan; Prof. R. B. Das* joins the Council as the fifth coopted member. *Prof. M. V. Mathur* has been unanimously elected Honorary Treasurer for a term of two years.

Standing Committee—The new Standing Committee of the Institute will comprise of the following : *Shri D. P. Dhar, Shri M. K. Chaturvedi, Prof. Shanti Kothari, Shri B. C. Mathur, Prof. M. V. Mathur, Shri P. P. Agarwal, Shri P. L. Tandon, Shri M. V. S. Prasada Rau, Shri C. A. Ramakrishnan, Shri V. Subramanian and Director IIPA.*

Training and Research Committee—The following experts have been appointed for a one-year term : *Prof. M. V. Mathur, Shri R. N. Haldipur, Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Dr. R. S. Arora, Shri K. Venkataraman, and Dr. G. R. Dalvi.*

Committee on Case Studies—The following would be its members for period of one year : *Shri Govind Narain (Chairman), Prof. A. Avasthi, Dr. B. D. Sharma, Shri M. Subramanian, Shri P. R. Dubhashi, Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Prof. M. V. Mathur, Dr. Ram K. Vepa (Director, Case Study Programme), Shri K. Venkataraman (Member-Secretary), and Director IIPA.*

Editorial Board—It will consist of : *Shri T. N. Chaturvedi* (Editor), *Shri P. R. Dubhashi, Prof. Shanti Kothari, Prof. M. V. Mathur, Dr. Ziauddin Khan, Prof. R. B. Das, Dr. K. K. Anand, Dr. R. S. Arora,* and *Dr. S. R. Maheshwari.*

Finance Sub-Committee—The composition of the sub-committee for a period of two years is as follows : *Shri P. L. Tandon* (Chairman), *Prof. M. V. Mathur, Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Shri V. Subramanian* and *Director IIPA.*

Consultancy Sub-Committee—The following will constitute the sub-committee for one year : *Shri B. Venkatappiah* (Chairman), *Prof. M. V. Mathur, Shri P. L. Tandon, Shri P. A. Menon, Shri W. G. Naidu, Prof. Shanti Kothari, Shri K. Venkataraman,* and *Director IIPA.*

Library Committee—The following will comprise the committee and hold office for two years : *Dr. B. D. Sharma, Prof. Shanti Kothari, (members of Executive Council), Shri D. L. Mazumdar, Dr. R. B. Jain, and two members from IIPA faculty.*

* * *

The Executive Council of the Institute took the following important decisions in its special meeting held on October 29 :

(1) Research programme of the Institute should have some reference to the administrative needs of the Fifth Five Year Plan;

(2) A regional branch of the Institute may be set up at Delhi;

(3) In some of the larger States, like West Bengal, there was no regional branch and it was, therefore, necessary that efforts should be made to set up such branches at Calcutta and other State capitals where they did not exist at present; and

(4) As was being done some years ago, some method should be devised to get into touch with Professors of Public Administration and other dignitaries visiting India and Delhi.

* * *

The Institute conducted the following courses during the quarter (October–December) for senior and middle-level officers of central and state governments, union territory administrations, municipal committees and corporations, public sector undertakings etc. :

Fifth Course in Personnel Administration, October 3–13 (New Delhi);

Third Course on Work Study in Municipal Administration, October 7–November 2;

First Course on Fundamentals of Computer Programming, October 19–28 (New Delhi);

Eighth Course on Development Administration, October 23–November 4 (New Delhi);

(The course was inaugurated by *Shri S. Mohan Kumarmangalam,* Union Minister for Steel & Mines and *Shri D. P. Dhar,* Union Minister for Planning delivered the valedictory address. Among the 27 participants of the course was *Lt. Gen. R. S. Noronha,* Deputy Chief of Army Staff).

Second Course in O & M, October 30–November 11 (New Delhi);

(The course was organized in cooperation with Department of Administrative Reforms, Ministry of Home Affairs).

First Course on Computers and Management, November 13–24 (New Delhi);

(The course fee, covering tution and study material, was Rs. 750 per participant).

Thirteenth Course in Municipal Administration, November 13–December 23 (New Delhi);

(The 14 trainees to the course included two foreigners—one each from Fiji and Laos).

First Course in Financial Management Techniques, November 27–December 6 (New Delhi); and

Seventh Course on Budgeting and Financial Control, December 4–23 (New Delhi).

Two seminars organized during the quarter by the Institute are :

(1) *Seminar on Democracy and Development*, December 8–10 (New Delhi).

MPs, jurists, academicians and journalists shared their views and experiences in the seminar which was sponsored by the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, IIPA and Gandhi Peace Foundation.

The seminar was inaugurated by *Shri Raj Bahadur*, Union Minister of Parliamentry Affairs, Shipping & Transport, while the valedictory address was given by *Shri I. K. Gujral*, Union Minister of Information & Broadcasting.

In its sessions, the topics for discussions were :

(1) "Democratic Institutions and Problems of Development", (2) "Poverty and Socio-Economic Policies", (3) "Law and Social Change : Constitutionalism and Conflict Management".

(2) *Seminar on Performance Budgeting*, December 29–30 (New Delhi).

In the seminar, inaugurated by *Shri T. Swaminathan*, former Cabinet Secretary to the Government of India, 40 participants (including *Shri P. B. Rana* of Government of Nepal) critically explored the following areas :

(*a*) The progress that has been made so far in India's implementation of the performance budgeting; (*b*) the problems and difficulties that have been experienced; (*c*) possible shortcomings in the approach to such budgetary improvement; and (*d*) the role of performance auditing in effecting performance budgeting.

The Seminar also afforded an opportunity to re-evaluate the potentialities of performance budgeting.

Prof. Joseph Pois, until recently a Ford Foundation Consultant at the Institute, helped in planning and organization of the Seminar; he also wrote the background paper.

* * *

First and Second prizes for IIPA 1972 Essay Competition were awarded to : *Shri Prabhakar Ghate*, Second Secretary (Economic), Embassy of India, Washington DC, for his entry "Law and Order : A Holding Operation", and *Shri H.G. Paranjpe*, Deputy Secretary, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, for his essay "Some Observations on Administration in Nagaland" respectively.

Consolation Prizes were awarded to following two entries : "District

Magistrate & District Police" by *Shri G. C. Singhvi*, Deputy Inspector General, Border Security Force, Jodhpur; and "Workers' Participation in the Management of Public Sector Undertakings" by *Shri Dipankar Sarkar*, Deputy Controller General, Defence Accounts, New Delhi.

According to the adjudicators—*Shri H. M. Patel, Shri T. N. Chaturvedi*, and *Dr. Ram K. Vepa*—the best of the 21 entries was the one written by *Shri Prem Narain*, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Bombay on "Economic Development and Fiscal Policy Objectives—An Examination with Reference to India". But, in the opinion of the judges, this essay was oriented more to the discipline of Economics than Public Administration.

* * *

Mr. F. K. Naganatha, Vice-Principal and Director of Studies, Institute of Public Administration, Kenya, and his collegue *Mr. D. T. Wanjuki*, Head of Social Development Department visited the Institute in October. They came to India to acquaint themselves with the experience gained by it in the fields of public administration, training for civil servants, local governments, and the working of social welfare programmes. During their 3-week attachment to the IIPA, they met the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, and paid visits to : Delhi School of Social Work; Institute of Criminology & Forensic Science; National Family Planning Institute; Training Division of the Union Department of Personnel; Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration; Panjab University; and Central Institute of Research & Training in Public Cooperation.

Dr. J. E. Sargent, Deputy Director-General of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, London, paid a visit to the Institute on November 27. Earlier, same day, at a specially-organized meeting under the auspices of the Training Division of the Union Department of Personnel, he gave a talk on "Management Development in the Public Service".

* * *

Prof. G. Mukharji, The Director, who resumed his duties on November 1, 1972 after medical leave, would be retiring in the middle of January, 1973. He would be succeeded by *Prof. Ishwar Dayal* of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.

Dr. S. R. Maheshwari, Reader in Public Administration, has been invited to be Member of a Working Group, set up by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The Group will study and report on "Administrative, Procedural and Structural Reforms".

Shri S. S. Vishwanathan, I.A.A.S., left the Institute on October 19 to take up his responsibilities as Senior Deputy Accountant General in the Office of the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh. On foreign service to the Institute, he was attached to the Financial Management Unit as Programme Consultant (Performance Budgeting) for about three years.

* * *

The following publications were brought out during the quarter :

(1) *Administrators in Action : Indian Case Studies* by IIPA's Committee on Case Studies, p. 298, Rs. 15.00;

(2) *Performance Budgeting in Government : An Illustrative Guide* by *S. S. Viswanathan* (of IIPA), p. 136, Rs. 12.00; and

(3) *Materials Planning in Emergency* by A. P. Saxena, p. 47, Rs. 4.00.

* * *

The following lectures/discussions/symposium were organized by the branches.

Branch & Date	*Subject*	*Speaker*
Ajmer Local Branch		
Sept. 11	—	*Shri Sriman Narayan,* Governor of Gujarat (*Shri S. C. Gupta,* Chairman, Board of Revenue for Rajasthan presided.)
Oct. 8	"Challenges of Last 25 years"	*Shri S. S. Vishwanathan,* Governor of Kerala. (*Shri G. B. K. Hooja,* Chairman, Board of Revenue for Rajasthan presided).
Poona Local Branch		
Oct. 20	"Consumers' Co-operatives" (seventh in the series on "Citizen and Administration")	*Prof. R. V. Nadkarni* of V. M. National Institute of Cooperative Management. (*Dr. G. S. Mahajani,* Vice-Chancellor, University of Poona and Chairman of the Branch presided).
Dec. 22	"Panchayati Raj in Andhra Pradesh"	*Dr. Rama Reddy,* Professor of Political Science, University of Osmania. (*Dr. G. S. Mahajani* presided).
Maharashtra Regional Branch		
Sept. 9–10	"Executive Excellence" (presentation-cum-discussion)	*Dr. H. N. Nanjundiah,* who contributed a 70-paged working paper, led the discussion.
Nov. 25	"Administrative Aspects of Implementation of Land Reforms in Maharashtra" (symposium)	*Shri B. B. Paymaster,* Chairman of the Branch presided over discussion session. (It was inaugurated by *Shri H. G. Vartek,* Minister for Revenue, Government of Maharashtra).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The Government of India has constituted an Advisory Council on Personnel Administration, with a term of two years, under the chairmanship of *Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha,* Union Minister of State for Home Affairs. Creation of such council was recommended by the administrative Reforms Commission in its report on the "Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work".

It will advise the Government on broad policy matters in personnel administration, especially with a view to acting as a feeder line of new ideas and thinking in this field. It will also consider and recommend broad lines of policy in the field of personnel administration and advise on matters in the field specifically placed before it for consideration.

Shri B. P. Bagchi, Secretary, Department of personnel, will be the Council's Vice-Chairman. The members are: *Sarvashri N. P. Sen,* Principal, Administrative Staff College, Hyderabad; *M. Krishnamoorthy,* Director, Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta; *A. D. Moddie,* Resident Director, Hindustan Lever Limited; *P. L. Tandon,* Custodian, Punjab National Bank; *B. Sivaraman,* Vice-Chairman, National Commission on Agriculture; *P. K. J. Menon,* Chief Secretary, Bihar; *N. K. Mukarji,* Chief-Secretary, Jammu & Kashmir; *D. D. Sathe,* Director, National Academy of Administration; *M. Gopal Menon,* Additional Secretary, Department of Administrative Reforms; *Jasjit Singh,* Chairman, Central Board of Excise & Customs; *S. K. Jain,* Chairman, Central Water & Power Commission, *Prof. M. V. Mathur,* Director, Asian Institute of Educational Planning & Administration; and *Dr. B. D. Nag Chaudhuri,* Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister.

Selection for appointment to posts of Secretaries to Government, Commissioners of Division and equivalent posts in Government of *West Bengal* will henceforth be subject to the following procedure: (*i*) A Screening Committee of senior Secretaries consisting of the Chief Secretary, Member, Board of Revenue, and the Finance Commissioner will prepare, on the basis of the confidential character rolls of the eligible officers and their acquaintance with the work of the officers concerned, a Fit List of officers who are considered suitable for posts of Secretaries and Commissioners of Divisions and equivalent posts; (*ii*) There will be a Cabinet Appointments Committee, consisting of the Chief Minister, the Finance Minister and the Agriculture Minister before which the Fit List prepared by the Screening Committee will be placed; and (*iii*) The recommendations of the Screening Committee will become valid only after the approval of the Cabinet Appointments Committee.

Similar Screening Committees would be set up with regard to senior appointments in other services, *e.g.*,

heads of Departments and heads of Directorates in the Police, the Forest Services, the Engineering Services, the Health Services and other State Services. Technical members may be included in the Screening Committees as may be considered necessary and the Ministers concerned may be invited to the meetings of the Cabinet Appointments Committee.

A new Specialist Cadre has been created in the Armed Forces Medical Services with one Lieutenant General, 5 Major-Generals, 14 Brigadiers and 55 full Colonels. The creation of the cadre will encourage specialists in various branches of Medical Services and other officers to have continuous service in the Specialist Cadre. *Major-General Inder Singh,* PVSM, Senior Consultant in Medicine, has been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. He will now be designated as Chief Consultant in Medicine.

The following appointments of Secretaries to the Government of India were announced on November 1 : *Shri B. D. Pande,* Secretary in the Ministry of Finance to be Cabinet Secretary vice *Shri T. Swaminathan; Shri M. R. Yardi,* Secretary, Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance to be Finance Secretary vice *Shri B. D. Pande; Shri M. G. Kaul,* Additional Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance to be Secretary in the same Department from the date of taking charge vice *Dr. I. G. Patel* proceeding on deputation to UNDP; *Shri H. C. Sarin,* Secretary, Department of Steel in the Ministry of Steel and Mines to be Secretary, Department of Mines and Metals and in the Department of Heavy Engineering, both in the same Ministry; *Shri T. P. Singh (Jr.)* to be Secretary, Department of Agriculture from the date of taking charge vice *Shri T. P. Singh (Sr.)*; *Shri M. A. Quraishi,* Special Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture to be Secretary, Department of Cooperation and Community Development in the same Ministry.

The Government of *Bihar* has decided to reduce the retirement age of its employees from 58 to 55 years. The change will come into effect from January 31, 1973.

The Government of *Haryana* has raised the age limit for entering the various State service to 27 years. The change in Rules is, however, subject to certain conditions.

Government of *Kerala* has amended its rules governing permanent exemption from passing obligatory departmental test for its employees to accommodate Scheduled Castes/Tribes employees. For such an exemption an employee must attain the age of 50 years and also complete 25 years of service. But now the conditions of completing 25 years service has been waived in case of Scheduled Castes/Tribes employees to bring it in line with the upper-age relaxation enjoyed by such persons at the time of entering Government Service.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has decided to give overriding priority to the members of the families of those who have been killed or disabled in the recent Indo-Pak conflict in allotting fair price shops.

The Government of *Rajasthan* will offer special preference in employment under it to one of the sons, unmarried daughters or the widow of its employees who die in harness. The dependent must, however, satisfy the prescribed qualifications and age for any particular post in Class III and Class IV Services of the State Government. To take advantage of this concession, he/she will register for employment assistance in the office of the nearest

Employment Exchange. This relief came into force with retrospective effect from August 15, 1971.

The President of India promulgated on September 23 an Ordinance for increasing the minimum bonus from 4 to 8.33 per cent for "the accounting year commencing on any day in the year 1971". The Ordinance, which amends the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, also provides that bonus in excess of the quantum paid or payable in respect of the previous accounting year shall be credited to the Provident Fund accounts of the employees. Payments of 8.33 per cent would, however, be made in cash in all cases.

The Payment of Bonus Act applies to every factory and to every other establishment which employs 20 or more persons.

Pending formal amendment of the Bonus Act, non-competitive public sector undertakings, which are at present not required to pay bonus, but are already paying ex-gratia payments to their employees, are being directed to make payments on the above mentioned basis.

U.P. State Electricity Board has appointed *Mr. Justice H. C. P. Tripathi* of the Allahabad High Court to examine and make suitable recommendations pertaining to the pay scales, other emoluments and amenities of Engineer Officers (including Apprentice Engineers) of the Board. The pay commission will take into consideration financial resource position as well as emoluments admissible to officers of equivalent ranks in other States and Electricity Boards.

On the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission, the Government granted further instalment of interim relief at the following rates to the Central Government employees (including those in Armed forces and Union territory administration) of the eligible categories with effect from *August 1, 1972* : below Rs. 85—Rs. 7; Rs. 85-209—Rs. 8; and, Rs. 210-575 (subject to suitable marginal adjustments)—Rs. 10.

The Government of India has decided that the winners or the legal heirs of the winners of gallantry awards will be entitled to a monthly monetary allowance irrespective of rank. So far only personnel below the officer rank were entitled to a monetary allowance. The rates of allowance vary from Rs. 100 to 16.

The Union Government, basing on the representations from parents to this effect, has decided that the pension payable to the widow of an officer killed in action will be divided, subject to result of investigations, between her and the parents of the deceased officer if the widow has not contributed towards the maintenance of the parents. In the case of personnel below officer rank, the special family pension is meant for the support of all eligible heirs. If the heir receiving the pension fails to contribute proportionately towards the support of others, it can be divided among all of them.

Delivering judgment on a case involving three officers of the Government of Punjab, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on September 21 upheld with costs a verdict of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which said that the Punjab Government was not entitled to reduce the amount of pension and gratuity legally payable to its officers on superannuation without giving a reasonable opportunity to them to show cause against the proposed reduction.

Appealing to the Supreme Court against ruling of the High Court,

the Government of Punjab had contended that Rule 6.4 (A) and (B) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules specifically stated that full pension was not to be given as a matter of course or unless service rendered had been really approved, and that if the service had not been thoroughly satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension should make such reduction in the amount as it thought proper.

The Board of Trustees of the Employees' Provident Fund in its 56th meeting held on November 1, agreed to continue the existing practice of making payment to the outgoing members or their nominees the amount deducted from the members' wages, but not remitted by the employers from Special Reserve Fund.

The Board also agreed that the existing benefit, under which nominees/heirs or a deceased member is assured of minimum of Rs. 750, should continue and the benefit be calculated with reference to the contribution to Provident Fund only. The Board recommended that an additional amount of Rs. 10 lakhs may be earmarked for this purpose.

Initially, financial relief from this Fund was limited to a minimum of Rs. 500 to the nominees/heirs of the deceased members subject to fulfilling certain conditions. But as recommended by the Board in 1969, the Government of India enhanced the limit of financial assistance from the Death Relief Fund from Rs. 500 to Rs. 750 with effect from the 1st August, 1969. So far Rs. 59,44,611 have been paid during the last 8 months.

The Government of *Kerala* has sanctioned a scheme carrying a stipend of Rs. 30 per month for giving training to 25 members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in each district of Kerala in Typewriting and Shorthand. The scheme will be implemented by the Director of Harijan Welfare.

The Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development has further liberalized rules of house building advance to Central Government servants. This will especially benefit the low-paid employees. The Government servants can now draw the maximum amount of advance equivalent to 75 times of the monthly pay or Rs. 50,000 which ever is less for building/buying a new house or a flat. Until now the Government servants were allowed to draw house building advance equal to 60 months pay or Rs. 50,000 which ever is less.

* * *

Tamil Nadu's Administrative Reform Commission, which was asked by the Government to submit its recommendations pertaining to implementation of the Government's decision on abolition of Board of Revenue, has not favoured administration of the functions of the Board directly by the Government. It has, instead, recommended that the functions of the Board may be divided into five independent departments, each headed by a Commissioner, through legislation (which requires concurrence of the Centre). The various enactments—both Central and State—which need amendment, have been listed out in the report of the Commission. The draft Bill (Annexure V to the report) would enable the progressive transfer of functions to independent Commissioners and the retention of the collective Board for specific purposes, if so desired. The Bill would also enable the transfer of subjects from other Heads of Departments to new Commissioners. The Commission's other important recommendations include : abolition

of the post of Commissioner of Food Production; not allocating all items of revenue to one commissioner; retention of the two existing posts of commissioners of land and settlement (in view of anticipated increase in work due to land reforms); and no change in jobs allocated to Commissioners of Transport, Excise and Commercial taxes (Entertainment and Cinematography Act to be administered by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes).

Existing administrative structure with reference to the requirements of development, stages of bottlenecks in administrative procedures, delegation of more administrative powers at lower levels, and promotion of speed in procedure are some of the questions which will be studied by a Working Group set up by the Government of *Uttar Pradesh*. The aim is to ensure effective implementation of the schemes under the Fifth Five Year Plan.

Shri S. P. Kotval, former Chief Justice of Bombay High Court, was sworn in as *Maharashtra's* first 'Lokayukta' on October 25. His term of office is five years without eligibility for reappointment. To be an independent authority, he will have powers to investigate all complaints against individuals in the Government up to the rank of Ministers (not the Chief Minister). For this purpose, he may summon any person to give evidence or call for official documents and submit his recommendations for remedial action to the Government within a short time. The Government will have to intimate within three months of receipt of his recommendation the action taken on his report.

If he is not satisfied with the action taken, he may make a special report on the case of the Governor. In addition, the 'Lokayukta' shall present annually a consolidated report on the performance of his functions to the Governor, a copy of which the Governor shall cause to be laid before each House of the State Legislature.

The Working Group on Prison Reforms, set up by the Government of India, is also to formulate training programmes for prison staff. Its other terms of reference include: laying down of standards in respect of different services and facilities in the jails; examination of the existing accommodation position in the prisons and laying down of guidelines for future constructions; analysis of the factors hampering the growth of prison development; laying down of priorities of prison development schemes and suggesting ways and means for incorporating the principles of reformation and resettlement of the criminals in the system of administration of the jails and the treatment of criminals.

The Group consists of the Inspector-General of Prisons of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, and the Director, Central Bureau of Correctional Services.

The National Academy of Administration at Mussoorie will be known as "Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration" (with effect from October 2, 1972) to memorize the late Prime Minister, who took a keen interest in the problems of administration and building up of proper attitudes among the civil servants.

The Academy was established on September 1, 1959 after merging the Indian Administrative Service Training School at Delhi, and the Indian Administrative Service Staff College at Simla. The scope of the Academy was later on extended to impart foundational training to probationers of all the All-India and

Class I Services as well as refresher and orientation courses.

* * *

Village clusters, which do not have any source of drinking water within a reasonable distance, and such villages, which need protection or treatment of the existing sources of water supply, or which have inadequate arrangements for supply of drinking water for weaker sections of society, have been selected all over India under the Central scheme for Acceleration of Rural Water Supply. For this purpose, a provision of Rs. 20 crores in the Central sector for 100 per cent financial assistance to the State Government has been made in 1972-73. This is in addition to the provisions already made in the State plans.

A Task Force has been constituted by the Ministry of Health and Family Planning to go into the various aspects of production of vaccine toxoid, its storage, refrigeration facilities and delivery of services. It will also examine the preparation of working instructions at various levels in connection with comprehensive immunization programme for the vulnerable groups of population.

The Government of *Assam* has constituted an Advisory Board with *Shri Hiteswar Saikia* (State's Minister of Youth Welfare and Cultural Affairs) as its Chairman, to co-ordinate and promote various programmes for welfare of the students and youths in the State.

The Board would, in particulars, assess the requirements of the students and youths, review from time to time the working of different Government and non-government schemes in the area, identify deficiencies and recommend suitable measures.

Amongst the members of tl Board are General Secretaries (students Unions in over 15 Colleg scattered all over the State.

In order to handle the problen of students, the Government c *Kerala* has, in consultation wi the students' organization, set up State-level Committee with tl Minister for Education as Chairma District-level committees are al proposed to be constituted under tl chairmanship of the District Collect and shall consist of one represe tative of students' organizatio functioning in the district. The will discuss matters connected wi educational institutions, dispu arising between the students ai transport operations and Transpc Department, as well as those betwe different organizations.

A survey, conducted by *Tan Nadu's* State Institute of Educatio has found that a high proportion children drop out from the prima schools because of the lower soci economic status of their parents. revealing answer discovered by t survey is : Wherever the teache resided in the village in which t school was located the number dropouts was less.

The survey has made followi suggestion: (1) Teaching in t first two years of school should made interesting and done in su a manner as to develop self-co fidence in the children. The late trends in education be adopted achieve this. (2) Teachers shou periodically meet the parents of the children so that they could unde stand their home background ai evolve a suitable strategy to ove come any handicap the childr faced. (3) Children from the po income group could be retained school by providing them with mi day meals, free school dress, ai books.

* * *

Two major tasks underlined in the *Approach to the Fifth Plan* 1974-79 are removal of poverty and attainment of economic self-reliance through a socialistic pattern of development.

For these, expansion of productive employment opportunities is of crucial importance—both for accelerated growth and reducing inequality. Employment policy must aim at expanding both wage and self-employment and raising their productivity. An employment-oriented plan must seek a reasonable balance between the employment-intensive sectors and the others bound to them with strong forward and backward linkages.

For the educated unemployed, besides providing adequate employment opportunities, university education, at the same time, must be so regulated as to conform increasingly to the likely quantum and pattern of employment opportunities for the educated youth.

Towards removal of poverty, measures for providing employment and income to the poorer sections of the population will have to be supplemented, up to at least certain minimum standards, by social consumption and investment in the form of education, health, nutrition, drinking water, housing, communications and electricity. A National Programme for Minimum needs has been envisaged for the purpose.

To achieve self-reliance net aid has been reduced to zero in the terminal year 1978-79. The Plan proposes to consolidate self-sufficiency in food-grains, increase production of cotton and oilseeds, and step up output of steel, non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, crude oil, petroleum products, engineering ancillaries, and basic chemicals together with intensifying export drive.

The Plan document has chosen a 5.5 per cent average annual rate of growth. The composition of the growth rate has been worked out to enable the lowest 30 per cent of the population to attain a more satisfactory level of living through laying emphasis on agriculture, key and basic industries and industries producing goods for mass consumption. Efforts must be made to ensure that exports grow at least at the rate of 7 per cent per annum.

The financial resources for the Plan have been estimated at Rs. 51,165 crores at 1971-72 prices, including an estimated Rs. 5,850 crores for financing the current development outlays in the public sector. The balance of Rs. 45,315 crores has been estimated as available for financing investment. The public sector outlay has been envisaged at Rs. 35,595 crores and for private sector Rs. 15,570 crores; the ratio being 65.6 to 34.4.

Regarding the major task of development of backward and hill areas an integrated development programmes has to be formulated; the National Programme for Minimum Needs has to be integrated with the overall programme assigning priority, at implementation stage, to programmes for these classes. To intensify development of backward classes, emphasis has been placed on the role of the general sector in providing major development programmes for these classes.

Besides other measures for attaining and maintaining a reasonable balance between wages, prices and incomes, the plan document envisages an adequate public procurement and distribution system for assured supplies of essential consumption goods at reasonably

stable prices, at least for the poorer sections.

The document emphasises the need to avoid rises in wages unrelated to improvement in productivity and evolving an equitable national wage structure, covering the public and private sectors.

Great stress has been laid on implementation by improving the performance of the administrative apparatus avoiding delays, cutting out waste and stopping leakages. According to the document, much of the delays and inefficiency can be attributed to inadequacies of management and lack of harmony is industrial relations.

To attain the goals set for the Fifth Plan, active involvement of the people in the formulation and implementation of the Plan is necessary. Priority has to be accorded to working out and putting into practice the varied modalities of such involvement so that the Fifth Plan may truly be a people's Plan.

The Planning Commission has suggested to the States to take necessary measures to set up effective apex planning bodies and also strengthen and organize the planning department on a functional basis. The apex body at the State level, the commission has suggested, should include the Chief Minister, the Finance Minister, the Planning Minister and technical experts representing various departments and disciplines. To ensure that the apex planning body is effective in getting plan formulation as well as the monitoring of plan implementation, a non-official full-time Deputy Chairman should be appointed to be incharge of the apex body. The Deputy Chairman will operate through State Planning Department which could function as the secretariat of the apex planning body.

In order to enable the planning departments to discharge their secretarial functions adequately for the apex planning bodies, the Planning Commission has suggested that their strength should be suitably augmented with experts drawn from various disciplines. The departments should also be functionally reorganized into different units to deal with different aspects of planning, like perspective planning, monitoring plan information and evaluation, project formulation, regional and district planning, and plan coordination.

The Government of India has undertaken to provide assistance to the extent of two-thirds of the additional expenditure to be incurred for strengthening the planning machinery at the State level.

The Planning Commission has commended for adoption by other states the scheme of Punjab Government which, while providing employment to the technically qualified persons, also aims at improving the productivity of the employing units through grant of suitable subsidy to industries.

Under the scheme, industrial units having a fixed capital investment of up to Rs. 25 lakhs are granted subsidy for employing engineers and other technically qualified persons and paying equivalent to 50 per cent of their salaries for a period of one year without break. The subsidy is, however, limited to Rs. 125 in the case of diploma holders. This is applicable only when the graduate engineers and diploma holders are paid minimum monthly salaries of Rs. 400 and Rs. 250 respectively. The employer units are required to employ the technically qualified

persons for at least one year, to qualify for the subsidy.

For the current year an amount of Rs. 50 lakhs has been made available to the State Governments through the Ministry of Education so that 3,735 engineers and diploma holders can be found placements. State Directors of Industries are expected to ensure that these placements are secured within the next few months.

* * *

The Public Accounts Committee (Fifth Lok Sabha), in its 50th Report, has suggested that the Income-tax returns of all the assessees having business income of over Rs. 15,000 should be reviewed to see whether all those having taxable wealth are submitting return of wealth because against 2,94,000 income-tax assessees (excluding companies) having business income of over Rs. 15,000 (as on 31st March, 1970), the number of wealth tax assessees was only 1,28,635. According to the report, it can be reasonably presumed that to earn an income of Rs. 15,000 per annum a person should have wealth of not less than Rs. one lakh, which is the limit laid down for the purpose of wealth tax. The Committee has called for concerted efforts to bring down the arrears in assessments, and has stressed streamlining of procedures for valuation as the increase in wealth tax revenue (Rs. 8.26 crores in 1961-62 to Rs. 15.62 crores in 1969-70) has not been even two-folds with a four fold increase in the number of assessees (30,827 in 1961-62 to 1,28,635 in 1969-70) during the past 9 years.

The report states widespread failures on the part of Wealth-tax Officers in assessing various kinds of assets shown by assessees in their returns. The concerned Ministry has been asked to submit a report regarding simplification of wealth tax returns to avoid recurrence of such lapses.

A separate Corporate Tax Act, incorporating provision on Sur Tax, has been proposed by the committee to simplify and rationalize the general tax structure.

After examining audit objections regarding treatment of certain reserves as capital for the purpose of levy of Super Profit Tax/Sur Tax on companies, the Committee has suggested that the treatment of various reserves should be examined carefully on the basis of judicial view and in consultation with Audit and Ministry of Law for issue of detailed instructions for the guidance of assessing officers.

The Committee, set up to examine the question of taxation of agricultural wealth and incomes from all aspects, has in its report recommended that a family consisting of husband, wife and minor children should be the basic unit of assessment for direct taxation purposes.

Regarding a rational system of direct taxation of agriculture, the Committee has observed the following : (*i*) it should take account of the differences in productivity of land depending upon the particular crops grown in a region; (*ii*) its incidence should be uniform in different parts of the country; and (*iii*) it should reflect changes in productivity and prices over a period of time. Moreover, it should be possible to build into the tax an element of progression.

The committee has recommended a procedure for working out Agricultural Holding Tax (AHT) which the committee has devised taking into consideration various significant factors, such as grouping areas according to productivity, average yield of land (on the basis of

production during the past 10 years, etc.

To ensure uniform and objective application of the AHT all over the country, the Committee has recommended formation of a standing All-India Committee on Agricultural Holdings Tax, to be appointed by the Planning Commission consisting of the following three members : (*i*) a non-official economist, (*ii*) an official with experience of Revenue Administration at the State level, and (*iii*) a technical officer who is or has been a Director of Agriculture in a State. The Committee wanted the AHT to be supplemented with a tax on agricultural property and a tax on capital gains arising out of transactions in such property, and that Wealth-tax should be levied on a family basis—the basic exemption limit for the purpose raised to Rs. 1.5 lakhs and all other exemptions done away with as far as possible. For calculating wealth and capital gains, the committee has laid down guidelines in its report.

The committee has suggested that income from livestock-breeding and poultry and dairy farming, which is now exempt from taxation should be subjected to income-tax, and, irrigation water may be viewed as an input and should be priced to cover the cost of providing it. The Committee viewed that betterment levy is unsuitable as an instrument for recovering capital cost of projects. The Committee favoured the idea of setting up a Land Commission as it can play a useful role in farming and securing the financial support for development programmes.

* * *

A joint forum—to be known as "Corporate Enterprise Group of Management and Labour" (CEG)—is to be set up by the Railway Board to provide for the free flow and exchange of ideas on the running and shaping of the enterprise of railways. The forum will consist of Chairman, Members and Additional Members of the Railway Board, Secretary of the Board and three representatives from each of the two labour federations. The workers will be represented by the President and General Secretary of each federation and one member to be nominated by each of the federations.

The CEG will evaluate the functioning of the Railways, and exchange data and ideas on ways and means for improving efficiency, and maximizing organizational effectiveness and viability of the Railways. In particular, it will appraise the investment programmes in regard to housing and welfare services.

The Group will, however, not discuss staff matters including those which come within the purview of the Permanent Negotiating Machinery and Joint Consultative Machinery.

The President of India, on October 31, promulgated, an Ordinance to provide for the immediate takeover in the public interest, of the management of 46 'sick' textile mills, pending nationalization. The important criteria followed, *inter alia*, have been mismanagement, fall in production and employment, closure of units, legal difficulties, etc. Through the takeover, the Government, among other things, would sustain production particularly of the varieties for use by weaker sections of the society, sustain employment and undertake speedy modernization programmes, last one would give a fillip to textile exports.

The public sector National Textile Corporation under the Ministry of Foreign Trade will function as the Custodian-General in terms of the Ordinance.

To remove some major shortcomings in the current procedure of scrutinizing proposals for investment in the public sector, a high-level Public Investment Board has been created. Headed by Secretary (Expenditure) in the Ministry of Finance, its members are : Secretary, Economic Affairs Department, Ministry of Finance; Secretary, Planning Commission; Secretary, Industrial Development; Secretary to the Prime Minister (*Shri P. N. Dhar*); and Secretary of the administrative Ministry concerned with the public investment proposal. The Director-General, Bureau of Public Enterprises will be a permanent invitee.

After examining broad contours of an investment proposal in the project formulation stage, it will take investment decisions on proposals for public investment to produce goods and provide services, and consider proposals for revision of cost estimates which exceed those approved at the time of investment decision.

All proposals for public investment in public sector corporations/undertakings (including department undertakings) involving an amount of Rs. 1 crore and above will be referred to the Board; such investment proposals involving direct government capital of the same value (excluding that of public financial institutions) pertaining to joint sector will also be referred to the Board. The proposals below Rs. 1 crore will continue to be referred to the Expenditure Finance Committee. Investment proposals of the Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Defence, Department of Atomic Energy, Space and Electronics, will be outside the purview of the Plan Investment Board.

The Board will be serviced by the present Plan Finance Wing, Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance, which will hereafter be known as Plan Finance and Project Appraisal Wing. With the constitution of the Board and procedure prescribed, prolonged correspondence and too many internal and inter-Ministerial meetings at different levels will be eliminated.

New Boards of Directors, constituted in accordance with the Nationalisation Act and approved by Parliament, replaced the first Boards (which have been functioning since July, 1970) in all the 14 nationalized Banks with effect from December 11, 1972. Accordingly, each Board of Directors (consisting 9 to 11 Directors for the present) will have two whole-time Directors; two representatives of employees of the bank—one from the workmen and the other from officers; one person each to represent the interests of depositors, farmers, workers and artisans; five persons having special knowledge and practical experience on matters likely to be useful for the working of the banks; and one official each from the Reserve Bank and the Central Government.

The office of 'Custodian' has now ceased to exist. The Chief Executive will be designated Chairman and Managing Director and will preside over the meetings of the Board.

The tenure of non-official Directors will be one year except for the representatives of workmen employees who will have a three-year term. The Director for workmen employees is selected from a panel furnished by the representative union of each bank. In one bank, pending the submission of a new panel by the representative union, the person appointed Director on behalf of workmen employees has been given a tenure of six months.

The Committee on Science & Technology, constituted by the Government of *Kerala*, has set up eight panels to study problems of the following areas in relation to the development of the State: (1) Agriculture and Animal Husbandry; (2) Fisheries and Aquatic Resources; (3) Forestry; (4) Industry & Technology (including Minerals); (5) Pure Science; (6) Medicine and Public Health; (7) Power Development; and (8) Water Resources and Management.

An Action Group set up by the Planning Commission will study the power supply situation in West Bengal and recommend suitable measures to stabilize power supply and maximize utilization of power generation capacity. The 9-member Action Group, set up in consultation with the Ministry of Irrigation & Power and the Government of West Bengal, will be headed by *Shri V. Ramachandran*, Chairman, Kerala State Electricity Board. It will also review the organizational structure and capabilities of the power supply undertakings in the State, as also the coordination obtaining among the agencies engaged in power generation, transmission and distribution in the State, and recommend measures for strengthening the organizations, for improving their capacities. The Group will monitor the implementation of the short-term steps considered necessary.

Besides 12 public sector undertakings, a private sector organization is also one of the recipients of grants-in-aid direct from the Central Government for promotion of family planning programme among its employees.

* * *

In pursuance of the decisions of the Chief Ministers' Conference on Land Reforms, the Union Ministry of Agriculture has circulated to the State Governments a set of guidelines pertaining to level of ceiling, unit of application, retrospective effect, exemptions, distribution of surplus land and target date for enactment of new laws. It has also been mentioned in the circular that all the amended laws should be included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution.

It has been clarified that implementation would be the responsibility of the state Government and that they should set up non-official bodies at appropriate levels and place competent official organizations for administering the ceiling legislations. They must obtain the concurrence of the Central Government in respect of any incidental departure from the guidelines necessitated by the special conditions prevailing in any State or Union Territory.

According to these guidelines, the best category of land with assured irrigation which is capable of yielding at least two crops a year, should have a ceiling within the range of *10* to *18* acres, depending upon the fertility of soil and other conditions. Allowance could be made for land irrigated from private sources and capable of growing at least two crops in a year by equating 1.25 acres of such land with one acre of land, irrigated from public sources and capable of growing at least two crops in a year. The ceiling for such land irrigated from private sources should not, however, exceed 18 acres.

It has further been explained that the term 'irrigation from private sources' meant tubewell or lift irrigation from a perennial water source operated by diesel and/or electric power. If a tubewell or lift irrigation from a perennial water source operated by power was

provided after the promulgation of the ceiling legislation, there would not be any reclassification of land, reducing the area permitted prior to such construction to the category of 10 to 18 acres.

All the State Governments are expected to amend their existing ceiling laws by the end of December, 1972. However, since some State Governments pointed out that pending the amendment of ceiling laws, the farmers might be reluctant to invest in new private irrigation works under the apprehension of reduction of areas, which would undermine the Emergency Food Programme, the Government of India has advised the State Governments that private irrigation works constructed subsequent to August 15, 1972, should have the same effect on classification of land as if they were after the promulgation of ceiling laws.

A Task Force of the *Tamil Nadu* Planning Commission has suggested amendment of the Seeds Act to ensure the quality of seeds and has recommended creation of a Seeds Corporation to produce and market certified seed. The proposed Corporation, according to the Task Force report, could also enforce quality control on supplies of fertilizers and pesticides.

BOOK REVIEWS

DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE IN BASUDHA—STUDY OF A WEST BENGAL VILLAGE; By AJIT K. DANDA and DIPALI G. DANDA, National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad March 1971, Rs. 13.00.

Social Change is a dynamic process. During the process of change, conflicts and tensions are bound to occur. In the post-Independence period, Indian society has been facing challenging problems, and social change is taking place very fast on account of economic and political development. Community development programmes have been implemented all over India through the agency of panchayati raj. Development of agriculture has been one of the most important tasks, and community development programme has also emphasized this aspect. It was visualized that modernization of agricultural techniques would bring about a revolution, but experience has shown that the attempts of extension workers in India have not been successful in this direction. The farmers rejected many programmes introduced by extension workers. It, therefore, becomes necessary to find out the causes of rejection or partial rejection so that hinderances to agricultural development may be removed.

The book *Development and Change in India* is a welcome addition to our knowledge in this field. It is an attempt to find out, in general terms, the various reactions of farmers towards specific agricultural programmes. The special emphasis is on analysing the causes of rejection of modern agricultural practices. Once the reasons for non-adoption of recommended practices are established, they could perhaps be remedied. "The objectives of this study were : (1) to describe, by select case studies within one village, the process of diffusion of a few agricultural practices and explain why certain practices are readily accepted whereas others are met with resistance; (2) to describe the characteristics of adopters and innovations and to examine how they influence adoption of a recommended practice; (3) to examine the way in which a change programme is administered and executed and to what extent it might affect its eventual success; (4) to generally describe what elements of community structure, clique membership or factionalism facilitate or inhibit the diffusion of an improved practice ; and (5) to analyse the clique structure and communication channels of the village."

This book is a case study of a village in West Bengal. This particular village was selected for study partly because of easy accessibility and partly because it was a representative village of Burdwan district. Field work was carried on by a team of two persons. All heads of households of the village were interviewed. Special interviews were held with opinion leaders, innovators and other categories of adopters. Larger amount of data was collected through informal discussions with the

villagers after winning over their trust and confidence.

Chapter I is introductory, giving the objects of the study and the method adopted in collecting data. Chapters II, III, IV & V deal with the background of the village—social, economic and political life of the people. Though these chapters have no direct bearing on the subject of discussion, this information is helpful in understanding the people of the village in the right perspective.

Chapter VI deals with the programmes for development, *e.g.*, agriculture and irrigation, education and social welfare, industries and housing, health and sanitation, transportation and communication. But the impact of the programmes on the life of the community on the whole has been rather superficial.

The adoption behaviour of villagers, particularly in connection with the agricultural innovations, has been discussed in chapter VII. For this purpose, ten agricultural practices were selected, *e.g.*, chemical fertilisers, improved seeds, plant production chemicals, farm equipment, and compost pits.

The authors have analysed that a series of factors are responsible for non-acceptance or partial acceptance of the farm practices. They include physical, situational, economic and cultural factors, and farmer's lack of knowledge. Physical situational factors include scarcity of local labour, unsuitability of soil, and lack of proper irrigation facilities. The economic factor has largely affected the acceptance of various programmes. The cultural factors include simple habits and accepted social norms, beliefs, social structure, world view and values and attitudes of farmers.

In chapter VIII, the characteristics of farmers influencing adoption behaviour have been discuss These factors are : size of la holding of farmers, quality of la owned by them, type of owners of land, degree of fragmentation the land-holdings, and availabi of labour. The personal charac istics of the farmers, like the a literacy, family structure, family s caste, and socio-economic status a affect the adoption behaviour.

In chapter IX, characteristics innovations and how these influe the adoption behaviour have b discussed. Whether an innovat will be accepted or not larg depends upon the socio-cultu background of the people.

How the role of the village le worker can influence the adopt behaviour has been discussed in last chapter. If the VLW friendly, and remains one with community, he can win the co dence of the people. But on whole, he could not be success in persuading the farmers in adopt the new practices.

The authors conclude t adoption of innovations, pa cularly in the Indian context, i highly complex phenomena. view of the above mentioned fa a thorough understanding of society is essential before tak up any major programme for de lopment. Only then the desi result can be expected. Howe excellent a scheme may be, but success is doubtful unless it designed keeping in view the soc cultural background of the peo The study, therefore, is valuable only to a social scientist but also the planners and administrators the country.

It would have been better if author had given some conc suggestions to solve the problem adoption.

—B. P. Gu

THE DAWN OF MODERN ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA; By DR. A. AWASTHI, New Delhi, S. CHAND, 1972, p. 278, Rs. 30.00

Publishing of doctoral dissertations is one of the recent trends in marketing of book business which mainly concentrates on library-sales only. Nonetheless, it represents a welcome beginning in the field of preservation and dissemination of knowledge that takes research conclusions of a scholar to a wider gaze of popular scrutiny, very much different in substance and standard from that of the academic examiners, appointed by the Board of Studies of a University.

Dr. Avasthi's thesis, which covers the Thomasonian era (1843-53) of Company administration in the North-Western Province (now Uttar Pradesh), traces the dawn of modern administration in India, which in a way was its twilight also. The author with his deep historical insight and laboriously collected and collated data, gleaned from first-hand source material, has conjured a picture of district administration and especially that of the land revenue settlement designed and developed by Sir James Thomason. The later chapters unfold the versatile personality of the Lt. Governor who, besides being a forward planner, was a great humanist, an aggressive innovator, a lover of forestry and above all a builder of institutions, like modern Roorkee University of Engineering. With astonishing factual details on his tips and profusly quoting from personal letters, proceedings, office records, diaries, government reports, despatches and gazettes, now unmanageably dumped in archives, Dr. Awasthi has presented his hero in glowing colours. Conscious as he is, "to tell the story through the lips of the actors", a number of eminent Governors-General, like Ellenborough, Aukland, Hardinge and Dalhousie, have made appearances in his pages and have appended their confessions. The Mahalwari system of land revenue (p. 60) and the Halkabandi system of education (p. 91), of which Sir Thomason was the chief architect, have been outlined and analysed in the context of Thomasonian school of civilians, which included illustrious names, like John and Henry Lawrence, W. Muir, J. Strachey, R. Montgomery and Walter Sherer.

The Thesis, which has been deservingly acclaimed and approved by eminent British orientalists, like Dr. C. H. Philips and Dr. C. C. Davies, is a real monument of industry and arduous painstaking research. Evaluating "the Thomasonian tenure of office as one of the most eventful periods in the revenue annals of India", Dr. Awasthi concludes, "Sir J. Thomason espoused the cause of the peasantry, but his concern for the well-being of the cultivator alienated and even prejudiced the landed aristocracy...and it was perhaps because of their powerful alliance that a blow was delivered which shook the foundations of the British empire in 1857" (p. 69). It is interesting to find that, while presiding over the management of a live volcano, Sir James had the administrative farsight to plan for technical education and laid "stress on the use of vernacular as the medium of instruction not only in study of humanities but also of technical sciences". This quite

rightly, according to Dr. Awasthi, has a lesson to many a skeptical mind in our midst at present, who doubt the wisdom of a policy, making regional languages the medium of education" (p. 103).

The then North-Western province, which was even larger than the present Uttar Pradesh, was and has always been more than a province. The rudiments of Police, Judicial, Jail, Irrigation and Welfare administrations, which Sir James judiciously stalled and meticulously garnoered, form the rock bottom and contours of district administration in India till today. Even the foundations of a secularism-oriented bureaucracy can be traced in the Thomasonian dictum that "My business as a Governor is to enlighten people not to teach religion" (p. 215).

On the weaker aide of the study, it may be contended that the author is somewhat soft with his hero and even the critical estimate is far from being an estimate and still less critical. After all, the man who ruled almost the whole of North India in that most fateful decade of pre-mutiny could not be worthy of all those adjectives which Dr. Awasthi has so generously showered on him. Sentences, like "His thoughts would be gently distilled like the dew" (p. 213), "He did not take care of his health and thus worked himself to death" (p. 16), "Inspite heavy load of work, he lived a happy domestic life" (p. 11), "He found the province as a raw brick and left it as an appreciable piece of marble" (p. 13), seem like estimates of a devotee rather than those of a researcher of history. It is true that the muse of administrative history of India should discard political blinke but it is equally disastrous historians start estimating individu and their contributions on the ba of obituaries and condolenc (p. 219). Spoken and written wor in history, even though authentica foot-noted, need not tell the obje tive truth and the research must safeguard himself agair superlatives and comparative me surabilities. Dr. Awasthi's analy suffers from lack of balanced co clusions. Even when he enumeral the defects of Mahalwari system, feels sorry for his administrat Sir James Thomason and ad "the poignancy of these evils w not acute in North Weste Province" (p. 70). After goi through the entire work, one dc not have the feel of a system or t period which Dr. Awasthi chara terises as "the period of lull befc the storm" (p. 220). The stu would have done a greater servi to the knowledge of administrati history, if the termination of t Thomasonian decade would ha been relevantly and meaningfu linked with the events that made bigger history than the 'minihistor which the author's hero w making at Roorkee, Azamgarh a Agra.

Yet the labour of Dr. Awast needs high commendation from those who wish to go to a histori to seek unvarnished facts. Descri tion and interpretation may be u separable exercises in the muse a lore of history, yet the former, faithfully attempted, can yield ri possibilities of reinterpretatio with the passage of time. I Awasthi's work is certainly rich facts and is a pioneering study its type in a very important area Indian history as it approach

›wards the watershed. The production is neat and the price is reason-ble in the era of rising prices. The udents of administrative history ın profit much by undertaking milar and comparative studies in the contributions of several other Thomasons, who have not even reached the archives.

—Prabhu Datta Sharma

BOOKS RECEIVED

IIPA (Committee on Case Studies), *Administration in Action*, New Delhi, IIPA, p. 298, Rs 15.00

IIPA (Committee on Case Studies), *Case Studies in Panchayati Raj*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1972, p. 161, Rs. 12.00.

IIPA (Committee on Case Studies), *New Challenges in Administration*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1972, p. 203, Rs. 12.00

Johri, J. C. *Comparative Politics*, New Delhi, Sterling. 1972, p. 174, Rs. 21 40.

Khan, Waheeduddin *and* Tripathy, R. N. *Intensive Agriculture and Modern Inputs : Prospectus of Small Farmers—A Study in West Godawari District*. Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1972, p. 124, Rs. 16.00.

Maheshwari, B. P. *Industrial and Agricultural Development in India since* 1914 (*A Study of Some Aspects of Economic History of India*), New Delhi, S. Chand, 1971, p. 290, Rs. 35.00.

Mathur, J. C. *Adult Education for Farmers in a Developing Society*, New Delhi, Indian Adult Education Association, 1972, p. 233, Rs. 12.00.

Muthayya, B. C. *Child Welfare : Existing Conditions and Parental Attitudes—A Perspective Study in Andhra Pradesh*, Hyder
National Institute of Comm
Development, 1972, p. 184, Rs. 2

Nayar, P. K. B. (ed.). *De*
ment of Kerala : Problems
Promises, Trivandrum, Universi
Kerala (Department of Sociol
1972, p. 277, Rs. 20.00.

Newton, Trevor. *Cost B*
Analysis in Administration, Lor
George Allen & Unwin, 1972, p.
£ 4.15.

Pruthi, Surinder P. S. *Eco*
and Managerial Environment in
Bombay, Progressive Corpor
1972, p. 262, Rs. 22.50.

Puttaswamaiah, K. *Indicato*
Development with Reference
Mysore's Economy (*India*), Bang
Government of Mysore (Direct
of Education and Manpower, De
ment of Planning), 1972, p. 86.

Saxena, A. P. *Materials Pla*
in Emergency. New Delhi,
p. 47, Rs. 4.00.

Varma, Paripurnanand. *I*
logy of Crime and Delinquency,
Sahitya Bhavan, 1972, p.
Rs. 40.00.

Viswanathan, S. S. *Perforn*
Budgeting in Government (*An*
trative Guide), New Delhi,
1972, p. 136, Rs. 12.00.

THE INDIAN JOURNAL
OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ol. XIX April-June, 1973 No. 2

AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN INDIA AND BRITAIN

R. S. Arora

DURING recent years, students of comparative problems of the public sector may have observed two distinct developments which ɔpear, at first sight, more or less inconsistent, nay, even contradictory. hese are (*a*) a rapid expansion of public ownership of strategic means of roduction and distribution as a worldwide phenomenon;[1] and (*b*) a large ;ale awareness, even serious concern, about some of the complex problems cposed by the expansion of the public sector. The nature and significance f problems may, in fact they do, vary from enterprise to enterprise and from ate to state. They, however, include those of : planning and implemen- .tion, administration and organization, pricing and investment, industrial ıd public relations, legal and constitutional status, autonomy and account- ɔility of public undertakings, etc.

The first point stated above, being not directly relevant to the present udy, can be disposed of relatively quickly. Evidently, during recent years, /en governments not formally committed to the attainment of an egali- ırian society have been pursuing—often willingly, and sometimes under ıe compulsion of circumstances—policies of acquiring 'ownership' or

[1] *See* Stephen Holt, *Six European States*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1970; Jim oagland, "Nationalization—African Fact of Life", *International Herald Tribune*, .nuary 2-3, 1971; "Algeria Oil Production Two-thirds Paralysed", *Le Monde Weekly*, ne 3-9, 1971; "Kenya Taking Half of Two Private Banks", *International Herald Tribune*, ıne 2, 1971; Charles Vanecke, "Chile—Slow Road to Socialism", *Le Monde Weekly*, ıne 24-30, 1971; Marcel Niederogang, "Venezuelan Oil; Nationalization by 1971", ; *Monde Weekly*, July 8-14, 1971. *Also see* R. S. Arora, "Petroleum Nationalization in iddle-East", *Lok Udyog*, June, 1972 ; "Expansion of the Public Sector in Latin merica", *Lok Udyog*, November, 1972; and "Public Sector in Sri Lanka", *Lok Udyog*, ecember, 1972.

just 'management' of economic enterprises which were considered earlier to be beyond the province of normal state functions. So much so that in some of the erstwhile *laissez-faire* societies the state ownership of vital economic enterprises has rapidly acquired dimensions where it now plays significant, if not decisive, role in the economic performance of those nations. For instance, today the British Coal Board, which runs the nationalized coal industry, has the biggest payroll in Western Europe and the British Ministry of Power, which is responsible for the nationalized coal, gas, electricity and steel industries, can be described as being the largest holding company in the world. Yet, until only a few decades ago Britain claimed to be the champion, *par excellence*, of free market economy.[2]

Similar trends can be found in most of the West European countries as well as across the Atlantic in Canada and even in the United States from where the most popular folklore of free enterprise have originated in the twentieth century.

During more recent years, governments of most of the developing countries have been taking daring steps of expanding the public sector, particularly by the acquisition of private industries, indigenous as well as foreign, in order to meet the aspirations of their people. For instance, several Asian, African and Latin American countries, including Ceylon, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iran, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela and Chile, have taken decisive steps to nationalize, completely or largely, foreign petroleum interests operating in their countries which until recently significantly controlled their economies. Like international petroleum cartels, many other industrial and commercial titans of national and international origin have been nationalized in the developing world.

While it has become almost counter-productive to stress any longer the virtues of the free enterprise in pursuit of a case against the expansion of the public sector, the emphasis on problems associated with the efficient conduct of the public sector is not misplaced. True, serious students of this subject have always felt that the public ownership of vital enterprises would indubitably resolve some age-old conflicts and would create situations which would be irreversible by nature but not without creating new problems. However, of all the issues, bulk of literature on public ownership continues to deal with various aspects of the accountability of nationalized industries. For obvious reasons, the concern about the performance and accountability of the state sector has been both genuine as well as 'motivated' or partly genuine and partly motivated; often it has been difficult to distinguish one from the other. The aim of this article is, in fact, very limited; it is to discuss some of the aspects of the role of audit as a tool of

[2] *See* R. S. Arora, "Growth of Public Sector in Britain", *Lok Udyog*, September, 1971.

accountability in order to ascertain the conduct of the public sector in Britain and India.

Here, it needs to be stressed that there has been a tendency to over-estimate the significance of audit and it has often been ignored that audit is only one of the several means of ensuring accountability and that even the most scientific techniques of auditing would operate within certain constraints and would, thus, produce limited results. Our aim, therefore, should be to evolve auditing techniques which can produce optimum results within recognized parameters set by the constraints, and the results produced by audits should supplement and should neither compete nor conflict with those achieved through other means of accountability. Other means of accountability include: parliamentary devices, such as the Questions Hour, debates, and enquiries by parliamentary committees; ministerial devices of informal consultations and formal directions to the boards; and studies conducted by governmental institutions, like the 'Prices and Income Board' in Britain, and the 'Bureau of Public Enterprises' in India. Again, in Britain, there are Consumers' Councils to protect the interests of consumers of nationalized industries.

All these devices of accountability are concerned with the efficient conduct of the public sector while the concept of 'efficiency' itself continues to elude any precise definition. Yet, an inefficient unit can be identified like a sick child in a healthy class. In view of this, we shall first examine the role of audit in the accountability of the public sector in Britain.

II

In Britain, with one or two exceptions, statutes creating public corporations do not empower the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to undertake auditing of accounts of nationalized industries.[3] Prior to 1953, the CAG had been assisting the public Accounts Committee in its deliberations. But he never reported separately upon nationalized industries. Various statutes dealing with nationalized industries assumed that firms of professional accountants be appointed to audit the accounts of nationalized industries and this remained, invariably, the practice. While giving an evidence before the Clitheroe Committee on Nationalized Industries, the late Sir Frank Tribe, Comptroller and Auditor General, categorically said that his department could, if required, undertake the task, only after a substantial addition was made to his staff.[4] Even then he would not be able to report on their efficiency. Evidently, he was reluctant to extend

[3] For extensive bibliography, *see* A. H. Hanson, *Nationalization—A Book of Readings*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1963.

[4] See *Parliamentary Papers* (U.K.) 1959, No. 276, p. 11, Q. 71.

his jurisdiction to the public sector. He suggested that professional auditors might be able, if required to do so, to provide Parliament with the kind of information which he usually gave to the Public Accounts Committee. On the other hand, the Institute of Chartered Accountants was also opposed to the above mentioned idea. Therefore, no action was taken on the Auditor General's suggestion.

However, a careful scrutiny of the present auditing practice in Britain indicates that certificates given by professional auditors with regard to the accounts of the nationalized industries resemble the unilluminating formula which applied to joint stock companies in the private sector. This arrangement has been widely considered as inadequate and, with the expansion of the public sector in Britain, the concern about the inadequacy has also grown. For instance, commenting on the prevailing situation, E.L. Normanton says that the British public corporations are unique in escaping any kind of constitutional control through audit. He regards this as a serious limitation on their accountability. "The submission of annual reports and professionally audited accounts", he believes, "does not amount to accountability."[5] Supporting the views of Normanton, Professor Robson observes that "a question of great importance which has so far escaped serious attention is the audit of the accounts of the public corporations". Robson believes that the professional audit used for the nationalized industries in Britain does not serve any important purpose except that it ensures financial regularity and honesty in the administration of accounts. Moreover, the relationship between a professional auditor and the company, which is his client and pays his fees, is entirely inappropriate for a public corporation.[6]

Such reservations about the existing auditing system were further reinforced when Parliamentary Select Committee on Nationalized Industries discovered that its own performance was not as impressive as expected by its advocates. After a few years of experience with the Committee serious doubts had begun to appear about its effectiveness for the purpose it was set up. The question often raised was : Could the device of a Parliamentary Committee on Nationalized Industries determine the performance of industries concerned? It was often felt that it was not safe to reply either in the affirmative or negative. If by public accountability it was meant that the Members of Parliament be simply informed about the activities of the nationalized industries, then it was perfectly correct to say that Committee did an effective job. It did produce a mass of information. As a matter of fact, to collect general information was not the ultimate object

[5] *See* E. L. Normanton, *The Accountability and Audit of Governments : A Comparative Study*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1966, p. 311.

[6] *Vide*, W. A. Robson, *Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1960, pp. 202-210.

of the Committee. The real aim of collecting informaton was tc see that the public enterprises were functioning efficiently and, if not, to take proper action to set the wrongs right.[7] For instance, the proceedings of the Select Committee revealed, time and again, that ministerial influence operated on the Boards. Such exposures did create some new problems. It was interesting to watch the reaction of those whose hidden activities were exposed. Now-a-days, inefficient Ministers are not generally sacked provided they remain loyal to the party oligarchy. Although Select Committee's reports were sometimes extensively discussed in Parliament, but the Committee did not succeed in deflecting the Government from any policy on which it was firmly set. Even on technical issues, the Minister concerned could find a way to ignore a Select Committee's proposal on the grounds that his *ad hoc* departmental committee had just given contrary advice. A Select Committee was not empowered to restrict a Minister's freedom to choose his own advisers or his own advisee. Nor could it hear evidence or see papers and records which the Minister decided to withhold.

On its own part, the Select Committee felt handicapped in measuring the performance of technical functions of nationalized industries. For instance, while examining the reports and accounts of the British European Airways, and the British Overseas Airways Corporation, the Committee had 60 pages of narration and 80 pages of accounts to deal with. There were also more than 60 memoranda, with reports and accounts of at least seven foreign airline companies. Finding of accountancy advice to assist it in its examination of such complex reports and accounts was the Committee's dilemma.

This situation compelled the Committee to examine the problem in a formal manner which resulted in a 'Special Report' in July 1959. In this Report, the Committee examined various possible types of assistance. The interesting point was that the Committee rejected the proposal for assistance by an officer of the status of the Comptroller. The Committee thought that such an assistance would most probably lead, or would appear to be leading, towards a 'Grand Inquisition' into the nationalized industries by officials acting on behalf of Parliament. The Committee also considered the idea of hiring the services of an accountant, experienced in industrial and commercial accounts, or to employ an economist to advise the Committee on the technical aspects of evaluating performance of public expenditures. The Committee, finally, decided that it should neither rely on Treasury officials seconded for the purpose nor on outside professional experts engaged in private practice. The Committee found no adequate plan to recommend to Parliament. However, the quest to

[7] *Vide*, R. S. Arora, "Parliamentary Scrutiny: The Select Committee Device", *Public Law*, Spring 1967, pp. 30-41.

determine the efficiency of nationalized industries continued to be felt widely.[8]

In response to this quest, the British Government issued in 1961 a *White Paper on the Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalized Industries.*[9] According to the *White Paper,* the Government's general policy was to ensure that the industries were organized and administered efficiently and economically. These undertakings were expected to 'pay their way', *i.e.,* on an average of good and bad years, to have not less than sufficient revenues to meet proper charges, including a provision for reserves. It was also felt that financial results alone did not fully measure efficiency. A simple comparison with the return on capital in private industry was thought to be misleading. However, taking several considerations into account, the Government laid down financial guidelines for nationalized industries. While doing so, the *White Paper* conceded that earning power, total depreciation provision, and reserve requirements will vary according to the prospective commercial, technological and financial developments of different undertakings. The Document concluded : "The nationalized industries are from their size and nature bound to play a major role in the economic life of the country. They cannot, however, be regarded only as very large commercial concerns which may be judged mainly on their commercial results; all have, although in varying degrees, wider obligations than commercial concerns in the private sector. The object of these proposals is to find for each industry or board a reasonable balance between these two concepts." It was hoped that the new arrangements will improve performance and morale and reduce the need for outside interference.

Within a few years, the implementation of the recommendations of the *White Paper* exposed their limitations. Once again several aspects of measurement of performance of nationalized industries were extensively discussed by the Select Committee on Nationalized industries in 1967-68. While critically assessing the recommendations of the *White Paper* of 1961, Sir Thomes Padmore, a member of the Select Committee, said :

> "What I do not quite understand is the principle of the thing. May I put it to you this way. The *White Paper* laid it down that one measures in broad terms the performance of a nationalized industry by requiring it to produce a certain return on the capital invested.... We do not. . . measure and control the performance of the industries which are in surplus in terms of a global figure of surplus. We do it under the terms of the *White Paper* by way of fixing an objective

[8] *Special Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries,* H.C. 276, July 28, 1959.

[9] *Cmnd.* 1337.

measured as a percentage return on capital and a lot of techniques flow from that. Why should that not equally apply to an industry in deficit?"[10]

Commenting on the same subject, another member of the Committee, Mr. D. L. Munby, said:

"No adequate economic justification has ever been produced for the Treasury financial targets expressed as a rate of return on net assets. There is a fundamental difficulty in the valuation of net assets in so far as these relate to pieces of capital equipment installed many years ago, and in many cases of a kind which would not be installed today. ... It is not disputed that most nationalized industries should normally earn some kind of surplus over their costs, but this surplus should follow as a result of a right pricing policy with some margin for contingencies and should not be decided by arbitrary criterion.

"It may be argued that the purpose of the target is to ensure a given rate of self-finance so as to avoid pressures on the Treasury. There is, however, no economic criterion by which such self-finance targets could be assessed and this policy means in practice that the prices of nationalized industries are rigged to meet the financing requirements of the Treasury. In some cases this may do little damage, in others it may do considerable damage."[11]

According to Professor J. R. Sargent, the *White Paper* suffered from several limitations. He conceded that one important ground on which it could be argued that financial objectives were necessary was that managerial efficiency and morales throughout the industry depended upon them. From the managerial-morale point of view it did not matter much exactly what the objective was. To be credible as an objective, and therefore capable of influencing performance in the industry, it must be neither too easy nor too difficult. At the same time, he stressed that the effectiveness of the objectives for an industry as a stimulant to managerial efficiency and morale depended not merely on the fact that it existed, but on what was done if it was not reached. It was far from clear from the *White Paper* what the sanctions actually were. While exposing the inadequacies of financial objectives, Professor Sargent particularly observed:

"The setting of an overall financial objective for an industry, such as the achievement of a certain percentage return on capital,

[10] See *First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, Session 1967-68, Vol. II, p. 396, para 1432.

[11] *See* D.L. Munby, "Prices, Investment and Financial Objectives", *First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, Session 1967-68, Volume II, p. 591.

is unlikely to be capable of ensuring that the costs which are identifiable with the performance of each of the many different services which it provides are reflected in the charges which are made for each of these."[12]

Professor J. Wiseman concurred with Professor Sargent and commented that an objective to achieve a particular rate of return was either an objective to be treated seriously or was not an objective at all. Unless we knew what happened when it was not achieved, it became difficult to assess its worth.[13]

At this stage, it is possible to summarise the deficiencies of the strategy of the 1961—*White Paper*. *Firstly*, industries, especially those with considerable unexploited monopoly power, could too easily achieve their objectives simply by raising their prices, without regard to possible economies in costs as the best use of resources. *Secondly*, the single objective might be achieved while continuing a large measure of cross-subsidization; pricing policies which under- or over-price the goods or services of the industries as a whole. *Thirdly*, the overall objective gave no guidance on the desirability of price differentials to reflect the differences in costs in meeting demand in the short run where spare capacity exists and where it does not exist. *Finally*, the financial objectives also gave inadequate guidance on investment policies.

True, the 1961-*White Paper* made a valuable start towards establishing an acceptable economic framework for the guidance of Boards on what was expected of them, and though it contained some helpful clarification about ministerial control in regard to prices and social obligations, it was in some respect a false start. The strategy of financial objectives was like that of the statutes of nationalized industries. It dealt with only the desired end-result, and left the industries largely free to decide how to achieve those ends. It provoked several questions, such as : Could the economic objectives of giant industrial organizations really be summed up by a single target rate of return on their investment? Was not the calculation of financial objectives much more difficult than the *White Paper* assumed? In fact, the *White Paper* did not fully succeed in establishing an economically sound basis for the measurement of efficiency of the nationalized industries.

In 1967, the British government thoroughly revised its strategy to determine the performance of nationalized industries. The revised strategy

[12] *First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, op. cit., p. 597.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 607.

was laid down in a *White Paper*.[14] The new *White Paper* removed the financial objective from the centre of the picture, and replaced it with pricing policies and investment criteria. The new strategy clearly separated, for the first time, the economic and financial aspects of the industries' obligations. This time, financial results were regarded as an expression of economic policies, and not an end in themselves. The strategy was sub-divided into four parts : investment appraisal, pricing policy, costs, and financial objectives.

The new approach marked an advance in two ways. First of all, it made clearer that the starting point on the road to finding a suitable pricing policy was marginal costing in the sense that a real effort should be made to work out properly and consider the long and short run marginal costs as they were appropriate and before other things were taken into account. *Secondly,* it emphasized the importance of looking at each broad service and product individually to devise a suitable pricing policy for each without running them too closely together. The 1967-*White Paper* sought to emphasize that where social obligations were important and needed to be brought into the calculation and the final decision, it was important that the proper investment and price studies be made nonetheless and that the importation of a social argument should not be used as a means of reducing the effectiveness and importance of the genuine investment.

III

According to many experts, the best way to determine the efficiency of a nationalized industry is to introduce performance auditing by a specialized institution. In a memorandum, submitted to the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in July 1967, Professor W. A. Robson made a strong case for efficiency audit of nationalized industries. Robson has been advocating for many years the establishment of an Efficiency Audit Commission. The proposal was first put forward by him in 1937 in his book: *Public Enterprise*[15]. It was further elaborated in his subsequent studies. His proposal assumed that the proposed audit commission would concern itself only with the efficiency of a nationalized industry operating within the framework of policy already laid down in the statutes, regulations and directions. It would not normally raise questions involving a change of fundamental policy, such as a different form of organization for the coal industry or the introduction of a subsidy for transport. Robson believed that the functions of the proposed Commission shall not overlap with those of other *ad hoc* Committees. The Audit Commission would inquire into

[14] *The Nationalised Industries: A Review of Economic and Financial Objectives,* Cmnd. 3437, 1967.

[15] W.A. Robson (*ed.*), *Public Enterprise : Developments in Social Ownership and Control in Great Britain,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1937, pp. 379-81.

such matters as the character, quantity, and quality of goods or services provided; price policy; efficiency of administration; personnel questions, including pay, recruitment, and methods of promotion; relations between the board and the consumer; capital expendituie, and the methods of financing it, and so forth. This will help in building up a skilled staff possessing an unrivalled insight into the problems of nationalized industry and unequalled ability to compare the methods adopted by the several boards for coping with them. Professor Robson further stressed that the work of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries could be immeasurably strengthened if they were supplied with the reports of an Efficiency Audit Commission or the advice of a highly qualified staff.[16]

Prof. Robson's proposal has been strongly supported by E. L. Normanton and W. Thornhill. According to Normanton, British public enterprises have been unique in escaping any kind of constitutional control through audit. He asserted : "The submission of annual reports and professionally audited accounts does not amount to accountability. . . .It is of the very essence of accountability that the persons or bodies held accountable should not be able to dictate which aspects of their business will be examined; the initiative must be held by those to whom they are accountable." In view of this, Normanton emphasized that a competent efficiency audit could make a really important contribution to parliamentary, public, ministerial and even managerial understanding of the nationalized industries.

This approach was further supported by Thornhill in his memorandum submitted to the above mentioned Select Committee. According to Thornhill, public enterprises in Britain suffered too much Ministerial influence and not enough public accountability. And within the existing framework ot the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, it was not possible to measure the performance of the public corporations. For that matter, even the existing ordinary financial audit proved for the most part irrelevant. Thornhill held that the concept of accountability assumed that the auditor could demand explanation on any matter he thought fit. It further presumed that the initiative was with the auditor and he was competent for his task; he knew where to look, what questions to ask, and he was not going to be blinded by the jargon of experts under examination. The tests to be applied were not simply the financial ones of probity and solvency. He could apply physical measurements, economic and statistical tests, technical assessments, and so forth. Thornhill expected the auditors to be completely independent both of Ministers and their corporations. For this, he suggested the establishment of a Public Industries

[16] W. A. Robson in *the First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, op. cit., pp. 531-537.

Audit Office under the control of a Parliamentary Officer. The Office should be empowered to initiate such reviews of the work and performance of the nationalized industries as appeared to them to be necessary for the purposes of accountability. The reports of the Office should be presented to Parliament and be referred to the Select Committee in the same way as the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General are referred to the Public Accounts Committee. Thornhill would prefer to call it 'accountability-audit' instead of 'efficiency audit'.[17]

During the oral evidence before the Select Committee Prof. A. H. Hanson broadly agreed with Prof. W. A. Robson and Mr. Thornhill, whereas Mr. D. N. Chester felt sceptical about their proposals. However, the idea of Efficiency Audit Commission provoked several serious questions from the Select Committee. For instance, the Committee asked : would not proposed scrutiny by the Audit Commission duplicate the work of the Departments and also that of the Select Committee? What sort of report should be expected from the proposed Commission? To whom should such reports be submitted? Should the proposed Commission give its opinion if it wanted? Who will appoint such Commission? Who would frame the agenda for the Commission? Who will pay for its establishment? Even the Select Committee was not unanimous on the virtues of the proposed Efficiency Audit Commission. Indeed, one of the members of the Select Committee commented : "There are only two conceivable bodies who can possess the power in this matter. If it is given to the Government, then public accountability is lost because it has to take place within the machine; if it is given to this Committee, we have not the power to put into effect the recommendations which might be made".[18]

On the other hand, another Member of the Select Committee wanted the proposed efficiency audit commission to work under the Select Committee, and he recalled : "After all, we have long since conceded the point that we need technical assistance, clerks to the Committee. Anything we can do to strengthen the authority of a Committee in dealing with people, whether it be by an audit body or some other body is acceptable to us".[19] However, the Chairman of the Committee warned that if the proposed Efficiency Audit Commission was set up, "There would always be difficulty in getting good chaps for these boards (*i.e.*, public corporations); because over their shoulder all the time is a Ministry and a Government Department who come along and poke their noses in, a Minister who may get the chairman over a lunch and then send him back with orders he has never heard about.

[17] W. Thornhill, "Ministers Relations with Nationalised Industries", in the *First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, op. cit. pp. 538-544.

[18] *The First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, op. cit., pp. 562.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 563.

On top of all that you are going to put someone to look over the other shoulder, a bunch of efficiency engineers who might come down at any time without any warning and say they were going to find out why they were doing this, that or the other."[20]

Several nationalized industries opposed the whole idea of efficiency audit or 'accountability audit.' The following comments of the BOAC were typical of the reaction:[21]

1 "There seems to be implicit in these proposals that BOAC, as one of the nationalized industries, is, at it were *ex-hopothesi,* not as efficient and not as accountable as it ought to be. This is just not true. We accept, of course, that perfection is never attained and that one of the more important functions of management is to strive to attain greater efficiency throughout the organization. But this having been said, there is no gound to support any suggestion that an audit is required to bring BOAC's efficiency up to standard.

2. "BOAC is continuously monitoring its own efficiency by making appropriate comparison with the results obtained by other international airlines.

3. "The establishment of an efficiency audit would inevitably imply a lack of confidence on the part of the Ministers in the members of the Board of BOAC who have been appointed to run BOAC efficiently.

4. "If the auditors are not really better experts than BOAC's, then their exercise would be time-consuming and, in fact, would hinder efficiency."

While the Committee was still in session, the British Government announced in September 1967 that henceforward all major price increases proposed by the nationalized industries would be referred to the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI), and also their intention that, in the course of its investigations into the industries' prices, the Board were empowered to carry out an efficiency audit of each industry. The NBPI were to be guided by the Ministers in respect of efficiency studies. For instance, the NBPI was given power to carry out efficiency studies only in respect of specific price increase. The Board were not expected to examine technological matters but were to concentrate on a review of the industries' machinery for keeping down costs, including the appropriate pre-casting and decision-making techniques. The Board were also to be assisted by a

---

[20] *The First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, op. cit., p. 563, para 1908.

[21] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 172-73.

small number of specialist permanent staff to concentrate on efficiency stu dies and to provide some continuity. The Board were not concerned witl efficiency audit, "in the sense of looking for errors made in the past". The were instructed to assist and advice for the future, *e.g.*, on pricing principles This meant, in fact, "a forward looking exercise". The Select Committe felt satisfied with this development, and consequently decided to ignore th idea of Efficiency Audit Commission. In support of its decision, th Committee offered the following reasons:[22]

1. A regular, continuous, external efficiency audit for the nationalize industries would not be compatible with the degree of autonomou responsibility that has been given the industries, or with the patter of Ministerial control. The Committee believed that apart from th normal commercial audit, the industries should not be accountabl in detail, and on a regular bases, to anybody, Parliamentary, Minis terial, or in some manner independent, for their day-to-day efficienc or for their detailed managerial decisions.
2. Efficiency audit would discourage enterprising people from joinin the Boards of nationalized industries.
3. Inefficiencies disclosed by the proposed Commission might encourag the Ministers to increase their interference in the affairs of th industries.
4. The efficiency audit would discourage the industries from applyin their own innovations to improve efficiency.
5. The efficiency audit might cripple the decision-making ability.

On the other hand, in the opinion of the Committee, the proper rol for efficiency studies should be to examine the current facts, costs, etc., an the current methods employed for securing efficiency in such matters a pricing policy, demand forecasting, investment appraisal, productivit improvement and cost control, and then making recommendations fo the future. The Committee also warned that the efficiency studies under taken by the NBPI should not duplicate the work of the Select Committee it should supplement it.

IV

In India, the growth of the public sector since her Independence ha taken place broadly within the constitutional framework which assures th establishment of equalitarian society through parliamentary democrati

[22] *The First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, Vol. l Chapter XV.

institutions. Surprisingly enough, with the expansion of the public sector, general awareness about various problems inherent in it have been very similar to those obtained in Britain and in other societies where the public sector plays more or less equally significant role. However, the problems of parliamentary accountability and auditing of the public sector in India have often provoked serious debates both in Parliament and in academic circles. It appears that while parliamentary accountability of public enterprises in India has been more or less shaped after the British model, the auditing practice has almost followed the American model. Both these aspects need to be briefly elaborated.

Just as in Britain, in India too there are two methods by which accountability to the Parliament is secured : (*i*) indirect, *i.e.* control over the boards canalized through Ministers; and (*ii*) direct, *i.e.* through review of Boards' activities by Parliamentary Committees.

All statutes and Articles of Association dealing with public enterprises in India grant extensive controlling powers to the Ministers. As a matter of fact, with the expansion of the public sector of economy, it was thought essential to arm the competent Ministers with necessary powers. The public sector's programmes often needed to be geared with the operations of the rest of the economic structure of the country. At the same time, the boards of nationalized industries have been given authority to take decisions except in respect of those matters where a Minister's approval is required, or in regard to which the Minister has given a direction of a general or a specific character.

Experience, however, reveals that the statutory means of accountability possessed by Ministers are of far less importance in the relationship between Government and public enterprises in India than persuasion and pressures exercised informally through discussions, negotiations, and influence. It has been noticed that Ministers usually hesitate to use their statutory powers which entail responsiblity to the Parliament. They constantly take advantage of the existence of these powers to influence the Boards. Most of the reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings, confirm that the Boards remain constantly in informal consultation with Ministries and the ministerial view is listened to with respect. Sometimes, Ministers intentionally keep their activities almost secret in order to avoid accountability to Parliament. For instance, the Chagla Commission, while examining the affairs of the Life Insurance Corporation, remarked:". . . there was a tendency on the part of the Finance Ministry to look upon the Corporation as a wing or branch of that Ministry and to issue orders to it in the belief that the Corporation was bound to carry out those orders." These remarks can prove correct in respect of several other public enterprises in India.

These strange relations, which the Ministers have developed with public enterprises, have constantly been the cause of Parliament's frustration in regard to the public sector.

In a parliamentary form of democracy, Members of Parliament are entitled to know all about the state undertakings. It is not only the right of Members of Parliament to keep themselves informed as to how Government concerns are being run, but it is also their responsibility as representatives of the people to see that the public funds are put to the best use. The vital question is how far a Member of Parliament can go either in the exercise of his right or in the discharge of his responsibility, as stated above. The general rule is, or ought to be, that the autonomy required for an industrial or commercial enterprise should not ordinarily be infringed. If too much influence is allowed, then the very purpose of establishing autonomous corporations or companies shall be defeated. The problem has persistently been to perserve, nay, to achieve a balance between democratic principles and efficient performance of industrial concerns. It was because of these objectives that substantial powers were given to the competent Ministers, and it was expected that while using these powers they would observe the firm parliamentary rule and tradition that a Minister is accountable to Parliament for anything he or his department does or for anything he has power to do, whether he does it or not. It is being increasingly realised that from this point of view the objective of parliamentary supervision of public enterprises has been defeated. The scope of parliamentary knowledge about public undertakings is restricted and second hand. Ministers sometimes come to Parliament and often decline to reply to question on the ground that this responsiblity is non-existent. The net result is 'gross dissatisfaction' and 'utter frustration' on the part of the general public about the undertakings it owns. Theoretically, it is correct that the Parliament or its representative Government creates the public undertaking by its own Statutes or Instruments of Association and has the power to expand, contract, quash or vary its powers by an appropriate piece of legislation. But, in practice, the Parliament has been reluctant to do so. However, there have been persistent demands for devising means to measure the performance of public enterprises.

Regarding the audit of public undertakings in India, there has been a tendency to follow the American model and not the British. However, the controversy over the role and scope of auditing has been growing with the expansion of the public sector in India.

V

In the United States, till 1934, exemption of the Government Corporations from the Auditor General's control was a common consistent

feature. United States *ex rel* Skinner and Eddy Corporatin *v* McCarl[23] established the principle that in the absence of express legislation, the accounts of a national proprietary corporations were not subject to the audit of the Comptroller General of the United States as the accounts of the Government Departments were. In 1934, this freedom was attacked by an executive order subjecting the accounts of the Government Corporations created after March 3, 1933, whose accounting procedure was not otherwise prescribed by law, to 'settlement and adjustment' by the General Accounting Officer (GAC).[24] Earlier, in 1933, the Comptroller General had proposed that all Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) funds be brought under his expenditure control. His attempt to assert auditing powers over the Tennessee Valley Authority, broader than Congress had contemplated, made it necessary for the statute to be amended twice in order to establish G.A.O. audit.[25] In 1944, Byrd Committee recommended that the Comptroller General of the United States be made the Auditor and Comptroller, *ex-officio,* of each and every Government Corporation.[26] The struggle for complete auditing power succeeded in 1945 when Congress passed the Government Corporation Control Act (1945) which provided a commercial type of audit by the G.A.O. for all the Government Corporations.

VI

The provisions for auditing the accounts of public undertakings are not uniform in India. For instance, the original Act of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration (1948) did not bind the Central Government to consult even the Comptroller and Auditor General while appointing auditors for 'Administration'. On the other hand, the Auditor General (A.G.) was empowered to audit the accounts of the Airlines Corporations.[27] Prior to the enactment of Section 619 of the Companies Act in 1956, the Auditor General's authority to audit a government company was based only on the Articles of Association of a company which made provision for such an audit.

However, the Auditor General of India had been keen since the adoption of the Constitution to establish this *ex-officio* claims of auditing the accounts of all public undertakings. For several years, the Government of India declined to recognize his stand as such yet was gradually led to amend certain Acts to provide for audit by the Auditor General. As early as 1951, the formation of the Sindri Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. had

[23] 275 U.S. (I) (1927).

[24] Executive Order No. 6549, January 3, 1934.

[25] *Vide.*, H. Pritchett, "The Government Corporation Control Act, 1945", *The American Political Science Review*, 1946, p. 503.

[26] *Senate Document* 227, 78th Congress, Second Session, p. 30.

[27] The Airlines Corporations Act, 1953, Sec. 15(2).

›voked controversy between the Government and the Auditor General. e A. G. neither approved the company form of institution for running public enterprises nor the arrangement of auditing provided in such :icles of Association. He insisted that A.G.'s right to audit should have :n established by an Act of Parliament and not conferred by the Articles Government companies.

The differences between the Government of India and the Auditor neral on the issue of audit claims became public during the discussion the Life Insurance Corporation Bill in 1955. Shri C. D. Deshmukh, n Finance Minister, who was responsible to pilot that Bill through 'liament, took a firm stand on this point that, if the accounts of Life urance Corporation were to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor neral, he would prefer not to nationalize the Life Insurance business all.[28] While explaining the constitutional position in this respect, he :rred to Article 149 of the Constitution of India, which said : "The mptroller and Auditor General shall perform such duties and exercise h powers in relation to the accounts of the Union or any other body as y be prescribed by or under any such law made by Parliament." Shri shmukh held that there was no doubt that in respect of transactions which er into accounts of the Union Government he was automatically the liting authority. But, according to him, the Auditor General did not ome the auditing authority automatically in respect of the affairs of :utory corporations or in respect of companies in which the Government ;ht be financially interested. He became responsible for their audit only ›far as Parliament entrusted him with their audit.

On the other hand, the Auditor General of India decided to exert ssures on the Government through Parliament to establish his *officio* claims. Just a day before the auditing provisons, made in the Life urance Corporation Bill, were to be discussed in Parliament, the Auditor neral circulated a note amongst some selected Members of Parliament ıvassing that according to constitutional provisions in India, withdrawal noney from the Consolidated Fund, in whatever form or manner this was ›ended, should automatically attract audit by the Auditor General, l that this fundamental principle could not and should not be modified ıny manner. He further supported his stand by quoting the Government 'poration Control Act, 1945 of the United States, which empowered the ditor General to audit the accounts of all Government Corporations in United States. The note was circulated amongst those Members of liament whom, perhaps, the Auditor General expected would speak him. This activity of the Auditor General was disliked by the

[28] *Lok Sabha Debates*, April 23-30, 1955.

Government. At the same time, the Finance Minister did not experience much difficulty in refuting all arguments advertised through this circular.

Eventually, the Auditor General's point of view was significantly but not entirely conceded by the enactment of the Companies Act, 1956, Section 619 of which entitled him to audit all government companies. Section 619(1) of the Act states that provisions of Section 619 shall apply to Government Companies. Section 619(2) provides that the Auditor of a Government Company shall be appointed or reappointed by the Central Government on the advice of the Auditor General. Section 619(3)(a) empowers the Auditor General "to direct the manner in which the company's accounts shall be audited" by the auditor appointed on his advice. Under Section 619(3)(b) the Auditor General is empowered "to conduct a test or supplementary audit of the company's accounts by such person or persons as he may authorise." Section 619(4) requires professional auditors of Government companies to submit a copy of this report to the Auditor General "who shall have the right to comment upon or supplement the audit report in such a manner as he may think fit." According to Section 619(5), "the comments upon or supplement to the audit report shall be placed before the Annual General Meeting of a Government Company at the same time and in the same manner as the audit report from the chartered accountants."

There are two aspects of this development. *Firstly,* this enactment brought in the authority of the Auditor General in the case of government companies and kept his position uncertain in the case of statutory public corporations. *Secondly,* the Act obviously resolved some conflicts but not without creating new problems. For instance, the law is obscure about the scope and coverage of the audit. It does not imply an efficiency-cum-propriety audit.

Several experts doubted the utility of this development. For instance, it would be relevant to recall here that Mr. Paul Appleby who was invited to examine India's administrative system, had attached only limited significance to the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General. In his report, Appleby said that the Comptroller and Auditor General was a primary cause of a widespread and paralysing unwillingness to decide and act; that he had no special comptence for appraising administrative performance in general; that Parliament had a greatly exaggerated notion of the importance of auditing to Parliamentary responsibility; that auditing was a necessary but highly pedestrian function with a narrow perspective and very limited usefulness; and that the function of auditing was a strictly negative one. Appleby believed that audit reports focus parliamentary attention on little things and this demeaned Parliament. According to him:

> "Auditing wherever done has hardly more than two purposes. One is to insure propriety in the sense of quite precise adherence to established

practices and standards in monetary transactions.... The second purpose of auditing is to provide an independent appraisal of the assets and liabilities of an organization which can certify as to the overall financial status of the undertaking. *Auditing can be done in ways to satisfy both requirements, in the case of industrial and commercial enterprises operated by the government, by private auditing firms.* The Comptroller and Auditor-General is otherwise oriented and too independent and, therefore too little enabled to adjust his approach to many different kinds of operations, to serve the first purpose. His special kind of competence is not a special competence in the second purpose.... Whether auditing is done by a private firm or by the Comptroller and Auditor General, it should be clearly determined that auditors are not judges of either policy, administrative judgments or the public interest."[29]

In a report prepared by the Sub-Committee of the Congress Party in Parliament in 1959, it was recommended that audit should be commercial and should be carried out according to a pattern to be incorporated in the general law governing state-owned companies, and that the auditing firms could be drawn only from the approved panel. Apparently, the Sub-Committee did not wish the auditors to be appointed by the Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General nor the latter to have the power to guide and direct the auditors. According to the Sub-Committee, the Comptroller and Auditor General could discharge his responsibilities towards Parliament in his report on the Ministry concerned with an enterprise. "It's open to him", the Sub-Committee concluded, "even to say that."

Commenting on the competence available with the CAG, Shri L. P. Singh said : "There is, no doubt, a commercial section in the Comptroller and Auditor General's organization, but its experience is confined to Government's own enterprises, which until recent years did not include manufacturing undertakings working for the market, or commercial undertakings, other than public utilities."[30]

However, Asok Chanda, a former Comptroller and Auditor General of India did not agree with the view. He held that it would be unrealistic to underestimate the potentials of the Comptroller and Auditor General in the attainment of country's economic policies. His successors, in fact, claimed that their office has been undertaking 'efficiency-cum-propriety audit', instead of "accountancy audit" or the 'regulatory audit'.

---

[29] *See* P. H. Appleby, *Re-examination of India's Administrative System with Special Reference to Administration of Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises*, New Delhi, Government of India (Cabinet Secretariat). 1956, p. 55-6.

[30] *See* L. P. Singh, *Public Control of National Enterprises in India* (Harvard University, 1960), p. 57 (unpublished).

In a recent thought-provoking research study on "Efficiency Audit of Public Enterprises in India", Prof. Laxmi Narain stresses that there has been a lack of coordination between the Auditor General and the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings (CPU). In this connection, his following observations are worth serious consideration:

(*i*) "Out of the 63 enterprises covered in the three audit reports, the CPU covered audit comments only for 10 enterprises, till March 1967. . .since there is no coordination between the work of the CPU and the Auditor General.

(*ii*) "There is a difference in approach also. The CPU provides a general review of an enterprise and does not deal with individual mistakes."[31]

Professor Narain rightly recommends a close coordination between these two bodies, at least for the benefit of the decision-makers in the enterprises. However, the Auditor General denies that there is any lack of coordination between his department and the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings.[32]

VII

The Administrative Reforms Commission in its Report on Public Sector Undertakings, submitted in October 1967, observed that the role of independent auditor had grown beyond that of mere regularity audit; it had extended to appraisal and to the forming of value judgments. This development explained the significance of 'Efficiency-cum-Propriety' audit, or, more briefly : 'Efficiency Audit'. According to the ARC, "this was essential to meet the urges of the public interested in the results achieved from the expenditure of public funds—whether there was extravagance and waste, and whether worthwhile results were achieved and at what cost."

The Commission realized that 'Efficiency Audit' was not implied in the existing provisions of the Companies Act. Such audit was, however, the prime concern of the Comptroller and Auditor General. For this, the Commission wanted to strengthen the staff of the Comptroller and Auditor General to match the needs. The Administrative Reforms Commission felt impressed by the French system of auditing of the public undertakings by the "Commission of Verification of Accounts". The Administrative Reforms Commission, therefore, recommended :

1. "Four or five Audit Boards should be constituted, each Board dealing with specified sectors of public enterprise. These Boards have to

[31] *See* Laxmi Narain, *Efficiency Audit of Public Enterprises in India*, New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 1972, pp. 82-3.

[32] *See* S. Ranganathan's Foreword to Laxmi Narain, *Efficiency Audit of Public Enterprises in India, Ibid.*

function under the general supervision of the Comptroller and Auditor General.

2. "The Staff required for the Audit Boards should be recruited through the Union Public Service Commission. And the expertise of the Audit Boards should be augmented by employing economists, management engineers, statisticians, etc., and also those who have had the experience of working in public undertakings."[33]

The Commission believed that it would be desirable to constitute these Audit Boards through an Act of Parliament. The enactment could define the role, functions and forms of these Boards as well as their relationship with the Comptroller and Auditor General.

After considering the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission, an Audit Board was set up with effect from April 1, 1969, under the supervision and control of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for conducting a comprehensive appraisal of the public undertakings. The first report, incorporating results of appraisal by Audit Board, was presented in 10 parts to the Parliament as "Central Government Audit Report (Commercial) 1970". The title of the next Audit Report has been changed from "Central Government Audit Report (Commercial) 1971" to "Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1969-70—Central Government (Commercial)".

In order to cover the public undertakings, the Audit Board met in ten groups. Each group consisted of the Chairman, two whole-time members and two part-time members. The chairman and two whole-time members are officers of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and are appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. The two part-time members of each group were appointed by the Government of India in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

While explaining the scope of performance auditing Shri S. Ranganathan, Comptrollor and Auditor General of India, recently said : "Performance Audit is concerned with the entire gamut of decision-making process". And decision-making in the case of public sector undertakings did not necessarily imply the aim of 'profit maximisation'. The state sector, in fact, intended to achieve maximization of net welfare of the society which, in turn, involved : (*i*) creation of employment opportunities; (*ii*) removal of regional economic imbalances; (*iii*) import substitution and/or export

[33] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Public Sector Undertakings*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1967, Chapter IX, pp. 89-95.

promotion; (*iv*) provision of infra-structure and creation of a self-reliant and self-generating economy; and (*v*) optimum utilization of scarce national resources for production of goods and services most economically, consistent with the goal of certain socio-economic objectives laid down in the Directive Principles of State Policy.[34] Some of these aims are imprecise and even mutually contradictory. Evidently, comparing with the traditional audit, the scope of performance audit appears to be limitless and by implication controversial. For instance, it may be infinitely difficult, if not impossible, for the Audit Board to decide whether or not a particular transaction of the State Trading Corporation or that of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. complied with the Directive Principles of State Policy! Somehow, we will have to wait for a few reports of the Audit Board before we determine the performance of performance auditors.

VIII

In the end, let us list the salient points of our study :

(1) With the expansion of the public sector, the debate on its 'accountability' and 'autonomy', has acquired greater significance, both in India and Britain. These two aspects of the public sector may appear mutually contradictory at first sight but this is avoidable. Somehow, it has been found exceedingly difficult to attain a healthy balance between accountability and autonomy. There has been a tendency, both in India and Britain, to stress the significance of one aspect and undermine the other's.

(2) Both in India and Britain, there do exist several means of control and accountability of the public sector. Because of several reasons, most of these means have not proved as effective as expected in determining the performance of the public sector. Often the effectiveness of each medium of accountability is assessed in isolation of the results achieved through other means. There is also lack of coordination between several institutions aiming at the accountability of the state sector.

(3) Audit of the public sector undertakings is at best only one of the means of accountability. Since it has to operate under certain constraints, it would be futile to over-estimate its scope and significance.

(4) In Britain, the Auditor General has consistently been declining to extend his jurisdiction to the nationalized industries. On the other hand, in India, successive Auditor Generals have been very keen to get their Department thoroughly involved in this area. But neither the

[34] *See* Inaugural Speech of S. Ranganathan, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, March 1, 1972 (memeographed).

British nor the Indian institutional framework has so far yielded satisfactory results. Most of the Indian Audit Reports are significantly deficient in quality. Comparing with the growth of the public sector in India the Auditor General's Department has failed to attract adequate know-how required to discharge its obligations.

(5) In 1967, in Britain, the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries extensively examined several aspects of 'performance audit' and eventually decided not to extend its jurisdiction to the nationalized industries. The Committee also decided not to follow the French practice of auditing by a special commission. On the other hand, the Committee endorsed the official policy which entitled the National Board for Prices and Incomes to undertake *ad hoc* 'efficiency studies' of nationalized industries. However, in the same year, in India, the Administrative Reforms Commission strongly recommended the introduction of performance audit to the public sector undertakings, and it also recommended adoption of the French model. Hence the Audit Board was formed in April 1969.

(6) Since the concept of efficiency, in the case of a state monopoly, is exceedingly complex to define, its precise measurement remains infinitely difficult. However, we will have to wait for a few British efficiency studies and Indian performance audit reports to assess the merits of our choice.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

J. B. Srivastava

"Public Health is the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting physical health and efficiency through organized community efforts for the sanitation of the individual in the principle of personal hygiene, organization of medical and nursing services for early diagnosis and preventive treatment of diseases and the development of social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health."

—WINSLOW

MEDICINE is both an art and science. In primitive societies, the practic of medicine was associated with religion, magic and astrology. Th basis of modern medicine is provided by the biological sciences and in recer years the scientific content of medicine has increased enormously. Althoug medicine developed in its scientific content, it had lagged behind as a 'art'. Today, there is an increasing recognition that successful applicatio of medicine to individual and community does involve more than mei scientific or biological knowledge. It involves an understanding of th behaviour of individual and the community who live together and shar certain values of life. The patient is no longer considered as one who is unde strict control but an individual with his tradition, culture, belief and superst tions which react upon his body and mind. Thus, there has been a shil from the earlier concept of 'Disease in Man' to 'Man in Disease'. Now, th involvement of multiple causes of disease has been recognized. As agains this, in the earlier days, activity in the health field, in India, was restricte to environmental hygiene, quarantine and communicable disease contro In the absence of a proper health and medical care system and utterl inadequate resources, communicable diseases were rampant and used t take a heavy toll of life. Just before Independence, the general death rat in the country was 27.4 per mille, infant mortality rate was 183 pe thousand live births and expectation of life at birth varying between 31 t 32.5 years. About half the number of deaths were among children belo 10 years and half of them occurred within the first year of life. In rur areas, 6.1 to 11.3 per cent of people were not well at any time and out c

which 1.9 to 6.5 per cent were acutely ill, and 2 to 8 per cent were chronically ill. Medical institutions and facilities were very much limited and were mostly located in urban areas and health services were concerned mainly with medical relief and control of epidemics. Organized attempt to meet the community health needs was conspicuous by its absence. Obviously at that time, the outlook was narrow. Therefore, in order to promote welfare of the community, a wider look covering the entire spectrum of health activities was needed.

It was only in 1946 that the Health Survey and Development Committee, which was appointed by the Government of India with Sir Joseph Bhore as Chairman, in their report envisaged a well developed health service in the country and suggested that no person should be deprived of adequate medical care because of his inability to pay for it. It also recommended that the major objectives of a fully developed programme should be accomplished in 30 to 40 years through a 'Long Term Programme' and a smaller scheme be implemented within 10 years as 'Short Term Programme'.[1]

Changes in the Health Organization

Health services in India have passed through different stages of evolution and have always reflected the socio-political changes in the country.

Health and medical care system has developed according to the existing needs and to keep pace with the changing concept has undergone appreciable changes during the past decades.

The most important land-mark in the health services in the country was the appointment of the Royal Commission in 1859. Subsequently, further momentum was given by the constitution of Plague Commission in 1904 which recommended the appointment of a Public Health Commissioner to the Government of India. The introduction of Government of India Act, 1919 and 1935 brought considerable reforms resulting in the autonomy of the State administration and reallocation of responsibilities between the Centre and State Governments and transference of medical administration to the States. The Health Survey and Development Committee, appointed by the Government of India in 1946, gave further impetus to the development of health services in the country. One of the important recommendations of the Committee was that both at the Centre and in the States, medical and public health departments should be

[1] Government of India, *Report of the Health Survey and Development Committee* (Chairman : *Sir Joseph Bhore*), Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1946.

combined under a single administrative head. This new outlook has permeated through different levels of health administration in the country and has reflected significantly in the administrative evolution of health developments in the Centre as well as in the States. As a result, the post of Director General of Health Services was created at the Centre. Similar change has taken place in most of the States and territories to bring about coordination between the curative and preventive health activities.

During the early stages, the existence of separate and independent machinery at different levels led to a compartmentalization. With the administrative fusion and integration of curative and preventive services, such difficulties have been overcome.

With a view to bringing in uniformity of standards and other conditions of service and also to effect interchangeability of personnel, a Central Health Service has been constituted by the Government. The Service consists of all categories of medical and public health posts under various Ministries of Government of India. Some States, in their turn, have re-organized their health services too. The formation of Indian Medical Health Service, on all India basis, has also been taken up by the Government. This will include all medical and public health posts under the State Governments as well as similar posts under the Government of India.

The recommendations made by the Health Survey and Planning Committee, appointed by the Government of India in 1959, had also contributed a great deal towards the re-organization of health services during recent times.

Health Plans

The idea of positive health in its fullest form crystalized after the major political transition when the country took up the challenge for meeting the health needs of the country and organizing health services for every citizen.

As an intrinsic part of the welfare State, health services are largely administered by the States. To meet the needs, the health set-up has been progressively decentralized and democratized so that even the isolated communities in the remote villages can get the basic medical and public health services.

This has been achieved in pursuance of the recommendations made by the Bhore Committee. The Health Survey and Planning Committee (Chairman : *Shri A. L. Mudaliar*), in 1959 while endorsing the Bhore

Committee recommendations, had also given new leads in the formulation of further health programmes.[2]

India is one of the very few countries that had from the very beginning planned health services as a part of general socio-economic development. The objectives of planning are derived from the directive principles of State Policy set forth in the Constitution.

The broad objectives of health plan are to strengthen the health infrastructure and to complete eradication of diseases and their integration into the basic health services.

In realization of the needs for social reconstruction, health care system was coordinated with other nation-building activities and was made a part of community development programme administered through primary health centres, which form the nucleus for a minimum scheme of health services for the rural community.

Poverty, ill-health and ignorance were in full inter-play in cummulative social causation of ill-health at the time the country became Independent. The National Government had adopted social objectives far higher than those adopted by developed countries, when they were at a similar level of development. Our Government had the tremenduous problem of making social programmes support rather than impair production without which welfare programmes would have led to aggravation of the already difficult situation.

Owing to acute shortage of resources, particularly funds and trained personnel, health programmes had to depend greatly on self-help, cooperative endeavour and community participation.

Although health is a State subject, the Central Government has mainly the advisory and coordinating functions to perform and to pursue the overall objective of health. And for this, the Union Ministry of Health has initiated nationwide programmes and has been coordinating the activities of the various participating States during the different plan periods.

During the First and Second Five Year Plans, emphasis was laid on control of communicable diseases, improvement of environmental sanitation, organization of institutional facilities, training of medical and para-medical personnel, provision of Maternity and Child Health (MCH) services, health

[2] Government of India, *Report of the Health Survey and Planning Committee 1959-61*, (Chairman : *Shri A. L. Mudaliar*), Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1962.

education and nutrition. The Third plan was formulated with the brc objective of expanding health services in order to bring about progress improvement in the health of the people and to create conditions favoura to greater efficiency and production. The Fourth Plan has been worked (with the objective of providing effective base for health services in 1 rural areas by rendering preventive-curative services through strengtheni of Primary Health Centres (PHCs) so that they are ready to take o the maintenance phase of control/eradication programmes.

There has been progressive increase in the outlays of health program since the First Five Year Plan. Inspite of this the allocations in differ periods can not be considered adequate.

During the First Plan period, out of the total investment of Rs. 23,(million, the outlay for health was Rs. 1,400 million, *i.e.*, about 5.93] cent. This included health, family planning, water supply and sanitati(

During the Second, Third and Fourth plans, the outlay was 4. per cent, 4.20 per cent and 7.27 per cent of the total outlays respectively.

The Central Council of Health emphasized that an adequate inve ment for improvement of health of people is necessary in order to imprc the productivity of the country. In this context, the Council suggested, 1965, that 10 per cent of the total plan outlay would be the absolute minim for health programmes. From the indications available so far for the Fi Five Year Plan, which is under preparation, it is understood that 1 allocation during this plan period would also fall short of what v recommended by the Council.

Need for Estimation of Economic Impact of Health

In the circumstances of today, when each sector of development claiming the maximum share of the scarce national resources, it has becoi necessary to make a convincing case for allocation of more funds 1 health. This has become particularly necessary in view of the fact tl arguments have often been advanced that expenditure on health is r productive. We have, therefore, to demonstrate that investment in hea is financialy rewarding apart from its humanitarian aspects.

Achievements

Over the past 20 years of planned development, considerable progr has been made in health programmes and some striking results have be achieved in respect of decline in the general death rate, infant mortal

ates and in raising the expectation of life at birth.[8] An appreciable ncrease in the number of medical colleges, in the number of available health nanpower and in the number of beds in the country, is noticable. Measures for eradication of malaria, smallpox and control of tuberculosis, eprosy, filariasis, cholera, etc., have resulted in a much decline in their ıcidence. The National Malaria Eradication Programme has undoubtedly ontributed towards greater production, particularly in the agricultural eld. Vast tracts of land which were earlier considered upproductive have een brought under plough. Insofar as other diseases are concerned, they ave been brought under control and the out-break of frequent epidemics s a thing of the past. Plague, which was a dreaded disease at one time, as completely disappeared from the country and no case has been reported ince 1967.

'hortfalls

The achievements, though by no means insignificant, are however ot enough. Gross disparity in the distribution of health infrastructure till exists between the different geographical areas and concentration of ealth services and manpower are mostly in the urban areas. The PHCs, ıe focal points for provisions of medical facilities in the rural areas, have oo large a coverage to be adequate and with the growth of the population ver the years their effectiveness has gradually deteriorated. Due to lack f adequate finances and non-availability of the full complement of medical nd para-medical personnel, the standard of health services has become iluted. At the district and sub-divisional level, referal services have not xpanded or improved significantly.

Though the programmes of disease control/eradication have consi- erably reduced the incidence, yet we have not reached a stage where these iseases cease to be major public health problem.

'roblem of Health Manpower

The increasing complexity of modern medicine demanding team work as given special importance to the development of training facilities for all ategories of health workers.

As it is today, the ratio of health manpower in all categories continues o remain far below the recommended norms. And with the existing opulation growth, any appreciable improvement cannot be expected in ıe near future unless special attention is given to this.

[8] Government of India, *Health in India :* 1972, New Delhi, Ministry of Health and amily Planning (Central Health Education Bureau, Bureau of Health Intelligence, and irectorate General of Health Services).

Health manpower requirements, therefore, have to be critically assesed and the developmental programmes spread out in a phased manner. It may also be emphasized that health manpower estimates cannot be considered in isolation. They should be considered in the total picture of the socio-economic development of the country.

Changing Concepts in Medical Education and Need for Basic Doctors

The recent decades have seen a new orientation in the field of medicine. With the rapid and striking advances in the field of curative medicine, the preventive approach has also pervaded the entire field of medical work and the dividing line between the two is gradually becoming thinner.

With this rapid change in our concept of medicine, the role of medical man also need change to meet the new challenges of the society.

It has been emphasized that medical education in India should endeavour to train basic doctors who should be able to deliver health programmes at the community level.

Teaching programmes, therefore, are being adjusted in such a way as will enable future doctors to meet the obligations of the community. It has been appreciated that medical education should take into consideration the complexities of the situation and the needs of the various segments of society and should be oriented to the conditions of life and work which vary from place to place. Our objective of medical education today is geared to this.

Another problem facing the country today is that the increased number of medical colleges has brought in its wake the problem of maintenance of standards of medical education, at least up to the minimum level as recommended by the Medical Council of India. Some of the institutions are ill-equipped, poorly staffed and have insufficient accommodation. Efforts need be made to improve the standards in the existing medical colleges.

Future Approach

Based on the experience accumulated during the previous years, the need for a dynamic approach and a more extensive network of services with greater accessibility has become imperative. The experience gained from the vertical programmes conducted during the last two-and-a-half decades clearly indicate that the gains can be consolidated only on the foundation of a well structured and integrated health service for the community. And this can be achieved if the variables, which act as barriers to

efficient performance, are identified and due consideration is given to them. In order to develop the philosophy of providing integrated health care delivery system to the community, particularly in the rural areas, our attempt in establishing PHCs in the countryside has not achieved the desired results. The assessment made by the Mudaliar Committee in this regard still holds good and the situation today is, basically, the same as before. The public health component of the integrated health services is just not there. The reasons are well-known and attempts are always being made to overcome the gaps.

Keeping in view the experiences so far obtained and the difficulties in the provision of health-care services in the rural areas, it has been realized that acceleration of the pace of health programmes is an urgent imperative and a much more concerted effort and substantially larger investment is vital for rapidly improving the health profile of the country. During the Fifth Five Year Plan, therefore, the attainment of certain minimum objectives has been planned and a National Strategy on Health has been prepared.[4] The different component contained in the National Strategy on Health, if implemented, would go a long way in solving the problems in development of health services in the country.

For increasing the accessibility of health services in the rural areas and correcting the regional disparities in the shortest possible time, the goals to be pursued in the National Strategy on Health during the Fifth Five Year Plan are :

1. expanding the network of medical facilities and health services in the country;
2. increasing accessibility of health services and medical facilities in rural areas;
3. correction of disparities in the provision of health services between urban and rural areas;
4. intensification of national programmes/eradication of diseases;
5. laying greater emphasis on provision of adequate potable water supply, disposal of wastes and improvement of environmental sanitation;
6. improving the quality of health services provided by securing in position the full complement of trained and para-medical personnel at PHCs; and
7. improving the quality of and providing the necessary rural orientation to medical and para-medical personnel.

[4] Government of India, *National Strategy for Health*, New Delhi, Ministry of Health and Family Planning (Directorate General of Health Services).

In order to achieve the goals, it has been suggested that the following should receive immediate attention :

1. establishment of one PHC for a population of 30,000 and one sub-centre for a population of 5,000;
2. upgrading of 1500 to 2000 PHCs to 25-bed rural hospitals;
3. provision of basic health workers and Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANMs) at the rate of one for every 5000 population; and
4. utilization of the services of large number of trained and experienced practitioners of indigenous system of medicine including homoeopathy.

The National Strategy on Health was discussed at different forums and the Planning Commission has agreed, in principle, to the upgrading of 2000 PHCs to 30-bed rural hospitals, as a centrally sponsored health scheme, during the remaining period of the fourth plan as an advance action for the future approach for the Fifth Plan, where 1500 to 2000 PHCs are proposed to be upgraded. These upgraded institutions will cover both general and specialist services. The existing two medical officers will continue with their normal duty of providing integrated and comprehensive medical care. In addition, trained specialist services in medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology and anaesthesia will be provided. In view of the non-existence of specialist services in the rural areas, it is felt that the services provided by the specialist will be fully utilized by the community.

Need for More Allocation

It has already been pointed out that the resources made available under the various plans have not been enough for expanding health services in the country. The States, due to various constraints, have experienced difficulty in allocating adequate funds. And this has affected the quality of health services. Efforts, therefore, have to be made for getting larger allocations, in future, for health programmes which could support a bold and ambitious programme for the expansion of services in the shortest possible time.

The organizational structure also requires strengthening from centre to the peripheral level to support and sustain the current as well as future programmes for development.

Evaluation

Continuous appraisal of different programmes at various stages of implementation should form an integral part of the developmental process.

Prompt and regular feed-back of information on progress of various programmes is of crucial importance not only for enabling corrective measures but also for effective modifications in the approach in the light of the experiences gained. The future approaches to the programme will, therefore, have to be based on a critical assessment of the progress likely to be achieved by the end of the current plan period. Based on this appraisal, a view has to be taken whether the objectives sought to be achieved under different schemes could be secured, and necessary adjustments made accordingly on the lines on which the efforts need intensification. This will necessarily result in formulation of appropriate schemes. And irrespective of whether the programme falls in the State Sector, Central or private sector, coordination and dovetailing of the efforts would receive utmost emphasis.

TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF BUREAUCRATIC RATIONALITY

Sami G. Hajjar

THIS article attempts to philosophically analyze the concept of bureaucratic rationality by making what can be called 'utility statements' about it. It is my contention that existing theories of bureaucratic rationality in public administration literature do not adequately and properly define the concept. I shall offer an alternate concept of bureaucratic rationality which I will call 'projected rationality'.

Essentially, two main themes permeate my discussion. The first is the thesis prevalent in most of the Western literature which states that modern bureaucracies have had a negative effect on the individual. The modern bureaucratic man is an alienated man. The second theme is the trend towards a scientific study of bureaucratic behaviour which, in my view, results in a narrow and restricted definition of the concept of bureaucratic rationality. Bureaucratic rationality is often confused and equated with economic and technical rationality. My alternate concept of projected rationality, the reader should be forewarned, is normative and subjective.

I

Anthony Downs, in his book *Inside Bureaucracy*, attributes to bureaucracy the characteristics of large size, full-time employees, a merit system, and the organizational outputs which are internally evaluated.[1] These characteristics permit us to arrive at a definition of bureaucratic rationality which, if not exclusive of economic and technical rationality, goes beyond these to distinguish bureaucratic decisions (the objects of the rationality test) from other forms of human decisions.

The four major characteristics of bureaucracy imply the existence of a multiplicity of goals and roles (large size, merit system), and established structures and functions (full-time employees, internal evaluation). In this sense, bureaucracy is a miniature society.[2] The similarity is strengthened

[1] *See* Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston, Little Brown, 1967, pp. 26-28.

[2] This point is not difficult to assert. Large bureaucracies contain numerous units and sub-units—some of which relate directly to the functions of the organizations (line units), others only indirectly (staff units). Many other units occupy an intermediate status. In bureaucracies, furthermore, it is difficult to determine what exactly their

(*Contd.*)

by the last characteristic in the definition, namely, that output is internally evaluated. D. F. Aberle, *et. al.*, came very close in their definition of society to the characteristic of internal evaluation when they pointed out that "the heart of the definition (of society) is 'self sufficient system of action', and this self sufficiency pertains only to the structure of action".[3] The same argument can be inferred from Talcott Parsons' work when he defines society as a social system "which meets all the essential fundamental prerequisites from within its resources".[4] His stress is on the independent structural and functional fundamentals of a society. It must be noted, however, that by defining bureaucracy as a miniature society, such a definition does not preclude any distinction between them. The obvious distinction is that a bureaucracy exists in a society, but not *vice versa*. Despite this fact, striking similarities remain in that multiplicity of goals and roles and established structures and functions exist in both systems, although in a smaller scale in a bureaucracy as compared to society. The most important similarity, however, is that bureaucratic action, understood as formal and collective rather than individualistic and informal, like social action, is internally evaluated.

In this part of the article, the concept of bureaucratic rationality will be discussed in light of the definition of bureaucracy just outlined. I will argue that in the literature on bureaucracy, including recent behaviouralist literature, the concept of rationality is viewed narrowly to mean only "instrumental rationality", as Amitai Etzioni calls it.[5]

Instrumental rationality is defined as "an open selection of means to serve a goal".[6] Etzioni suggests that an alternative notion to instrumental rationality is the concept developed by the behaviouralists which he calls "incrementalism", a notion which is basically the same as

---

functions are since they usually produce more than one product while, at the same time, engaging in more than one social function. For instance, large business bureaucracies today consider it part of their responsibility to actively participate in programmes dealing with urban and social ills. Further still, an employee in such large organizations plays a multiplicity of roles, for, in addition to his overall bureaucratic role, he plays a number of other minor roles at the same time as a technician, supervisor, captain of the company's soccer team, etc. All this tend to support the notion that a bureaucracy is in fact a society within a society. The literature in this area is extensive. For a brief discussion of the similarities between large organizations and society, *see* Pfiffner and Sherwood, *Administrative Organization*, Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Prentice Hall, 1960, Chaps. III and XXII; *and* Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Prentice Hall, 1964, Chap. X.

[3] D. F. Aberle, *et. al.*, "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society", Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown (eds.), *Comparative Politics*, Homewood (Illinois), Drosey Press, 1964, pp. 79-80.

[4] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, Glencoe (Illinois), Free Press, 1951, Chap. I, especially p. 19.

[5] *See* Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society*, New York, Free Press, 1968, pp. 254-257.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

Herbert Simon's "Satisficing Model".[7] While the distinction between instrumental rationality and incremental rationality is logical in the manner in which Etzioni presents it, it will be argued that instrumental rationality is the generic name for the two types of rationality, economic and technical. Technical rationality is the type stressed by the early writers in administration, such as Frederick Taylor, and Frink and Lillian Gilbreth, and particularly by the scientific management school. Economic rationality is the one concept favoured by the later writers, especially Gulick, Urwick, Fayol and others, and *in essence* no profound distinction exists between it and instrumental rationality.

Instrumental rationality occurs whenever practical problems requiring solutions present themselves. The actor, being aware of the problem and the need for a solution, seeks that alternative mean that is most efficient in solving the problem. If the state of affairs is such that the actor knows *all* possible alternatives, 'most efficient' will mean that he seeks to maximize. If he is aware only of existing alternatives, then 'most efficient' will mean (to use Simon's term) that he seeks to "satisfice".[8] When this process of decision-making applies to one practical problem, that is when only one goal needs to be realized, then that process is designated as technical rationality. When it applies to a number of problems, or plurality of goals, it is called economic rationality.[9] The difference between both types of rationality is in what they focus upon, but both are governed by the same principles of decision-making.

Let me quote Paul Diesing here :

> "Technical rationality appears in actions which are undertaken for the sake of achieving a given end. When such actions are repeated again and again they become standardized and turn into techniques or ways of acting. Techniques also exemplify technical rationality, since they are also oriented to goal achievement."[10]

It is clear from this description of technical rationality that it was the underlying concept in the "scientific management school" literature. Frederick Taylor, for example, was interested in precisely those repetitive actions which a worker engages in and sought to determine the best possible techniques to be adopted in relation to every minute motion. This concept is also at the basis of Simon's "programmed" decisions since these

---

[7] Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society*, op. cit. pp. 268-270. Herbert Simon, *A dministrative Behavior, A Study of Decision-Making in Administrative Organization*, New York, Free Press, 1965, p. XXIV.

[8] To Simon, bureaucrats "satisfice" because "they have not the wits to maximize". *Ibid.* My argument is that in reality no difference exists between satisfice and maximize.

[9] *See* Paul Diesing, *Reason in Society*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962, p. 1.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

decisions are made in connection with standardized problems. Technical rationality. in short, applies when the question of 'how to do' arises. But beyond this practical question, what does the concept entail both theoretically and practically?

On the theoretical level, the concept of technical rationality implies at least two sets of subjective values. First, it implies the values of efficiency and maximization. "Efficiency is the maximum achievement of a given end with given resources, so it includes within itself the value of maximization and achievement."[11] The logic of technical rationality can provide an adequate answer to the question "why efficiency?", but not "why maximization ?" If we are to ask the actor why he has chosen this alternative to a particular problem of the type "how to do", his initial answer will be that it is to realize his goal. If we are to pressure him further by inquiring why *this* alternative, his reply will have to be, assuming he is following the dictates of technical rationality, because it achieves his goal most efficiently. "But why would you want to achieve it most efficiently ?", we persist in our inquiry. At this point he will have to say, "It maximizes my goal". Any further questioning in this direction will lead to the means-end chain whereby the actor can keep on saying that this goal that I have just maximized is a mean to a further goal I want to achieve, and to maximize this second goal I have to act in accordance with the dictates of technical rationality by maximizing the first goal. The argument will eventually stop at the desire to maximize. The additional logical question "why do you desire to maximize ?" is no longer answerable by the logic of technical rationality. Our question becomes of the order "what to do" in the normative sense, and the answer to it is a subjective value judgment.

Technical rationality implies, secondly, the value of objectivity and neutrality. The same line of questioning is applicable leading to the conclusion that either objectivity and neutrality are ends, in which case, they are value judgments, or else they are means; in this case, they are means to maximization which is a subjective value.

On the practical level, the application of this notion of rationality as a problem solving device would imply first that the actors in a bureaucratic situation perform highly standardized and routine tasks. Individual tasks are highly specialized and the actor chooses the most efficient means habitually. It was the perfection of this habitual behaviour under the banner of technical rationality that led to the alienation of workers from the scientific management techniques and which, subsequently, gave rise to the

[11] *See* Paul Diesing, *Reason in Society,* Urbana, University of Illinois Press 1962, p. 11.

human relations school in the literature of public administration. The aim of the human relations school was primarily to relax the rigidity of the scientific management techniques. Secondly, the application of the notion of technical rationality implies that organizations are neatly divided and subdivided into functional units, each having a well-defined goal with the value of maximization underlying all these goals. In other words, each goal is a means to a higher goal, corresponding to the relation of units to one another in the hierarchy, and technical rationality presupposes that the organization has one overall goal, that of maximization. That goal is, furthermore, measurable by a determination of the output/input ratio in a neutral market outside the organization. From this point alone, it is evident that technical rationality does not characterize bureaucratic rationality, for it fails to conform to the essentials of the definition of bureaucracy employed, namely, the question of internal evaluation.

Economic rationality denotes the allocation of means to alternative ends in a manner that will maximize the ends. In this sense, it incorporates technical rationality insofar as it is concerned with the choice of alternative means. It goes beyond technical rationality in that it is concerned with the choice of ends. In other words, economic rationality governs the economic process within the organization and outside it. Within the organization, it is applicable in two forms. First, it seeks to determine the most efficient means to the realization of goals. In this case, it is the same as technical rationality and applies primarily to the production and distribution phases of the organization. Secondly, it seeks to evaluate the goals realizable by technical rationality by transferring values between two economic units. This is the economic process of exchange and is made possible by viewing the goals of economic units as means to further goals. In its application outside the organization, economic rationality seeks to "transfer values to alternative ends within an economic unit". This is the economic process of allocation and it is possible only insofar as alternative ends are measurable, usually on the scale of the outside market. In either case, economic rationality seeks to maximize in the face of limited resources.[12] It might be noted here that this concept of rationality is the one adopted by the early or 'traditional' writers in public administration (*e.g.*, Fayol, Gulick and Urwick). It was a natural adoption since these writers viewed the organization basically from the 'top' which necessitated the evaluation of sub-goals and how they relate to the ultimate goal of the organization. It is, furthermore, basically the same notion which governs the work of behaviouralists.

The incrementalist position arises from the epistemological supposition that the decision-making process must deal with *what is*. It differs from

[12] *See* Paul Diesing, *Reason in Society*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962, Chap. II.

economic rationality by viewing that type of rationality as prescribing what *ought to be* in the form of maximization. To maximize, according to most behaviouralists, is to seek unreal alternatives and 'utopian' goals, and the decision-making process becomes an impossibility. Ironically, the concept of incremental rationality is paradoxical. To substitute satisficing for maximizing means either that the rules of the scientific method, which the behaviouralists employ, are unable to attain maximization and the behaviouralists would have to settle for a common sense position in satisficing; or that these rules are capable of determining the 'best way' but only by considering 'real alternatives', in which case satisficing is a form of maximizing.

The incrementalist argument finds its natural philosophic support in logical positivism, primarily in the writings of Karl Popper. In *The Open Society And Its Enemies*. Popper argues against philosophical absolutism. He points out that its metaphysical view, that absolute reality exists independent of our knowing it, is a position conducive to totalitarian political philosophies. Instead, Popper adopts a relativistic position, advocating an empirical doctrine of reality that is knowable to the subject. In political life, such a position minimizes human suffering, for instead of channeling human actions and goals in the direction of the 'ultimate good', good is realizable negatively by avoiding 'evil'. The rational actor then seeks progress and reform piecemeal, and in the language of bureaucratic theory, rational action is in 'satisficing' rather than maximizing.[13]

This argument was, in part, brought into the literature of public administration by Herbert Simon and later fully developed by Charles Lindblom.[14] Lindblom argues that the "science of muddling-through" is a decisional process that follows three consecutive steps which requires the decision maker, as contrasted with his role in economic rationality to (1) set his main objective explicitly or implicitly while at the same time admitting that he has ignored many related values and many related consequences, (2) outline whatever alternatives he has and compare them in the light of past experience; and (3) make the final selection of an alternative that "would combine into one choice among values and the choice among instruments for reaching values". As contrasted with the economic decision

[13] *See* Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp, 156-158. The incrementalist argument is expounded further by Garl Hempell, "Rational Action", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. XXV (October, 1962). For an analysis of absolution and relativism in philosophy and politics, *see* Hans Kelsen,"Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLII (October, 1948).

[14] Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling-through' ", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIX (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88.

maker, the incrementalist aims to achieve his goal only partially[15]. Lindblom calls this process "successive limited comparison", whereby the value of a decision is determined in the course of action, which will judge whether it be accepted as it is or modified or further developed. This method is, furthermore superior to economic rationality, for it is more realistic in that it is "aware of limits on man's capacities and of the inevitability that policies" will be approached in accordance with this method.[16] As Lindblom's method is fundamentally similar to Simon's satisficing model, the following criticisms can be made :

(1) The model seems to favour Western culture and Western bureaucracies. When it is argued that values cannot be rationally determined, but at the same time their existence is recognized, then decisions must be guided by those values which command the highest degree of acceptance.[17] This presupposes a democratic open society where decisions are the product of lengthy bargaining and peaceful adjustments. "Muddling-through" is, therefore, inapplicable and irrational in a non-democratic Western society. Its application in bureaucracy is less meaningful in Western bureaucracies, especially at the lower levels of the hierarchy, for a bureaucracy by definition maintains a certain degree of authoritarianism.

(2) The model of "muddling-through" substitutes the value of maximization with that of atomism. Each decision maker is said to partially realize his goals according to his knowledge of alternatives and their consequences, judged in the light of his own values. The decision maker, according to Simon, will then have satisfied. But in bureaucracy, whom would he have satisfied ? If he acts to satisfy himself and this logic is carried to its conclusion, then the entire notion of bureaucracy, which presupposes collective efforts, will fail. If he satisfies his superior, then of what value is the "muddling-through model" to him? For in this case, rational action will be the maximization of the superiors' wishes and instructions.

(3) If decisions are based on those values which command the highest degree of acceptability, then the process by which conflicting values are compromised tend to favour those values held by persons in positions of power and prestige. Furthermore, if the process of compromise and bargaining takes place between majority and minority groups, then the process will tend to favour the values of the first group.

---

[15] Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Mudling through' " *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIX (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-80.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[17] *See* Herbert Simon, *op. cit.*, Chap. III.

(4) The model in its emphasis on past experience, tends to ignore societal innovations. As such, it favours "conservative" decisions.

The discussion thus far leaves us with the impression that instrumental rationality is not an adequate concept for bureaucracy. *Firstly*, it implies a simplified definition of what bureaucracy is. It omits certain characteristics of bureaucracy, particularly that of internal evaluation. *Secondly*, it raises methodological problems with respect to the question of "values", whose presence in the decision-making process is inevitable. *Finally*, it does not provide to the "bureaucratic man" adequate alternatives to solve the problem of his alienation.

While the first two conclusions are clear from the discussion, the last may not be. Instrumental rationality offers the bureaucratic man the ability to rationally choose, and falsely equates such a choice with decision. (The distinction between choice and decision will become more apparent below). Technical rationality carries this process of choice to an extreme, where the bureaucratic man becomes a tool for the system which, if made highly technical, he would merely execute. Economic rationality, including incremental rationality, expands the area of choice by giving the bureaucratic man some leeway in how to go about acquiring the alternatives; yet these alternatives continue to be those that maximize or satisfy. This activity in itself is not a cause for his alienation, unless it is interpreted, as it must be, that the bureaucratic man neither maximizes nor satisfies *his* own personal goals, but those of his employer. In this case, the alternatives he *can* choose from are "given". While it could be true that his goals and those of his employer may coincide (Presthus calls this type of man the upward mobile), it is also possible that they do not, as is often the case. What then is the character of alienation ?

Karl Marx viewed alienation as caused by the capitalistic mode of production that forces the worker to specialize and to work for wages. As a specialist, he no longer can identify positively with the product of his labour and hence becomes alienated from it and from his own labour. He is further alienated from the system itself for it causes him to loose his freedom, namely the freedom to exist in accordance with a mode of existence that he desires; and he becomes totally dependent on the system for his existence. To Marx, therefore, alienation results in the *loss of freedom* and productive integrity. The worker lost the ability to exist in a market in which he can produce whatever product he wishes to expand his labour on, whenever he wishes, and to be paid in accordance with the amount of labour that he puts into it. In this case, the worker is free to choose whatever mode of existence he desires; while under capitalism, he is only free to subsist.

This theory of alienation does not apply to the bureaucratic man for two reasons. *Firstly,* Marx is discussing what is called today a blue-collar worker, while the bureaucratic man is usually referred to as a white-collar worker. The first type of worker physically produces, while the second facilitates production. *Secondly,* the bureaucratic man, as compared to Marx's proletariat, has not lost his freedom. In fact, he never had it. He is a special breed of man and his alienation is also special. While the blue-collar worker is alienated from the product of his labour, the bureaucratic man is alienated from the product of his *reason.* In his bureaucratic role, he does not have the freedom to use his rational faculties freely. He has to comply to an already established decision-making process that is judged rational, for it is instrumental and value free. As such, he becomes a chooser and not a decision maker. More important, however, there is no rational way under instrumental rationality to make a decision when such a decision is required of him.

At this point, the distinction between choice and decision, which is central to the thesis of this article, can be formulated on the basis of the discussion thus far. I hold that in decision behaviour, decision makers continuously face two basic questions: "what to do", and "how to do". The process by which the question "how to do" is answered involves making of choices. I define choice as the selection of a mean or an alternative from a given set of alternatives to solve a problem of the nature of "how to do". The question of "what to do", on the other hand, is less technical and always involves the selection of ends or values, a process by definition not subject to scientific and empirical determination. I define decision as the selection of ends to answer the question "what to do". A decision then involves subjective value judgments, a choice does not. The obvious consequence of this distinction is that existing definitions of bureaucratic rationality (*i.e.,* instrumental rationality) adequately apply to choice-making but not to decision-making. What is needed, therefore, is a concept of bureaucratic rationality that accounts for all those problems mentioned. Ideally, it ought to have answers for the problem of subjective values, the problem of alienation, and must conform to the definition of bureaucracy outlined earlier. If such a concept can be found, it will undoubtedly be utopian in nature. In the following section, I shall present an alternate concept of rationality, one which, in my judgment, is superior to instrumental rationality but inferior to "utopian rationality". This alternate concept will be called projected rationality.

II

Projected rationality indicates the decision-making process which allows for the expression of values and which points to the manner by

which these values can be verified in bureaucracy. This concept prescribes what must be, rather than what is. It focuses on decisions as distinguished from choices. As such, the discussion will have to focus on those relations that must exist between the decision-maker, the bureaucratic setting, and the subject matter of the decision.[18]

In bureaucracy, projected rationality must apply whenever a "difficult situation" requiring the making of a decision occurs. By difficult is meant not merely a complex situation in a technological sense, but one involving the relations mentioned above and wherein the question "what to do" is involved. Such situations tend to occur more frequently at the upper levels of the bureaucratic structure than they do at the lower levels. This is because of the nature of the bureaucratic hierarchy that tends more towards specialization at the lower levels. At these levels, technical rationality prevails; and consequently, more choices than decisions are made. On the other hand, the upper echelons of a bureaucracy are more involved in policy questions. This means that, in addition to their normal function of overseeing the lower levels, they perform the function of innovation (to use one of Simon's terms). In performing these functions, the actor must make decisions, for the nature of these functions is neither standardized nor routinized. Hence, the need for decisions occurs in bureaucracy in principally two ways : *First,* whenever a change or new policy is desired, either to keep up with the pace of progress or else to meet new demands; and *second,* whenever a unique situation materializes, usually at the lower levels, for which there is no precedent and no provisions for its solution are available under technical rationality. In this case, the bureaucrat is confronted with a "difficult situation" that requires him to decide. In either case, the need for decision occurs within the bureaucratic setting; and failure to recognize the possibility of a "difficult situation" arising in a bureaucracy is one of the major faults of instrumental rationality in all its forms,[19] that is to say, when the bureaucrat has to choose between two conflicting values.

Projected rationality is a maxim prescribing that when you find yourself

---

[18] Choices are excluded, for they are governed by technical rationality and they occur insofar as technological procedures are sufficiently standardized. It is recognized, however, that in modern complex bureaucracies, change is sometimes made necessary for a variety of reasons, and a highly routine procedure cannot be maintained indefinitely. Whenever such change or innovation is needed, then the term technical *decision* is the proper term to use, since in that instance routine choices are no longer feasible. Technical decisions will, in this case, be the same as bureaucratic decisions and must, therefore, be governed by the same notion of rationality.

[19] Etzioni points out that the behavioralists (incrementalists) do not deny the existence of fundamental decisions (difficult situations), but only argue that they are less common. This, of course, is no justification as to why incremental decisions do not account for 'difficult situations'. Etzioni is correct in objecting to the incrementalist argument that the actor chooses between the two kinds of decision-making (fundamental and incremental), for : (*a*) most incremental decisions specify or anticipate fundamental decisions, and (*b*) the cumulative value of incremental decisions is greatly affected by the underlying fundamental decision. *See* Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society, op. cit.*, pp. 288-89.

in a "difficult situation" you should separate your *personal* values from it; and your decision should be the outcome of projecting the norm of your role as a bureaucrat to the referent of the situation. The alternative you choose is the one you logically determine to be instrumental in linking the norm with the referent.

Having defined bureaucracy as a miniature society, we see that the bureaucratic system is akin to the social system in that it "is a normative entity based upon beliefs, values, and norms of the membership".[20] But what is significant to note is the system of interaction which exists between individual values and beliefs and those already established in the bureaucratic structure. The interacting results, assuming that the individual becomes a career employee where he and the bureaucratic structure retain each other, in a "fusion process".[21] The fusion indicates equilibrium whereby both the bureaucracy and the individual gain something from each other.[22] Once this fusion occurs, the individual acquires the *role* of a bureaucrat; that is, he adds a sector to his total system of action.[23] But to acquire a role is to acquire "role expectations" or "patterns of evaluation"; in short, a bureaucratic norm which is given.[24] In bureaucracy, furthermore, the norm refers to efficient, responsible, and loyal action. It positively prescribes a mode of behaviour that is required under certain circumstances.

There is nothing strange or unusual about the presence of norms in the philosophical discussion of rationality. A bureaucratic norm and a bureaucratic referent are an existential must if bureaucratic rationality is to mean anything at all. On the one hand, decisions are always made in relation to roles, if the truth (*i.e.*, correctness) of the decision is to be determined. The individual, who makes a decision, irrespective of a role (assuming that this is possible), makes such a decision without providing evidence for it. Indeed the "difficult situation" arises because the actor is a specific *kind* of actor, in this case a bureaucrat; and the situation requires a specific *kind* of solution. This is the difficulty, and the puzzle is how to decide rationally. On the other hand, a norm can be treated in like manner

[20] William C. Mitchel, *Sociological Analysis of Politics*, Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Prentice Hall, 1967, p. 52.

[21] *See* John Pfiffner and Frank Sherwood, *Administrative Organization, op. cit.* Chap. XII.

[22] The nature of the gain is immaterial to our discussion, although it can be noted that usually the individual's gain is material in the form of wages, and perhaps psychological in the form of status. The bureaucracy gains his productive power or his labour. As long as they need and strengthen each other's gain, the equilibrium persists.

[23] Talcott Parson, *Towards a General Theory of Action*, New York, Harper & Row, 1962, p. 190.

[24] For a detailed discussion of acquiring roles, *see* Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking : Process Versus Conformity", Arnold Rose (ed.), *Human Behavior and Social Processes*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, pp. 20-40.

as a hypothesis is treated in the body of established sciences. Like a hypothesis, therefore, a norm directs inquiry along appropriate methods; and the results of the inquiry (the final decision) will determine the truth or falsity of the norm, that is, if the actor actually projected *that* norm into the decision or if he projected some other norm.

The second important factor that enters into the discussion of bureaucratic rationality is the referent. The referent is the object of decision behaviour, and, in bureaucracy, it is the preservation of the bureaucratic structure. As the presence of a norm is crucial if the truth of a decision is to be determined, the presence of the referent complements this process. While the norm directs inquiry in such a manner that an evidence for the truth of a decision can be made, the referent is the evidence. It is, furthermore, a given standard of evaluation. We insist on this characterization of the referent as the preservation of the bureaucratic structure, for our interest focuses on *bureaucratic* decision-making. It implies that the "difficult situation" which confronts the actor confronts him in a bureaucratic setting and requires of him the making of a bureaucratic decision. His decision, therefore, refers to a particular subject-matter; that is, his decision has the quality of 'bureauness'. But to have a subject-matter, to be of a particular nature, is to have a referent.

The question, as to why the referent is the preservation of the bureaucratic structure, implies the need for two types of answers. *Firstly*, it implies the need for an evidence that this given referent is true. The answer in this case must be formulated from a within-bureaucratic viewpoint. In this case, the rules of common sense will tell us that it is so, for it allows for the continuation of the process by which difficult bureaucratic situations can be solved. *Secondly*, however, it implies the need to demonstrate that the preservation of the bureaucratic structure is a "good" value or end. In other words, it raises the general normative question, why have a bureaucracy in the first place? In this case, we are called upon to provide an answer from outside bureaucracy, which must necessarily involve a process of evaluating values. This, however, is beyond the scope of this discussion and instead we must continue to focus on a 'within' view.

The making of a true decision is now facilitated by the concrete presence of a norm and a referent. The rational solution (decision) of a "difficult situation" can be stated thus : the actor chooses that alternative course of action which appears to him to successfully link his norm with the situation's referent. By successful link is meant a logically constructed line of action or mode of behaviour, which stretches from the norm to the referent and which resolves the "difficult situation" while projecting that line. This is not, however, taken to mean that projected rationality is a

simple matter of choice. The problem is more complicated than the statement might suggest. Indeed, the reason as to why the actor is deciding rather than choosing is because of the multiplicity of factors which surround the relationship between himself, the situation, and the referent. These factors include the determination of his proper character as a kind of decision-maker, the way he perceives the norm of his role, and the probable vagueness and ambiguity of the situation, for at one moment of time he could be facing a number of related difficult situations that are difficult to separate from their referents. The merit of projected rationality lies not in providing a mechanical, clear-cut answer to every difficult situation, but only in providing guidelines on the basis of which the actor can rationally behave. As such, projected rationality includes instrumental rationality as one of its aspects insofar as the process of decision-making is concerned. It goes beyond instrumental rationality in clearly prescribing a norm and a referent. Its merit and, thus, superiority to instrumental rationality can be demonstrated by discussing the manner in which it answers the following three questions:

(1) How can a decision be proven true (correct, right)?

(2) How does it permit the internal evaluation of a decision; that is, how does bureaucracy evaluates its decisions without having to resort to an external market?

(3) What are the consequences on the problem of alienation?

The first two questions can be answered by making a reference to Felix Kaufmann's argument regarding subjectivity.[25] His thesis is that the standards of evaluation are ultimately unjustifiable for both scientific and moral criticisms. In science, the standards of evaluation or the referent form the empirical test. A certain phenomenon is judged true or objective by virtue of its conformity to the empirical test. The question, as to why the referent in science is the empirical test, is unanswerable scientifically. It is taken as a given, since it constitutes one of the epistemological boundaries of science.[26] Therefore, in science, the determination of what is true or objective is only meaningful if this question is asked *within* the epistemological and given boundaries of science. The meaning of truth, therefore, is conformity to *a referent* and not specifically to the empirical referent, since the truth of any referent cannot be asserted. This is the thrust of Kaufmann's argument which is further supported by Arthur Kalleberg's statement when he concluded that the "procedures or methods for *verifying hypotheses* are logically the same in the social as in the physical

---

[25] *See* Felix Kaufmann, "The Issue of Ethical Neutrality in Political Science", *Social Research*, Vol. XVI (June, 1949), pp. 344-352.

[26] *See* Sami G. Hajjar, "The Rationality of the Scientific Method", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXXIII (April-June, 1971), pp. 145-157.

sciences".[27] Consequently, a bureaucratic decision can be asserted to be true or false to the extent to which it conforms to the bureaucratic referent. The manner by which this is to be done is, as Kalleberg concluded, logically the same as in science which can be identified as the scientific method, and which is also instrumentally rational.

The discussion points to an important fact. It now appears that it is the nature of the *referent* that determines whether a body of knowledge is scientific or not. Furthermore, a phenomenon which is not asserted scientifically need not be illogical, false or subjective. The fallacy of most of the behaviouralists is their attempt to subject all social phenomena to the empirical referent. It is the insistence on such an empirical referent that creates the alienation of the bureaucratic man. We admit, however, that some behaviouralists realize that such empirical referents are not always possible, but in this case they advocate no other concrete referent at all. Instead, they argue that the actor chooses alternatives in light of past experience first and in making such choices is guided by whatever norms are preferable to him. After such a choice has been made, then the referent will emerge. This method precluded any means to judge a decision as true and is another cause of alienation. It is, furthermore, the reason why erroneous bureaucratic decisions are often made.

CONCLUSION

Having stated that projected rationality prescribes to the bureaucrat, by means of a referent, the preservation of the bureaucratic structure, and by means of a norm, efficient, loyal and responsible action, and having argued that there is nothing illogical or untrue about such a prescription, we can now state the following conclusions.

(1) A bureaucratic decision is true (right) insofar as it conforms to the referent of preserving the bureaucratic structure.

(2) The ability to judge a bureaucratic decision as true implies that a bureaucracy can evaluate its output internally. That is, bureaucratic decisional behaviour is evaluated in terms of a bureaucratic norm and a bureaucratic referent.

(3) The fact that an alternative referent to the empirical referent is given to the bureaucrat, by means of which he can evaluate the correctness (truth) of his decision, indicated a solution to alienation. For to say that his alienation is the product of his reason, is to say that he is unable to evaluate that product (decision). Furthermore, the

---

[27] Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIII (March, 1969), p. 38.

meaning of this notion ot alienation is of the same logical character as that of Marx's. The worker is unable to judge the extent to which his labour contributed to the final product, particularly when that product is the result of a complex technological process. The solution of alienation in this case is to find a method by which the worker can identify with and evaluate the product of his labour. Likewise, the alienation of the bureaucrat is soluble through projected rationality which allows identification with and evaluation of decisions. Objections to the argument on the grounds that projected rationality prescribes a referent and a norm, and hence is restrictive in nature and is not functional in solving alienation, implies a misunderstanding of both the nature of alienation and its solution. Alienation refers to a disagreeable *mode of existence* rather than *existence per se*. To solve it, is to find an agreeable mode of existence, and any mode of existence implies restrictions. Hence, the worker's alienation is solvable when he is allowed to make a product from already existing primary materials. He need not cιeate all the materials he needs to produce, for in the final analysis God becomes the only unalienated being. The same logic applies to the bureaucratic man, whereby the referent and the norm are an existential necessity.

EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL ROLES IN MYSORE STATE'S PANCHAYATI RAJ

Dan Fritz

INDIA'S Panchayati Raj Programme has been analyzed from a variety of perspectives both at the time of its inception and at various stages in its evolution. A primary concern of these analyses has been evolution of roles and relations of the officials and non-officials who direct rural development efforts. This article, using field data gathered approximately one decade after this programme was established, reports on how some of these roles and relations have evolved during this decade.

The focus of this study is on roles and relations of Mysore State's Block Development Officers (BDO) and Taluk Development Board Presidents (Presidents). Mysore's Panchayati Raj Programme generally conforms to the Mehta Committee's principles except that its middle tier is based on the taluka instead of the block of the Community Development Programme. The Taluk Development Board is headed by a President elected by the Board members and is analogous to the panchayat samiti found in other Indian states which is headed by a pradhan. Because of this similarity, the findings presented here are relevant to an understanding of evolution of official-non-official relations in other states. In Mysore, as in other states, this middle tier of the Panchayati Raj scheme is particularly important because the officials and non-officials working here have responsibilities which directly affect villagers in establishment and implementation of development policies.

Under the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Board Act of 1959 Panchayati Raj was established in Mysore. This Act, however, did not explicitly define the nature of roles and relations of BDOs and Presidents for carrying out various development functions. The Act describes the broad outlines of these roles but provides only brief and vague proscriptions of the roles, particularly in their relations with each other.

The Act succinctly states that the President's powers and duties are to :

> preside at the meetings of the Board and all its standing committees; watch over the financial and executive administration of the Board and exercise general supervision and control; and

submit to the Board all questions which require its sanction.[1]

Therefore, the Act says the President exercises general supervision and control, but gives no specific statement as to what this means in regard to the BDO.

The Act's formal proscriptions for the BDO role are more extensive but still vague concerning his relationship with the President. To the BDO, the Act assigns the responsibilities of Chief Executive Officer of the Taluk Board. In this capacity, he is to convene Board meetings, maintain its proceedings, implement its resolutions, and furnish it with returns, statements, estimates, statistics, or other information relating to Board's administration. He is also directed to report on matters and documents in his charge whenever called upon by the Board. Further, he is directed to supervise and control the acts of all officers and servants of the Board in executive administration and maintain the Board's accounts and records. He must appoint qualified persons to various posts under the Board and grant leave, suspend, fine, or dismiss these people. He can execute contracts and agreements on behalf of the Board within certain financial limits, and take part in Board meetings, subject to its regulations, but he cannot vote or make motions. Finally, he is required to perform "such other functions as may be required of him under the Act or delegated to him by the Board".[2]

Since the President is head of the Board, the BDO is theoretically accountable to him for all of these responsibilities, but the Act does not say so specifically. Consequently, the clause in the Act which gives the President "general supervision and control" of administration is subject to different interpretations. A broad interpretation would say that the President has only overall administrative responsibility and that the BDO has responsibility for administrative specifics. A narrow interpretation of the Act would say that the President has direct responsibility for administrative specifics and, therefore, has more authority over the BDO. Therefore, the actual nature of BDO and President roles, and their relations, was left to individual definition and evolution of informal role expectations.

The purpose of this research was to determine whether, at a time approximately one decade after the current BDO and President roles were established in Mysore, incumbents of these roles have evolved common informal role expectations for their roles and relations. The research pursued this objective in two ways. *First*, an effort was made to determine

[1] Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, *The Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act*, 1959, (Bangalore), Government of Mysore, 1970, p. 85.

[2] Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, *The Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act*, 1959, op. cit., pp. 90-92.

the extent to which institutionalization of informal role expectations has occurred in the sense that general agreement was found among a state-wide sample of BDOs and Presidents in their expectations for specific functions related to their development activities. *Second*, the research focused on individual dyads of BDOs and Presidents who worked together to determine the extent to which they have been able to reach accommodations in their expectations for the assignment of responsibilities for these *functions*. In examining this accommodation process, an effort was made to determine what factors influence this process.

The degree of institutionalization and accommodation that had occurred was measured by asking BDOs and Presidents separately who had responsibility for seven functions involved in the development effort. These seven functions were :

1. who decides where, in the taluk, a development project, scheme, or work should be located;
2. who supervises the extension staff;
3. who draws up the annual budget of your Taluk;
4. who draws up the agenda for Taluk Development Board meetings;
5. who organizes meetings and programme to involve the people in the Community Development Programme;
6. who decides who can use the block jeep; and
7. who decides which contractor will get a contract for a taluk project.

One reason these particular functions were chosen was because conflicts over these issues have been suggested or reported as a source of stress between BDOs and Presidents or pradhans in other states,[3] and also because no clear-cut formal proscriptions are stated in the Mysore Act for these functions.

[3] C. P. Bhambhri, "No Short-Cut to Harmony," *Kurukshetra*, December, 1967, p. 13; [C. P. Bhambhri, "Official-Non-Official Relationship in Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, 1967] ; Iqbal Narain, "The Administrative Challenge to Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 3 (July-September, 1966), p. 572; Iqbal Narain, "Developmental Administration Under Panchayati Raj : The Rajasthan Experience", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January-March, 1968), pp. 67-69; B. Mehta, "Some Aspects of Relationship in Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (July-September, 1961), p. 300; C. N. Bhalerao, "Changing Pattern of Development Administration in the District", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January-March, 1966), p. 128; V. R. Gaikwad, *Panchayati Raj and Bureaucracy : A Study of the Relationship Patterns*, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1969, pp. 49-56; M. V. Mathur and others, *Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan*, New Delhi, Impex, 1966, p. 251; Ram Reddy, "Role of the Block Development Officer : Promise Performance", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (April, 1967), p. 101.

The seven functions themselves are loaded with potential for stress. Conflicts can arise over how the functions are handled, because BDOs and Presidents have different perspectives. BDOs are concerned with administrative accountability, and must answer to administrative superiors and implement state-level directives on an impartial basis. Presidents are inclined to be concerned with responding to the local (taluk) public and maintaining political support. Consequently, they may want to implement policies and distribute resources in a way that rewards past political supporters and builds future political obligations.

Data for the analysis was gathered in Mysore during early 1971 by means of a close-ended questionnaire which was sent to BDOs and Presidents. Both an English and Kannada version (the local language) was sent, so that potential respondents could choose either version. Questionnaires were sent separately to the BDOs and Presidents in 143 taluks, or to a total of 286 potential respondents. Of the total universe of 175 taluks, which blanket rural Mysore, these 143 taluks were the number that remained after subtracting 32 taluks that were visited for in-depth interviews. Data from these interviews is not discussed here and can be found elsewhere.[4] The total response to the mailing was 88 BDOs (61.5%) and 67 Presidents (46.5%).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ROLE EXPECTATIONS

Respondents were asked to indicate to whose role they assigned responsibility for each of the seven functions which are a part of the Community Development Programme. Responses were interpreted and categorized generally to an administrative role (BDO), a political role (President) or to a combination of both types of roles. In an ideal sense, the function would be considered as institutionalized for a role if a relatively high percentage of BDOs and Presidents both assigned responsibility to the administrative role or to the political role. A lesser degree of institutionalization would be considered to have occurred if a high percentage of respondents indicated that the responsibility rested with a combination of administrative and political roles. Conversely, and again in an ideal sense, the expectations for a function were not considered institutionalized if a high percentage of President assigned the function to the political role and a high percentage of BDOs assigned the function to the administrative role or *vice versa*. The results of this analysis for the seven functions is presented in Tables 1–7.

[4] Dan Fritz, *The Roles and Relationship of Local Politicians and Administrators in Mysore State, India* (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, The American University, Washington, D. C., 1973).

Table 1

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions : Choosing a Project Site*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other administrator's responsibility	5	(4)	0	(0)
President or other political actor's responsibility	63	(56)	67	(45)
Joint responsibility	30	(26)	31	(21)
N.A.	2	(2)	1	(1)
Total :	100	(88)	99	(67)

*The actual question used was : "Who decides in which village or circle a project or work should be done in your taluk ?"

Table 2

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions : Supervising the Extension Staff*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other administrator's responsibility	72	(63)	48	(32)
President or other political actor's responsibility	0	(0)	0	(0)
Joint responsibility	26	(23)	51	(34)
N.A.	2	(2)	1	(1)
Total :	100	(88)	100	(67)

*The actual question used was : "Who supervises the extension staff in your taluk ?"

Table 3

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions : Preparing the Budget*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other administrator's responsibility	27	(24)	10	(7)
President or other political actor's responsibility	9	(8)	15	(10)
Joint responsibility	61	(54)	75	(50)
N.A.	2	(2)	0	(0)
Total :	99	(88)	100	(67)

*The actual question used was : "Who draws up the annual budget for your taluk ?"

Table 4

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions : Preparing the Agenda*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other political actor's responsibility	32	(28)	7	(5)
President or other political actor's responsibility	2	(2)	6	(4)
Joint responsibility	64	(56)	87	(58)
Other	2	(2)	0	(0)
Total :	100	(88)	100	(67)

*The actual question used was : "Who draws up the agenda for Taluk Development Board meeting in your taluk ?"

Table 5

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions: Organizing Programmes*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other administrator's responsibility	49	(43)	21	(14)
President or other political actor's responsibility	0	(0)	1	(1)
Joint responsibility	47	(41)	77	(51)
Other	5	(4)	1	(1)
Total :	101	(88)	100	(67)

*The actual question used was : "Who organizes programmes to introduce new hybrid seeds to the people in your taluk ?"

Table 6

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions: Using the Block Jeep*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other administrator's responsibility	54	(47)	40	(26)
President or other political actor's responsibility	1	(1)	4	(3)
Joint responsibility	41	(36)	54	(36)
N. A.	5	(4)	3	(2)
Total :	101	(88)	101	(67)

*The actual question used was: "Who decides who can use the jeep in your taluk ?"

Table 7

Assignment of Responsibility for Developmental Functions: Choosing a Contractor*

Role Selected	*BDOs' Choice*		*Presidents' Choice*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
BDO or other administrator's responsibility	27	(24)	33	(22)
President or other political actor's responsibility	27	(24)	31	(21)
Joint responsibility	40	(33)	34	(23)
N. A.	7	(7)	1	(1)
Total :	101	(88)	99	(67)

*The actual question used was : "Who decides which contractor will get a contract for work in your taluk ?"

The results presented in Tables 1-7 show that neither of these ideal states of complete institutionalization or lack of any institutionalization existed for any of the seven functions. Maximum institutionalization had occurred in the function of project site selection (Table 1), where nearly two out of three BDOs and Presidents assigned this responsibility to the political role. This finding suggests that Presidents have been able to develop a general acceptance that this responsibility belongs to the political role. Further, the finding may also reflect a particularly strong concern which the Presidents have for controlling this function because of its political potential.

Next most institutionalized was the function of extension staff supervision (Table 2), where nearly three out of four BDOs and half the Presidents said that this was an administrative responsibility. The least institutionalized function was that of choosing a contractor (Table 7), as both BDOs and Presidents distributed their responses in nearly a random manner among the three options.

A moderate degree of institutionalization was found in the remaining functions (Tables 3-6), as in each case both sets of respondents tended to see these functions as either joint responsibilities or as administrative responsibilities. The tendency to select this joint option may mean that BDOs and Presidents have still not been able to resolve the Act's vagueness on specific matters and that they selected this option as a form of hedging.

Or, it may mean that they genuinely feel the function is a joint responsibility and that they have worked out the day-to-day details between themselves.

The data presented in Tables 3-6 also indicates that for the five functions, BDOs and Presidents tended to act as "utility maximizers". Anthony Downs[5] has used this concept to describe the tendency for members of organizations to choose acts or combinations of acts, that give themselves the most utility. Both sets of respondents acted as "utility maximizers" in the sense that both tended to assign more authority to their own roles than to the other's role. For these five functions, more BDOs than Presidents assigned responsibilities to the administrative role than to the other roles. More Presidents than BDOs assigned responsibility for these functions to the political role. Further, Presidents indirectly also stressed the power of their role because they were more inclined than BDOs to assign a responsibility to the joint option.

This maximizing tendency means that BDOs are trying to retain as much of the administrative prerogative that once belonged to their roles before the initiation of Panchayati Raj. Presidents may be trying to expand the authority of their roles and dispel the image of the strong, powerful administrator they remember from the past.

These findings based on aggregate data suggest that some institutionalization of expectations of these selected functions has occurred during the decade; however, the aggregative nature of this data does not provide any insight into BDO-President roles and relations at the taluk level, where individual dyads of BDOs and Presidents interact. Therefore, individual pairs of BDOs and Presidents were analyzed to determine the extent to which individual BDOs and Presidents have been able to accommodate each other's expectations for these seven functions.

PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation, as used here, refers to the process by which BDOs and Presidents adjust or reconcile differences in their expectations about their roles. The purpose here is to determine whether such a process has occurred among individual pairs of BDOs and Presidents, and further, what factors influence this process.

The analysis of BDO-President dyads was based on a subset of the aggregate mail data, which included 39 pairs of BDOs and Presidents who had worked together in the same taluk for at least six months. This time limitation provided a more accurate assessment of the respondents' role expectations because presumably superficial differences in expectations would have been adjusted after the initial six-month period.

[5] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967, pp. 81-82.

The 39 dyads were categorized as to whether the BDO and President agreed or disagreed in their expectations for each of the seven functions. Some accommodation was evident in all dyads. Each dyad's response for all the seven functions was totalled. If the dyad members agreed in their expectations for four or more of the functions (or 59 per cent or more of the total response), the dyad was categorized as a "high agreement" dyad. Conversely, if they disagreed in their expectations for four or more of the seven functions (or 59 per cent or more of the total response), the dyad was categorized as a "low agreement" dyad. Fifteen of the dyads had a relatively high level of agreement; 24 had a relatively low level of agreement.

To learn what factors influenced the accommodation process taking place here, the analysis looked at the background characteristics of the individual BDOs and Presidents and also the amount of time they had worked together to see if these factors were influential.

Influence of Background Characteristics

Four background characteristics were studied—age, education, home district, and caste. Since nearly all respondents were Hindus, and less than five of the entire universe of BDOs and Presidents in Mysore are women, it was not possible to control religion and sex. These four factors were chosen because a vast literature on political socialization and communication, based on an analysis of American political behaviour has, found these characteristics to be influential in both political attitude formation and political behaviour.[6]

Because of the relatively small size of the sample, each of the four controls was divided into only two groups. These sub-groups for the four factors were drawn in the following manner. BDOs and Presidents who differed in age by more than 10 years were separated from those who were closer in age. Dyads of BDOs and Presidents who were college graduates were separated from dyads where only one member or no member, was a college graduate. Dyads of BDOs and Presidents who shared the same home district were separated from those dyads who did not share the same district, and those dyads who shared the same caste background were separated from those who did not have the same caste.

---

[6] B. R. Berelson and others, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1954, pp. 54-76; E. Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communication*, New York, The Free Press, 1955, pp. 48-65; R. E. Dawson and K. Prewitt, *Political Socialization*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969, pp. 52-62, and 175-94; Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization*, New York, The Free Press, 1959, pp. 71-95; and Angus Campbell and others, *The American Voter : An Abridgement*, New York, John Wiley, 1964, pp. 161-83, 251-54 and 261-65.

The purpose of distinguishing dyads with similar background characteristics from those without similar background characteristics was to test the proposition drawn from the political socialization and communication literature that similarities in background are likely to produce similarities in political attitudes and behaviour. Applied here, the proposition would suggest that dyads with similar backgrounds are more likely to have reached accommodations in their role expectations than the other dyads.

To find out the extent to which background characteristics played a part in the accommodation process, the "high-agreement" dyads and the "low-agreement" dyads were analyzed to see which group contained more of the dyads determined to have similar background characteristics. The results are presented in Table 8.

Table 8

Relationship between Background Similarities and Agreement on Role Expectations

Background Similarity	*High Agreement Dyads (N)*		*Low Agreement Dyads*		*Difference (+indicates accommodation)*
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)†*	*Per cent*
Same caste*	26	(5)	21	(5)	+ 5
Same home district	33	(5)	16	(4)	+17
Both college graduates	46	(7)	41	(10)	+ 5
10 years or less age difference	66	(10)	43	(10)	+23
Total :		(15)		(24)	

*BDOs and Presidents were considered as having the same caste background if they mentioned the same caste background on their background data sheet. If dyad members mentioned castes with different names, they were considered to have different castes, even if the castes were of equal status in a caste hierarchy.

†Total sample involved 23 days.

For all background characteristics tested, more of the dyads with similar characteristics were found among the "high agreement" dyads than among the "low agreement" dyads. This findings, then, supports the suggestion that a process of accommodation is influenced by background similarities of dyad members.

The mail survey also tested the suggestion that the time dyad members have worked together influences the accommodation process.

Influence of Time-Spent-Together

The "routinization" of expectations, a concept borrowed from Max Weber[7], refers to the process of adjustment in role expectations over time by which role incumbents come to share similar role expectations as a consequence of having worked together over a period of time. In the case of BDOs and Presidents, this would suggest that dyads of BDOs and Presidents who had worked together longer would be the same ones who agreed in their expectations for the seven functions.

To find out whether the routinization of expectations has occurred. dyads of BDOs and Presidents who had worked together for 6 to 20 months were separated from those who had worked together for 21 to 36 months. Then the "high-agreement" group and the "low-agreement" group were analyzed to see if the former group contained more of the dyads who had worked longer together than the latter group. The results are presented in Table 9.

Table 9

Relationship between Time-Spent-Together and Agreement on Expectations

Time-Spent-Together	*High-Agreement Dyads*		*Low-Agreement Dyads*	
	Per cent	*(N)*	*Per cent*	*(N)*
6—20 Months	40	(6)	67	(16)
21—36 Months	60	(9)	33	(8)
Total :	100	(15)	100	(24)

The effect of spending time together can be reflected in BDOs' and Presidents' expectations in two ways. *First,* the longer the time that BDOs and Presidents spend together the greater the opportunity they will have to reach compromises which would be reflected in agreement on expectations. *Secondly,* BDOs and Presidents, who do not have similar expectations, are not as likely to spend as much time together as they would if they agreed

[7] H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Webber : Essay in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 54, 262 and 297.

in their expectations. That is, BDOs with expectations dissimilar to those of their Presidents are likely to have requested an assignment elsewhere; and Presidents with different expectations than their BDOs are likely to have their BDOs transferred. Therefore, this second factor would operate to increase the chances that BDOs and Presidents, who have been together for a long time, would have similar expectations.

The findings supported the suggested relationship between the amount of time BDOs and Presidents worked together and their tendency to develop similar expectations; that is, there were more dyads who had worked together for 21 to 36 months among the "high agreement" dyads than among the "low-agreement" dyads.

The data shows that both similarities in background characteristics and time-spent-together influences BDOs' and Presidents' accommodation of expectations for the seven functions. However, a question still remains as to whether the factor of time-spent-together is related to the tendency to have similar expectations when the four background characteristics are controlled; a '*Q*' test was used to measure this relationship. Although the *N* was small, the results showed that in all cases except one, time-spent-together did influence the routinization of expectations. The association was strongest in dyads where both the BDO and the President were college graduates (+0.8); the association was weakest in dyads where both the BDO and the President were not college graduates (+0.2). The one exception was in dyads where both members of the dyad were members of the same caste (—0.2).

CONCLUSION

The findings show that some institutionalization of these roles has occurred, in that when BDOs and Presidents were asked which role had responsibility for various developmental functions, they did not assign responsibility for the functions to dichotomous options and often agreed in their choices.

However, the fact that many respondents selected the joint political-administrative option may suggest that BDOs and Presidents still have different interpretations of the Act for aspects of their roles and they chose the joint option as a way of hedging. At the same time, the selection of the joint option may mean that in some cases individual BDOs and Presidents have resolved the conflict between themselves through a process of accommodation, and genuinely believe the functions is a joint responsibility.

Some process of accommodation was observed by analyzing individual dyads. This process seems to be influenced by the extent to which dyad members share similar background characteristics and by the amount of time they have worked together.

The findings are limited in two important respects. Both the processes of institutionalization, as discussed by Huntington,[8] and accommodation, as discussed here, are highly complex processes; this discussion focuses on only a few components of both. Further, since the analysis was restricted to only one point in time, it does not explain the entire process of role evolution. In this respect the findings presented here may serve as a benchmark for later studies.

The findings presented here suggest that some of these administrative-political conflicts may be resolved over time as politicians and administrators develop similar expectations for their roles through informal processes, such as the institutionalization and accommodation processes at work in Mysore.

---

[8] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 12.

ORGANIZATION FOR COMMAND AREA ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA*

V. S. Gopalakrishnan

CRORES of rupees have been spent by Indian Government in constructing major and medium irrigation projects, and yet the returns have been partial due to under-utilization of irrigation potential. Of late, stress is being laid on the application of the principles of scientific soil and water management with a view to obtaining optimum benefits from each unit of available irrigation water. However, what is rather striking is that innovations in the organizational set-up have not kept pace with the development of techniques in water utilization. It is high time that a complete change is brought about with a view to constituting a highly efficient organizational structure responsible for command area administration. Any amount of improvement in scientific techniques of water management would be of little avail without there being a suitable self-contained and efficient administrative machinery to bring about the development of the command envisaged.

Extent of Under-Utilization

Land and water are basic to agriculture. Where there is no adequate support of water to the land, agriculture becomes hazardous. The bulk of Indian agriculture is carried under the vagaries of rain-fed conditions. Therefore, it is only in respect of the areas where both protective and productive irrigation has been made available with the construction of major, medium and minor irrigation projects, that there is a scope to combine the soil and the water in the best manner possible with a view to obtaining maximum agricultural production. Compared to the total sown area, the irrigated area being fractional, there is need for total concentration in maximizing production in the command of major and medium irrigation projects. Any amount of efforts made in the dry land areas in the manner of various scheme, like soil conservation, dry farming practices, etc., can make no significant impact on production statistics. If a "big leap" in agricultural production is to be brought about, we have to operate mainly on those areas where water is available as a result of the existence of irrigation projects. Some statistics in this regard would amplify the position. The net area cultivated in the country in 1967-68 was 139.7 million hectares,

* The views expressed here are meant to be personal and not official.

whereas the net area irrigated was 27.5 million hectares. The percentage of irrigation out of cultivated area comes to 19.7 per cent only. In the year 1970-71, the total irrigated area was estimated to have been 39.0 million hectares, out of which the area irrigated by major and medium projects was 19.0 million hectares and the area irrigated by minor irrigation projects was 20.0 million hectares. According to the information available, the percentage of utilization of the irrigation potential which has been created is 83 per cent. If we roughly assume the non-utilization percentage as 20, the under-utilized potential for major and medium projects comes to roughly 4 million hectares. Assuming an investment of Rs. 2,500 per hectare, the under-utilized potential would represent an investment of nearly 1,000 crores that is now almost a dead loss. Even the figure of 83 per cent of utilization would give us an exaggerated picture since the efficiency of utilization is very much below the optimum level. In fact, some studies made in irrigation projects have indicated that only about 40 per cent of the water delivered at the canal head reaches the field. All this would point out to the greatest need of the hour to concentrate on maximizing foodgrains production out of the irrigation potential created in India rather than scattering away our energies in various types of schemes applicable to dry lands and other areas.

Factors Responsible for Under-Utilization of Irrigation Potential

The utilization of irrigation potential of major and medium projects is 50 per cent in Bihar, 40 per cent in Madhya Pradesh, and 56 per cent in Maharashtra. The picture in other States is better, but that is still a far cry from the ideal. The reasons for under-utilization can be enumerated briefly as follows :

(*i*) Lack of coordination between the Departments, especially the Department of Irrigation and the Department of Agriculture;

(*ii*) Lack of land development in the command area, *i.e.*, land levelling and land shaping, etc;

(*iii*) Absence of well designed field distribution system consisting of water courses, field channels, etc.

(*iv*) Lack of adoption of proper cropping patterns based on water availability and soil characteristics;

(*v*) Lack of adequate soil surveys;

(*vi*) Lack of proper extension services;

(*vii*) Seepage losses in the distribution system;

(*viii*) Untimely supply of input facilities;

(*ix*) Poor infra-structure facilities in the manner of roads, markets, etc.; and

(*x*) Incomplete work in the consolidation of land holdings.

Remedies have already been evolved in respect of items (*ii*) onwards in the list of reasons indicated for poor utilization of water. It has been suggested that the development of Ayacut should go hand-in-hand with the construction of the dam. The World Bank/International Development Agency (IDA) now-a-days insist that irrigation engineering works and agricultural development programmes should go on simultaneously. The new planning methodology would consist in ensuring that when a dam is completed along with its canals, distributories, etc., the command area is also simultaneously ready for irrigation after the completion of all the required developmental work, like land levelling, shaping, construction of water courses, etc. This would also obviate delays between the Commissioning of the projects and commencement of use of water. As regards the field distribution system, there is an attempt to take over the work of construction of water courses, field channels, etc., by the Government Departments rather than leave it to the will and mercy of the cultivators. In respect of cropping patterns, emphasis is being laid on zoning of the crops to suit the nature of soil, climate, natural protection available, etc., with a view to optimising the yields from every unit volume of water. In order to reduce seepage losses, lining of water courses is being widely recommended. The importance of soil surveys is being stressed more and more since soil information is most essential to ensure efficient water management. There is a growing awareness to the question of strengthening the extension services as well as in ensuring timely supply of inputs and other facilities to the farmers in the command area. The State Governments have been giving serious attention to the consolidation of holdings, especially in areas of high-agricultural potential on a priority basis. Though provision of infra-structure facilities call for tight financial outlays, its importance is being increasingly realized.

Integrated Area Development Approach

Realising that a wide range of activities have to go together simultaneously, like land levelling and shaping, drainage, prescription of proper cropping patterns, construction of water courses and field channels, provision of necessary inputs, building of adequate infra-structures, etc., the Government have adopted an integrated area development approach in respect of the command area with a view to bringing about maximum utilization of water and maximization of agricultural production. Accordingly, during the Fourth Plan, a Central Sector Scheme for the Integrated Area Development of Commands has been launched. A second programme

of Soil and Water Management—Pilot Projects, in Selected Irrigation Commands—has been taken up during the Fourth Plan, the main purpose of which is to demonstrate to the cultivators the introduction of improved irrigation techniques. These two schemes are said to be working successfully.

Innovations in Command Area Administration

Any amount of physical support for best water management, like land development, proper water courses and field channels, etc., coupled with timely supply of inputs and facilities will make no sense unless a suitable organizational set-up is evolved for their administration of the same. The impression of the author is that sufficient attention has not been paid to the aspect of evolving a suitale administrative machinery for the management of command areas, although many improvements in scientific techniques of water management have been brought about. A beginning has however, been made, as in evident from the fact that most States have accepted the need for providing a single planning and coordinating authority for the command area projects. It appears that Project Coordinators/ Administrators are now in position in Pochampad, Mahi, Kadana, Tawa, Tungabhadra, Jayakwadi, Chambal, Kosi, Gandak, and Sone Projects. It also appears that action to set up such organizations has also been initiated in some other commands. It has been recognized that "there should be a single planning and Coordinating authority to look after the working of all the Departments and agencies concerned. Such an agency has not only to be under an officer of proper status and seniority, but he has also to be provided necessary support in technical disciplines."

Departmental Chauvinism and Inadequacies in Present Management Set-up

What strikes one's eyes most is lack of coordination between the Department of Irrigation and the Department of Agriculture. This position obtains not only at planning and construction stage of a project, but also during the maintenance stage. During the project formulation and construction stage, the Irrigation Department does not have sufficient liaison with the Department of Agriculture. The construction of dam and canals is not coordinated with development of command area. The Agriculture Department remains in the dark as to the nature and extent of benefits the project would offer to the cultivators. The Irrigation Department is likewise bereft of any conception as to how well the farmers would benefit from the irrigation project. The Departments of Irrigation and Agriculture often function in isolation with the result that it is the poor cultivator, who should be the primary concern, is left high and dry. Very often the end is forgotten and only the means are remembered. The Irrigation Engineers often forget that their activity only constitutes a means and is not an end in itself. The

Agricultural Officers also generally consider the dam and the impounded water as alien. They do not have any sense of belonging to the dam, canals and distributories, but have a sense of belonging only to the fields.

The cultivators, when questioned or even without it, have many complaints against the working of the Department of Irrigation or the Department of Agriculture. One of the usual complaints is that the water is not being released by the irrigation people in a timely manner. Another complaint that crops up quite often is that supply of inputs to the farmers has not been effected on time. The combined result of these two types of complaints is that the proper recommended varieties of crops are not raised and even if raised, they suffer from inadequate irrigation. The irrigation Engineer would deny the charge on him but would readily point out that the Agriculture Department has failed to make timely supply of inputs and therefore, the expected crop production is not there. The Agricultural Officers would claim that they are not at fault, but the Irrigation Department did not release the water on time and, therefore, the expected crop production is not there. There is hardly any coordination between these two Departments. In many states, the Collector is the coordinating authority and there are even Coordination Committees constituted. The Collector is, however, a busy man and his main attention is taken away by matters pertaining to law and order, revenue administration, civil supplies, etc. The Coordination Committee meets once in three months or so and except for conducting some reviews by way of *post-mortem* accomplishes nothing. This points out to a sad lack of coordination between the various departments operating in the command area. The cultivator is the eventual victim, who does not even know as to who is the single top authority he can approach to obtain redress for his grievances.

Irrigation Officers, who maintain the dam, feel responsible to their bosses only (like Superintending Engineers), and the Collector, who is the Coordinator, has no control over these officers. Similarly, the agricultural extension machinery operating in the command area has no allegiance to the Collector and its loyalties rest only with the district level agricultural officer who is generally a member of the District Development Office. The work of Ayacut development, namely, construction of water courses, levelling, etc., is undertaken by specialized State governmental agencies, like Soil Conservation Department in full independence of the Collector or the district developmental authorities, like Zila Parishad. Quite often, the drainage schemes in the command areas are undertaken by the Irrigation Departments, whose officers are naturally independent of the Collector. The District Deputy Registrar of the Cooperative Societies controls co-operative credit in respect of inputs, like seeds, fertilizers, etc., but this officer is normally independent of the district developmental officer as well

as the Collector. We thus have a multiplicity of functionaries and departments operating in the command area, whose work the Collector or the Committee is supposed to coordinate but over whom he has no real control. There is no machinery to ensure day-to-day coordination in the working of these departments. The departmental functionaries in the Command Area also lack being supervised since their superiors are normally located at District or Divisional Headquarters, way away from them.

PROPOSAL FOR AN ORGANIZATION FOR COMMAND AREA ADMINISTRATION

The integrated area development approach has come to stay. Mere integration is not enough, but day-to-day coordination with control is also a must. I would, therefore, make a plea for both integrated and coordinated area development approach. The coordination without control, as in the case of the Collector today, can offer little benefits. It is, therefore, necessary to set up a command area authority which will be able to bring about, on a day-to-day basis, coordination with control and supervision. Therefore, what is envisaged is a Project Administrator who will have full control and supervision over the following agencies working in the command area : (*i*) officers of the Irrigation Department, (*ii*) officers of the Extension Wing of the Agriculture Department, (*iii*) officers incharge of Ayacut development wing of Agriculture Department, etc. If this set-up is possible, there is no reason why the Project Administrator should not be delegated with the powers of Registrar of Cooperative Societies so that he can control cooperative credit to the primary societies and to the farmers and bring about a link-up between supply of inputs and supply of credit, in a timely manner. (Quite often we now find that the credit operations controlled by the Deputy Registrar and the supply of inputs controlled generally by the district developmental body do not go hand-in-hand). The unit in-charge of soil survey, working in the Command area can also be made directly responsible to the Project Administrator who can supervise its work administratively at close quarters on a day-to-day basis. A soil Testing Centre can also be located in the Command area which would function under the administrative supervision of the Project Administrator though technically it would be guided by the State departmental officers. The Project Administrator should also be put in-charge of planning and development of infra-structure facilities required for the Command area. The continuous presence of the powerful and influential Project Administrator at the site of the Command area itself would be a helpful factor to ensure that the cultivators follow the cropping patterns as prescribed. He can also establish personal contacts and bring about a larger activization of the Land Consolidation Officers. In effect, the Project Administrator will be a leader, friend, philosopher and guide to the farmers in the Command area as well as a leader, supervising and guiding force for the multi-departmental set-up operating in the Command area itself. In such a set-up, there will be a close day-to-day

watch and supervision exercised on the work of the multi-departmental officials in the Command area by the Project Administrator who will be ultimately responsible to the project as a whole. The present situation, in which the district level irrigation officer, the district level agricultural officer, the district level cooperative officer, etc., or their supervisors maintain only occasional supervision over the work of the subordinate officials in the Command area due to the factor of long intervening distances, can thus be remedied with the appointment of a Project Administrator located at the dam site itself.

It may be possible to make a further extension to this proposed picture, by putting the Project Administrator as incharge of fisheries development in the tank area and also for soil conservation measures in the catchment area. We would thus have a single unified, apex authority, *viz.*, the Project Administrator with lines of control running down from him consisting of irrigation officials, agricultural extension officials, etc. This entire administrative set-up should be located right near the dam with suitable office and housing facilities.

A Few Details of the Proposed Organization

About 600 major and medium irrigation projects have been taken up on hand in the Plan era—1951-1972. Of these, 42 major projects with potential of 3.5 million hectares, and 326 medium projects with a potential of 2.1 million hectares have been completed. It is felt that the Project Administration required for major projects may have to be slightly different from that required for medium projects.

Medium Projects

Apart from 326 medium projects with a potential of 2.1 million hectares that have been completed already as Plan works, 153 medium projects are under execution with the targeted irrigation of about 1.0 million hectares. The importance of efficient project administration for medium projects cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. Normally, a medium project costs anything between Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 5.0 crores and would be in a position to irrigate anything between 1,000 hectares and 20,000 hectares. It would be reasonable to assume that the Project Administrator for command area of 15,000 acres (about 6,000 hectares) and above should be an officer of the rank and status of a District Collector. For projects with command of less than 15,000 acres, the Project Administrator should be of the rank at least of a Sub-Divisional Officer.

For projects above 15,000 acres, the Project Administrator of the rank of a Collector will be located near the dam and would be fully in-charge of

the development, administration and management of the command area. He should be assisted by a Class I Agricultural Officer, who should be at least M.Sc. in Agriculture and trained in Extension work. For every 5,000 acres, there may be a Graduate Agricultural Officer, who would be responsible for extension and who would be located in one of the major villages in his jurisdiction. For areas of 1,000 acres, we may have Agricultural Assistants who should be generally Matricultates and products of Agricultural Schools. This agricultural extension machinery, though directly responsible to the Project Administrator, should maintain close technical liaison with the District Agricultural Office. Similarly, the Executive Engineer or Assistant Engineer of Irrigation Department, who is in-charge of maintenance and management of the dam, canals and distributories, should also function directly under the Project Administrator though he should derive technical assistance and guidance from higher level departmental officers, like the Superintending Engineer. The Project Administrator can also be entrusted with the supervision and the governance of the functioning of trial-cum-demonstration farms in the command area. The officers of the Agriculture Department concerned with land development in the command area would also be directly responsible to the Project Administrator though they would derive technical guidance and help, apart from supplies of machinery, etc., from their superior officers working in the State Agriculture Departments. The Soil Survey Unit and the Soil Testing Laboratory should be put under the administrative control of the Project Administrator. The Project Administrator would also be Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies for the Command area villages in respect of primary societies. The planning and development of infra-structure facilities would also be the charge of Project Administrator. Likewise, the Fisheries Officers entrusted with the development of fisheries in the tank as well as the officers in-charge of soil conservation projects in the catchment area can also be put under the charge of the Project Administrator.

We would, therefore, have a self-contained administrative machinery fully controlled and coordinated in a day-to-day basis and fully alive to the developmental needs of the command area. In such a set-up, the goals become clear and common to all the functionaries. In this set-up, the Agricultural Officer would regard the dam and the canals as belonging to the common organization and, therefore, unto himself. The Irrigation Engineers would regard the command fields and the farmers as very close to themselves.

Projects of Less than 15,000 *Acres*

Here the Project Administrator should be at least an officer of the rank of a Sub-Divisional Officer. The set-up that may consist of officers of the concerned departments would be identical except in respect of their levels.

Here also, there will be a unified command and a clear line of control. There will be coordination with control and responsibility with authority.

Set-up for Major Irrigation Projects

With the in-flow of aid from World Bank/I.D.A. and the interest shown by the A.R.C. in financing of command development programmes, perhaps, the most ideal set-up would be to have a corporation or an authority which can be in a position to draw upon funds from the financial bodies for carrying out the developmental programmes. Command Area Boards or Authorities have already been set up in respect of some major irrigation projects, and Projects Administrators on a whole-time basis of a sufficiently high rank and status have been appointed. However, the Project Administrator often functions in isolation, with the power to coordinate but without any control over the officers of various departments, as in the case of Jayakwadi project. Even though such Project Administrator may be a full-time officer, the lack of control over the officers renders attempts of coordination often infructuous. He is vested with responsibility to coordinate, but he has little authority over the officers. Therefore, what is suggested here is that in respect of such major command areas where a Project Administrator has been functioning independently or as a member of the Project Developmental Board/Authority, the officers of various departments responsible for development or administration of the command area should be brought directly under his control and supervision so as to facilitate coordination. The constitution of a Corporation or an Authority may not be always possible in respect of all the major projects. Even in such cases, a Project Administrator should be appointed along with a complete set-up of various departmental officers concerned with command area development and administration under him. A major irrigation project normally commands an area of 50,000 acres and above and, therefore, very often the catchment and the command over-run more than one District. The Project Administrator for major projects should, therefore, be at least of the status of a Commissioner.

Likely Difficulties in Constituting Proposed Organization

Finance may be argued as the main constraint in bringing about the proposed organizational set-up for command area administration. However, strictly speaking, there is no reason why Finance should come in the way. Let us assume that a project with a command of 50,000 acres has been constructed with a cost of Rs. 5.0 crores. The Project Administrator in this case of the rank of a Collector and his own personal office set-up may cost the Exchequer something like only Rs. 30,000 per year. All the rest of the staff working under the Project Administrator will not be new since the existing departmental officers would be simply transferred under his

control. It has been estimated that the cost of development of land and provision of various facilities, like soil survey, extension and demonstration, communications. markets, etc., would work out to, on a very rough and average basis, Rs. 400 per acre. On this basis, the developmental cost of the command of 50,000 acres would work out to Rs. 2.0 crores. Considering the expenditure of Rs. 5.0 crores for the Project (dam, canals, etc.) and Rs. 2.0 crores on the command area development, the cost of running the proposed organizational set-up would be negligible.

Another argument against the proposed set-up may be that it would cut across the concept of democratic de-centralization. Here also, this argument cannot hold much water. Since the irrigation department in-charge of dam and canals, and the agriculture department in-charge of Ayacut development are already independent of the district local development body, the proposed set-up cannot make inroads into the authority of the district local body. The district level local body may be affected only to the extent that the agricultural extension machinery would be transferred over to the Project Administrator.

CONCLUSION

About 600 major and medium irrigation projects have taken birth since 1951, out of which 42 major projects and 326 medium projects are already completed. The major and medium projects alone offer irrigation facilities to 20 million hectares of land. Since minor irrigation is mostly under the control of private individuals, and is also largely managed in an efficient manner, the Government can do very little for it. However, since major and medium projects are those over which the Government have invested crores of rupees and are under the control of the Government, it should be Government's endeavour to derive fullest benefits from optimum utilization of water from such projects. It is in this context that it is urged that the proposed type of machinery for project administration should be set up for each and every major and medium project.

TRANSFER OF COLLECTORS IN RAJASTHAN

P. S. Bhatnagar and G. B. Sharma

DEVELOPMENT of a sound and rational transfer policy is a *sine qua non* of any good system of public personnel administration. Unsound transfer policies and practices not only adversely affect the efficiency and morale of the civil servants but also act as deterrent to the development of a comprehensive policy of career development. Although transfers are inevitable in any system of public administration, frequent transfers of public personnel neither allow them sufficient opportunity to develop the necessary amount of expertise in any major area of administration, nor do they provide to the administrators the requisite continuity necessary for developing a broad perspective and emotional attachment with the programmes entrusted to them for execution.

In the post-Independence era, the nature of administration has undergone a metamorphosis and the erstwhile administration concerned predominantly with regulatory functions has been entrusted with the task performing developmental functions. This new development has added important and serious dimensions to the field of public personnel administration. Since the objectives of administration have changed, a corresponding change in the structure and practices of the public administration, in general, and personnel administration, in particular, has become inevitable. We require now an entirely new set of personnel practices and procedures, which are in tune with the requirements of development administration. Since personnel are the key to effective formulation and execution of development plans, a greater attention has to be paid to all those personnel policies and practices that affect their performance. A change is, therefore, necessitated in almost all major areas of personnel administration.

One important area that has been seriously neglected and that needs a very close attention is the area of transfers. Drastic efforts to reform the existing system of transfers appear to be inevitable to bring it in tune with the requirements of the present-day administration. The basic change desired in the transfer policy in the context of development administration has been very well brought out by George F. Gant, as follows :

> "Development administration requires close identification with, rather than aloofness from the community or communities of interest.

Effective development administration depends not only upon authority and efficiency but more largely upon mutual interest and confidence and ability to provide motivation and management support to the relevant segment of the population embarked upon a programme of development. Civil servants engaged in development administration should not be rotated from location to location too frequently. Their tenures should be long enough to instil the confidence and establish the constructive relationship required to get a programme going and to keep it going."[1]

But the actual position with regard to transfers of administrators, in general, and development administrators, in particular, is far from satisfactory. In fact, it appears that the transfer of important administrative functionaries are made without taking into consideration their possible evil effects on the overall implementation of development programmes. Commenting on the manner in which the transfers are affected, Pai Panandikar observers: "by and large, transfers are too frequent and not enough attention is given to the aptitudes or propensities of individuals for a group of allied functions. Such lack of specialization in a group of allied functions has led to the serious problems of waste of training and experience and also to the so-called 'generalist' moving in and out of jobs needing considerable background knowledge and familiarity. Such practices have necessarily reduced the commitment of individual civil servants to programmes and achievement. Often two successive officers have taken diametrically opposing attitudes to specific programmes thereby causing enormous waste of effort. The consequences of the present transfer policies are, therefore, serious enough to warrant attention. Since development administration is concerned with programme goals and objectives, policies and practices on transfer to the extent, they damage development objectives, must be changed".[2]

The problem of transfers of development functionaries assumes still greater importance in the case of Rajasthan, which is one of the most backward States of India. In the case of Rajasthan, transfer policy suited to the developmental needs and peculiarities of the State has to be devised. The State of Rajasthan was formed by integrating the erstwhile Princely States of Rajputana, which were entirely feudalistic in character, with no properly organized systems of district administration. Only a few of the Princely States had evolved a system of district administration which was

[1] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Personnel Administration (Personnel Planning, Staffing of Public Sector Undertakings and Personnel Management)*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1967, pp. 148-49.

[2] V. A. Pai Panandikar, *Personnel System for Development Administration*, Bombay, Popular, 1966, pp. 136-37.

also in its rudimentary form. Since district administration in the pre-Independence days was mainly concerned with the maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue and enforcement of justice, two important factors impeded the growth of district administration in the erstwhile Princely States. *First*, in many a Princely States, because of large tracts of desert, there was hardly any scope for collection of land revenue. *Second*, though in late forties some of the Princely States did appoint Deputy Commissioners or Collectors, yet (on account of the prevalence of *Jugirdari* System) whatever little land revenues were to be collected, these were collected by the *Jagirdars*. In brief, land revenue as such did not form a significant part of administrations of erstwhile Princely States of Rajputana in the pre-Independence days. Hence, there was no well-established system of district administration in this region.[3]

It was only after Independence and integration of Princely States, that the district administration was organized on a systematic basis in Rajasthan. The whole State was organized into 26 districts and each was placed under the charge of a Collector in the year, 1954. Thus, the Collector's office is a post-Independence phenomenon in the case of Rajasthan.

Because of feudal administration, most of the princely states were quite backward and administration was absolutely regulatory with almost no emphasis on developmental activities. Only few Princely States had developed systems of administration and were economically developed also. On the whole, on the eve of Independence, Rajputana presented a picture of utter backwardness in most of the spheres of social and economic life.

In this article we have studied the transfers of Collectors in Rajasthan during the decade—1956-65. The reasons for the selection of this period are : *First*, though collectors in Rajasthan had been appointed in the year 1954, which also coincided with Mr. Mohan Lal Sukhadia's taking over as the Chief Minister of Rajasthan (who continued as Chief Minister even beyond the chosen period of study), yet one important reason for choosing the year 1956 as the starting point of our study was that the process of formation of Rajasthan was completed only in the year 1956. The present district of Ajmer was merged into the State only in the year 1956, on the recommendation of the States' Reorganization Commission. Hence, selection of 1954 as the starting point of our study would have resulted into exclusion of one district which might have adversely affected our findings. Second this period also coincided with the introduction of the Second Five

[3] For a detailed description of the historical evaluation of the Office of the Collector in Rajastnan, *See* A. K. Roy, "Collector in Rajasthan", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-September), 1965, pp. 560-61.

Year Plan (1956-65) and, by and large, enfolded—within itself Second and Third Five Year Plans as well as the initial years of introduction of Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan, which was introduced in the State in the year 1959. These were the years when the process of transformation of regulatory administration into development administration started. Therefore, the facts of the situation during this decade are likely to provide, some guidelines for reforms in the future patterns of administiation and its various practices.

In order to find out whether the transfer policy of Rajasthan Government is in keeping with the needs of development administration or not we have chosen the office of the Collector, primarily because the former is the most important development functionary in the district. With the advent of Five Year Plans and programmes, like Community Development and Panchayati Raj, the regulatory role of the collector has receded into background and his developmental role has become more important. As P. K. Dave points out : "The Collector today has far more to do than ever before and what is more important, a great deal is expected of him by the Government and the people. His responsibilities call for the ability to persuade, influence, convince and encourage not only his colleagues in the district but also the members of the Zilla Parishad, the Block Samiti and the Village Panchayat. Short postings, lack of adequate background experience and the resultant immaturity are likely to detract from the collector's utility."[4]

The success of developmental programmes in the districts, therefore, depends to a large extent on the ability and initiative of collectors as well as on the extent of their continuous association with these programmes. A Collector, who has initiated new and important development schemes in the district should be allowed to stay at a station till its completion. He would naturally display more commitment and evince greater interest in seeing it through, than a collector who is posted there when it is almost more than halfway through or has just been initiated. Moreover, if the next incumbent happens to be a person of altogether different ideas and interests, then in such a situation the fate of schemes initiated by his predecessor is most likely to hang in balance. The new collector may just try to complete them as a matter of routine, without associating himself whole-heartedly with them. This situation would obtain precisely, when a collector is transferred without being allowed to complete the schemes which he had initiated during his tenure in the district. Such premature transfers adversely affect the content and the fulfilment of developmental programmes in the district and the net result of frequent transfers is that neither the collectors

[4] P. K. Dave, "The Collectors, Today & Tomorrow", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-September) 1965, p. 387.

themselves are able to derive any satisfaction out of their work nor does the district tend to get any benefit out of such short postings.

The hypotheses intended to be tested through this study are :

First, in the Rajasthan State administration there is no transfer policy as such, which is followed while shifting the administrators from one post to another. What really exists in the name of transfer policy of the state is merely a set of antiquated rules which too are respected more in breach than observance. One important and general rule with which we are seriously concerned here, says that "no public servant should be transferred from one place to another before expiry of a term of three years". The hypothesis is that even this general rule which applies to all classes and categories of public services and which is considered to be the corner-stone of the transfer policy of the State is followed very rarely while effecting transfers. Therefore, because of non-adherence to the three-year norm and the negative and routine manner in which transfers are effected, majority of tenures of collectors are of excessively short durations.

Second, that political stability leads to quicker transfers. The greater the amount of political stability in a state, the greater the amount of ease in the exercise of power by the political executive in matters such as transfers in public service. When the ruling party is firmly entrenched in power, there is an increase in the possibilities of transfers of administrative functionaries, like collectors, on the basis of personal likes and dislikes of ruling party MLAs and Ministers.

Third, in the State of Rajasthan, on the one hand, we have some districts which are industrially and agriculturally more advanced and have greater amenities of life, while, on the other, we have districts which are comparatively more backward in terms of industrial and agricultural advance and amenities of life. The public servants try to stay in advanced districts as long as they are allowed, they usually do not like to be posted in backward districts, and if under certain compulsions they somehow get posted into these districts they try to get themselves transferred at the first available opportunity. Thus, while the tenures of collectors tend to be longer in advanced districts, they tend to be shorter in backward areas. Also, that the advanced and backward districts show wide variations in terms of tenures of collectors.

The *fourth* hypothesis is that because a number of districts in Rajasthan have been classified as training districts where newly recruited IAS officers are posted for limited durations for undergoing practical field training, the average length of tenures of collectors in training districts is lower than the average length of tenures of the collectors in non-training districts.

In our view, the need for evolving a transfer policy geared to the tasks of development assumes still greater importance for the Government which professes to be genuinely interested in pursuing socialistic goals. Hence, the transfers of developmental personnel need to be looked into in their totality, *i.e.*, in relation to their overall impact on development efforts of the State rather than as a matter of routine. This important variable is endogeneous in relation to the development process rather than exogeneous, as the Rajasthan State Government appears to view it.

METHODOLOGY

The present study is based on the data collected from the records of the Personnel Department of Government of Rajasthan. The sample taken for the study is a cluster sample. To calculate the average stay of a collector in a district, first of all the average length of postings of collectors in each of the 26 districts was calculated (see Table 1). The average stay of collectors in each district was worked out by totalling the duration of tenures of all the collectors posted in the district during the period of study, by dividing the total length of postings of all the collectors by the total number of postings of collectors in each of the 26 districts.

Table 1 indicates that the lowest average tenure of collectors in a district was as low as 9.8 months and the highest average tenure of collector in a district was 23.5 months. Compared with the three-year norm propounded by the State Government, even in the district showing the highest average, the average tenure of collectors was less than two years. Therefore, this goes to prove that even the general and antequated norm of three years' propounded by the State government is respected in breach and not in observance. Hence, it proves our first hypothesis.

We constructed a frequency distribution of the data regarding the length of all the postings of the collectors for whole of Rajasthan. Table 2(a) highlights the variations and the characteristics of the length of postings of collectors in districts wherein these postings have been grouped into 12 classes, each having a class interval of 4 months. The average state length of postings as calculated from the frequency table comes out to be 14.2 months, *i.e.*, 1 year 2 months and 6 days (vide Annexure I).

Table 2(a) highlights the fact that out of a total number of 190 postings, 20 (10.5 per cent) were of less than 4 months duration, 31 (16.3 per cent) of a duration between 4 and 8 months and 42 (22.1 per cent) of a duration varying between 8 and 12 months, and 25 (13.1 per cent) between 12 and 16 months and so on.

Another Table [Table 2 (b)] was constructed for showing in detail the duration of number of postings of collectors of a period less than 6

months. This table demonstrates that out of 38 postings, 4 postings were of less than 4 months' duration, 6 between 1 and 2 months, 5 between 2 and 3 months and so on. Out of these, 38 postings (though not shown in the Table) 2 postings were of duration which was as low as 3 days, rest of the two of 17 and 20 days' durations respectively. The range of postings varied from 3 days to over 3 years. The longest of the 190 postings, reported from Chittorgarh district (which was 3 years 8 months and 7 days) has to be viewed as an exception.

Table 1

Average Length of District-Wise Postings of Collectors in Rajasthan During 1956-65

Name of District	*Average Length of Posting in Months*
Barmer*	9.8
Jaisalmer*	11.0
Jalore*	11.2
Pali	11 4
Bundi*	11.5
Banswara*	11.6
Bharatpur	12.1
Jhunjhunu	12.1
Dungarpur*	12.4
Sirohi*	12 4
Jhalawar*	12.8
Nagaur	13.0
Churu	13.3
Jodhpur	13.6
Tonk	14.2
Alwar	14.5
Sikar	15.4
Jaipur	16.3
Kota	16.3
Ajmer	16.8
Bikaner	19.1
Chittorgarh	21.4
Sawai-Madhopur	21.8
Udaipur	22.0
Ganganagar	22.6
Bhilwara	23.5

*Training Districts

Table 2(a)

Distribution of Length (in Months) of Postings of Collectors in Rajasthan During 1956-65

Length of Posting in Months	*Number of Collectors*
0 — 4	20
4 — 8	31
8 — 12	42
12 — 16	25
16 — 20	24
20 — 24	21
24 — 28	9
28 — 32	12
32 — 36	3
36 — 40	2
40 — 44	0
44 — 48	1
Total ⟶	190

Table 2(b)

Distribution of Length (in Months) of Postings of Collectors of Duration Less than 6 Months in Rajasthan During 1956-65

Length of Posting in Months	*Number of Collectors*
0 — 1	4
1 — 2	6
2 — 3	5
3 — 4	5
4 — 5	6
5 — 6	12
Total ⟶	38

Table 3 shows that out of 190 postings, 93 postings (48.9 per cent) were of a duration of less than one year and of a total number of postings 24 (12.8 per cent) were of a duration of more than two years but less than 3 years. Number of collectors, whose tenures in districts were above 3

years number only 3 (1.5 per cent). This indeed is a very low percentage and it can be emphatically asserted that such postings are exceptions rather than the rule. In fact 85.7 per cent (163) of the total postings were of less than two years' durations. Hence, we can say that the three-year rule enunciated by the Government itself is expected in breach in 98.5 per cent cases and in observance in 1.5 per cent cases only. Therefore, the only reason to which short average tenures of collectors could be attributed is perhaps, the fact that throughout the period of study the same party continued in power with the same persons as the Chief Minister and the Minister-in-Charge of personnel affairs. Hence our second hypothesis that political stability leads to quick transfers also proves to be correct. Politicians cannot escape their responsibility by attributing quick transfers to pressures from the administrators or to any other cause. In any case the ultimate responsibility for proper administration rests with them.

Table 3

Length in Years of Postings of Collectors During 1956-65

Length of Postings in years	*Number of Collectors*	*Percentage of Frequency*	*Cumulative Frequency*	*Percentage of Cumulative Frequency*
0 — 12	93	48.9	93	48.9
12 — 24	70	36.8	163	85.7
24 — 36	24	12.8	187	98.5
36 — 48	3	1.5	190	100.0

The median stay of collectors was also calculated and it was found to be 12.3 months, *i.e.*, 50 per cent of the postings of collectors were of a duration of less than 12.3 months and rest 50 per cent more than 12.3 months (*vide* Annexure III). However, for the purposes of analysis and interpretation, we shall use the average stay of collectors as our main base.

Table 4 shows the districts in which the average term of collectors is either equal or more than the State average. The total number of such districts is 12, which amounts to 46.1 per cent of the total number of districts in Rajasthan. Tonk district shows exactly the same average as the State, *i.e.*, 14.2 months. Districts of Alwar and Sawai-Madhopur having an average stay of 14 5 and 14.8 months respectively maintain approximately the State average. But on the other hand, there are 6 districts, *viz.*, Bhilwara (23.5), Bikaner (19.1), Chittorgarh (21.4), Ganganagar (22.6), Sawai-Madhopur (21.8) and Udaipur (22.0), which have average tenure

of collectors much higher than that of the State average of 14.2 months, while the rest of the districts fall in between the State average and the highest district average. Table 3 shows that there is a difference—very wide difference—between the average tenures of collectors in different districts.

Table 4

Districts showing Average Length of Postings Equivalent or More than State Average, $\bar{X}=14.2$ Months

District	*Average Length of Postings*
Tonk	14.2
Alwar	14.5
Sikar	15.4
Jaipur	16.3
Kota	16.3
Ajmer	16.8
Bikaner	19.1
Chittorgarh	21.4
Sawai-Madhopur	21 8
Udaipur	22.0
Ganganagar	22.6
Bhilwara	23.5
Total : number of districts=12 (46.9%).	

Table 5 shows the number of districts having average stay of collectors less than the State average of 14.2 months. The total number of such districts is 14, *i.e.*, 53.9 per cent of total number of districts in Rajasthan. This makes it clear that in majority of districts in Rajasthan the average stay of collectors has been less than the State average. The lowest average tenure being shown by the districts of Barmer (9.8) and Jaisalmer (11.0), both of which fall in the desert belt and are the most backward industrially and agriculturally and have lesser amenities of life. Perhaps one reason that could be advanced to explain the phenomenon of majority of the districts showing an average stay of less than the State average may be that a larger proportion of its territory still continues to be backward with fewer amenities of life available, and nobody wanting to stay in such districts for long. The lowest average tenures of collectors shown by these two districts goes to prove our third hypothesis.

One reason for shorter stay of collectors in the districts (marked with asterik in Table 5) is that these are training districts to which young

IAS recruits are posted as collectors for limited durations. But, here, it has to be pointed out that not all postings of collectors made in these districts during the period of study were training postings as many senior persons were also posted in these districts as Collectors. And also that there is atleast one non-training district, the district of Pali, which shows an average stay of collector which is less than the average shown by 5 out of 8 training districts proves that the lower average of the tenure of collectors in training districts is not entirely due to their being training districts. This simply shows lack of adherence to any policy. Hence, it disproves our fourth hypothesis.

Table 5

Districts Showing Average Length of Postings Less than the State Average *i.e.* $\overline{X}=14.2$ Months

District	*Average Length of Postings*
Barmer*	9.8
Jaisalmer*	11.0
Jalore*	11.2
Pali	11.4
Bundi*	11.5
Banswara*	11.6
Bharatpur	12.1
Jhunjhunu	12.1
Dungarpur*	12.4
Sirohi*	12.4
Jhalawar*	12.8
Nagaur	13.0
Jodhpur	13.6

Total : number of districts=14 (53.9%).

*Training Districts.

DISCUSSION ON FINDINGS

Looking to the overall backwardness of the State of Rajasthan, wherein considerable amount of initiative, drive and consistency is required in the developmental effort to improve the lot of people, the average duration of tenure of collectors of 14.2 months is, in our view, pitiably low and not at all conducive to the attainment of the overall developmental goals. For a backward State, like Rajasthan, even exceptionally long postings of collectors should be permitted if they could prove to be congenial to the

process of development. But instead of their being any thinking in the direction of linking career development of the administrators with the general development plans, it appears that the collectors in most of the cases are dislocated from their positions even before they are able to acquaint themselves with the barest problems of the district. Not only is there a greater justification for longer postings of collectors in backward states, like Rajasthan, but also on account of the fact that their workload has increased enormously during last 15 years due to increase in both the regulatory and developmental functions. Therefore, it is essential that they are allowed to stay in the districts for considerably longer durations in order to be able to manage and execute developmental schemes successfully. In the case of Rajasthan, where majority of districts are backward both agriculturally and industrially, their longer stay will surely give a boost to the developmental efforts of the State. In developed districts also, on account of their increasing workload, longer tenures of collectors have become necessary, so as to enable them to do full justice to the development plans and programmes.

The two surveys[5] on the breakdown of collectors workload (the one conducted by the erstwhile State of Bombay and the other an All-India Survey conducted by Gillespie) show that collectors get very little time for devoting themselves to developmental programmes. A big chunk of their official time is consumed by routine matters, such as paper work, attending public functions, receiving visitors, presiding at the courts, attending meetings and other such insignificant pieces of business. Further, these surveys show that the majority of collectors themselves feel that the paper work with them is either "excessive and burdensome" or "excessive but not burdensome". These facts clearly point out the need for longer tenures of the collectors in the districts.

Moreover, when we compare the average tenure of collectors in Rajasthan with the all-India average as calculated by Gillespie, we find that the all-India average of one year and eight months is nearly six months higher than the Rajasthan State average of one year two months and six days. This comparison further highlights the fact that in Rajasthan the average length of postings of collectors is still on the low side. When doubts are expressed about the performance of collectors in India as a whole, on account of their shorter postings, how could one be very hopeful of a high level of performance from the collectors in Rajasthan where the average stay is much lower in comparison to the all-India average, and where the problems of development are much more magnitudenous, complex and acute.

[5] Quoted by P. K. Dave, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

The preceding analysis makes it explicitly clear that there is no well defined transfers policy and that in majority of cases probably considerations other than the rational ones govern the transfers of collectors. Though, for want of empirical evidence from both the Government as well as the IAS Officers, it is difficult to enumerate the factors that might have affected the transfers of collectors in Rajasthan, yet on the basis of half-a-dozen interviews of retired IAS Officers, conducted by us, and on the basis of the frequency with which transfers are affected, it could safely be assumed, that more often than not, frequent transfers in public administration tend to be governed (in majority of cases) by considerations irrational and extraneous.

Having said all this, the only logical question that follows is what, after all, is the remedy ? What could be done to improve the present situation with regard to transfers of Collectors in Rajasthan State administration ? As regards the reforms in the transfer policy and practices in the state administration, we are in general agreement with the views expressed in the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) Report on Personnel Administration as they largely corroborate our views. The ARC in their Report have expressed the view that : "The system of periodic transfers has had a long history. We think that this has now become antiquated. The practice was devised long ago obviously with a view to preventing officials from acquiring personal influence with the people, of a kind that could be prejudicial to the ruling power. No one of any consequence was, therefore, allowed to stay at a particular station for longer than three or four years. We think that the situation has now changed. It is no longer necessary for Government to be suspicious of its own employees. Secondly, frequent shifts in the present context interfere with development work, which needs continuous association and identification on the part of the officer with the programmes that he is charged with and the community that he serves. This also gives him job satisfaction and sense of achievement. The policy regarding transfers has not so far been given the close attention it deserves and at present transfers are being made in a routine manner. In posts involving activities connected with development and the management of programmes, continuance of officials in the same place should be the rule and transfer an exception. Exceptional cases would be, where a promotion is involved or where qualified personnel are needed for new programmes."[6]

CONCLUSION

In order to suit the peculiar circumstances prevalent in the State of Rajasthan, in slight modification of ARC's recommendation, it may be

[6] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, Delhi Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969, pp. 109-10.

emphasized that "there are some parts of the State which are considered as inconvenient or difficult and there is a tendency to avoid postings to such places. The State may (for purposes of transfers), be divided into three classes of area : (*a*) good, (*b*) average, and (*c*) difficult. With a view to avoid dissatisfaction amongst the services and to provide equal opportunities, every member of each service, in the course of first six to eight years of his career, should be posted for a period of two years in the difficult area and for the remaining period by rotation in other areas."[7]

If the aforesaid reforms suggested by ARC with the slight modifications described above, are brought about, there is no doubt that these will go a long way in improving the system of transfers in State Administration.

[7] H. C. M. State Institute of Public Administration, *Report of the Proceedings of Higher Management Seminar on Personnel Administration*, Jaipur, H.C.M, State Institute of Public Administration, 1969, p. 71.

Annexure I

Computation of the Arithmetic Mean of Length of Posting of Collectors in Rajasthan During 1956-65

Length of Posting in Months	*Mid-point of* X	*Number of Collectors* F	*Step Deviation from class of guessed* D	*Step Deviation times frequency* FD
0 — 4	2	20	—3	—60
4 — 8	6	31	—2	—62
8 — 12	10	42	—1	—42
12 — 16	14=$\bar{x}$d	25	0	0
16 — 20	18	24	+1	+24
20 — 24	22	21	+2	+42
24 — 28	26	9	+3	+27
28 — 32	30	12	+4	+48
32 — 36	34	3	+5	+15
36 — 40	38	2	+6	+12
40 — 44	42	0	+7	0
44 — 48	46	1	+8	+ 8
	Total——→	190		+ 12

$N=190$ $\qquad$ $Efd=12$

$$\bar{X}=\bar{x}d+\left(\frac{EfD}{N}\right)i$$

$$=14+\frac{12\times4}{190}$$

$$=14+0.2$$

$\bar{X}=14.2$ months.

Annexure II

Computation of Median Length of Postings of Collectors in Rajasthan During 1956-65

Length of Posting in Months	*Number of Collectors*	*Cumulative Frequencies*
0 — 4	20	20
4 — 8	31	51
8 — 12	42	93
12 — 16	25	118
16 — 20	24	142
20 — 24	21	163
24 — 28	9	172
28 — 32	12	184
32 — 36	3	187
36 — 40	2	189
40 — 44	0	189
44 — 48	1	190
Total——→	190	

Arrow indicates median class

$N = 190$

$\frac{N}{22} = 95$

$L1 = 12$

$c = 93$

$fmd = 25$

$i = 4$

$$\text{Median} = L1 + \frac{\left(\frac{N}{22} - c\right)}{fmd} i$$

$$= 12 + \frac{95 - 93}{25} \times 4$$

$$= 12 + \frac{2}{25} \times 4$$

$$= 12 + \frac{8}{25}$$

$$= 12 + 0.3$$

$$= 12.3 \text{ months.}$$

Annexure III

Computation of Modal Length of Postings of Collectors in Rajasthan During 1956-65

Length of Posting in Months	*Number of Collectors*
0 and under 4	20
4 and under 8	31
8 and under 12	42
12 and under 12	25
16 and under 20	24
20 and under 24	21
24 and under 28	9
28 and under 32	12
32 and under 36	3
36 and under 40	2
40 and under 44	0
44 and under 48	1
Total——→	190

Arrow indicates Modal Class

$N=190$

$L1=8$

$\triangle_1=42-31=11$

$\triangle_2=42-25=17$

$i=4$

$$\text{Modal}=L1+\frac{\triangle 1}{\triangle 1+0_2}\times 1$$

$$=8+\frac{11}{11+17}\times 4$$

$$=8+\frac{44}{28}$$

$$=8+1.5$$

$$=9.5 \text{ months}$$

JUNIOR MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT : A GRADE-STUDY IN TRANSVALUATION

Bata K. Dey

JOINT Secretaries and above in the Central Government are, by convention, known to belong to what has come to be called 'senior policy and management group'. This description has considerably narrowed the credibility gap, so to say, through the reflected respectability, and glory, of the Fulton Report on (British) Civil Service (1968) which has glamourized the senior civilians at the policy-planning levels with such a generic description. In India, the Administrative Reforms Commission's (ARC) study team on 'Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work', and later, the ARC itself, working on the same theme, have also used such a label to refer to the top decision-making stratum of the government in this country. It would, therefore, cause no conceptual violence to designate the layer below the top-management as 'below-top' or, better still perhaps, middle management which would obviously cover the grades of Deputy Secretaries (including, now, Directors) and Under Secretaries. Junior management, then, would consist of grades of section officers and officers in the grade of, say, Rs. 700-1250. (It is not merely the pay-scales which determine the managerial label, but the responsibility level and the functional complex, including work content.)

This article does not propose to encompass the entire gamut of junior management in government, scattered over in various types of organizations in government, such as attached/subordinate offices, boards/commissions, public sector enterprises, quasi-governmental agencies, etc. For the purpose of this article, junior management has a restrictive denotation as well as connotation. Government here has been taken to mean the secretariat, and not its other formations; this study is an attempt at transvaluation of one basic grade of the junior management group in the Central Government Secretariat namely, the section officers' grade.

The exercise consists in unravelling the historical perspective of this level; bringing into closer focus the credibility of the personnel holding this grade; gradual erosion of their authority and status, with perhaps not very happy result from the angle of quicker decision-making ; and discovering the modality of restoring the health and vigour to the functioning of this level of secretariat. While this remains the basic approach of the

article, the indirect purpose that it would serve is to assure, through providing an insight into the management world in the government, that the interests of those—normally outsiders but interested in, or having something to do with, government and its methodology of operation—are not only not in unsafe hands but have every chance of being handled with care and attention, having regard to the quality of the personnel constituting this junior management group.

THE PERSPECTIVE

The section officer, as the designation implies, is the officer who presides over and conducts the business of a section, the latter being the basic functional unit in the secretariat of the Central Government. He is the man who receives the incoming dak, that is, communications, letters, etc., marks them to the dealing hands; examines the cases submitted by the dealing hands to him; sends files upward for decision; takes necessary action when they travel back to him; and supervises outgoing replies. Many important cases he himself handles, apart from guiding and training his 'aides' in tackling others. In short, he oversees and, in a real sense, 'manages' the entire affairs of the section, and is responsible for the efficient functioning of his unit. A gazetted officer, this functionary was initially recrüited, in part*, on the basis of the combined competitive examinations, which also feed the IAS, IPS and other Class I Central Services. Designationally, a section officer certainly is an officer in the secretariat but, as his role has emerged over a period of years, he now functions, contrary perhaps to the original intent, more by correcting the grammar of his assistant's English and merely putting up papers for others to take descision. Devalued in worth, he constitutes the last line of 'decision-helper', rather than the first line of 'decision-maker'. Put differently, in the trek toward the peak (of decision-making), this officer is simply a 'sherpa' but only up to the 'base-camp', not ever included in the team poised for the final assault on the summit. Though from the angle of intrinsic quality, salary structure,

*Previously the intra-category quota in the Section Officers' Grade was :

Direct recruitment	50%
Departmental promotion	25%
Departmental examination	25%

Over a period of time, this percentage distribution of feeder sources has undergone severe distortion. Now, this inter-group percentage-distribution in the Section Officers' grade is as follows :

Direct Recruitment	16%
Departmental promotion on the basis of seniority	28%
Departmental promotion on the basis of length of service	28%
Departmental examination	28%

It is to be observed that in the current scheme of things, particularly in this Secretariat Service Grade, no significant premium is put on direct recruitment from the open market, whereas, in most on-going Class I services, organised and regularly constituted, the emphasis is, for obvious reasons, on young blood, transfused through direct recruitment of high calibred, youthful candidates.

and experience level, he compares as well, if not better, with other officers of equivalent ranks of the Central Government and generally excels officers of equivalent or even higher categories belonging to the state governments, but he is entrusted with such inconsequential responsibilities in decision-making which make him a high cost officer for low-level jobs. Being starved of responsibility and authority year after year, this junior management layer of the Central Secretariat gradually grows rickety mentally and rusty intellectually through a prolonged innings of disuse of their appropriate faculties.

THE SECTION OFFICER

This functionary, in its present designation, was born on July 1, 1959—though it existed and lived long in the Secretariat even before that as the fourth layer of hierarchy (from the top) in the name of Superintendent. In the Government of India, prior to 1949, every secretariat department consisted of a hierarchy with the following five layers of posts (or officers) one below the other :

(*i*) The first (or top) layer consisted of the secretary (administrative head of the secretariat department) and certain other officers who were distinguished from other officers of the secretariat department by the fact that each of them owed direct responsibility to the minister-in-charge within their allotted field, subject to the general or overall coordination by the secretary. These officers could be special, additional or joint secretaries.

(*ii*) The second layer consisted of posts or officers designated as deputy secretaries, who worked under, and were immediately responsible to, officers of the first layer.

(*iii*) The posts or officers of the third layer were designated under secretaries or assistant secretaries. They used to be known as branch officers.

(*iv*) The posts or officers of the fourth layer were designated, in the main, as superintendents. Parallel with them had also grown others designated as assistant-in-charge. The secretariat formation in the charge of the superintendent (or an assistant-in-charge) was called secretariat section—frequently referred to also as 'office'; the reason being that the power of decision on behalf of government vested (and still vests) in branch officer and above, and not in officer of the section.

(*v*) The fifth layer consisted of members of the staff of all secretariat sections engaged on case work —known as assistants or dealing hands.

The Central Secretariat Service (Reorganization and Reinforcement) Scheme of 1948 (in short, R & R scheme)—with which starts the modern

era of Central Secretariat Service, replacing the old Imperial Secretariat Service (constituted in 1919)—provided for the following layers up to the under secretaries' grade.[1]

Grade I—Under Secretaries	—Class I (Gazetted)
Grade II—Superintendents	—Class I (—do—)
Grade III—Asst. Superintendents	—Class II (—do—)
Grade IV—Assistants	—Class II (Non-gazetted)

A selection grade representing deputy secretary was formally added to the Central Secretariat Service from October 1, 1955, and it was visualized[2] that those who were recruited directly as assistant superintendents, would be eligible to go to deputy secretary's rank and beyond, and that too fairly early.

The officers of the two grades, namely, grade II & III were commonly known as section officers, since both held charge of sections in the secretariat. (The initial intention[3] of grade III officers taking charge of lighter sections and grade II of heavier ones was, however, never realized in practice.)

From the structural angle, the salient features of this R & R scheme were :

(*i*) A new grade of officers, namely, Assistant Superintendents, Grade III, was created in between Assistants' and Superintendents' Grade. This grade of Assistant Superintendent was a gazetted class II Service.

(*ii*) Positions of Assistant Secretary, as a class, were abolished. Those of such officers not absorbed as Under Secretaries were allowed to waste out.

(*iii*) The posts of Assistant-in-charge, as an institution, also done away with.

There were three methods[4] of recruitment to the grade III, *i.e.*, the Assistant Superintendents;

(*i*) 50 per cent by direct recruitment from the results of combined competitive examination.

---

[1] *The Central Secretariat Service (Reorganisation and Reinforcement) Scheme*, 1948, Government of India.

[2] *Prospectus for the Combined Competitive Examination*, 1955, New Delhi, Union Public Service Commission.

[3] *The Central Secretariat Service (Reorganisation and Reinforcement) Scheme*, 1948, *op. cit.*

[4] *The Central Secretariat Service (Reorganisation and Reinforcement) Scheme*, 1948, *op. cit.*

(*ii*) 25 per cent by promotion from Assistants who have completed 5 years but not more than 10 years of service in the grade of Assistants through a limited competitive examination; and

(*iii*) 25 per cent by Departmental promotion, made ministry-wise on the basis of seniority, subject to rejection of unfit.

The R & R scheme clearly visualised the creation of an officer-category in Assistant Superintendent by providing for "a new point of entry into the service at a shorter distance beneath the top than the present Assistants Grade". Direct recruitment of an "officer-type-recruit" was considered essential for at the best reasons:

(*i*) The average post-War assistant was going definitely to be a poorer type than the pre-War assistant, for a long time to come.

(*ii*) Whereas before the War, the ICS practically filled all the posts of and above the rank of Deputy Secretary, in future, the ICS-cum-IAS will barely suffice to man about one-half of the posts. The Central Secretariat Service was, therefore, to contribute its share to wipe out the gap.

(*iii*) In 1948, there were just not enough men with the qualifications, training and experience necessary for manning all the sections of the Secretariat Departments. In fact, it was the necessity for finding appropriate substitutes for the nearly extinct and vanishing species of good Superintendents (and also Assistants) that prompted the induction of bright material at Assistant Superintendent's level directly from the open market through a high-grade examination.

The *sine qua non* of the new scheme was thus the moulding of the good material by proper training and early promotion to ensure that "fire was not quenched by a long wait in far too many cases". The training course for direct recruits included institutional training at the Secretariat Training School (now Institute of Secretariat Training and Management) and practical secretariat training through actual attachment to the ministries. All Grade II Superintendents' posts were to be filled by promotion from amongst the Assistant Superintendents solely on merit, and recruitment to grade I, *i.e.*, Under Secretary's posts, was to be entirely by promotion from the rank of Superintendents, based on merit and made on the advice of Selection Board for the Central Secretariat as a whole.[5] The grade of Assistant Superintendents can thus, be seen as clearly intended to *"provide training, junior duties and apprenticeship"* for the direct recruits before taking up, at an early age, Under Secretary's postions *via* superintendentship. It

[5] UPSC is now associated with the selection of Central Secretariat Service officers for promotion to Under Secretary's grade and there is also an 'interview' for such selection.

was also to serve another valuable purpose in providing scope for promc tion at a sufficiently early stage for promising assistants, though, c course, as U.P.S.C. conducted limited competitive examination.

Later in 1959, the Second Pay Commission, however, recommendec the merger of the two separate grades, namely, Assistant Superintenden (Grade III) and Superintendents (Grade II) into one combined Sectio Officer's grade on the ground that "for direct recruits the new grade wa to be a training grade and once the period of training is over, there is n difference between the two grades functionally and there is free inter-chang of positions among Section Officers of the two grades". While recommendin for the proposed combined grade, the scale of Rs. 350-25-500-30-830-35-90 the Pay Commission observed :

> "The interest of public services appears to require that a significai proportion of direct recruits to the service should be of a standar higher than that of the generality of class II services if not comparab to that of the class I central field service".

The Government of India accordingly merged the two grades c Section Officers with effect from July 1, 1959. It was thought that the tw grades were not fulfilling any identifiably different purpose, functionall speaking. It was, therefore, difficult to justify the existence of two grade which itself had led to certain mis-directed personnel deployment practice One could argue that the solution, in fact, lay in correcting the imbalanc and removing the distortions that had crept into the system, rather tha in wiping out the prevalence of the two grades.

Be that as it may, it would be pertinent to see what the secretaria system in the headquarters organizations of the Government of Indi needed at the section level for better organization of functions expected c the so-called 'office'. It is only from this premise of systemic requirement that one could rationally conclude if there had been any norm-displacemer and if so how that can be rectified. In other words, some of the question to be answered are what are the goal-assumptions for, and the pattern c expectations from, this grade; whether the personnel in this grade ar qualified to meet the demand made by the system on them, etc.

It is well known that the current functional system in the governmen is based on the clear dichotomy between policy formulation at th headquarter and programme execution in the field. The former is done i the secretariat organizations, the proverbial headquarters of authority

---

[6] Government of India, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Emoluments an Conditions of Service of Central Government Employees* (1957-59), Delhi, Manager c Publications (Government of India), 1959.

leaving the letter to the charge of non-secretariat field-formulations. While, thus, the secretariat lays stress on the intellectually-oriented, analytical type of functions—based on collection, collation, classification, interpretation and evaluation (through feed-back) of relevant data for policy framing and applied decision-making—the focus of the field organizations is more on programming and implementation within the framework of policy-cum-decision structure handed down by, and emanating from, the 'Capitol'. Obviously, the style of operation and the pattern of skill-ranges as well as the quality and qualification of personnel manning these two types of organizations have to be different.

Within this overall frame of Secretariat functioning, one has to compose sub-goals, so as to tag on different functional charter to different grades. In other words, one has to closely see as to what is expected of this grade of Section Officers. If the hypothesis is that Section Officers belong to a mere subordinate stratum of the secretariat, and, hence, are required to perform only supportive functions, the conclusion will be different from what may flow from the assumption that they are also expected to decision-making roles, howsoever nominal those may be initially in that grade. In any case, they cannot avoid 'decision exercise' on promotion to the next higher grade for which a kind of preparatory ground work is inescapable. This means that it would not be proper to treat the potentiality of personnel in these grades lightly; on the contrary, they should be better utilized both in that grade, and imaginatively developed or assuming more onerous responsibilities of higher hierarchies.

The hypothesis with which the author of this article starts is that it will be in the interest of secretariat system that this grade is not asked to support, purely clerically, the decision-making super-structure but made a valuable feeder layer or base for a permanent corps of officers who, with appropriate exposure to the right type of field training and carefully devised deployment-planning could be groomed into a competent class of policy planners. This is particularly so, in the context of an overlarge flow-in of deputationists' stream from all sources, who had once been described in the pre-Independence days as no better than 'birds of passage', The system, therefore, needs a permanent group of officers who 'reside', as it were, in the secretariat, would acquire specialization in headquarters' works through long enough innings on the 'crease' and be expert advisers in policy making, planning, and programming. Traditional 'tenure' officers cannot obviously fill this bill particularly in the emerging perspective of fast technicalization of administration and increasing sophistication of decision-making technology, which, through the knowledge-explosion and information revolution, has made the governmental work and its operational style intensely specialized and counter-amaturish, requiring professionalized skills of high order. Thus, it is clearly in the interest of public administration to recruit

and nurture a young band of officers and groom them for higher tasks in the headquarters. The basic objective of the afore-mentioned Re-organisation and Re-inforcement Scheme was just this, and with that object in view, the direct recruitment to the grade of Assistant Superintendents from the combined competitive examination which feeds the top services in India was started. The primary approach was 'catch them young'—a group of quality candidates—in order to develop them into a permanent corps of officers of the secretariat.

It would be relevant, in this context, to analyse if the scheme of direct recruitment met the original expectation and threw up material of required standard, *i.e.*, officers of qualitative merit and with promise of potentiality, on which alone was the scheme was postulated.

Quality and Qualifications

Direct recruits to the Section Officer's grade have naturally to be 'graduates' because the minimum academic qualifications for Combined Competitive Examination, through which they come in, is a 'degree'. A large proportion of such direct recruits are, in reality, holders of post-graduate degrees. It would not be out of place to mention that some of these direct recruits have bagged Ph.Ds. (Indian and foreign), and added feathers to their caps by securing top honours in First Class (with distinction) in the field of Public Administration both in Indian Institute of Public Administration and International Institute of Social Studies abroad. Since Assistants (direct recruits) have also to be graduates, the Section Officers coming through limited competitive examination are generally graduates barring a few non-graduate departmental Assistants. The following Table[7] speaks for itself :

Academic qualifications of Direct Recruits (DR) Departmental Examination Recruits (DE) (Purely) Departmental Section Officers (D) (based on a sample of 1,084 *permanent Section Officers).*

	DR	D	DE
Post Graduates	102	122	51
Graduates	116	364	168
Undergraduates	—	142	19
TOTAL	215	628	238

[7] *Central Secretariat Civil List—Selection Grade, Grade I and Section Officer's Grade,* January 1961, New Delhi, Office of the Establishment Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs (Government of India). No new Civil List for Section Officers has been printed after 1962.

An analysis made sometime ago of academic attainments of direct recruits recruited up to 1959 (later dossiers were not readily available) shows that out of 148 graduates/post-graduates, 60 were first class and 80 second class. It is also revealing that out of this batch of 148 direct recruits, 59 were in the Class I zone of the merit list prepared by the UPSC for Class I field services and secured ranks higher than the last candidate going to the Class I Central Services. All such people—potentially class I material—had to be contented with Class II Service in C.S.S. becau e of one or the other technical disability, such an non-indication of preference for some class I services, medical unfitness for Class I Railway Service or IPS—which requires higher medical standard—or the disability clause restricting entry of departmental candidates into only their own departmental services.

However, it is not so much the quality of the officers of the Section Officers' grade that is sought to be advanced as an argument (though that by itself should be a solid one) for giving them their due, but it is the scheme of things in the headquarters administration, the character of its functioning, implications of the tenure system of staffing, etc., which should determine what should rationally be done with the personnel of this level. In fact, right from 1919 down to 1950, the weight of evidence on almost all eminent authorities had been in favour of having a real and permanent officer class at a level below that of Under Secretary.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A brief excursion into the world of administrative history of Imperial Secretariat insofar as this aspect of the question is concerned should be rewarding, at this stage.

The Llewellyn-Smith Committee[8] of 1919 recommended wholesale replacement of Under Secretaries by Assistant Secretaries on the ground that officers of and above the rank of Under Secretaries were mere "birds of passage and practically the whole of permanent traditions of the Department are the exclusive possessions of the Office Establishment"—which resulted in depriving the Secretariat of the "guidance of permanent and experienced higher officials". The Assistant Secretaries were "intended to be a *permanent officer class* and *not a superior ministerial establishment class*". They felt that it would be a distinct advantage to have strong pockets of concentrated experience in the persons of permanent *officers* of the Secretariat.

[8] Government of India, *Report of the Government of India Secretariat Procedure Committee*, 1919 (Llewellyn Smith Committee), Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1920.

The Maxwell Committee of 1937[9], on the contrary, put its axe on Assistant Secretaries but recommended the creation of an additional grade of 'Attache' in the Secretariat which would have consisted virtually of supernumerary Under Secretaries before entering regular duties. The assistants were to submit finished cases direct to the Under Secretaries, thus eliminating the Superintendents from the route and the Secretariat scene. The promotion channel of promising Assistants was built up, but at a fairly early stage, through their appointment to some other Central services and not diiectly to the grade of Under Secretaries.

Sir Richard Tottenham, in his "Report No IV :—Reorganisation of Secretariat",[10] advocated the breaking up of the Imperial Secretariat Service into class I (Superintendents) and a Class II (Assistants) service and "giving those in class I a new name—perhaps Principals—and empowering them to dispose of certain classes or routine work in the name of Government". In other words, Superintendents were to be given powers (though not of sufficiently high magnitude), to take decision on behalf of the government. (Even this cannot be considered commensurate with the Class I status accorded to the Superintendent, as Class I officers in other sectors or services were, *ab initio* and as a matter of course, saddled with much higher responsibilities of decision-making). In his scheme, just above the Superintendent or Principal there would have been only Under Secretary and no Assistant Secretary.

The Machinery of Government Committee (1946),[11] chaired by Mr. E. C. Coates, contemplated a service of Assistant Principals and Principals (the former being mainly a training appointment for the latter) in place of the then case-noting Assistants and Superintendents, thus going one step further than Tottenham by way of recommending conversion of Assistants' category also into an officer class. In the language of the Committee,

> "The days when the business of the central government largely consisted of the application of precedents or in running the country on a care and maintenance basis are over. New problems and new activities have crowded in the Centre in recent years, new policies are constantly having to be formulated, and fresh ground has constantly to be broken. The nature and volume of the work now confronting government require much specialised and more thorough handling. This cannot be achieved by a system of non-gazetted Assistants noting

[9] Government of India, *Report on Organisation and Procedure*, (Maxwell Committee) 1937, Delhi, Manager of Publications, Government of India.

[10] Government of India, *Reports on the Reorganisation of the Central Government (of India)*, 1945-46, Delhi, Manager of Publications, Government of India.

[11] Government of India, *Report of the Machinery of Government Committee*, (Coates Committee) 1946, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India).

to a few over-strained officers. The work is of a nature which can only be performed by officers who know their subjects inside out, and who can hold their own in departmental, and if need be in international discussions. The Committee recommended that case-noting Assistants and Superintendents should be replaced by *officers* of the new Service. The standard ranking of a Department should be Secretary, Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, Principals and Assistant Principals—the latter two replacing the present Assistants and Superintendents. The care for the "General Line" of the new Service would be last two ranks, the Assistant Principals being mainly a training appointment."

Even the Chairman of the UPSC observed in 1947 that the defects of the Secretariat functioning arose largely from the fact that there were "not enough lower ranking *officers* to see that files are handled properly".

This concept of having officers right from the lower rung of the Secretariat ladder could not be accepted by the Government as it was thought that "in practice, they would provide no more than a costlier duplication of the present Secretariat Organisation", and that "any large demand on the only raw material, *i.e.*, the University graduates must produce substantially the same men to whatever rank initial recruitment was made". Also, under "a new ministerial regime, pressure of the Government would be applied at the top and not at the bottom. In practice, the new type of officers would tend more and more to do the preparatory work, with the merits or at any rate the decision left, as at present, to the officers of and above the rank of Under Secretary. The structure would be top-heavy in designation and pay but the essential disposal of work would proceed on the same lines." The Home Department's Reorganization Scheme stood for status-quoism for Assistants but advocated direct recruitment to a newly constituted grade of Assistant Superintendent "for infusion of fresh blood and also as a feeder service to the rank of Under Secretary".

There seem to be some inconsistencies and assumptional inadequacies. It would, first, be incorrect to assume that, if the two lower-levels of Secretariat were retained merely as 'glorified clerks' and not given officer-status and pay, the same high quality-staff would still flock in. Secondly, there was also no basis for assuming that even after good material was inducted by conferment of officer status and pay and delegation of decision-making authority, those officers would still behave in the old clerical style by merely passing the buck and never holding it. The entire reasoning seems to underrate the immense psychological effect on a man's "outlook, keenness and willingness to assume responsibility which direct appointment as an officer is apt to engender as compared with the deadening effect of appointment as a subordinate with the certain prospect of 10 or 12 years and the probable

prospect of a *further* 10 to 12 years' work in a subordinate capacity before he can rise to an officer status." Indeed, Machinery of Government Committee scheme, which was based largely on the Whitehall system, would have given the Central Government a Secretariat machine having much greater efficiency, possessing much greater initiative and ability of original thought, and at comparatively moderate expense.

After a plethora of noting and voluminous exchange of views, the CSS(R&R) scheme (as referred to earlier) was ultimately introduced in 1950. But the decade that followed (twelve years, to be precise) could perhaps be termed, insofar as CSS is concerned, a 'decade of doubt, confusion and chaos' during which no worthwhile or strategic personnel planning, perspective research in cadre-management policies and programmes seem to have been undertaken on any systematic, regular basis To cap it all, no statutory rules or regulations regarding such vital aspects of a service as recruitment, promotion, etc., had been framed or promulgated till 1962 and all crucial service matters were left to be governed by *ad hoc* instructions designed more to meet the emerging contingencies than to formalise or rationalise a career-service system. The rules, when they came in 1962[12], provided for decentralization of Section Officer's grade to individual Ministries and prescribed a minimum of 10 years' "parking time" before giving the amber signal for the start of consideration (and just consideration!) of Section Officers, including the already tested direct recruits, for promotion to the centralized Under Secretaries' grade. In practice, the gestation period in many cases were even longer, even for the direct recruits who, evidently, had been inducted young, into an officer grade, for transfusing fresh blood into the decision-making veins of the permanent parts of the Secretariat. Contrasted with State Civil Service Officers' minimum of 8 years before consideration for inclusion in the "Select List" for promotion to the Senior Scale of the IAS (Rs. 900-1800), this 10 years' wait for Section Officers in a Class II grade* for earning a mere *eligibility for consideration* for Under Secretaries' grade in such a short ranging scale as Rs. 900-1250 is utterly frustrating and demoralising, to say the least.

A comparative reference to the State Civil Service Officers should be rewarding from another angle. The direct recruits to the grade of Deputy Collectors of the State Civil Service, having initial pay scales not, again,

[12] Central Secretariat Service Rules, 1962.

* Consequent on the merger of grade II and III of CSS on the recommendation of the Second Pay Commission (1959) the merged grade of Section Officers was made Class II instead of its being conferred Class I status which grade II had, in fact, enjoyed. This merger of the two Section Officers' grade had already taken away from the Assistant Superintendents the chance of acquiring Class I Service-status through promotion to Grade II.

generally higher than Section Officers' grade, come, in the main, from local candidates, as against direct recruits to the grade of Section Officers coming through an all-India, IAS, etc., Combined Competitive Examination (conducted by the UPSC annually to feed the IAS, IFS and other all-India and Central Services). A large segment of Deputy Collectors, which ranges from 22.2 per cent in Rajasthan to 95 per cent in Bihar and some other States, is promoted from subordinate State Services which throw up Tehsildars or Mamlatdars, etc. Even then, the type of tasks entrusted to the Deputy Collectors is of a much wider sweep and the decision-making authority vested in them is of a far higher level than those given to the Section Officers in the Secretariat, and, yet, nobody has ever complained that the State Administration is in disarray because of the responsibility reposed in their comparatively junior officers. For all we know, the Deputy Collectors must have been doing very well indeed in their allotted sphere of functioning. As an evidence of the positive trust, the Deputy Collectors can be, and are, rewarded by promotion to the highest Civil Service of India today namely, the IAS, while the Section Officers, though recruited initially through a higher all-India Competitive standard and possessing quality and merit comparable to class I Services of the Government of India,[13] fall far behind (almost by miles!) in career prospects when compared even with State Civil Service Officers.

The reference to the State Service Officers proves that the officer-development is, in the main, a function of entrustment of responsibility, and handling of it, at early age which generates a climate of commanding confidence conducive to growth. This is precisely what seems to be wanting in the Secretariat. For instance, a Section Officer, recruited at the age of, say, 25 (average) will have to wait for his first break in promotion for ten years (in theory) and longer (in practice). The responsibilities of the grade of Section Officers are office supervision but no participation, to any degree, in the decision-making activity of the government. Despite their being essentially good material at the start, the Section Officers often fail to measure up to their initial promise because of factors not connected with intrinsic quality of their personality. If they had not filled the bill in the past and had run to seed, or had not been able to display enough dynamism or forward-looking approach, or had been reduced to what can be more appropriately called the status of clerical foreman, it is not as if there was something pathological about them, but merely that 'secretariatism' (or the

[13] Indeed when thousands appear in all-India competitive and hardly 200 or so are recruited, a difference of few marks put candidates 20-30 places below another candidate and though there is no qualitative difference, candidates are compartmentalized into different services, say, one in Audit and Accounts and the other in Central Secretariat. The point that is sought to be made here is that when the material induced into the Central Secretariat Service stands at qualitative par with the other Class I Services of the Central Government, the difference in responsibility-pattern between Secretariat officers and State Civil Service Officer is easily that of two worlds' !

system that had somehow been made of the original scheme) is having its toll in the form of gradual erosion of initial quality and the blunting of their sharp-edgedness. The proper policy in the interest of efficiency of the system should, then, appear to be to treat this category *ab anitio* as 'officers', in reality and not merely in name, and invest it with all that goes with it.

Even in the Central Government itself, the practice in this regard appears to suffer from some inner inconsistency. When a candidate instead of joining the Secretariat service, goes to another Class II Service, like Customs Appraiser's Service or Income-tax, he is required to shoulder (as full-fledged officer having specially allotted tasks to perform) higher responsibility and exercise greater power. Instances can even be quoted where the same candidate from the UPSC's merit list earmarked for Section Officers' grade or even working as such, goes to join a Class I service just on the occurrence, in the same year, of some more vacancies there (and not obviously on the demonstration of higher capacities or merit!) and take up more responsible assignments. Again, when the same Section Officer of the Ministry is posted as, say, Assistant Controller in the office of Chief Controller of Import and Fxports or Assistant Director in Directorate General of Supplies and Disposal or Administrative Officer in any Attached or field office (to cite only a few example), he has to handle tremendously more responsible assignments and take decisions of higher magnitude, independently. The point sought to be made here is that when the quality of the material remains unchanged, the same set of officers are entrusted with a plentitude of responsible decision-making power in one case and not trusted with substantive responsibility in the other. This personnel-utilisation programme manifestly needs a fresh look in this sector of government activity.

The Deshmukh Study Team[14] of the ARC on Machinery of Government and its procedure of work had proposed "doing away with the Section-centred pattern of today" and recommended adoption of "desk-officer system" under which "each executive is allowed a defined area of functioning and handles all correspondence and problems relating to that area. When a communication is received, the executive concerned drafts a reply and issues it in simple situations. He submits the draft to the head of the division for signature without any recommendation or note". In this scheme of things, there are five executive grades :

— E.I Rs. 210 530 (Assistants)
— E.II Rs. 325-575 (Research Assistants)

[14] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Delhi, Managers of Publications (Government of India, 1968).

— E.III Rs. 350-900 (Section Officers)
— E.IV Rs. 700-1250 (Under Secretaries, Senior Research Officer, Senior Analyst etc)
— E.V Rs. 1100-1400 (Assistant Economic Adviser Grade VI of Indian Management Pool Joint Directors, etc.)

Thus, under the Dushmukh umbrella, the first-line of officers, in the name of Executive, starts from Assistants grade. Care will naturally be taken for proper choice and deployment of right grade of executive in a particular work-situation. With stenographic assistance and other facilitative infra-structural support, these executives are expected to dispose of the work presently done by the Assistants, Section Officers or even Under Secretaries.

The ARC, however, takes a different line and observes in its Report on Machinery of Government and its Procedure of Work[15] as follows :

> "We would strongly urge the scraping of the present procedure. The officers at the decision-making and consideration level would, to some extent, need staff assistance. Here, we would suggest that the existing functionaries known as Assistants and Section Officers may be suitably utilised for this purpose. These aides will collect data and other relevant material, maintain files, draft replies to receipts of simple or routine nature. They should, however, be forbidden to note on the files."

On the foundation of this premise, the Commission[16] built up the edifice of their conclusion and recommended :

> "There should be only two levels of consideration and decision below the Minister, namely, (*i*) Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and (*ii*) Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary/Secretary Work should be assigned to each of these two levels on the lines of 'desk officer' system. Each level should be required and empowered to dispose of a substantial amount of work on his own and be given the necessary staff assistance."

It is thus apparent that according to the ARC : (*a*) the decision-making levels in the Secretariat should only be two; (*b*) they start only from Under Secretaries; (*c*) the present Section Officers and Assistants should merely collect data and material, maintain files, and do certainly no brain work but merely perform what is currently done by the clerical

---

[15] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedure of Work*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India, 1968).

[16] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work, op. cit.*

grades. *This, to be sure, further devalues the Section Officer's job and status in that they will, in ARC's scheme, be completely cut off from the main stream and shutout from making any contribution, worth the name, to the transaction of substantial government-business. It is doubtful, therefore, if for getting merely this type of purely clerical assistance, Government should at all invest in Section Officers to be inducted from such a stiff all-India competitive examination as at present and at such high cost. The ARC in its subsequent report on Personnel Administration[17] found it fit to recommend stoppage of direct recruitment to class II posts of Section Officers (*cf.* Recommendation No. 18). The Commission even went to the extent of suggesting abolition of direct recruitment to all other Class II posts services also (*e.g.*, Income Tax, Customs, etc.) whose incumbents perform duties similar to those allotted to junior Class I officers; such Class II posts were to be entirely filled by promotion. It is doubtful, however, whether it will really lead to more efficient and expeditious transaction of business, when we take away, without profering a viable alternative, whatever contribution the Section officers and Assistants were making by way of providing finished products to the decision-makers of today.[18] It is likely to have a negative impact on executive

* Even the clerks in the Secretariat, not to speak of Assistants, do a lot of case work; in any case, the major brunt of the case-handling is invariably borne, in majority of cases, by these two categories, that is, Assistants and Section Officers ; ARC's recommendations therefore, seem to reverse the work pattern without bringing about infra-structural changes and attitudinal reforms.

[17] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of Personnel Administration*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969.

[18] Furnished below are the results of some sample studies made of the type of work transacted in the sections to show that much flows down the Secretariat can be cleared in no time if Section Officers are made the real 'clearing house' :

Ministry/Department	*Strategic Policy*	*Problem solving*	*Corres-ponding handling*	*Remarks*
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	
1. Ministry of Commerce (International Trade Wing) (A sample of three Territorial Sections)	7.3	15.2	77.3	About 40 per cent of the total receipts are of routine/simple type falling in the correspondence handling category and 60 per cent requiring higher consideration at present.
2. Department of Economic Affairs (Internal Finance wing) (A sample of four Sections)	10	25	65	In correspondence-handling category, 45 per cent of receipts are of routine/sample type, 55 per cent of the total work, thus, requiring higher consideration at present.
3. Department of Agriculture	7	13	80	In the correspondence-handling category, routine and simple type accounts for 50 per cent, thus, only the remaining 50 per cent requiring higher consideration at present.
4. (Animal Husbandary Division) (A sample of 3 units)				

(*Contd.*)

development and morale-building. It is anybody's guess if starving the section officers of responsibility and treating them the way the Commission has suggested is the best way of developing responsible officers out of them in future.

While commenting on the major demerits of the present system of Secretariat functioning, the Deshmukh Study Team has very succinctly brought out :

> "The whole concept of officers—office pattern seems, in any case, to be out of gear with the democratic base of the country. The number of officers is so small that too heavy burden rests on their shoulders. They tend to get absorbed in day-to-day responsibilities and find little time to think, plan, and organise. The consequent absence of direction from them on basic matters creates uncertainty about the line of action to be adopted in individual cases and eventually adds to their work. There is thus a vicious circle which steadily increases the burdens of officer class and correspondingly reduces the contribution of the office. Many of the dealing officials are potentially good material, but remain tied to the limited task of 'dealing' for the formative years of their career. During this period, they are not made full use of by the very nature of the system; and by the time they are eligible for the entry into the decision-making world of officers, their initial promise is usually snuffed out. This amounts to a wasteful utilization of promising material...All matters, big or small, are subjected to the same method of processing. Whether the issue is how a simple letter should be replied to or what the answer is to a pressing tactical problem or what long-range policy should obtain in a particular area, there is usual series of noting up the hierarchical ladder until a decision is taken. Problem-solving and long range policy-making, thus, did not receive more or less the same attention as the daily round of correspondence and thus is not good enough."[19]

We have never had it so good! The paragraph above speaks for itself and speaks volumes.

CONCLUSION

The critical factors, leading to a collapse of efficiency-programme at the junior management level should now seem evident. That is, there is no

---

It is thus clear that because the Section Officers are not encouraged to independently handle correspondence-cases even where no decision is involved or where policy is clearly laid down, an easily avoidable but tremendous pressure of significant paper work is deverted to the dicision-makers of to-day, namely, Under Secretary and above. This obviously is far from an instance of realism in man-utilisation in the field of public personnel administration.

[19] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, *op. cit.*

'officer level' intervention in the first handling of the receipts and the first few levels, through which papers pass, are not authorized, in a large-majority of cases, to take decisions on the questions raised in the receipts. Indeed, this is the result of not giving to the present sets of functionaries at these intermediate levels (adequately qualified though they may be by education and training) the due responsibility for more effective discharge of their duties; more crucial seems to be the authority's almost total denial of real officer status to the class of people recruited *ab initio* as Section Officers. The frustrating effect of this lack of trust, this neglect and non-recognition, on their morale and development potentialities is not difficult to gauge. There is, therefore, an urgent need to cry halt to this state of improper use of suitable material and evolve a different programme in this regard.

The Third Central Pay Commission has also gone into this question, It has observed[20] as follows:

> "In regard to the secretariat, there has been a consensus of opinion that there should be a reduction in the levels of consideration and decision-making and also in the number of persons of departments responsible for taking a decision. The Pilot Section Scheme and Officer-oriented Scheme have been in force in some Ministries. The Administrative Reforms Commission has recommended a modified version called the "Desk Officer System". We endorse this recommendation which should be followed by such changes in recruitment procedures and personnel deployment as are found necessary for the success of the new system."

Elsewhere, while discussing the headquarters' organisation of the Government of India, the same Commission has stated:[21]

> "We do not think that it would be advantageous on the whole to shut out direct entry to the Section Officer's Grade."

There seems to be no divergence of opinion that there is a direct relationship between work-system and office-procedure, and the pattern of staffing. Also, there is a consensus that there is need for re-inforcing qualities in this grade; and hence it has been held in many quarters not excluding the Pay Commissions and the U.P.S.C., that the 'desk-officers' should not be conventional Section Officers but should be officers with a difference, of course, from the quality angle. In other words, they should hold *ab initio* class I status, and recruitment, promotion, remuneration pattern and other conditions of service should be commensurate with the status proposed for the new class of Desk-Officers.

---

[20] Report of the Third Central Pay Commission, 1973, Ministry of Finance, Vol. IV, Chapter 66, Paragraph 6.

[21] *Ibid*, Chapter 9, Paragraph 32.

Some suggestions toward improving this situation would easily flow from the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs. If it is true, as would appear to be the case, that the basic material in this layer is good, the only problem that remains to be done is to reshape and mould this material into a more effective group. This could be attempted by :

— making Section Officer's grade *ob initio* Class I, to impart a smart confidence in them;

— delegating more and more of responsibilities and decision making authorities to those officers;

— giving them better training not merely in foundational subjects but also in specialities of 'headquarters' functions;

— having a compulsory executive training-programme for the grade which would fill the so called 'field experience' gap;

— designating them as 'Executives', completely new rubric being necessary to wash out the stigma associated with Section Officers for so long; and

— having a well planned development programme for them through modern career-planning techniques and quicker promotions to boost up their morale.

Though it is most difficult in practice, an attempt should be avoided to make the dead deader. But the drift from bad to worse should, and must, be checked through the adoption of a suitably geared action-programme to vitaminise this anaemic Section Officers' grade in the interest of imparting a positive and dynamic thrust to the decision-making process in the governmental headquarters. This is what the junior management in the headquarters of the government of India requires; this is what the system can ill-afford to go without.

Research Notes

NOTE NO. I

SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND STATUS PERCEPTIONS : GENERALISTS AND SPECIALISTS IN A NEW FOCUS

THE purpose of this note is to analyse the data on the social background of the administrators in Rajasthan. The analysis recognizes the significance of socializing processes in influencing decision making.[1] It assumes that behaviour of an individual is in some way a function of his background. Administrators perceive reality on the basis of their socializing experiences. Much of what they see depends on how they see, which in turn depends on their socio-economic origins. Thus, in Britain, for example, lack of touch with the problems of the working class and the sense of superiority towards them possibly emanate from the middle-class background of the bureaucrats.[2] Similarly, in India, the elitist character of the civil servants is assumed to be related to their status consciousness, sense of superiority and lack of understanding of the problems of the masses.[3] The basic argument assumes that the attitudes and the sympathies of a bureaucrat will be those of the social class from where he is drawn. He will carry his class attitudes and prejudices into his official life. Thus, only when all classes are properly represented in the civil service will their different needs and interests find due considerations.[4]

[1] For a review of the literature in this field and an excellent attempt to analyse the significance of each background variable in predicting attitude, *see* Lewis J. Eddinger and Donald D. Searing : "Social Background in Elite Analysis : A Methodological Inquiry", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LX, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 428-445; Donald D. Searing : "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization", *Political Studies*, Vol. I, No. 4 (January 1969), pp. 471-500.

[2] R. K. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain*, London, Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1955, pp. 189-93.

[3] Ralph Braibanti's writings on the ethos of Indian Civil Service are based on this kind of proposition. *See* in particular, Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Traditions*, Durham (N. C.), Duke University Press, 1966. *See also* D. N. Rao, "Disparities of Representation Among the Direct Recruits to the IAS", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 1, January-March, 1963, pp. 88-99; S. N. Swaroop, *Background of the Indian Administrative Service Officers 1965 and* 1970, New Delhi, Government of India, Training Division, Department of Personnel, Cabinet Secretariat, 1971.

[4] *See*, for elaboration of the concept, V. Subramanian "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXI, 1967, pp. 1010-1019

The sample for our study consists of 176 administrators in Rajasthan. Out of these, 54.5 per cent (96) are generalists and the rest are technocrats. The generalists are members of the Rajasthan Administrative Service manning the second level administrative and management positions in the state. In the sample, most of them hold jobs either in the districts or in the Directorates or public industrial or utility enterprises. The technocrats are drawn from engineering, medical, veterinary and agricultural departments. Most of them hold field positions in the districts or in their Directorates. None of them hold a position than that of a District Level Officer.

The way the sample has been stratified, it recognise the significance of the two kinds of administrators in the complex activity of the state today. The success of the state programmes of public image of the state cannot be attributed merely to the generalists. Technocrats are assuming greater significance as the complexity of the tasks increases. Therefore, it becomes necessary to focus attention on these bureaucrats too and provide an integrated picture of public personnel. The frequent controversy between the generalists and the technocrats provides an added significance to the study. It is for this reason that the sample provides for those bureaucrats who have frequent opportunity of interaction in the field and hold somewhat comparable positions.

The average age of our respondents is 36.6 years. Only about 12.6 per cent of them are above the age of 45 years. So most of the respondents are comparatively young individuals. But, as Table 1 shows, there is a considerable difference in age between the generalists and the technocrats.

Table 1

Distribution of Administrators in Rajasthan by Age

Age (years)	*Generalists* (per cent)*	*Technocrats† (per cent)*
25—35	27.1	68.8
35—45	52.1	28.8
45 and above	20.8	2.5

**N*=96
†*N*=80

Note : Percentages may not add up to hundred due to rounding errors in all Tables of this article.

As is obvious, the majority of the generalists fall in the 35–45 age category while the technocrats fall in the 25-35 age category. Only 2.5 per cent of the technocrats are above 45 years but there are 20.8 per cent of this age among the generalists. Technocrats are also, on an average, 5.6 years younger than the generalists.

In considering the social origins of our respondents, the data reveal that 52.8 per cent of them were born in an urban area. There seems to be more or less equal distribution of administrators from the rural and urban areas. There is no significant difference between the generalists and the technocrats in this regard.

The single largest group of administrators are sons of government servants. The next important occupational category is business and small trade followed by agriculture. Table 2 presents the full data.

Table 2

Fathers' Occupation of Administrators in Rajasthan

Occupation	*Generalists** (*per cent*)	*Technocrats*** (*per cent*)
Government Service	39.6	47.5
Business and Small trade	26.0	18.8
Agriculture	18.8	15.0
Teaching and Law	9.4	5.0
Medicine and Engineering	3.1	5.0
Others	3.1	8.6

*N=96
**N=80

Comparing this data with that of the IAS, we find that in that service too sons of government servants predominate. This is followed by agriculture by a wide margin.[5] Among the Block Development Officers in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, the picture is slightly reversed with government servants closely following the single largest group in agriculture.[6] There is no doubt that the early experiences of administrators in India are influenced heavily by an environment of government service.

[5] S. N. Swaroop, *op. cit.*

[6] Kuldeep Mathur, *Bureaucratic Response to Development*, Delhi, National (forthcoming).

Further data on social composition also reveal that extremely few of our respondents have studies in prestigious English Public Schools. The overwhelming majority has gone to local, denominational or government schools. But 24.4 per cent of them were educated in schools through English medium. There are significantly more generalists than technocrats in this group ($p=0.001$). This may be due to the fact that the generalists are older than the technocrats and the schools in their time usually adopted English medium. To study through English medium, it was not always necessary to go to a specific kind of school as today.

In terms of their educational background, 40.3 per cent of the administrators have studied beyond their under-graduate degree. This consisted of either a law, master's degree or a diploma. There were significantly more technocrats than the generalists among the simple single degree holders ($p=0.001$). Among the generalists 96.9 per cent or an overwhelming majority held arts or commerce degrees. None of them held degree in any technical subject and only 3.1 per cent were science graduates. This shows that only those who have general degrees either opt for or are successful at the competitive examinations to recruit members for the RAS. But greater success is ensured with a post-graduate degree even though a bare degree is the minimum qualification to appear for the examination. For the IAS also, it has been found that even though a mere degree is the minimum qualification, most of the IAS Officers carry a master's degree.[7] On the other hand, in the technical services, the minimum degree requirement is enough and hence there is a significantly large number of simple degree holders. Table 3 shows the pattern of education among the administrators in Rajasthan.

Among the administrators in Rajasthan, 25.3 per cent had pre-entry job experience. There were significantly more generalists than technocrats in this group ($p=0.001$). Of these generalists, 76.5 per cent had teaching experience. They were also younger and more frequently with master's degrees than others who did not have any pre-entry experience.

The data reveals a striking similarity between the education and experience of the IAS and the state generalist civil service. Both are dominated by arts and commerce graduates. Both have a tendency to attract individuals with teaching experience among those who have pre-entry experience.[8] The average length of service of administrators in our study is 12.2 years. As is evident from the earlier statistics on age, the generalists have put in two years more and technocrats two and half years less than

---

[7] S. N. Swaroop, *op cit.*

[8] *Ibid.*

the group average. Table 4 shows the distribution of administrators according to their length of service in greater detail.

Table 3

Pattern of Education of Administrators ($N=176$) in Rajasthan

Subject of Study	*Graduates only** (*per cent*)	*Post-Graduates only†* (*per cent*)	*L. LB with B.A./M.A.‡* (*per cent*)	*Diploma only*** (*per cent*)
Engineering	30.8	3.0	—	75.0
Agricultural Science	11.5	4.5	—	12.5
Veterinary Science	26.9	4.5	—	—
Medical	7.7	4.5	—	12.5
Arts/Commerce	19.2	80.3	100	—
Science	3.8	3.0	—	—

*$N=78$
†$N=66$
‡$N=24$
**$N=8$

Table 4

Distribution of Administrators in Rajasthan According to their Length of Service

Length of Service in Years	*Generalists** (*per cent*)	*Technocrats†* (*per cent*)
Less than 5	3.1	10.0
Between 5 and 10	8.3	46.3
Between 10 and 15	39.6	33.8
15 and above	49.0	10.0

*$N=96$
†$N=80$

The average income of administrators in our sample is Rs. 843 with the generalist earning about Rs. 170 more than the technocrats on the

average. It seems to be a reflection of age and length of service that there are 32.0 per cent generalists but only 7.5 per cent technocrats earning more than Rs. 900. But it seems the generalists have to put in greater number of years of service than the technocrats to earn the same emoluments. Table 5 is revealing in this regard. At each income level, the average age of the generalists is higher than that of the technocrats. Thus, considering their age and experience, they seem to be doing better on the economic front.

In summary, the general profile of an administrator in Rajasthan is of a middle aged, middle income individual with an urban background. His father is a government servant and sent him to study in local or government schools. His medium of instruction is largely non-English and he has studied up to a college degree. He has little experience before joining the government service in which he has put in about 12 years of service.

Table 5

Income According to Age of Administrators in Rajasthan

Income (in Rupees)	*Average Age (in Years)*	
	Generalists	*Technocrats*
500—700	35	32
700—900	40	38
900 and above	42	36

Generalists and technocrats have a similar background as far as urban living, father's occupation and type of school attended are concerned. But otherwise, there are significantly more generalists who have studied through English medium, have a post-graduate qualification, have pre-entry experience, and more income than the technocrats. What is significant in this comparison is that the technocrats are younger of the two groups and, on the basis of the average age, earn more than the generalists.

Members of Rajasthan Administrative Service and Indian Administrative Service have a striking similarity. They resemble each other in urban middle income background and father's government service occupation. Their educational attainments and pre-entry experience are also largely similar.

Together with this analysis, it is important to point out certain characteristics of the status perceptions of the administrators in Rajasthan.

Only very few, about 3.1 per cent consider their public prestige high. The majority of them consider it moderate or downright low. It is with this perception in mind that their aspirations for their children's education and profession becomes analytically interesting.

In a country where literacy rates have been dismally low, studying in exclusive English medium public schools is a mark of status and prestige. With around Rs. 3,000 per annum as the costs of schooling, only persons with certain socio-economic background can sent their children to study there. Thus, these schools, in building an elite background, become sources of recruitment for the top professions including the ICS. That they continue to be envisioned as highly prestigious is borne out by the fact that more than 60 per cent of administrators in our study would like to send their children to these exclusive educational institutions. There is no difference between the two groups of administrators. It is difficult to say how many administrators do actually send their children to schools of this type but from the economic point of view it seems rather difficult that they can.[9]

The professions that the administrators have in their mind for their children are medical or engineering. Choices for other professions, like government service, teaching, law, business or agriculture came from very few of them. There is also no difference between the generalists and technocrats in this regard. Thus, it is needless to emphasize from the above mentioned data that the administrators do not consider very highly of their own professions and would like to give such education and professional training that is different from their own.

In conclusion, the administrators coming from an urban middle income background prefer urban education and profession for their children. Even though they followed their father's professions, the generalists would not like their sons to do the same. From their point of view, English public schools continue to be passports to success even today. Medical and engineering colleges are expensive propositions. It can only be surmised that failure to provide this type of education for their children may leave frustration in them which, in turn, results in low opinion of their own public prestige.

—KULDEEP MATHUR

[9] For the argument of English public schools being passports to elite status, *see* Andre Beteille, *Castes : Old and New*, Bombay, Asia, 1969, pp. 204-228.

NOTE NO. II

IIPA NEWSLETTER READERSHIP SURVEY

THE aim of the survey was to obtain information from and impressions of the readership and on that basis "to try and improve the coverage, or production of the *Newsletter*, if necessary".

The questionnaire mailed with the February issue came back with a wealth of information.

The promptness and number of returns are an indication of the readers' interest in the *Newsletter*. The returns represent nearly 17 per cent of the potential 2,522 respondents. The *Newsletter's* circulation amongst the IIPA members is 2,479. It has 26 subscribers. In addition to this, 17 copies are picked up by a news agency every month. At a fairly precise guess, therefore, 2,522 would have received the questionnaire.

Respondents

Of the 425 readers who returned the questionnaire, 410 (97 per cent) were IIPA members, and 12 (3 per cent) subscribers. Three did not identify themselves.

The replying IIPA members defined their membership thus : Ordinary 374, Associate 22, and Corporate 6. Twenty-three skipped this question.

When we split the number of respondents according to their occupations, the "Government Servants" came out as the largest group, followed by "Teachers". The Table below shows the group break-up :

Occupation	*No.*	*Per cent*
Government Servants	222	53
Business Executives	44	10
Traders	3	0.7
Teachers	109	26
Students	17	4
Researchers	3	0.7
Journalists	3	0.7
Lawyers	3	0.7
Municipal Employees	1	0.2
Army Personnel	12	3
Social Workers	1	0.2
Consultants	3	0.7

Some respondents ticked two occupations, namely, "Government Servant" and "Teacher". We placed them under the category "Teacher". Many others, not finding their jobs covered by any of the five occupations listed in the questionnaire, mentioned their own titles, such as Journalists, Lawyers and Consultants. We maintained the groups indicated by the respondents, hence the long list.

Contents

Comparison of the relative popularity of each of the five Sections in the *Newletter* revealed "News from the Centre" as "read most often". This is how the Sections fare :

Institute News	*News from the Centre*	*News from States*	*Important Judicial Decisions*	*Other News*
236	289	242	196	146

Sixtynine (16 per cent) read all the Sections of the *Newsletter.*

Occupation-wise preferences for each Section also shows that "News from the Centre" is favoured most by all categories except Teachers and Consultants ; they show marginal preference for the "Institute News". For second place, the "New from States" and the "Institute News" vied with each other. "Important Judicial Decisions" and "Other News" finished third and fourth respectively. It must be added, however, that amongst the Lawyers, Business Executives, Army Personnel and Consultants particularly, and in other categories generally, the Section "Important Judicial Decisions" was popular.

Format, Frequency, Layout, etc.

Regarding the present format, 73 per cent were in favour of retaining it. Only 27 per cent wanted to see it "sprightly".

There was not much support for change in the frequency of the *Newsletter.* While 65 per cent gave their approval for its present frequency, 25 per cent said that they wanted it to be a fortnightly, 8 per cent preferred it as a weekly, and 3 per cent thought that it could be a quarterly.

Again, the respondents were not too keen about reviewing the layout of the *Newsletter.* A majority of them (55 per cent) felt there was no need for it.

When asked to state if they ever returned to the *Newsletter* for information, 50 per cent said "sometimes" followed by 22 and 28 per cent who mentioned "yes" and "no" respectively.

Respondents were also requested to furnish replies on the time, on an average, they spent reading the *Newsletter* ? Forty eight per cent reported "Less than 30 minutes", 46 per cent spent "Between 30-60 minutes", and 6 per cent gave it "More than 60 minute".

The Survey also indicated that 74 per cent went through the *Newsletter* fully, 11 per cent merely glanced at it, and 15 per cent read it sometimes. Not a single respondent checked the "not read at all" box.

For dealing with the data resulting from Question 6 ("For how many years have you been reading the IIPA *Newsletter"?*), we divided the respondents into three distinct groups : (1) Less than one year, (2) 1-6 years, and (3) 7-17 years. The analysis revealed their percentages as 2, 59, and 39 respectively.

On the issue of reading the *Newsletter* at home or in the office, it was found that an overwhelming majority (81 per cent) preferred to read it at home. Four per cent read the *Newsletter* both at home and in office.

Information Choices

Readers' chocies varied for the kind of information they would like to see in the *Newletter* : 186 wanted to learn about the "Latest Books on Public Administration", 93 spoke in favour of "Detailed Information about IIPA Activities", and 154 were for "News from countries like Japan and West Germany".

Subjects (under "Any Other" category) on which information is sought by the respondents covered a wide range :

> Contemporary administrative set-up in developing countries, particularly of South and South-Eastern countries of Asia ; Changes in the organisation and working of civil services in the developed countries ; developments in business management and public administration—Convergence and/or divergence ; systems analysis in public administration ; modern scientific techniques, like computers, operations research and statistical analysis ; practical problems concerning district administration in India ; public sector ; administrative procedures and structures in communist countries ; controversial matters, like Mulki Rules and inter-State disputes ; details of research projects undertaken by the IIPA ; findings of empirical studies done in India ; industrial administration ; public administration as a discipline of study in Indian universities ; case studies ; training courses abroad ; steps taken to correct malpractices in Administration ; problems of industrial labour ; important judicial decisions (greater coverage) ;

administrative practices tried and proved useful in foreign countries ; measures devised for improving efficiency ; advance information about IIPA Course etc. ; Issues debated at IIPA ; important postings in key Government positions ; developments in the theory of public administration ; action taken by Government on recommendations made by reforms committees/commissions ; problems of Government employees ; Select Committees' reports ; vacant academic positions ; abstracts of thought-provoking articles ; current political and economic affairs in the country ; personnel administration ; tips for administrators ; implementation of laws and their effect on public, government, and elected representatives.

A few members underlined the need to make the *IIPA Newsletter* a mechanism for two-way communication : *i. e.*, not only informing members about what goes on at the Institute's campus but also informing the whole IIPA community about the activities of the members.

Elimination and Subscription

Perhaps the most interesting parts of the Survey were the answers furnished to Questions 17 and 19.

Question 17 asked : "Would you favour elimination of *IIPA Newsletter* as a service to members"?

The responses were :

	Number	per cent
Yes..........................	24	6
No..........................	388	91
No response..................	13	3

Question 19 asked : "Would you still subscribe to the *Newsletter* if it is priced (only IIPA members to answer)"?

The results were :

	Number	Per cent
Yes........................	164	40
No..........................	209	52

Twelve respondents were inclined to subscribe but added the following riders : Implement our suggestions (5), Keep the price reasonable/moderate/low (5), Let the *Newsletter* provide more than what it does now (1), and Give a wider coverage (1). Six respondents said they would not go in for the *Newsletter* "in its present form". Two, however, offered to pay for it provided the subscription is "taken alongwith membership fee". Two were "not sure". One thought the *Newsletter* was worth having it but attributed

his helplessness due to "financial limitations". Another suggested postponing Question 19 till he had got "a quality *Newsletter*". Four gave vague replies : "Depends"; "Probably"; "Depends on the price fixed"; and, "Probably not"'.

Twelve members did not answer the question.

Who were the respondents willing to get the *Newsletter* even if it was priced ? In order to find the answer, we examined their occupational categories. The Government Servants were again in the lead, with Teachers coming next. At the bottom, in the following order, were : Business Executives, Students, Army Personnel, Traders, Lawyers, and consultants.

Major differences were found even amongst those who were in sympathy with the idea of eliminating the *Newsletter* "as a service to the membership" (Q. 17). As reported above, there were 24 such respondents. But, while answering Question 19, 14 of these 24 dissentients said "yes", and only 9 gave negative replies. One did not express any opinion either way. In other words, the actual strength of those supporting elimination of *Newsletter* is only 10 (3 per cent and not 6 per cent).

Suggestions

Question No. 18 : ("....what improvements would you suggest to enable the *Newsletter* to capture your interest and to be of greater use") and No. 20 : ("Additional comments, if any !") were open-ended. The answers they drew from 292 respondents (69 per cent ; the remainder said nothing) are coded below :

Category	*Number*
News from Government (Centre, State, etc.) and about People in Government	80
Greater coverage of news world over	42
Research Findings/Experiments	30
IIPA activities (Headquarters, Branches, Membership)	30
"Book Reviews" and "Readers Forum" as regular features	29
Information/Articles on Management/Public Administration	27
Emphasis on Issues Debated at IIPA	24
Study of Public Administration as a Discipline in India/Abroad	16
Advance Information about IIPA activities	14
Judicial Decisions bearing on Public Services	12
Critique of news	11
Focus on Public Sector Undertakings	6
Change of format	5
Responses Not Applicable	11

The following got only one mention : "Send copies of *Newsletter* to all libraries in India"; "Bring out an Annual Number to cover all decisions, laws, especially of State Governments"; "Publish a list of IIPA Branches and their addresses at least once a year"; "Start a Hindi Version of the *Newsletter*"; "Organise a *Newsletter* quiz contest"; and "Produce a house journal".

Criticism

As many as 14 complained about the lack of punctuality on the part of the *Newsletter*. Four felt it would be useful to have a Table of Contents on the front page.

There were quite "telling" comments which either commended the *Newsletter* or censured it. However, those which were complimentary (19) exceeded those which were critical (10).

Critical	*Complimentary*
Routine type of news ; Presentation drab ; Poor editing ; Quality deteriorated for the last two years	Very useful ; Interesting and informative ; Coverage adequate and up-to-date ; More attractive for the last two years.

Five lamented that the *Newsletter* was dull and had no sense of humour and wanted it to brighten itself through cartoons and photographs.

Eight respondents offered suggestions for affecting economy : These included : (1) Use of cheaper paper for the *Newsletter* ; (2) Smaller size ; (3) Paper wrapping for mailing ; and (4) An advertisement service.

New Sections

Eleven new Sections for the *Newsletter* were recommended, but each one of these found only one supporter : News from Universities about Discipline of Public Administration ; Obituary. Indian Economy ; Current Systems of Administration ; Fundamental Materials on Public Administration ; India's Neighbours ; Recent Developments in Public Administration at the Central and State levels ; Short Clues to Administrative Problems ; Placement Services ; Suggestions from Readers ; and, Articles From IIPA members.

"Editorial" and "Information Service" were two other features proposed by six and two respondents respectively.

What Next ?

There is clear indication of a desire for wider coverage, if not of change in the production of the *Newsletter.* Many useful suggestions have been made and a couple of them (like 'advance information about forthcoming IIPA activities') have already been put into practice. Quite a few would require careful thought and planning, while others would have to be weighed in terms of the resources of the Institute.

The important thing that emerges out of this whole exercise is : (*a*) the dialogue that has taken place between a service and its users, and (*b*) a basis on which certain improvements may be initiated.

Thanks

We take this opportunity to express our thanks to those who took time off to fill out the questionnaire and returned it to us in time.

—RAJ KUMAR NANDY

INSTITUTE NEWS

Prof. G. Mukharji, Director, re-:ed on January 15 and his successor rof. *Ishwar Dayal* joined the Insti-.te the same day.

Before coming to the Institute ; Director, *Prof. Ishwar Dayal* was hairman and Senior Professor of rganizational Behaviour at the ıdian Institute of Management, hmedabad. With him he brings a ch and broad background of ‹perience in management, research, ›nsulting and teaching.

Prof. Dayal is 48 and has ıthored six books and about 80 :ticles.

*　　*　　*

The Institute conducted the ›llowing courses during the quarter ›r senior and middle level officers f Union and State Governments, Inion Territory administrators, Iunicipal Corporations/Committees, ublic sector undertakings, etc.

(1) Fourth Special Course on Performance Budgeting for Public Sector Undertakings, January 15–20 (New Delhi),

(2) Special Course on Network Techniques and Performance Budgeting, January 22–February 2 (Bhopal), (The course was specifically designed for Madhya Pradesh Government Officials.)

(3) First Course on Laws in Municipal Administration February 12-24 (New Delhi), (The course was also attended by two Panchayat Training Officers from Nepal under the Colombo Plan.)

(4) Sixth Course on Administrative Leadership and Behaviour, February 12–24 (New Delhi), and

(5) Sixth Orientation Course on Materials Planning, March 12–17 (New Delhi).

The Institute also organized the following seminars during the quarter :

(1) *Seminar on Approach to Fifth Plan*, February 10-11 (New Delhi)

The Seminar was inaugurated by *Shri D. P. Dhar*, Union Minister for Planning and Chairman of IIPA's Executive Council. Economists, sociologists (representing leading concerned institutions of India), administrators and others who participated in the seminar included : *Prof. S. Chakravarty*, Member, Planning Commission; *Shri Asoka Mehta* and *Shri Chandrasekhar* (MPs); *Dr. Dharam Narain* (Chairman, Agricultural Prices Commission); and *Prof. A. M. Khusro* (Institute of Economic Growth). Two foreigners, *Mr. S. Ito* (Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo) and *Mr. Sukadji Ranuwihardjo* (Gadjah Meda University, Indonesia) also took part in the seminar.

The subject of the seminar was discussed in three sessions on : (*i*) the strategy, (*ii*) resource mobilization, and (*iii*) administrative structure and policies, which were chaired by *Prof. V. K. R. V. Rao* (Director, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore), *Prof. B. V. Krishnamurthy*, and *Prof. Ravi Mathai* (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad); over the

last session—the review session—*Prof. Ishwar Dayal* presided.

Of the eight papers presented to the seminar, four were contributed by the following members of IIPA's faculty : *Dr. S. K. Goyal* (he was incharge of the seminar), *Dr. B. N. Gupta, Dr. S. R. Maheshwari,* and *Dr. D. N. Gadhok.*

(2) *Seminar on Urban Community Development,* February 15 & 16 (New Delhi)

IIPA's Centre for Municipal Training & Research collaborated with Central Institute of Research & Training, New Delhi, in organizing the national seminar which was inaugurated by *Shri Kedar Nath Sahni,* Mayor of Delhi.

The recommendations which emerged during the discussions covered the following areas : (*i*) objectives and scope of the programme, (*ii*) coverage and extent, (*iii*) organization and administration, (*iv*) financial pattern, (*v*) staffing, (*vi*) training, and (*vii*) research and evaluation.

The organizations which participated in the seminar included : UNICEF; Municipal Corporations of Delhi, Gauhati and Surat; Family Planning Foundation, New Delhi; Universities of Panjab, Baroda, and Luchnow; Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority; Ford Foundation; Town and Country Planning Organisation, New Delhi; Gandhi Peace Foundation; Union Ministries of Works and Housing, and Education and Social Welfare; Central Social Welfare Board; and Planning Commission.

(3) *Seminar on Perspectives and Plans of IIPA,* March 24 (New Delhi)

In its first two sessions, 35 participants discussed two notes, one defining the field of study of public administration and the IIPA's role, objectives and functions, and the other spelling out the plans and programmes of the IIPA for the next two years or so. The last session was devoted to possibilities of IIPA's collaboration with University and other institutions.

The Seminar was inaugurated by *Shri B. D. Pande,* Cabinet Secretary to the Government of India.

Besides the courses and seminars, a 6-day *Workshop on Research Design* was also conducted by the Institute at the headquarters from March 17-23 in which about 30 persons, including four nominated by Institute of Foreign Trade, took part. *Dr. A. P. Barnabas* of the Institute presided over all the six sessions of the Workshop.

* * *

The following Indian and foreign visitors came to the Institute during the quarter and discussed matters of mutual interest with Director and members of Faculty :

(*i*) A group of 25 officers from African, Asian and Latin American countries undergoing training at the Institute of Secretariat Training and Management, New Delhi (January 25);

(*ii*) *Mr. C. L. S. Omari,* Principal, Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe (Tanzania) (February 9); and

(*iii*) *Prof. E. Newbigging,* Head of the Council for Technical Education and Training for Overseas Countries, London (March 7).

* * *

Prof. Deva Raj, Director of IIPA's Municipal Centre has been invited to serve on U.P. Government's Task Force on Urban Administration.

Prof. M. J. K. Thavaraj has been named member of a Panel (appointed by Union Ministry of

Communications) which is to make a detailed study and report on the billing system in Delhi Telephones.

Shri D. N. Gadhok, member of IIPA's faculty, has been awarded Ph.D. degree by University of Delhi on his thesis "Parliamentary Control over Government Expenditure". For his research study he had got an IIPA fellowship.

* * *

The Institute has decided to organize public lectures every month in order to encourage discussion on matters relating to public administration.

* * *

Four new branches of IIPA—a Regional Branch for West Bengal at Calcutta and three Local Branches at Belgaum, Sangli, and Sirohi—were opened during the quarter January to March. With these new branches, the number of Regional Branches has become 13 and that of Local Branches 15.

* * *

Maharashtra Regional Branch of IIPA organized a Seminar on "Role of Audit in Public Administration" on March 10, at Bombay; about 80 delegates from the fields of audit, administration and business management took part in it.

The inaugural address was delivered by *Shri A. Bakshi*, Comptroller & Auditor General of India. Others who spoke include : *Shri S. V. Page*, Chairman, Maharashtra Legislative Council; *Shri S. S. Bhatt*, Chairman, Indian Investment Centre; *Shri P. V. R. Rao*, former Defence Secretary; and *Shri H. B. Dhondy*, former President, Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

The Working paper for the Seminar was prepared by *Shri V. Subramanian*, Honorary Secretary of the Branch.

* * *

The following lectures/symposium were organized by IIPA's branches :

Branch & Date	*Subject*	*Speakers*
Ajmer Local Branch		
Feb. 25	"Judicial System of England"	*Mr. D. E. Hill-Smith*, Circuit Judge of Crown Courts of England. (*Shri B. P. Beri*, Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court, presided.)
Maharashtra Regional Branch		
Jan. 23	"Problems of Economic Development"	*Dr. Colin Clark* of Monash University (Australia).
Jan. 24	"Industrial Relations"	*Shri N. H. Tata*, President of the Employees' Federation of India and Chairman of Textile and Electric Companies in the Tata Group of Industries.

Branch & Date	*Subject*	*Speakers*
		(*Shri B. B. Paymaster,* Chairman of the Branch, presided over both the lectures)
Jan. 30	"Theory and Practice of Corruption"	*Shri Sharu S. Rangnekar,* General Manager, Searle (India) Ltd. (*Shri M. G Wagh,* Special Inspector General of Police and Director of Anti-Corruption & Prohibition, Intelligence Bureau of Maharashtra presided.)
Feb. 2	"Indian Capital Market"	*Shri H. T. Parekh,* Chairman, Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India, Ltd. (*Shri R. S. Bhatt,* Chairman of the Indian Investment Centre, presided.)
Feb. 22	"Organizational Design for Public Administration"	*Prof. Ishwar Dayal,* Director, IIPA. (*Shri L. M. Nadkarni,* Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, presided.)
March 14	"Power and Politics"	*Dr. Alfred de Grazia,* Director of Research Programme in Representative Government, New York University. (*Shri B. B. Paymaster* presided.)
Tamil Nadu		
Feb. 23	"Educational Management"	*Prof. A. P. Jambulingam,* Principal, Technical Teachers' Training Institute, Adyar. (*Mr. Allen Hough,* a British expert, and *Shri Ramani* of the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras were also among the speakers.)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

According to the Allocation of Business Order issued by the Union Government on February 7, two new Ministries—Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Heavy Industry—have been created and changes have been introduced in the lists of items allocated to the Ministry of Industrial Development and the Ministry of Steel & Mines. Other important changes are as follows : (*i*) Department of Statistics will form part of the Ministry of Planning; (*ii*) Directorate of Manpower will be transferred from Ministry of Home Affairs to Planning Commission; (*iii*) Matters relating to creation of a pool for temporary placement of Indian scientists and technologists returning from abroad will be transferred from Ministry of Home Affairs to Department of Science and Technology; (*iv*) Department of Administrative Reforms will be transferred to Department of Personnel, which will be renamed as Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms; (*v*) Matters relating to Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes, denotified nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and other Backward Classes will be transferred from Department of Social Welfare to Ministry of Home Affairs, where they will be dealt with in the National Integration Division; (*vi*) Matters relating to local self-government, water supply, sewage and drainage (excluding public health and sanitation, hospitals, and dispensaries) will be transferred from Ministry of Health and Family Planning to the Ministry of Works and Housing which deals with Urban Development.

A 7-member panel with the Deputy Minister of Railways, *Shri Mohammad Shafi Qureshi,* as Chairman, has been set up to review the policy and procedures of procurement of stores and inventory control in the Indian Railways.

The object is to ensure that the materials required by the Railways are available on time, while keeping the inventories of stores at the desired level.

A Task Force headed by *Shri M. L. Dave* (Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence) has been asked to examine, *inter alia,* the amendments that should be made in the Cantonments Act, 1924, after considering representations and suggestions received from various quarters, as also matters like changes in the concept of municipal administration consistent with the necessity to ensure greater discipline, security, sanitation and health of the troops.

The participants in a Seminar on "Civic Consciousness", organized by the Delhi Municipal Corporation recently, have asked for creation of the office of Municipal Ombudsman to facilitate methodical investigation of people's grievances against the local administration.

A number of other recommendations were also made. They included : (1) Opening of municipal shops to check food adulteration; (2) Encouragement of voluntary organizations to build up good

citizens and the establishment of a citizens' bureau in this connection; and, (3) Scientific studies on civic problems by the municipal administration.

"Roads" and "Buildings" will be two separate wings of *Assam's* Public Works Department with effect from April 1. For the time being, however, this bifurcation will be only up to the level of Superintending Engineers. The State Government has also decided to separate Irrigation Department from its "Agriculture, Flood Control and Irrigation Department" which will look after irrigation projects of the State exclusively.

The *Jammu & Kashmir* Government has changed the top level of its educational set-up as follows : (1) Commissioner for Education, (2) Director of School Education, (3) Director of Youth Welfare, (4) Director of College Education, and (5) Director of Planning & Curricula.

The changes have been carried out to facilitate introduction of a reorganized pattern, recommended by the high-level Committee appointed in April, 1972, consisting of *Shri Bhagwan Sahay,* Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (Chairman); *Shri G. Parthasarthy, Dr. M. S. Swaminathan, Shri J. P. Naik, Shri N. K. Mukharji, Shrimati Mahmooda Ahmed Ali Shah, Prof. Aga Ashraf Ali, and Prof. Satya Bhushan.* The Committee, after making a reappraisal of educational policies and programmes in the State, made a number of important recommendations so that education plays its full part in the process of modernization and development as also to make the system more closely related to employment opportunities.

* * *

The Committee on Subordinate Legislation (Fifth Lok Sabha) has, in its Fourth Report, made the following important recommendations/observations : (*i*) Rule 50 (157) (ii) of the Central Services (Leave) Rules 1972 (which restricts sanctioning of study leave to non-gazetted Government servants) be omitted. (*ii*) Rule 18(2) of the Post Office Savings Banks Rule, 1965 (according to which the Post Office Savings Bank is not liable in case of a fraud, whether by a department employee or by an outsider, due to the failure of the depositor to ensure that the amount sought to be withdrawn is entered in the application for withdrawal before it is presented to the Post Office for withdrawal) be corrected to safeguard the interests of illiterate depositors. (*iii*) Wide publicity be given to 'orders concerning age concessions allowed to Scheduled Castes/Tribes, etc., particularly those relating to 'other special categories of persons' which were not published in the Gazette of India. (*iv*) Item 8 of Appendix I to the Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers Recruitment Rules, 1969 (which provided discretionary powers to the Government in fixing relative seniority in individual cases of officers recruited to the Service through competitive examinations of the UPSC and also through other methods of recruitment) and any other similar rule existing in the Government of India be amended in the light of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. The High Court did not approve of the provision on the ground that it gave unguided power to Government to fix seniority according to their discretion and could thus enable them to discriminate among officers similarly placed.

The changes effected on January 2 at the top level of the Secretariat of Union Government are as follows.

Shri B. B. Lal, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade; *Shri R. V. Raman,* Secretary in the Ministry of Industtrial Development; *Shri A. N. Banerji,* Special Secretary in the Ministry of Industrial Development; *Shri G. C. L. Joneja,* Secretary in the Department of Food; *Shri R. R. Bahl,* Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat; *Shri M. M. Sen,* Secretary, Department of Defence Supplies, in the Ministry of Defence; *Shri K. Balachandran,* Secretary in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals; *Shri C. S. Ramachandran,* Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Planning; *Shri P. P. Agarwal,* Secretary in the Department of Supply (on the retirement of *Shri K. Ram*); and *Shri K. T. Satarawala,* Special Secretary (with the rank of Secretary) in Department of Mines till 31 March, 1973 and thereafter as Secretary in the same Department (on retirement of *Shri H. C. Sarin*).

The number of specialists now engaged in advising Ministers went up by one when *Shri Mantosh Sondhi,* (Chairman of Bokaro Steel) took over as Secretary, Ministry of Heavy Industry on March 5. Shri Sondhi is a mathematician turned into engineer.

The Government of India has raised upper age limit from 24 years to 26 years (as on August 1, 1973) for the candidates appearing in the Indian Forest Service Examination to be held by UPSC in 1973. The age limit is further relaxable in the case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, etc.

Fresh rules of seniority have been prepared for Class I officers of the Income-Tax Service, both direct recruits and promotees, on the basis of the Supreme Court judgment of August 16, 1972 and in consultation with UPSC. As a result, direct recruits as well as promotees will equally share the vacancies in Class I. This will enable a large number of promotees who would have otherwise remained in Class II to be absorbed in Class I earlier than hitherto. The rotation principle which has now been introduced, would ensure that a large number of direct recruits of comparatively younger age do not block the promotion prospects of relatively older promotees.

The limit of House Building Advance for the Central Government employees has now been raised from Rs. 50,000 (but not exceeding 60 months' pay) to Rs. 70,000 (but not exceeding 75 months' pay) for house building or for buying a new house or flat.

Pensions, including provisional pensions, up to Rs. 100 per month to Armed Forces Pensioners (including civilians paid from Defence Services Estimates) may, at their request, be remitted henceforth by money order at Government expenses. This concession will be available to all pensioners whether they draw their pensions from treasuries, sub-treasuries, Pension Pay-masters or from post offices.

The Directorate General of Employment and Training of the Union Department of Labour and Employment, has undertaken a detailed study on the employment pattern of graduates, post-graduates, graduates in professional/technical subjects and diploma holders (equivalent to graduates) in Engineering/ Technology, who passed out from various Universities, Institutes, Polytechnics in the country during the year 1968.

The design of the survey covers all post-graduates (including Doctorates), graduates with honours, graduates in professional/technical subjects and other graduates, who secured first division, as also a

sample of graduates who have secured either second or third division.

Haryana Government employees, who improve upon their qualifications through further study within the country, will also be entitled to advance increments in the following order: (*i*) Diploma of at least one year's duration—one advance increment; (*ii*) Master's Degree—two advance increments; and, (*iii*) Doctorate—three advance increments. Until now, such benefit was being given only in those cases where the higher qualifications were obtained by study abroad.

According to a decision of the Government of *Haryana*, maternity leave will not be admissible to those female government employees who have more than two living children.

The Government of *Gujarat* has constituted the Second Pay Commission to look into the general conditions of service, including pay and perquisites, applicable to its employees other than officers of the All India Services but including those in the Panchayat Services.

According to a directive of the Government of *Maharashtra*, full-time non-teaching staff in recognized and aided non-Government junior colleges of education in the State, who have retired on or after April 1, 1966, will be entitled to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits which are admissible to the State Government servants under the revised Pension Rules, 1950 and the Family Pension Scheme.

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* has approved a schedule of dependents (*i.e.,* son, daughter, grand-son, grand-daughter, brother, sister, paternal nephew and niece) of freedom fighters (including certified ex-soldiers of INA, certified ex-members of India Independence League and persons involved in Peshwar Case) for purposes of granting benefits of exemption of five years in upper age limit and reservations in the State Services. The reservation of posts would be as follows: (*i*) 10 per cent in the case of non-technical Class II Services, recruitment to which is made on the basis of competitive test; (*ii*) 12½ per cent for State Medical and Engineering Services; (*iii*) 10 per cent in the case of Class III Services; and, (*iv*) 5 per cent in the case of Class IV Services.

To avail of these facilities, a certificate in the prescribed form from the concerned district magistrate, as a proof of their being the dependent of a freedom-fighter, would be essential.

In supersession of previous order, the Government of *West Bengal* will now promote government servants on grounds of merit and suitability in all respects. Seniority would be taken into account only when it is impossible to choose between two or more persons on grounds of merit alone. In determining merit, some guidelines would, however, be followed.

* * *

According to a scheme approved by the Planning Commission, Manpower and Employment Cell would be set up in each State Government's Department of Planning; in those States where such cells already exist, they would be further strengthened. The object is to reorient manpower planning to include all educated personnel, provide for upgrading of the existing manpower and its better utilization, and foster decentralized manpower planning.

Jammu & Kashmir Government has issued a directive to establish an Expert Evaluation Agency to determine the entire development programme in the State. Other guidelines

laid down in the directive are : (*i*) To have advance planning in all the departments connected with development, and taking steps to actualize the contemplated schemes; (*ii*) Reviewing implementation of schemes through monthly meetings of Commissioner for Planning with concerned Secretaries and Heads of Departments; (*iii*) Identifying key sectors of development and undertaking special surveys/census to collect necessary data to arrive at a base figure for the Fifth Plan; (*iv*) Organizing special drives with the help of the Universities, departmental staff and, if necessary, outside institutions for taking up these surveys; and (*v*) Laying down methods for scientific research and preservation of the data to be issued for Planning and Management purposes.

The Government of *Rajasthan* has constituted a State Planning Board under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister to advise the Government on plan formulation and implementation. The State Planning Minister will be the Deputy Chairman of this Board. The Chief Secretary, the Development Commissioner and the Secretary, Agriculture Production, in addition to five non-official members from different disciplines, will be the members of the board, and the Special Secretary, Planning, will be its Member-Secretary.

The Board will advise the State Government on perspective planning, overall strategy of development, priorities of sectoral planning within the national framework, keeping in view the scientific and economic data available. It will initiate economic studies to improve the quality of project formulation.

* * *

The Planning Commission has constituted an 11-member Task Force under the chairmanship of *Dr. B. S. Minhas,* Member of the Commission, to work out a broad strategy for Integrated Rural Development in the Fifth Five Year Plan. The strategy of integrated development will be oriented towards greater employment and better production base in the Fifth Five Year Plan. It will also review the on-going special programmes for rural development and rural employment and suggest ways for their modification and synthesis into an integrated programme or rural development.

The Task Force is expected to furnish its interim report within six months and the final report within one year. A scheme of integrated rural development is to be taken up in selected areas, in the light of the interim report, during the last year of the Fourth Plan, 1973-74. On the basis of the experience gained, suitable approach towards integrated rural development will be incorporated in the Fifth Five Year Plan.

A series of recommendations for redressing various types of imbalances, in regard to current expenditure and capital investment in agricultural holdings, have been suggested by an Expert Committee—headed by *Prof. M. V. Mathur,* Director, Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration—consisting of economists, statisticians and other specialists set up by the Ministry of Agriculture for evaluating Intensive Agricultural Programmes. The Committee has brought out two monographs on Intensive Agricultural District Programme—one on "Patterns of Current Expenditure and Capital Investment in Agricultural Holdings" (based on data collected in 14 districts from about 30,000 cultivators relating to 1964-65, 1968-69 and 1969-70), and the other on "Performance of High-Yielding Varieties of Paddy".

Assam State Planning Board has appointed an Agricultural Commission to review comprehensively the progress of agriculture in Assam, and make recommendations for its improvement and modernization. The Commission, headed by the Vice-Chancellor of Assam Agriculture University, will also suggest measures on organization, land utilization, inputs, programmes, and diversification.

A new scheme aimed at providing : (*i*) work to the unemployed doctors; and (*ii*) medical care to the rural areas has been launched by the Government of *Kerala* in the form of cooperative dispensaries, with the 'Panchayats' as their areas of operation.

Functioning under the supervision of a medical officer, each dispensary would be a self-contained medical unit, rendering day-to-day medical services with a laboratory attached to it. The dispensary will also sell medicines at fair prices.

The cooperative dispensaries will have two categories of membership : (*i*) Doctors, nurses and other staff who would also be the salaried employees; and (*ii*) All individual beneficiaries living in the area of their operation. The Government's contribution to the initial capital will be Rs. 15,000 as against Rs. 5,000 to be raised through shares by the members.

To begin with, 11 such cooperatives are being set up. Each dispensary shall have seven members of the first category and 120 members of the second.

* * *

Under *The Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Ordinance*, 1973, promulgated on January 30, 464 non-coking coal mines in the private sector have been taken over by the Government of India, pending their nationalization. The only two exceptions are : the captive coal mines attached to the steel plants of TISCO and ISCO. The Ordinance provides for, among other things, payment of management compensation at 20 paise a ton of coal on the highest monthly production during the last four years.

The Government of India announced, on January 15, the appointment of a 10-member Standing Linkage Committee for planning of coal supplies to thermal power stations. It has been constituted in view of the need to supply fuel of appropriate quality to various power stations and at the same time to make the most economic use of the available capacity for production and transport of coal. The Joint Secretary (Coal) in the Union Ministry of Steel and Mines will be the Chairman of the Standing Committee.

The Jammu & Kashmir Government has created Development Committees to resolve all management issues—administrative, financial and technical—concerning some of the key public sector undertakings, such as power development, and transport. These Committees have been authorized to devise their own procedure for convenient transaction of their business. Major policy decisions will, however, continue to be the responsibility of the Cabinet.

The Government of *Tamil Nadu* promulgated *The Tamil Nadu State Carriages and Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Ordinance*. 1973, on January 14, and took over the passenger transport system in the State. One of the reasons of the takeover is that the Government wanted to connect all the villages to the transport system, in order to implement more effectively its programmes of social welfare in such fields as family planning, health, education, and house building.

* * *

To facilitate an easy appreciation of the total outlays on each of the programme and for better control and utilization of the budget provisions by the individual Ministries, the following innovations were introduced in this year's Budget documents, which were presented to the Lok Sabha by the Finance Minister on February 28 : (1) Demands for Grants, which give expenditure estimates, have been made more compact by omitting unimportant details and highlighting the main objectives and programmes of the Ministries; (2) Revenue and capital components of expenditure have been brought together in the same demand and the Plan and non-Plan break-up is given for each item; and (3) Provisions for Grants and Loans to States and Loans to Public Undertakings, hitherto included in the Demand of the Finance Ministry, have now been incorporated in Demands of the concerned Ministries.

A small brochure titled *Key to the Budget Documents*, designed to explain what each Budget document contains and the relation between one document and another, was another novelty.

Amongst the proposals unveiled by the Budget were : partial integration of agricultural and non-agricultural income; liberalization of tax exemptions for contributions to provident fund and Life Insurance; concessions for research and development, particularly in the field of industry; incentives for industrialization of backward areas; assistance to indigenous industry; encouragement for more extensive manufacture of machinery within the country; inclusion of cooperative societies in the category of taxpayers required to deduct income tax at source from payment made to contractors; higher income tax rates on Hindu undivided families; and. provision to treat management compensation paid for takeover of managements of undertakings or property as income from business liable to tax from 1972-73.

A three-member Committee headed by *Shri B. Sivaraman*, former Cabinet Secretary, will make a comprehensive review of the excise tariff on tobacco. The objective is to have a judicious and rational tariff structure which can be administered effectively, efficiently and economically through simplified practical procedures.

* * *

The Union Government has constituted a Committee on Socio-Economic Studies on Family Planning with *Prof. V. K. R. V. Rao* as its Chairman. The Committee will advise and coordinate research on the economic, sociological, educational, psychological, communicational and demographic aspects of population growth and family planning and reviewing the progress of the research work done in these fields.

The *Government of India* is to set up a Centre for studies in Social Sciences at Calcutta, in collaboration with the Government of West Bengal, to promote research in social sciences, particularly relating to the problems of the eastern region and West Bengal.

Dr. Bhabatosh Datta, an eminent economist from West Bengal, will be the first Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Centre; and *Prof. Barun De*, a leading historian, will be its first Director.

The Board of Governors of the Centre will consist of the Chairman, the Director, one nominee of the Government of India, one nominee of the University Grants Commission, one nominee of the Indian Council of Social Science Research,

two nominees of the Government of West Bengal, Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, and Vice-Chancellor of another University of West Bengal (in rotation).

A three-day Seminar of Demographers and Social Scientists, which concluded in New Delhi on February 17, has recommended that evaluation of Mass Vasectomy camps, which at present covered only demographic aspects, should also be extended to organizational and managerial aspects. Other recommendations are : (*i*) Undertaking of studies and surveys on factors relating to differential acceptance of Family Planning; and (*ii*) Constitution of Technical Coordination Committees in States for guiding demographic research and for bringing out reports with special emphasis on policy implications.

The Cancer Assessment Committee, in its report to the Union Government, has recommended that there should be a small cancer unit in every medical college, so that the medical students are exposed to essentials of cancer detection, diagnosis and treatment. It has also recommended upgrading of the eleven existing centres into full-fledged Regional Cancer Research centres to serve as nucleus for cancer research, treatment and training in India.

The Committee was appointed in December, 1971, under the Chairmanship of *Prof. P. N. Wahi*, Director-General, Indian Council of Medical Research, to consider the feasibility of developing the existing cancer centres into regional cancer research centres.

The Committee on the Perspective Planning of the Employees' State Insurance Scheme has recommended that the scheme should be extended to fresh sectors of employment, including smaller sectors, commercial establishments, shops, mines and plantations (the scheme is restricted at present to power factories with 20 or more workers). After the extension, the Scheme will protect 88 lakh industrial workers and their families by 1977-78.

A major recommendation of the Committee on the Perspective Planning of the ESI Scheme is that the scheme should considerably improve cash and medical benefits. Also suggested by it is the method of financing the expansion and improvement of the Scheme.

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* has appointed a Task Force with *Shri Mahabir Prasad Srivastava* as Chairman to reform Urban Administration. The task force is to enquire into the causes of failure of urban administration in the State and will suggest ways for effective functioning of the local bodies.

* * *

BOOK REVIEWS

POWER DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA; By K. VENKATARAMAN, New Delhi, Wiley Eastern, 1972, pages 166.

The author states in the introduction that there is a need for the study of the financial aspects of electricity development in India. This is a vast subject. The author has, therefore, confined himself in this book to examining some of the "major areas of interest like that of the finances of the electricity boards, the tariff policies, the Centre-State dimensions of electricity finances and the relation between foreign aid and electricity development." More than two-thirds of the book deals with finances of the electricity boards.

The electricity boards are large organizations. The country has invested vast sums of money in the generation and distribution of electricity through these boards. The total investment in our electricity boards now exceeds the total investment in our railways where it is about Rs. 4,100 crores. Indeed, the U.P. State Electricity Board's total capital is now over Rs. 675 crores, and this board is the third largest public undertaking in India coming only after the Railways and the Hindustan Steel.

Electricity is also the first necessity for the industrial development of the country. It is now fast becoming an important means of agricultural development. Besides this, its contribution in bettering the quality of life needs no emphasis. There are ample reasons, therefore, that we should keep a watch on the financial health of the State Electricity Boards, who have been given the charge of supplying electricity throughout the country.

The pioneering effort of Shri Venkataraman in this regard is, therefore, commendable. He has, with his experience of a state finance department and his intimate knowledge of the workings of a large number of public undertakings under the Ministry of Industrial Development, analysed the working of these boards in a fresh manner. It may be hoped that this general study will pave the way for more detailed studies on different aspects of the subject. Incidently, it may be mentioned that the commercial wing of the Central Water & Power Commission is now making available consolidated statistical information about the finances of the electricity boards. Things will, therefore, be much easier for those who make such studies in future.

—A. K. ROY

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ACTION : THE COMPREHENSIVE EXPERIMENT AT COMILLA, EAST PAKISTAN; By ARTHUR F. RAPER, Ithaka, Cornell University Press, 1970, p. 351, £ 5.19.0.

After attainment of independence, the developing countries have launched upon various programmes of rural development. The comprehensive development programme in Comilla, formerly in East Pakistan, and now in Bangla Desh has been one of the most effective

community development efforts that has been made in the depressed areas of a developing country. It has attracted international attention. In the book under review, the author, who was himself a senior adviser to the East Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (EPARD) for Michigan State University from 1962 until 1964, has, with the help of his close associates in the Comilla programme, painstakingly chronicled the various stages of evolution of the Comilla rural development programme in all aspects and has analysed perceptively the factors which were a key to its success.

What distinguishes the Comilla programme of rural community development from the other similar programmes, including the community development programme in India, was its concentration of effort to a limited area and rigorous insistence on maintaining high standards and fulfilment of the cardinal principles of development. The programme, to start with, was confined only to Comilla Thana no more extensive than a 100 square miles of rural area and implemented under the close supervision of the East Pakistan Academy for rural development established in 1959 to train public officials and to find indigenous solution to rural people. It was only by mid-July 1962 that an attempt was made to reproduce the Comilla type programmes in three other Thanas. Encouraged by the successful experience with the three Thana expansion in 1965, the programme was extended to the whole District and came to be known as Comilla District Integrated Rural Development Programme covering other 20 Thanas of the Comilla District. If one contrasts this with the rapid extension of the Indian Community Development Programme to the whole country through 5,000 development blocks within a decade, one realizes the reasons behind the superficial impact of the extensive community development programme in India as compared with the deeper impact of the Comilla experience in a Thana size laboratory, and appreciates the wisdom of EPARD to resist pressure to extend the system without proper training of the leadership.

The author has succinctly summed up the special features of the Comilla experiment in the following words : "to get at the roots of rural development programmes; to formulate tentative approaches to their solution; to test these hypotheses in experimental programmes involving the motivation and instruction of hundreds of decision makers under the conditions of free choice; to record document and analyse the record of successful approaches; and to utilise these records of the experiments as the primary instruction materials for the administrators of the rural development programme".

While all achievements in the field of socio-economic development are necessarily collective in nature, they owe their inspiration to the fervour and imagination of some outstanding individuals. In this case, it was Akhter Hameed Khan. As the author rightly points out, without him "there would be no Comilla Programme in its present form. The Comilla approach is largely the product of this man who has worked insightfully and hard and long at one place." Shri Khan, born in October 1914, competed successfully for the Indian Civil Service in 1936 beginning, like all officers of the ICS, as an Assistant Magistrate at Comilla. But after a few years of service, he resigned from the ICS in 1944 and started working as a locksmith apprentice at Aligarh (U.P.) for about two

years to learn how the working man lives. He then moved from place to place in India and Pakistan taking up several teaching assignments, including the principalship of Comilla Victoria College. It was from there that he was appointed as the first Director of EPARD in mid-1958. This indeed was a most unusual career for a person who joined the ICS but in this perhaps lies the seed of his unusual dedication to rural development of which the Comilla experiment was the fruit.

As David Bell, Vice-President of the Ford Foundation, points out in his foreword : "This book documents again and again how agonizingly slow any progress must be when initial circumstances are so difficult. But it also shows the beginnings of the self-reinforcing, upward spiral of change that can come when new ideas begin to pay off in the form of higher incomes, which in turn permit larger investments in more new ideas and when new organisations having held together under initial stresses begin to produce stronger leadership and rising confidence among their members."

Comilla rural development programme was in its origin the offshoot of the EPARD, which, from the very beginning, conceived the idea of a pilot development programme with training, research and demonstration dynamically integrated into the life of the rural community and the structure of the Pakistan public service. As a part of this pilot project, in addition to the training of officials, the EPARD also took up a training programme for villagers at the Thana Training and Development Centre established by EPARD.

A very special feature of this training were once-a-week courses for the organizers of rural cooperatives and family-planning programmes and later for village *imams* whose services were harnessed as the teachers of the village school. These village organizers trained in once-a-week-sessions proved to be highly successful agents of change. They were at the back of the new village based cooperative system which was a great success as compared with the dismal failure of the cooperative system in the past. The organizer of the cooperatives brought the weekly cash savings and the problems of his society to the weekly sessions and took back the ideas he learnt at the EPARD to the entire membership at the society's weekly meetings. The society's mobilized rural savings introduced joint planning and management for use of tractors and irrigation pumpsets and for subsidiary occupations and vocational education.

The Central Cooperative Association was formed to give support to the activities of the local cooperative societies. The Central Association helped the cooperatives to develop new programmes, like purchase and supplies of machinery and credit and marketing of farm products. The Central Association was able to do it because of the services of the specialized staff. A special feature of the cooperative at Comilla was "savings come first, creditworthiness next, and then loans". The milch cow loans were repaid by members through regular daily supply of milk. The good record of loan repayment of Comilla was the result of systematic training and planning.

The Central Association was able to set up a Cooperative Machinery Shop and Tractor Station to service the machines. The importance of transport of vehicles, roads and communication facilities has been highlighted in the marketing experience of the cooperatives.

Mechanization received tremendous stimulation from the profitability of irrigated crops, a development which promises to revolutionise agriculture.

In the Comilla experience, the idea of vitalization of local government and the local political leaders and government administrators working together was there from the beginning. The idea further developed with the establishment of basic democracies in October 1959. The EPARD helped a great deal for the departmental officials and Union Chairman to work together as a team and with a coordinated effort. Though there were some cases of village clashes and projects abandoned or of defaulcation of money by showing higher wages paid than actually paid, outstanding public works programmes were implemented by local leadership, such as irrigation projects, channels, drainage to deal with floods, roads etc. In addition, the programmes of agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries were also taken up. Another example of villagers' themselves taking responsibility and getting involved in all aspects of local planning was the Thana-wide programme of irrigation and rural electrification.

An outstanding programme of rural development was women's activities and family planning. Considering the Orthodoxy of the Muslim religion, which kept women in *burqua*, it must be considered as an outstanding achievement to have turned some of the village women into active family planning workers. The women cooperative programme covered other aspects besides family planning, like popularisation of wheat products, adult education, making and selling of silk garments, growing vegetables, making livestock products, etc.

When the women's education and family planning programme became active, there started the opposition from the village religious leaders namely the *Imams*. This schism between the old system of religious education and new secular education was resolved by training *Imams* as the teachers in the new schools. The programme showed how teachers can play a leadership role to villages.

Research and systematic documentation were greatly helpful in keeping continuous action and reaction between reflection and implementation. So were use of library and communication media, like numerous booklets, maps, charts, monthly newsletters, tape-records, and training manuals.

In India, the enthusiasm for community development seems to have ended. Nobody talks any longer of community development programme as an instrument of economic development and social change in the countryside. However, this does not mean that the principles of community development have themselves become irrelevant. This study of Comilla experience shows that community development cannot be a hot-house growth. Honest and dedicated efforts over a long period supported by experience and research can, with time and patience, give the country the benefits and results of community development.

—P. R. DUBHASHI

THE AMENDING PROCESS IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION; By HARI CHAND, Delhi, Metropolitan, 1972, p. 242, Rs. 25.

Ever since the principle of 'constitutionalism' was sought to be introduced primarily in order to restrain governments, the existence of a 'written' constitution has become a symbol of 'modern' government. This, in turn, has led some to regard change in the written texts of constitutions as something of an encroachment upon the sanctity and supremacy of the constitutions. In a written constitution, the provisions governing its amendments constitute the 'acid test' of its legal status. The ease or difficulty with which a constitution may be amended has come to be used by constitutional lawyers as the primary measure of its flexibility or rigidity. By this yardstick, while the Constitution of the United States of America presents an example of extreme rigidity, the Indian Constitution during the last 23 years of its operation has proved to be very flexible, in fact, too flexible for the critics who charge that the 'sanctity' of the Constitution has been destroyed. However, the degree of 'flexibility' or 'rigidity' of a constitution does not always determine the extent of constitutionalism prevalent in a polity. Constitutions do help to restrain governments, but their effectiveness is not unlimited. Constitutional changes thus do not necessarily constitute an attack on 'constitutionalism'. Even the most 'constitutional' theorists have recognized the need of changes in the constitution and have advocated the existence of a proper machinery for constitutional development. The acceptance of the theory and practice of lawful amendments has been one of the remarkable achievements in the contemporary history of political theory and institutional developments.

The amendment process in the Indian Constitution, "one of its most ably conceived aspects", forms the subject matter of the book under review, which is based on the author's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of London in 1969. Using the familiar historical-legal approach, the author has briefly traced the history of the amending process in India from the days of the British East India Company and has discussed the various provisions relating to the amending procedure provided in the Government of India Act of 1935 and the issues raised in the Constituent Assembly in this context. He has analysed in detail each step of the procedure of amendment as provided in the Indian Constitution, and has further examined the amending procedures relating to Federal clauses and other parts of the Constitution. As the author was greatly stimulated in his study by the *Golaknath* case, he has devoted a full chapter on the discussion of the various issues arising out of it relating to the amendments in the Fundamental Rights, including the possibility of convening a Constituent Assembly for this purpose.

The conclusions of the author are almost on familiar pattern. As a result of his 'enquiry', he thinks that Art. 368 contains both power as well as procedure for amendment. There are no express or implied limitations to the power of amendment provided under this article. The only limitation is that the procedure prescribed in Art. 368 must be complied with. On the problem whether the Parliament has or has not the power to amend Part III of the Constitution, so as to take away or abridge the rights enshrined

therein, the author believes that each and every provision of the Constitution is amendable and there is no provision which can be said to be unamendable by Parliament under Art. 368. Therefore, there is no need of calling a Constituent Assembly for amending Part III, even when the rights are abridged or taken away. The implications and risks involved in calling such an Assembly may prove to be too hazardous to reinforce the view that the suggestion was not so good as it appeared to be. In his opinion, therefore, the Constitution (Twenty-Fourth) Amendment Bill, 1971, was a right step in the right direction.

Dr. Hari Chand does not attach much importance to the 'sanctity' of the Constitution. Although, he believes, that the Constitution should command respect and regard from all, at the same time he is not against its amendment. "It should be amended if and when the nation needs to amend it.....To worship the Constitution as an idol is to make it useless for the future generations." Despite this he feels that amendment for the amendment's sake should be avoided. It is in this context, that the author has refreshingly suggested that in the Indian circumstances, a Constitutional Commission comprising men of high calibre, integrity and possessing sufficient knowledge of Constitutional Law would be a far better agency for the task of discussion on the amendment of the Constitution than a Constituent Assembly elected on adult franchise. A genuine amendment, if required, should be hammered out after a good deal of thought, and, in particular, after full evaluation of its effects on the other parts of the Constitution. Such a Commission, he holds, might be called periodically for reviewing the working of the Constitution and for suggesting suitable amendments after examining extra-legal factors, such as political conditions, freedom of press, etc., in relation to the proposed amendments.

The study is useful from the lawyer's view point and is based on an analysis of a large number of cases which have substantial bearing on constitutional amendments in the Indian context. However, the analysis, both of the amending procedures as well as of the contents of various amendments in the Indian Constitution, done in a legalistic style, has seldom concerned with their political aspects or their wider implications. The book thus makes a worthwhile addition to the existing literature of the procedure of amendment in the Indian Constitution, but to the extent that the author has not taken into account the whole concept of constitutional change, which is viewed in broader perspective than a strict change of constitutional law, the whole of the study is purely one sided—an enquiry into legal questions alone. Constitutions are also modified by customary practices, sometimes even formally recognized and indeed partly helped by judicial recognition. Such changes, strictly speaking, are unconstitutional, and perhaps as a result they remain somewhat understudied. A legalistic interpretation of the constitutional amendments may appear simpler to describe, but the history of constitutions, elsewhere as well as in our own country, shows it to be unrealistic and the conditions of political life show it to be untenable.

The book suffers from bad printing and inaccurate binding (at least the copy which this reviewer has received). It is high time that the ICSSR should somehow ensure that the publications subsidised by it should come up to a minimum

standard of printing and get-up. Alternatively, the ICSSR should think in terms of publishing such studies under its own auspices. This, however, does not in any way reflects upon the merit of the book, nor on the scholarship and the painstaking efforts of the author.

On the whole, the book is ‛ written, is simple in style and pres the various constitutional is connected with the amendment cedure of the Indian Constitu in a forthright manner.

—R. B.

FARMERS AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS : INFLUENCE OF SO(ECONOMIC STATUS AND WORK ORIENTATION; By B MUTHAYYA, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Developn 1971, p. 113, Rs. 130.

Aspirations of people give an idea of the type of life they look forward to. These show their vision of the future. The present study of the aspirations of the farmers is of tremendous value and significance as 70 per cent of the people in our country are engaged in agriculture. The importance of human factor in economic development is being increasingly realized now. In this context, a study of aspirations becomes very crucial both for understanding and engineering the process and strategy of economic development.

The present study covers five villages—Chilkur, Bandalguda, Khanapur, Yenkepalla and Hydershakote of the Rajindarnagar Block (Hyderabad) of Andhra Pradesh. The total number of respondents selected for study was 101. The selection was restricted "to farmer-cultivators who are married, have dependents, are in the age group 25-45 years, and have a land-holding of 5 to 20 acres". It was "based on the rationale that the middle category may serve as a good basis for study of aspirations". The selection of respondents was done by sampling technique.

The object of the study was to assess the aspirations of the selected cultivators "with a view to finding out the extent of their aspirati influence of socio-economic st and work-orientation on their as tion". The areas covered for study of aspirations include education to son/daughter, occ tion to son/daughter, income, l holding, produce in crops, posses of type of house, agricultural in ments, furniture and material po sions, general contentment, po sion of livestock and other h(reared animals, and shelter livestock. The reference period most of these items was the co three years. The information these was collected through as open-ended questions as also thr(the use of Cantril's pictorial anchoring ladder scale with s points. The use of both t methods was made with a vie finding out whether there wa dependable relationship in these methods to act as alternative future studies. If may be a(here that the result of the s brought out that the ladder technique was useful only i "quantitative assessment of as tions in relation to present sta The study has confirmed rather obvious a conclusion in this re

The work-orientation ques naire covered three aspects : aspect, including personal-s

aspects oriented to persons' habits and involvement in work; work aspect, including method of improvement of work and care of livestock; and work attitudes.

The book contains the following eight chapters : (1) Introduction, (2) Methodology, (3) Socio-economic and Work Characteristics, (4) Aspirations, (5) Socio-economic Status and Aspirations, (6) Aspiration and Work Orientation, (7) Socio-economic Status and Work Orientation, and (8) Findings and their Implications.

The study brings out the following: "Generally it has been found that the farmers maintain a progressive outlook, aspiring for some increase in all these aspects but their aspirations have been cautious in respect of items, like material possessions, livestock, furniture, house, agricultural implements, land-holding, etc., which involve expenditure. Their aspirations have been very realistic, probably because of caution and/or a defence against failure as they do not want to aspire for something which they think they may not achieve, judged from their present frame of reference. This calls for attempts to improve their general resources as it will certainly give rise to an increase in their level of aspiration." It further says, "the farmers maintain a progressive outlook and look forward to future with hope. This positive outlook about the future should be sustained by programmes oriented to their improvement, economically and otherwise, so that their desire for progress gets strengthened".

The above mentioned finding incidentally corroborates the observation made in *Modernizing Indian Agriculture—Report on the IADP (1960-68)* that the myth that the Indian farmer is tradition bound has now been safely laid to rest. The above mentioned finding also suggest that the much criticized Communit Development programme ha definitely succeeded in Rajindar nagar in its prime objective o instilling in the people a desire fo better life and willingness to worl for the same. The present stud clearly shows that the farmers ar progressive and are very realisti in their aspirations and are prudentl cautious. The need, therefore, i to present to them the programme having economic viability an attractiveness and which are supported by the required facilities and hel to enable the farmers to adop them successfully. Our failure o the food front has not been due t the apathy of the farmers o inefficiency of C. D. programme bu due to our failure to make available to the farmers an economicall attractive technology, the supporting supplies and credit facilities, and appropriate price and othe policies. Whenever the government has been able to make these things available, the farmers have lost no time in adopting the new technology. It is amply clear from increases in wheat production in our country. Any extension agency, by itself, cannot deliver the goods. It must have proper and adequate research, supplied and policy support. This is being increasingly realized now and the present study reinforces the point that there is a crucial need for economically attractive and viable programmes supported by efficient supplies and credit facilities and appropriate policies.

On the vital question of relationship between the aspirations, work orientation and socio-economic status, the study observes that "the question arises whether high socio-economic status results in high aspiration or high aspiration results in high socio-economic status. The latter

contention is supported to some extent by the results in work orientation as it is found that the higher the work orientation (personal attribute), the higher the aspiration. But work orientation and socio-economic status are related and the results of these two variables in relation to aspirations are similar as far as their influence is concerned and hence we cannot lay much emphasis on the contention that high aspirations give rise to high socio-economic status. We may, however, safely conclude that high socio-economic status/ high work orientation certainly generates high aspiration." This is as such a very revealing finding and it calls for action on two fronts for improving the aspirations leading to a better life. These two fronts being : (*a*) institutional reforms to improve the socio-economic status and (*b*) steps necessary to improve the work-orientation. Due to reasons best known to the author, he has not touched on the need for institutional reforms and has given suggestions based on the findings of his study only for improving work-orientation. An important suggestion given is to improve the level of education of the farmers as illiteracy was found to be a stumbling block for one's level of aspirations. This is a very welcome and extremely useful suggestion, particularly as a reminder to those who have since forgotten about adult education scheme under the C. D. programme. Greater attention is also necessary for motivating people to send their children to schools. Another interesting and useful finding is that, among other things, larger number of children (above three) adversely affect the aspiration. This is an additional point for our accelerating the family planning programme in the country side.

Since the main objective of tl study was to find out about aspir tions, etc., of the farmers, the lin of action for improving the aspir tions have been indicated onl briefly.

Though the study as such very revealing and useful yet i value would have been considerab increased if the author had als included in his sample some small farmers having a holding of less tha 5 acres and some agricultural labou ers and would have tried to fin out the factors responsible f relatively higher and lower aspiratio within these categories. In fac the number of people owning le than 5 acres and agricultur labourers is very large in o country and most of these peop are below the poverty line. T most hard and pressing proble today is to develop some real useful programmes for them. In th context, the knowledge about t factors influencing their aspiratio and motivations is of crucial impo tance. The author may consid this suggestion for future programn of research.

The present study is a mo welcome and valuable addition the literature on the subject and is practical use to the Extensic Workers and Administrators e gaged in the challenging task bringing about a change in t country-side for a better life. T publication also contains many re erences to the already availab literature on the subject and additionally useful as a book reference.

—M. L. SUDA

BOOKS RECEIVED

Arora, H. C., *The Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 as Amended up-to-date : Permission and Means*, Delhi, Universal Book Traders, 1972, p. 318, Rs. 20.00

Bhalerao, C. N. (ed.), *Administration, Politics and Development in India*, Bombay, Lalvani, 1972, p. 511, Rs. 35.00

Dagli, Vadilal (ed.), *Commerce Yearbook of Public Sector*, 1972, Bombay, Commerce (1935), 1972, p. 512, Rs. 40.00

Iqbal Narain (gen. ed.); Grover, V. P. and associates; *Panchayati Raj Administration in Rajasthan : A Study of the Media of Supervision and Control*, Agra, Lakshmi Narain Aggarwal, 1973, p. 215, Rs. 25.00.

Ishwar Dayal; Srivastava, Suresh; and Alfred, Theodore M. ; *Anatomy of a Strike : A Systems Application to Understanding Events in the Organization*, Bombay, Somaiya, 1972, p. 192, Rs. 32.00.

Laxmi Narain, *Efficiency Audit of Public Enterprises in India*, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1972, p. 304, Rs. 35.00.

Singh, M. M., *Justice by Tribunals : A Study in Methods with Reference to India*, Calcutta, World Press, p. 374, Rs. 30.00.

Sinha, P. R. R. (ed.), *Studies in Extension Education*, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1972, p. 151, Rs. 18.00.

Thavaraj, M. J. K. ; and Handa K. L.; *Financial Control and Delegation*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1973, p.166, Rs. 15.00.

EDITORIAL NOTE

It is a little over 23 years since India opted for the process of planned development in the context of the ideals enshrined in our Constitution. In March 1950, the Planning Commission was set up. The problems relating to planning machinery, planning process and implementation have all along evoked great interest throughout the world. We are now on the threshold of the Fifth Five Year Plan. We have stuck to the process of democratic planning and development with faith and vigour in spite of many vicissitudes, political, economic and international.

While grappling with the problems of development, the machinery set up for the formulation and implementation of the plans was being continuously reviewed and limitations in the process were being identified. Any dynamic plan effort needs imaginative and continuous appraisal and reappraisal in an environment of accelerating changes. Regional imbalances, particular needs of geographical units, special problems of backward areas and under-developed regions clamoured for attention. Though the first impulse for planning came mainly from the Centre, the States have been involved in the process. The need for planning from below, however, has been continuously felt. "It is through enlargement of the area of agreement that conditions can be created for the most effective mobilization of the community's resources towards the common objective of allround economic development." This was realized right from the First Five Year Plan. The common objectives had also to be determined by the community. It was felt that the smaller the lowest geographical unit involved in the planning process, the more representative the plan would become. With a view to making the plans, therefore, more representative and to get them closely correspond and respond to the local needs and aspirations in the national perspective, it was suggested that the States might set up the necessary Planning Boards and appropriate arrangements even for the District, the regional and even other levels, might be devised so that

the planning process might have more scientific basis and the evalua tive perspective as well as the necessary monitoring system could b suitably developed. Guidelines for evolving District plans have bee drawn up in most of the States. Drought-prone areas, tribal areas under-developed regions, inaccessible areas, command areas, servic and growth centres, metropolitan regions—all these have come up fo attention. The Planning process has acquired a new dimension a levels other than the Union and the State. Indian planning has thu entered the era of multi-level planning.

We, therefore, considered it appropriate to devote the special issu of the Indian Journal of Public Administration this year to the concep and problems of multi-level planning. Economic and social develop ment can be planned sectorally as well as comprehensively, and verti cally as well as horizontally. At various levels, there is the need t integrate the different sectoral programmes and policies. A list of topics relating to multi-level planning was drawn up and contributor approached. We are glad to announce that, on the whole, our reques has had a favourable response. The outcome of our efforts is now befor the readers. In our opinion, there is a freshness of outlook, some new thinking, in these contributions. Experience of two decades i certain areas of planning and implementation has been summed up Many other valuable ideas, suggestions as well as issues, both procedura and of substantive nature for reflection and follow-up have found expression in these articles. We earnestly hope that this specia number will help to initiate a national debate on the varied facets o multi-level planning, and identify the concrete measures and steps necessary to achieve success in implementation, especially in the ligh of the national goals and the socio-economic objectives which we have set for ourselves.

We do not have yet adequate information about the planning process and machinery in the States. This is an area which requires intensive exploration. A modest and preliminary approach in the direction of compiling some information in this field has been made The Planning Departments in State and Union Territory administrations were, therefore, requested to let us have information on the composi- tion of their planning boards and committees, their functions, the

problems faced and the solutions found or measures proposed for solving them. Some States and Union Territories have furnished the requisite information. It is arranged as a special feature in this issue at the end to give us a comparative picture of the plan mechanism and implementation in different parts of our country. It has been rather difficult to arrange the information obtained from the different States and Union Territories in any uniform pattern.

It is hoped that our readers will find this issue interesting and useful. We would welcome useful comments upon and reactions to the views expressed by the distinguished contributors. We are sorry that some of the articles, promised by some very eminent experts and public men could not be received in time for inclusion in this issue. Further articles and information which we might receive later will be published in the next or subsequent issues of the Journal.

We are grateful to all those who have helped us in bringing out this issue, particularly the contributors of the articles and the concerned authorities of the States and Union Territories for furnishing the necessary information. We take this opportunity to send the season's greetings to our contributors, readers and subscribers, whose generous support and suggestions, we greatly value.

—*Editor*

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Vol. XIX July-September 1973 No. 3

PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF BACKWARD AREAS AND WEAKER SECTIONS OF SOCIETY

Mohan Dharia

BACKWARD AREAS

THE problem of achieving greater inter-regional and regional equality has been one of the long-term objectives of planning in this country. One of the most clear elucidations of this objective is contained in the Third Five Year Plan, which reads as follows:

> "Balanced development of different parts of the country, extension of the benefits of economic progress to the less developed regions and widespread diffusion of industry are among the major aims of planned development. Successive Five Year Plans seek to realise these aims in large measure."

Even prior to the formulation of the Third Five Year Plan, the National Development Council had recommended programmes for promoting decentralized industrial production and suggested that in the location of new enterprises, whether public or private, consideration should be given to the need for development of a balanced economy for the different parts of the country. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 also took cognizance of regional disparities and stressed the importance of progressive reduction of disparities in the levels of development.

It was, however, at the time of the formulation of the Fourth Five Year Plan that policy changes were introduced at the Central level for favouring the backward areas and regions of the country. First of all,

nter-state disparities were distinguished from intra-State disparities vith the underlying idea that the responsibility of the Centre was conined essentially to redressing the inter-State disparities. As for the ntra-State disparities, the Planning Commission took the position that eduction of these disparities is essentially the responsibility of the State Governments. As a sequel to this position, the Planning Commission isked the States to prepare their plans in a manner that would result n the reduction of disparities in the matter of development between lifferent areas and communities.

The Planning Commission has been particularly seized of the problem of inter-State disparities since the beginning of the Fourth Five Year Plan and has taken a number of measures for reduction of inter-regional disparities. Two main policy instruments which have been used by the Centre for reduction of inter-State disparities are: (*a*) principles governing the allocation of Central assistance; and (*b*) adjustments in the procedures and policies of financial and other institutions with a view to encouraging private investment in the backward areas. In addition to these two, location of Central projects in the backward areas has, subject to techno-economic feasibility and viability, continued to be one of the major planks of the policy for development of backward areas.

Principles Governing the Allocation of Central Assistance

Prior to formulation of the Fourth Plan, Central assistance to States used to be distributed without the help of any definite set of principles. In fact, the entire procedure was to fix Plan outlays rather han quantum of Central assistance, and the quantum was largely listributed in the light of capital resources of individual States in elation to Plan outlays decided.

The desirability of evolving principles for allocation of Central ssistance stemmed out of the need for doing away with bargains in he National Development Council in the matter of allocation of ssistance. The National Development Council approved the following riteria for the distribution of Central assistance in the Fourth Five 'ear Plan:

(1) population,
(2) per capita income,
(3) tax efforts,
(4) outlays required for selected continuing irrigation and power projects over Rs. 20 crores each, and
(5) existence of specified special problems in the States.

In this formula, 10 per cent of Central assistance was set apart for States whose per capita income was lower than the national average; the per capita income was worked out on the basis of the average for the years, 1962-65. The new formula benefited the States of Bihar, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. It may be mentioned that out of a total Central assistance of Rs. 3,500 crores for the Fourth Five Year Plan, a sum of Rs. 310 crores was earmarked to be distributed to the above mentioned States. The share of each of the above mentioned States on the basis of this criterion is given below:

Sl. No.	*State*	*Rupees (in Crores)*
1.	Bihar	77.62
2.	Kerala	22.47
3.	Madhya Pradesh	45.29
4.	Orissa	25.89
5.	Rajasthan	29.61
6.	Uttar Pradesh	109.12
	Total	310.00

In addition, special problems of border States were separately reckoned in the formula under which Assam, Jammu & Kashmir and Nagaland became entitled to a much larger share of Central assistance. The share of these three States was Rs. 400 crores for the Fourth Five Year Plan period. There was also a special pattern for the hill areas under which 90 per cent of Plan outlay on hill areas of Assam, Jammu & Kashmir and Nagaland was agreed to be given as grant and remaining as loans. Similarly, a special pattern of proportional assistance, 50 per cent grant and 50 per cent loan, for the hill areas of Uttar Pradesh, Darjeeling district in West Bengal, and Nilgiris district in Tamil Nadu was simultaneously introduced to deal with the problems of hill areas.

Adjustments in Procedures and Policy of Financial and other Institutions

In pursuance of the decision taken at the meeting of the National Development Council, held in September, 1968, the following two Working Groups were set up by the Planning Commission in November, 1968:

(1) to recommend the criteria for identification of industrially backward areas, and

(2) to recommend fiscal and financial incentives for starting industries in backward areas.

The Reports of these two Working Groups were considered by the National Development Council at its meeting held in September, 1969 and, in pursuance of the decisions taken, the question of evolving criteria for determining industrially backward districts was taken up with the financial institutions and after consideration of their suggestions in the matter, the State Governments were approached to furnish lists of backward districts of their respective States which should qualify for concessions to be offered by the financial institutions. State Governments were also requested to indicate separately the names of two or three districts for consideration for outright grant or capital subsidy by the Centre.

On the basis of the proposals received from the States, industrially backward districts in the States have been selected by the Planning Commission, in consultation with concerned Ministries, for concessional finance from financial institutions for starting small and medium-scale industries. In addition, eight Union Territories have also been selected for the purpose. Similarly, the Centre is giving an outright subsidy of 15 per cent of the fixed capital to industrial units having a total fixed investment of not more than Rs. 50 lakhs each in six selected districts in each of the nine States identified as industrially backward and three districts in each of the remaining States and Union Territories. Further, units having a fixed capital investment of more than Rs. 50 lakhs will also be ordinarily eligible for Central subsidy, subject to a limit of Rs. 5 lakhs.

A Transport Subsidy Scheme was introduced in 1971 to give transport subsidy equivalent to 50 per cent of the transport cost on both raw materials and finished goods for all new industrial units to be set up in the State of Jammu & Kashmir and the North-Eastern States, *i.e.*, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh. In the case of existing units also, the subsidy is payable for expansion or diversification if that leads to an increase in production of at least 25 per cent over the average annual output. The scheme has been given wide publicity. A decision to extend the transport subsidy to the hill areas of U.P. has also been taken recently.

Notwithstanding a series of measures undertaken during the Fourth Five Year Plan regarding accelerated development of backward areas, there is no denying the fact that these measures have so far had only a limited impact. The principal reason for limited success on this

front has been the inability to put through the critical minimum effor required for a sustained process for growth. There has been a tendenc to define the needed efforts merely in terms of financial magnitude Organizational and institutional aspects of the resource developmer problem of the backward regions have not been attended to. Surve and research work relating to these areas have greatly lagged behinc

The Fifth Five Year Plan

The Fifth Five Year Plan is committed to removal of poverty an attainment of economic self-reliance. These two basic objectives ca be achieved only if we move toward consolidation of the democrati political order, prevention of concentration of economic power, re duction of disparities, attainment of balanced regional development an spread of the institutions, values and attitudes of a free and just society The policy frame, which has now been evolved for dealing wit the problems of regional disparities, takes into account these basi objectives.

The approach to the development of backward areas in the Fift Five Year Plan has already been spelt out in the approach document While the details of the approach are still being worked on, the mai ingredients of the approach can be summarized as follows:

(1) to identify the backward areas on the basis of national objectiv criteria;

(2) to formulate integrated development plans and programme on the basis of resource endowment and quality and coverag of infrastructural facilities;

(3) to assign appropriate priorities to the creation and expansio of basic economic infrastructure covering irrigation, communi cations, credit, marketing, power, education, administrativ improvements, etc.;

(4) to undertake a critical minimum development effort in th identified backward areas and integrate the national minimun needs programme with the development plans and programme of these areas;

(5) to attune licensing policy and fiscal and financial incentiv programmes in favour of backward areas; and

(6) to introduce innovations in the institutional structure for th formulation and implementation of integrated developmen plans and programmes for backward areas.

It is around these ingredients that the Fifth Five Year Plan for the backward areas would be formulated.

WEAKER AND VULNERABLE SECTIONS

Since Vedic times, Indian society is known to have stratified on functional basis. However, in the historical process, these functional specializations transformed into rigid hierarchical social stratification resulting in the caste system with ritualistic notions of pollution and purity. In this process, certain groups of people were kept outside the 'varna' system and others, even though brought under the 'varna' system, were labelled as unclean castes. These unclean castes, by and large, lived interspersed with the rest of the population belonging to the four varnas and provided various types of services to them. The other groups, which are now known as predominantly tribal communities, isolated themselves from the mainstream of these groups of civilization and insulated themselves from exposure to various cultural and social transformations, innovations and developments that affected these main groups. They continued to live in inaccessible hilly regions. The former group came to be known as scheduled castes and the latter, scheduled tribes. A few other groups, by virtue of their position in the hierarchy in the social system and their traditional occupational base, could not gain access to possession of land. Therefore, by and large, they depended on land-owning classes as labourers for their livelihood. As a result, besides scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, there is a substantial group of those known as landless labourers coming from different communities who form the bulk of the weaker sections of the community. These groups, due to social handicaps, occupational immobility and operation of traditional value systems, have been confined to the regions of their habitation for centuries. They were not exposed to the process of change and modernization to the same extent as the other groups. Besides, there are certain other groups in the society—such as beggars, juvenile delinquents, destitute women and children, invalid persons and physically handicapped persons—which deserve special care and attention. These deserving cases were taken care of by the family, village and communities of the pre-industrial societies.

Evolving Policies and Programmes to Effect Change

The process of transformation of traditional agrarian and rural societies into modern industrial nations has not always been smooth. Modernization and industrialization are often accomplished only when the organizational and administrative infrastructure in a society is built up for undertaking functional specializations and diversified occupations.

This could be achieved only when functional diversification is brought about in the structure of occupations and a new set of values, aspirations, motivations and attitudes are developed to promote hard work, discipline and commitment. Without these changes in the social, cultural and psychological attributes in the organizational set-up, the process of transformation would be retarded to a significant extent.

Social, cultural and economic diversities could be seen in Indian society. In such a diversified cross-cultural situation, the process of modernization and industrialization brings about serious imbalances in distributing the fruits of development in all spheres. Bureaucracy, both in public and private sectors, is mostly dominated by the urban elite and the well-to-do upper classes. Business interests have been monopolized by a few hundreds of families. New occupations, such as doctors, engineers, skilled jobs and other white collar jobs, have largely benefited certain sections of the population. Green revolution had largely benefited the landed and only marginally, the landless. The process of modernization had not benefited the weaker sections to the extent as it did the other communities. Moreover, these pulls and pressures in the levels of development, which led to major imbalances in the socio-economic base of different communities had a direct impact on the decision-making process of the nation.

A State, committed to a policy of growth with social justice, has necessarily to devise policies and programmes in the manner that should minimize these pressures. The benefits from all sectors of development should flow in equitable and just manner to all groups and communities for reducing socio-economic cleavages. The Constitution of India has declared in its Preamble that it aims at securing for all its citizens, "Justice: social, economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity, and to promote among them all, FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation". In the Directive Principles of State Policy, it is stated that "the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which Justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life". Article 46 of the Constitution further states that "the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation".

Efforts are being made through the planning process to maximize gerowth rate and the potential for growth along with distributive justic

to narrow down the inequalities in pursuance of the objectives laid down in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State policy. Welfare services, such as health care, housing, water supply, rural roads, nutrition, tribal development, and social welfare, are being provided with a view to offering reasonable opportunities to the under-privileged sections. Besides, Article 335 of the Constitution provides that "the claims of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointment to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State". Article 16, while giving equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, states that "nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointment of posts in favour of any backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State". Further, experience shows that substantial number of posts remains unfilled due to lack of sufficient number of qualified members from these communities. This situation is proposed to be corrected by undertaking a number of programmes. The number of scholarships awarded at pre-matric and post-matric stages has shown a phenomenal increase during the last two decades. Also, special coaching and guidance schemes are being undertaken in order to improve the competitive capacities of these communities. Besides educational programmes, a number of economic development programmes for increasing the economic viability of the families has also been launched. Small farmers' development scheme, marginal farmers' development schemes, rural works programme and other related programmes are directly benefiting the economic base of the families of these communities. All these programmes in a decade or two are expected to diversify the occupational base of these communities from their extreme dependence on agriculture to other non-agricultural occupations.

In the Fifth Plan, welfare services would have to be promoted taking the family as a unit of development. Moreover, welfare services for family are to be dovetailed with programmes of employment, economic development and distributive justice for increasing economic viability of the family so that minimum welfare needs could be met from within the family. Crash employment schemes, small farmers and marginal farmers' schemes that are now in operation would be expanded on a large scale for increasing the economic standards of the families. Simultaneously, efforts are to be made to provide basic health services, such as maternity care, family planning, immunization, functional literacy, child care, nutrition and other social services. In the Fifth Plan, the strategy of development of backward classes places greater emphasis on

the role of general sector in providing major developmental programmes. The public consumption programme, specially in regard to minimum needs, will evolve eligibility conditions which will give high priority to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and nomadic tribes. Programmes of the general sector, which include agriculture, land reforms, village and small scale industries, training programmes for employment in semi-skilled professions, and communications, will accord high priority to development of backward classes. Education, economic development and social legislation programmes are to be directed towards improvement in the quality of life of these communities enabling them over a period of time to reach reasonable levels of development. Although the area based tribal development block programmes had been undertaken, experience shows that the block is far too small a unit for large investments in infrastructure. Programmes of communications, minor irrigation, marketing and higher education could not be taken up with the tribal block funds alone. In future, therefore, a larger flow of funds from various sectors of development are to be directed to meet the requirements of each specific area, based on a carefully drawn up area plan. Apart from integrated area planning for the tribal areas, there are small pockets of tribal concentration throughout the country which require attention. The problems of development of these pockets would need consideration while detailed multi-level planning is done in each State.

Implementing the Programmes

The implementation of these programmes with this new approach and strategy would raise several problems at the State and block levels. At the State level, the planning machinery is relatively weak and in some States, it does not exist. Planning machineries would have to be set up or strengthened for undertaking these programmes. Research and evaluation base for project formulation and for preparation of comprehensive plans is found to be inadequate. It has to be strengthened. Sponsoring various socio-economic surveys, to bring out the problems of different regions and communities in an integrated manner, would further strengthen this process. The research pre-occupations would have to be reoriented towards the special problems in liaison with the planning cells that are likely to be set up by the State Governments. The monitoring of plan projects and programmes also needs considerable improvement. Unless these two aspects are combined, it will not be possible to make an assessment of the impact of the programmes on the felt needs of the people.

Past experience in programme implementation reveals that involvement of Panchayati Raj institutions and voluntary organizations fell

short of expectations. The applied nutrition programme, family and child welfare programme, public health, nutrition and several other such programmes envisaged considerable role for participation of local communities. Lack of proper organizational base of the voluntary organizations and also local factions of Panchayati Raj have hindered, to a large extent, their participation in these programmes. Therefore, ways and means would have to be devised for effectively involving the Panchayati Raj institutions and the voluntary bodies. To this extent their organizational base would have to be strengthened. Also, some types of orientation programme on a large scale would have to be undertaken during the Fifth Plan for appraising the functionaries of the Panchayat Samiti with the objectives of various plan programmes. Personnel engaged in other institutions, such as village schools and cooperatives, could be effectively involved in programme implementation. Our experience revealed that the personnel at the intermediary level, engaged in different programmes, were not familiar with programme objectives and detailed aspects of programme implementation. This is proposed to be corrected by offering short term in-service training to the personnel engaged in various programmes. In the past, due to lack of proper supervision, implementation and standards of services have suffered to some extent, which has to be removed by providing more personnel for supervision at the field level. The budgetary pattern at the block level does not provide any flexibility for undertaking any programmes for meeting the specific needs of the area. Some type of flexibility needs to be provided in the present budgetary pattern.

Various social services, which are now being implemented and proposed to be expanded, would have to be coordinated and integrated for maximizing and reinforcing their impact on the beneficiaries. This should be done effectively at the block level. Block Panchayat Samiti, Block Development Officer, and voluntary organizations would have to be actively involved in the programme supervision and implementation. The welfare administrations in several States are at present scattered under different administrative agencies. They need to be brought under a single agency to achieve integrated planning and development.

SOME DIMENSIONS OF PLANNING

R. N. Haldipur

SINCE time immemorial, man has tried to shape his environment and destiny. In the course of history, he has expanded his activities with the object of improving the quality of life. But progress and development imply substitution of haphazard efforts to modify environment by more systematic ones. Every developing nation is desirous and anxious to utilize its resources at the optimum rate in the shortest possible time. Planning, therefore, is an organized, conscious and continual attempt to select the best available alternatives to achieve specific goals. It, thus, involves economic management of scarce resources. This implies full utilization of all the productive capacity, in terms of natural resources, capital by mopping up savings, human labour and all the available infrastructure.

In the history of civilization, there has never been a perfectly integrated society. Development implies movement from one set of equilibrium to another, at a higher level. The process of transition may often involve discontinuities as a result of which conflicts and frictions become manifest. These conflicts need not be taken as shortcomings or signs of weakness. They are endemic to change and could be a sign of vigour and vitality, provided they lead to a higher synthesis.

The important question that crops up is as to who plans, for whom and for what purpose. This takes us to determination of area of planning, its unit and goals. Planning done at a national level does not automatically ensure its applicability at local levels; for each area has its own personality, potentiality and needs. A successful plan, while taking into account the limitations posed by national priorities, must be sensitive to these variations, so that a balance is attained. What is needed is a two-way approach—the process of planning from below lending realism and concrete content with the down-ward movement giving the Plan a coordinated and national character. Mere aggregation of discrete plans of various Departments and States followed by a disaggregation of national plans down-wards, through different ladders of administrative hierarchy, will not suffice.

In a country of our size with its vast problems, Central intervention to effect correctives to the imbalances in the economy is inevitable. Since there is a general reluctance to mop up local resources, financial viability of the lower units is not sound. Hence, central allocation of funds on a sectoral basis has become unavoidable. Very often, the national planning process is forced to intervene, using fiscal and monetary devices and centrally-sponsored schemes to give a sense of direction and to provide the necessary vigour and dynamism to sectors and areas which have remained dry. So far, in the absence of planning bodies at the State level, State plans have failed to take into account the total resources available to them so that there could be meaningful projections of plan for a fuller utilization of their resources, on the basis of a long-term perspective based on the needs and availability of assets. It would also need inter-State coordination and regional planning to obtain the best results.

> "However wholesome or worthy the Planning objectives and strategy at the national level may be, certain specific spatial features emerge in the actual working for specific areas which are far from wholesome and these unwholesome features tend to appear over large compact tracts interspersed in the country each of which has relatively homogeneous economic characteristics and which appears to a significant extent to have remained uninfluenced by forces which have brought about growth and diversification of economy in other parts of the country. These regions often cut across political divisions but are difficult to tackle as a whole on account of the political and administrative decisions which have in the meantime ossified and criss-crossed them."[1]

Asok Mitra[2] has pointed out the following aberrations which go to the root of regional disparities:

"(1) Certain particular sectors of the economy receive more attention and investment than others .... The balance of power in political and economic terms among the population who receive the benefits from these special sectors may have also something to do with it.

(2) Decisions at the State level tend to rely more and more in favour of those programmes which show quantitative achievements in terms of physical attainments or financial spending than those that have more to do with changing the quality of life or bringing about income distribution.

---

[1] Asok Mitra *Multi-level Planning*, second lecture delivered at the Academy of Sciences in the Institute of Geography at Moscow, June 1973.

[2] *Ibid.*

(3) Many States have not developed any machinery to work out long-term perspectives.

(4) An integrated strategy is certainly easier to talk about than work out with deliberately established relationships between different programmes of economic development, the conservation and development of natural resources, infrastructural development and social services, as each region must be given custom-made service.

(5) In actual working, sectoral programmes always tend to win over programmes of spatial strategy.

(6) In the absence of perspective plans for the States or elaborate resource inventories, the States find it difficult to prepare a shelf of investment projects which might offer an opportunity for considering alternative choices.

(7) There are an absence of an earmarked, specialized staff, regular feedback by way of qualitative data and proper evaluation of ongoing projects, progressive reliance on aggregative exercises based upon the proposals of the departmental agencies.

(8) There is an inadequate appreciation of the need for training of critical persons involved in the various tasks with a view to develop their planning and implementation capability."

The Priorities

Very often one forgets that solutions of today could be problems of the morrow and selection of one option could restrict the choice and become a constraint. A planning process involves not only a careful definition of goals leading to a clear-cut policy formulation but has to be followed through with strategic, administrative and operational decisions consistent with the choice of objectives. Therefore "the more outstanding policy decisions can be viewed in their two-fold significance: both as causes and as consequences. At the same time, we are compelled to give greater thought to the more basic problems of economic organization, structural change and effective utilization of assets and resources available within the economy".[3]

The five year plans in India had placed shifting emphasis on priorities in various sectors, very often to administer correctives to the planning process. But planning has consistently been at the macro-level. The actual implementation of the plans, however, was left to predilections

[3] Tarlok Singh, *The Statesman*, October 3, 1973.

and pressures of politicians or judgments of local officials. Although the district was accepted as a proper unit of developmental administration, the administrators at the district level tended to base their decisions in operationalizing the sectoral programmes, relying on their own field experience or were guided by local political and other pressure groups. A systematic study of locational implications of such planning efforts had been seriously lacking. Absence of a scientific concept of a region or a community tended to waste a lot of our developmental efforts and created many political and social problems, especially that of 'imbalances' between one region and another, between city and village—between a centre and its dependent region.

What is needed is an objective examination of the actual realities prevailing in our rural areas and to make operational plans, on the basis of a scientific concept of a community and a region. A number of factors, like size, nature and distribution of population, level of development, ecology, entrepreneurial level, social structure and value orientation, become very vital when we transform our aggregative macro-plans into developmental micro-plans for the purpose of implementation. A large country of our size and complexity cannot improve the standard of living of its people, generate employment, develop agriculture and industry unless it strikes at the base.

Important Factors

In developing countries, which have scarce resources, "all statistics of growth and development have to be read against the growth of population".[4] Population, scattered over other areas tends to concentrate around certain centres. Size and density of population is one of the important criteria for determining the level of economic development achieved by a particular region. Though basically it is affected by resources, like land and water, it may be favourably influenced by availability of other resources, like forests, minerals, a command area project, etc. Utilization of resources at higher levels of production very often leads to a higher density of population and sometimes results in employment of more people in the same kind of work unless counter magnets in the form of new growth centres are established.

The second important factor is the level of development. In some regions, achievement motivation is strong for cultural and historical reasons; in others, there are islands of backwardness insulated from the social forces operating around. Parliamentary democracy and development

[4] Asok Mitra, *Micro-Planning of Space*, first lecture delivered at the Academy of Sciences in the Institute of Geography at Moscow.

planning are bound to unleash such forces the outcome of whos interaction is going to determine the future socio-economic ethos of th country. The past-present-future nexus of forces and events hav therefore, to be fully understood and charted. What is needed is a assessment of the level of economic development of an area taking int consideration the multipliers and the back-washes. Economic growt seems to be linked up with spatial development. Asok Mitra,[5] quotin J. Friedman, refers to four stages in the evolution of spatial organizatio in the national economic development. "The first stage is the pre-indu trial one, characterized by a number of small independent centres servin its own surrounding regions and linking other centres. The secon corresponds to the period of incipient industrialization characterize by primate cities and towns which are either ports or are in the heart c one or two centres of industrial activity featuring fan-shaped network of transportation facilities.... This stage is characterized by lack c balance in the distribution of size over the whole spectrum of citie The third or the transitional stage comes with the recognition an conscious articulation of a hierarchical vertical organization by mear of which new resources from the former periphery are brought into th national economy which enhance the potentiality for further nation development but still leave very large pockets of poverty and back wardness between the national and regional centres. The stage i essentially unstable and leads on to the fourth one, consisting of ful fledged spatial organizations based on the hierarchic principle and th so-called rank-size rule...." These stages are generally indicative of historic process and warn the planner to intervene through either speci programmes or other corrective steps to restore the balance.

The geographical and the ecological factors are the next importan elements to be reckoned with. All regions are not homogeneous a far as environmental factors go. The location determines the climat and the vegetation of an area and this affects not only the nature an distribution of settlements but the strategy of development relevant t it. The land-use pattern, the degree of soil erosion, the possibilit of floods, the potentiality for construction of dams and drainage, th geological data and minerals are also important constituents. A these factors combine to produce the basic resources.

It is not merely the geographical landscape but the cultural one als which is very relevant to a planner. The social structure, value orienta tion and leadership profile influence the planning process in a marke way. This is very well illustrated by the problems of hill areas, triba

[5] Asok Mitra, *Micro-Planning of Space*, op. cit.

areas and arid zones. Given all the growth potential, much will depend on the ethos of the people—whether their outlook is traditional or progressive, whether they have acumen for entrepreneurship or whether they are fatalists. There are social, communal and religious factors which interfere with the cold logic of mathematical economics.

Intimately bound up with the above and arising from them is the fact of the growth potential which is not merely a sum-total of the above but is very much more besides. Constituent elements of demographic, physical and cultural landscapes sum up the growth-permitting and growth-conditioning factors. The nature of these factors, their spatial distribution and the inter-relationship which a planning process will build up, go to enhance or inhibit growth and the quality of life. If so, multi-level planning becomes the most important single element to link plan with implementation. In such a process one will have to identify a watershed mark where the aggregative macro-plans could be transformed into concrete realistic micro-plans for an area or a region. Where economic planning ends, the administrative and operational planning begin. Through all these stages the effort should be influenced and inspired by the basic objectives of planning—economic growth and social justice.

Administrative Units and Centres of Growth

For a long time, since 1952, the closest to grassroot planning, in our country, has been the Community Development and National Extension Service Blocks, with a certain population size and a specified number of villages. For some time, one did speak of village production plans also. The block was conceived as the lowest administrative unit for the execution of the plan, next to the taluka which was a revenue unit. However, these blocks were demarcated at the state level and selection of headquarters and its location were dictated by administrative convenience or local pressures. It was not based upon a scientific study of location wherein optimum results could be obtained because the place was a centre of sale and supply activity—a unit serving its hinterland and linked by a network of roads.

> "In any part of India which enjoys some commercialization of agriculture, such a unit can be immediately identified as a primary market area. Rapid improvement can be obtained by pitching on the market area, defining it and demarcating its zone of operation. The remarkable success of Punjab, Haryana and Maharashtra has been due very largely to the development of the

regulated market at the *mandis.* These *mandis* carry the seeds of growth centres and can easily blossom forth to a variety of activities as a point of intersection of roads and transport systems, a centre for departmental stores for agricultural inputs, repairs and serving facilities, credit institutions and cooperatives, warehousing and marketing as well as a centre for culture, education and administration."[6]

These centres of growth could form a set of concentric circles providing higher and higher levels of services for a hierarchy of settlements. Instead of taking the village as a unit, one could consider a group of villages with a specified threshold of population below which many services of a minor nature are ubiquitous and beyond which a package of services are necessary at a centre to serve its hinterland. This concept is certainly not inegalitarian as it can be applied to backward areas also to remove regional imbalances. It has, however, three basic weaknesses. Firstly, one may either neglect the economic base for providing durable assets or ignore the social side which is equally an input of economic development. Secondly, there may be transmission weakness. We may talk of spread effect once the growth has taken place but there may be very little evidence of the centre being a catalytic force. Thirdly, there is implementation weakness for lack of proper and correct data and the rigours of a scientific study. There is such a thing as monopoly of space and unless some counter magnets are created, things are likely to orbit around the same centre, as we have seen in the case of our metropolitan cities. The merit of growth-centre consists in its departure from the dichotomies of rural and urban and of planning and implementation, as these circles and hexagons with a centre and a hinterland are interlinked with the larger areas, till micro-planning merges with the district, the regional, the meso and the macro plans.

At the micro-level, the following steps become important:

(1) to identify existing and potential growth and service centres, together with their associate areas in terms of an economic base and a range of population;

(2) to investigate the suitability of a population range of 10 to 15 thousand, in a cluster, for the purposes of a viable unit to provide services;

(3) to locate relevant criteria for such identification and delineation, including resources available in the area;

[6] Asok Mitra, *Micro-Planning of Space*, op. cit.

(4) to study the inhibiting factors—social, religious, etc.—and also the growth factors;

(5) to determine norms for viable village communities in terms of economic investments and social amenities and effectiveness of community institutions, like panchayats, cooperatives, etc., so that people's participation can be in real terms;

(6) to organize provision of services and amenities with which these centres should be equipped for creating a self-generating process within the community;

(7) to suggest eventually, as may be necessary, lines of possible change in the structure and base unit of planning and administration; and

(8) to study locational implications of such planning and establish linkages with other centres.

The objectives of such an exercise would not only be to identify existing or potential growth centres but to make substantive recommendations within the study area for removing imbalances and for more efficient functional integration of the area. By identifying critical gaps, investment decisions to fill them could be made with a view to having a multiplier effect on the area. The delineation and development of a cluster of villages, to include them within the 'Impact Zone', should be based on local resources, a harmony of interest and aspirations bound by common socio-economic values and objectives, an existing or potential communication network, and existence or creation of socio-economic overheads which can assist commercialization and diversification of the economy. This requires a systems approach, taking into account, settlements, resources, traffic, markets and administration. "Care has to be taken to see that the district or the area is not treated as a 'closed system'. All regions for one purpose or the other are 'open systems' and, therefore extra-regional linkages and flows need to be studied."[7]

Much of the success will depend on how well manipulated the administrative machinery is. Today, the district has a well integrated administrative system, though it may contain several sub-regions from ecological point of view. It has better data and considerable expertise to undertake a task of micro-level planning. It will probably be the best point of departure from the macro to the micro-level planning. It will, however, need strengthening by establishing a Planning Cell with an agro-economist, a statistician and a cartographer to assist the

[7] Sudhir Wanmali, *Lessons of Work on Growth Centres for Micro-level Planning.*

District Planning Officer. The financial management will have to result-oriented—in terms of identification of critical areas of devel ment so that the investments could lead to a spread effect. It will a need a proper information system. However, one may remember wl late Dr. D. R. Gadgil said in this context:

> "In planning, in an under developed country, inadequacy of d must be taken for granted. What I would like to emphasize is r so much full information or elaborate tools of analysis as t desire to understand the situation, to define a set of coordina goals with some precision and to think of possibilities carefu and in some detail."[8]

There is plenty of secondary data which can be usefully employed, wi out making a fetish of long questionnaires which will never take us the goal soon enough, though these have merits. We may have pla and plans but if we do not take into account our limitations, t possibilities, the projections, the second generation problems and cc sequences, they will remain only in our archives. "Modernizing for have to enter the very heart of the rural community. People have be sensitized to social responsibility and awakened to broader natio requirements."[9]

At various tiers, the limitations and scope of authority, the int dependencies—to ensure the avoidance of cleavages between differ points of the planning process—a proper monitoring mechanism a the coordination of local initiative and governmental assistance wo all be necessary to see that the up-ward and the down-ward moveme are well coordinated and that they lead to a realistic planning effo In the words of Aneurin Bevan, "The whole art of local government to estimate catchment areas for dealing with particular services befc deciding where boundaries of these services should be drawn". Tl could be a reliable measure for different levels of planning, from t national level to the villages, so that perceptions of national goals a local needs could converge for the substantial satisfaction of the citize

[8] Quoted by Asok Mitra, *Multi-level Planning*, op. cit.

[9] R. N. Haldipur, "On Remodelling Panchayati Raj", *The Indian Journal of Pu Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (July-September, 1971).

ROLE OF AREA DEVELOPMENT IN MULTI-LEVEL PLANNING

Lalit K. Sen

MULTI-LEVEL planning, as the term indicates, is integration of planning at various levels. Our past planning efforts were primarily sectoral in nature and were focussed at the national and state levels. Budgets were prepared with specific allocations for various sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, industry, education, health, family planning and so on. These schematic budgets reflected national priorities as well as the availability of funds. The same procedure was adopted at the state level.

We have, by now, acquired enough knowledge about the efficacy of this system of planning over the past 20 years and it is almost universally agreed that a balance has to be maintained between national priorities and local needs.[1] Sectoral planning at the national and state levels with the help of schematic budgets has shown some modest overall gains but at the local level the impact, if at all visible, has been uneven. This uneven impact in the current socio-political context, has created problems for backward regions as well as for backward classes. While new wealth has been concentrated in a few regions and in a few hands, unemployment has also increased steadily.

Obviously, our past planning efforts at the national and state levels were not enough and now more and more attention is being given to planning at the local levels. The Planning Commission, for example, has recommended the district as the unit of planning and development.[2] Regional planners would rather have a homogeneous region as the unit of planning.[3] Experiments have been attempted in Tamil Nadu to identify regions by regrouping taluks.[4] Whatever the unit of planning

[1] Planning Commission, *Approach Paper to the Fifth Five-Year Plan*, New Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1972.

[2] Planning Commission, *Guidelines for the Formulation of District Plans*, New Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969.

[3] See, for example, Lalit K. Sen (ed.), *Readings on Micro-Level Planning and Rural Growth Centres*, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1972; and R. P. Misra (ed.), *Regional Planning : Concepts, Techniques, Policies and Case Studies*, Bangalore, University of Mysore, 1969.

[4] A. V. Krishna Murthi, "Regional Planning in Tamil Nadu" in Lalit K. Sen, *op. cit.*

may be, the idea is not to prepare schematic budgets for units sma than the State, but to prepare area development plans based on the ne and potentialities of the smaller units. Targets of achievement in case will be dictated by the needs and potentialities of an area rat than by sectoral allocations.

There is also a danger in making area plans the sole basis of all planning endeavours. The needs of our rural areas are many and pl based only on these may require astronomical amounts of mon Moreover, priorities have to be considered before finalizing these pla Multi-level planning provides an approach by which local plans can fitted into the matrix of sectoral plans based on national priorities a the availability of funds. Our five-year plans at the national and state levels are sectoral plans. We now need a consensus on methodology for preparing area-development plans which can be fit into the framework of these sectoral plans.

The main purpose of this article is to raise some issues which area planner faces while planning for specific areas, such as a region a district or even a taluk, within the framework of sectoral plans.

CONCEPT OF INTEGRATED AREA DEVELOPMENT

Area development is, by definition, based on an integrated approa Very briefly, it refers to two types of integration—functional and sp tial—which are themselves interrelated. Functional integration ref to the integration of all economic and social activities which influer the life of a people. Thus, health, education, agriculture, industr and several other aspects of our day-to-day living overlap. A char in one sector almost invariably brings about a change in another. Ti point is generally understood and needs no elaboration here. It is al understood that any policy for development must try to utilize th interrelationships. What puzzles administrators who are responsil for implementing policies, and social workers is how to use t knowledge.

The community development programme in India tried to achie functional integration by establishing an integrated staffing pattern. Sp cialists from different departments of government representing heal education, agriculture, industry, etc., were brought together as a tea at the block level and it was expected that the daily interaction amo such an interdisciplinary team will also lead to an integrated develo ment of the rural areas. By and large, this has not happened.

There are many reasons for this failure which have been discussed at length in hundreds of publications and in public forums. However, one of the reasons which has not been discussed often enough and which has never been fully understood is the spatial nature of functional integration.

The interrelationships among various socio-economic activities depend a great deal on where they are located. If spatial relationships among existing activities are observed, it will be noticed that there is a definite pattern in the dispersal or concentration of activities in space. The actual location of a specific activity in relationship to other activities depends on several factors. Some of the important factors are the general level of development, demand for specific services and their supply, accessibility of these services in terms of roads and transportation, time and distance of travel, level of income of the people, cost of obtaining these services, and so on. Large portions of our rural areas are deprived of many basic amenities of life due to one or a combination of such factors. On the other hand, there are areas where there is a concentration of such amenities and services due, again, to similar reasons.

Thus, in the context of development, when new activities or services are proposed, the location of such services becomes extremely important. An appropriate location of a new activity may start a chain reaction of development with far-reaching effects. An understanding of functional interrelationships in space, therefore, goes a long way toward the development of an area. Integrated area development, thus, refers to the appropriate location of social and economic activities over a physical space for the balanced development of a region.

The idea of an appropriate location is, by definition, selective. In other words, each and every settlement cannot have each and every activity or service. It has been observed by location theorists that there is a hierarchy of settlements, based on availability of services of various degrees of specialization and also on area and population served by a settlement. Services of various degrees of specialization, therefore, need to be located in the most appropriate places. It must be pointed out that this selective location is by no means discriminatory. Higher-order settlements have their own hinterlands, which include those of the lower-order settlements. The location of a specific activity in a specific settlement is meant not only for the centre but also for its dependent territory. The pattern of linkages between the centre and its territory may need strengthening but the appropriate location of activities will necessarily be in the central place itself.

The idea of selective and appropriate location is most relevant under our present economic conditions. We do not have enough resources to provide all services and all developmental programmes to all settlements. Furthermore, we need quick returns for all our investments to build up our capital supply for further investments. Selectivity should, therefore, be our guiding principle in any future investment.

Integrated area development is also concerned with the development of backward areas. If only the existing hierarchy of settlements in a particular region is utilized for formulating a developmental plan, then areas far away from important centres of economic activity may remain permanently underdeveloped. Some inducement for growth is, therefore, necessary in backward areas in the form of overheads and infrastructures in selective locations. The decentralization of investments of this kind will, of course, depend on the potential resources of the backward area and on the expected multiplier effects of the investment.

Integrated area development is thus based on the ideas of selectivity on the one hand and decentralization on the other. Decentralization of development is seen here on a regional level between the rich and the poor areas. But the actual location of developmental programmes in both the rich and the poor areas is selective.

Decentralization and actual location of activities need to be done within the framework of a region encompassing both urban and rural sectors. In the past, the development of these two sectors has been kept separate and towns could not be utilized for the development of rural areas. It is needless to say that the separation of the urban from the rural is arbitrary and harmful from the point of view of development of a region.

The concept of integrated area development suggests a framework for decentralizing economic and social activities by locating specific functions in appropriate places. The network thus created provides a meaningful infrastructure which can attract and sustain a diversified but a growing economy.

MICRO-LEVEL PLANNING AND INTEGRATED AREA DEVELOPMENT

The term micro-level planning remains rather vague unless the actual level of planning is defined. At the lowest level, each village provides the raw material for planning. However, the village with its small population base and meagre resources is too small a unit for development. With rare exceptions, our villages are not economically viable for

developmental investments. Past researches have indicated a very strong possibility of the presence of functional units, consisting of clusters of villages with close functional ties which, for all practical purposes, constitute a community.[5]

It is postulated that a central village among the constituent villages of such a functional community will provide some of the higher-order services needed by the people. These services will, of necessity, be those which can be supported by the total population of the functional community. It is also postulated that a number of these functional communities will constitute a sub-region which also will have a focal point. This sub-regional focal point may be called a service centre which will be of higher order than the central village. In addition to the services provided by the central village, the service centre will also provide a set of more complex activities.[6]

Following this logic one can visualise several such sub-regions on a hierarchic scale with progressively increasing geographical area and population base and with service centres (or growth centres) of increasing functional complexity as one goes upward from the functional community toward a region. The final level, one step short of the national level, is a region with perhaps a metropolitan city as its centre. The central villages, service centres, growth centres and the regional cities will be interconnected with roads, fast-moving transport, telegraph and telephone lines and other means of communication. It is essential to keep this hierarchic picture in mind for any area planning. With the use of available theories and methods, one can prepare guidelines for the location of services and for economic investments at various levels of this hierarchy. Micro-level planning is not limited to any particular level of settlement. It takes a whole hierarchy of central places and its hinterland as its focus. The emphasis in micro-level planning is on planning from the lowest level (in this case, the functional community) upward to a clearly defined region. In many cases, this region may be coterminous with the district. In doing this, the needs of the local areas, as well as the purpose of regional development, are served. The location of specific socio-economic activities and their interlinkages over a region are major concerns of micro-level planning.

Macro-level planning, on the other hand, starts at the national level and is broken down into segments suitable for regions. This is

[5] F. C. Fliegel, *et al*, *Agricultural Innovations in Indian Villages*, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1968.

[6] Several nomenclatures for naming centres at different hierarchic levels are available. See, for example, Lalit K. Sen (ed.), *op. cit.*, and R. P. Misra (ed.), *op. cit.*

generally in the nature of budgetary allocations, indicating national or state level priorities and without any guidelines for locations.

It is obvious that these two methods of planning must complement each other. Without national or state level priorities, no micro-level planning is possible. The national and state plans provide a broad framework within which detailed planning can be done. On the other hand, micro-level plans can help fix priorities for different regions depending on their specific needs. Also, without micro-level planning, no national plan can be properly implemented. In India, we have gone through the exercises of macro-level planning without evolving micro-level plans for implementation. The dilemmas and contradictions of half-planned development are already with us.

DISTRICT-LEVEL PLANNING

As indicated earlier, micro-level planning cannot be done for each village separately. It takes into account the interlinkages and the hierarchies of a whole range of settlements. Yet, one has to draw a boundary around such a system or systems which will provide a unit for planning and development. Ideally, this unit should be a region based on a certain amount of homogeneity. Criteria, such as agro-climatic characteristics, ecological conditions, common resources, cultural ties, etc., have been used in the past for delineating a region. In India, attempts at identifying such regions have just begun.[7] In the current socio-political context, however, planning for such regions may be difficult as these regions are bound to cut across the boundaries of various states. Our past experience in inter-state planning has not been very encouraging. One practical difficulty will be the non-availability of inter-state data. Secondary data maintained in the various official records on agriculture, industry, etc., are all aggregated at the existing administrative levels. To collect data for a region which overlaps some of these units will mean a near-impossible task of reclassification and collation of masses of data.

District, on the other hand, provides a large enough area for planning although it may not necessarily be identical with a region. In most cases, a district will form a sub-region or a combination of a few sub-regions belonging to different regions. Yet, the practical advantages of selecting a district as a unit of micro-level planning will

[7] The notable examples are the work done by the SIET Institute, Hyderabad; the Institute of Development Studies, University of Mysore; Wardha Institute, Wardha, Maharashtra; the Town and Planning Organization, Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, and the Town and Country Planning Department, Government of Tamil Nadu.

definitely outweigh its drawbacks. In the long run, if all districts are studied and planned, regions will emerge from contiguous districts. The added advantage of the district is that it has a well integrated administrative structure for implementing micro-level plans.[8] Planning and implementation in a district can, therefore, be easily coordinated. This was definitely one of the considerations which the Planning Commission had in mind in recommending the district as a unit of planning and development.

Two considerations need to enter into micro-level planning at the district level. First, the funds available under the various subjects are very limited and it is not possible to give individual attention to each village. It is necessary, therefore, to be selective in allocating funds over a large area. Second, even if funds were available for developing each village separately, it is doubtful whether it would be an economically viable proposition to put higher-order functions in smaller villages. For example, not all villages will be able to make use of a hospital, a high school or a rice mill.

A more realistic way of looking at allocation of funds is to select appropriate locations for specific investments. Two points must be kept in mind before such a selection is made: (1) a settlement selected for a specific investment must be able to absorb and sustain it, and (2) the benefits of the newly located function must filter down to the surrounding settlements which were not selected for such investment. The question, therefore, is of optimum location of services, such as education, health, etc., on the one hand, and inputs of development, on the other. The locations are optimum in the sense that maximum impact is obtained by putting investments in specific places for the development of an entire region.

THE GROWTH CENTRE CONCEPT

This concept takes into account the considerations mentioned above and provides the basic tool for micro-level planning in rural India. The growth centre concept is not new in India, though in the past not enough attention was given to it. It has been revived only during the last two years as an important strategy of rural development. In the early fifties, the Narielwala Commission recommended planning for rural-urban communities with a small town at the centre and a number of villages at the periphery. The economic relationship between the

[8] Y. Raghavaiah, "District Planning and Development Administration—A Case for Unified and Integrated Approach", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (1967); also Planning Commission, *Guidelines for the Formulation of District Plans*, op. cit.

town and the surrounding villages was suggested to be one of mutual dependence. The villages would produce raw materials and food for the town. In return, the town will process these materials and send them back to the village in finished form. Machinery and their servicing would also be provided by the town. However, the Narielwala Commission did not foresee the use of such a concept for planning purposes. For example, the linkages between the rural-urban communities themselves and the hierarchical arrangement of these in terms of progressively specialized services and functions were not defined in the Commission's report.

The available theories and methods for identifying growth centres of various orders and their hinterlands could be utilized for planning of our rural areas. One that may suit our purposes very well is the Central Place Theory. There are alternative theories also which need to be tested under Indian conditions. To save space, we would like to state briefly the main theme of the central-place theory and its methods.

The concept of central place is mainly a contribution of a German geographer, Christaller and has been refined and improved upon by Losch and others.[9] The theory is deductive but was tested by Christaller in southern Germany and by others in different parts of the world. The gist of Christaller's theory, stripped of details and elaboration, is as follows:

(1) A central place (usually a city, a town or a large village, depending on the specific area or region under study) which provides functions and services to its tributary area, is located at the centre of minimum aggregate travel, providing minimum cost to the customers and maximum profit to the sellers.

(2) There is a hierarchy of such central places. Higher-order places provide functions in addition to what the lower-order places have.

(3) Functions which are unique to higher-order places have a wider hinterland than those which are common to both higher- and lower-order places.

(4) It follows that higher-order places also command a larger tributary area than lower-order places. In other words, their degree of centrality is higher than that of lower-order places.

[9] W. Christaller, *The Central Places of Southern Germany*, Englewood Cliffs (NS), Prentice Hall, 1966; and A. Losch, *The Economics of Location*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1954.

(5) The-higher-order places are fewer in number and more widely spaced than the lower-order places.

According to Christaller, the centrality of a place is a measure of its importance. He recognizes population size as an associative factor but the major emphasis is placed on the functional importance of a place in terms of the nature of services offered.

Role of Growth Centres in Integrated Area Development

The concept of growth centres provides a methodology for a balanced programme of rural development. If the central-place theory, as formulated by Christaller and refined by others, is utilized, field investigations will indicate a hierarchy of settlements and their hinterlands based on the progressive specialization of functions in each settlement. In our previous discussion on the problems of development in India, we have pointed out the following major handicaps in our efforts: (1) lack of enough resources and need for consolidation of resources in selected places, and (2) lack of scientific guidelines for selecting places which are ideally located for regenerating the entire countryside. We had also discussed the need for decentralizing economic activities so that benefits of economic development can be shared by all groups and all regions.

The scientifically selected growth centres at various levels would provide such locations. Empirical research could easily provide guidelines for: (1) location of different orders of services and investments; (2) delineation of viable communities, sub-regions and regions; and (3) planning for future growth centres, which will be needed in a rapidly changing agricultural scene.

Planning for Integrated Area Development

The basic idea behind the growth centre concept is to select larger villages and towns which could service hinterlands of various sizes. Depending on agricultural potentiality of the area, growth centres will provide services, such as agricultural input distribution, marketing, storage, nodal points for a transportation network and various types of agro-based industries. The reason for selecting a few places rather than providing these functions in every village is based on a scientific assessment of the situation. It has been proved in several research studies that not all functions can be sustained in all settlements. There is a hierarchy of functions based on the degree of complexity or the degree of specialization. Very highly specialized functions can be

sustained in only a few large places. On the other hand, functions with low specialization can be found in a large number of places of all sizes.

To start with, a thorough inventory of the existing and potential resources of an area has to be undertaken. Depending on the predominant resource, such as land and water, mineral deposits, livestock, forestry, etc., a proper projection should be made about future production; it should be based not only on existing resources but potential resources as well. These projections will provide future production goals. Secondly, in order to attain these production goals, proper inputs have to be provided. With the higher production, storage, marketing, distribution and processing of the produce have also to be done. Within this framework, one can think of introducing new programmes, such as intensive farming with the help of high-yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, etc., credit to small and marginal farmers, land development, irrigation, and drainage, road-building, agro-based industries and so on.

A growth centre will provide the location for introducing various programmes for receiving marketable produce and for processing them. The scheme will only work if the growth centres are linked with their hinterlands by roads and other communication facilities. The growth centres can be seen at various levels. At a very low level, they could perform only a few functions, such as input distribution and collection of produce. At a higher level, the produce can be scored, marketed and processed. From here, the processed goods can be transported to still higher level growth centres. Along with these, services, such as education and health, can also be located in various growth centres in increasing order of specialization.

The contribution of the growth centres to the development of an area depends upon the fact that all productive forces in a unit area can be integrated within a spatial framework. The community development programmes emphasize the aspect of functional integration in the development process. But at the time of implementation, this idea could not be operationalized because no model was available to bring about this functional integration. A spatial plan indicating the location of various functions, their geographical as well as functional relationships can correct this deficiency. The growth centres by providing stimulus for improved agriculture or development of the basic resources will help raise production. By providing marketing, storage and transport facilities, it will provide the basic infrastructure for a commercialized agriculture. At the same time, several agricultural and non-agricultural jobs will be created. The higher level growth centres, by providing

processing and other agro-based industries, will create more jobs. The growth centres, in short, combine both agricultural and industrial development within one framework, and improvement in agriculture, according to this scheme, directly affects the prospect of rural industrialization. At the end, the development of the tertiary sector consisting of trade and commerce, transport, construction and services will also come in the wake of commercialization and industrialization creating even more jobs.

PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

A realistic planner tries to keep the cost of such a plan within reason. Major limitations are budgetary allocations made under various subjects at the macro-level. Another constraining factor is the investment already committed to by the government which does not fit into the plan. One way out of these difficulties is to phase the plan over a number of years so that the investment in the first or second year can be made within budgetary restrictions. The phasing is done on the basis of a careful analysis of the interrelationships of the various investments. For example, if a large mineral-based industry is planned, the initial investment may consist only of power supply and a network of roads. New demands for funds for the plant may be made simultaneously for the next year.

A careful cost-benefit analysis will indicate the return of the investments in terms of more service facilities, higher production and above all more employment. A well integrated plan for the entire planning area, conveniently phased over a number of years and based on local needs and resources, should be an ideal exercise in micro-level planning.

One important factor in the success of a plan of this nature is its acceptance by the government and local leaders. It has been the experience of the present author that in the case of a well-formulated plan these difficulties can be easily overcome. If the plan is priced within the framework of budgetary allocations, the government or governments are willing to consider it. Local leaders may provide strong political support, if they are involved at various stages of plan formulation. Sometimes, their sound commonsense may be a welcome relief for the planner whose success depends, to a great extent, on how realistic the plan is.

MULTI-LEVEL PLANNING FOR INDUSTRY

Ram K. Vepa

ALTHOUGH planning has become a familiar exercise in India for almost two decades, there has been a growing feeling that the pattern of planning adopted so far has not yielded the expected results. In spite of the impressive increase in industrial production recorded in many sectors, planning has not somehow contributed to a real increase in the standard of living of the common people. It is this disillusionment that makes many wonder whether commonly used economic indices, such as per capita income or Gross National Product (GNP) have any real meaning for developing countries and whether a more down-to-earth approach in regard to helping the weaker sections of the population and backward regions of the country might not be more fruitful. The Fifth Plan will undoubtedly provide an indication of this changed attitude, both of the public and the Government, towards the whole process of planning.

The four Five Year Plans that have so far been implemented have significantly raised the industrial production in a number of sectors, although the increase has not been as great as was anticipated or expected at one time. In fact, when planning began, in 1950, it was expected that by the end of the Fifth Five Year Plan, there would a doubling of the per capita income (in real terms) as also a complete independence from foreign aid. Today, as the Fifth Plan is about to begin, both these objectives seem far from fulfilment.

In addition, the problem of unemployment has become increasingly significant from the Third Five Year Plan onwards. The number of the unemployed at the end of each plan has been consistently larger than at the beginning; at the end of the First Plan, it was estimated to be 5.5 million, at the end of the Second 7.5 million, at the end of the Third 9.5 million and, perhaps, around 17 million today. The Expert Committee on Unemployment has estimated the figure to be 18.7 million, including 16.1 million in the rural area. By the end of the Fourth Plan period, at least 20 million persons are expected to be without meaningful jobs. This does not take into account the vast under-employment that is a perennial feature of the Indian economic scene and the fact that a

significant proportion of the unemployed are educated persons with technical qualifications which, one may normally expect, would be a scarce commodity in a developing country.

Another important deficiency of the plans has been the regional imbalances created in the country. Even the limited increase in prosperity that has taken place has not been evenly spread out; some states, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Haryana, are forging ahead more rapidly while some others, such as Bihar, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and U.P., seem to be falling behind. Even within the so-called advanced states, the pockets of prosperity are all too few and the prosperity itself is somewhat artificial. Even the 'Green Revolution' which was expected to transform the rural scene has also tended to make the cleavages in the agrarian society more pronounced. The rich and more efficient peasants and the landlords are able to obtain larger yields from land because of the increased inputs which only they can afford.

All these factors have made many ask whether the pattern of planning, so far implemented in this country, is indeed the most appropriate. On the one hand, there are examples within Asia itself of countries, like Japan, Korea and Taiwan (not to mention the island states of Hong Kong and Singapore), which seem to have found out a magic formula for rapid economic growth. On the other hand, China in Asia and many east European countries seem to be advancing quite rapidly with a completely different political and social framework. India's own planning effort has tended to fall between the two ideologies and, while bravely attempting to promote 'growth with justice', there seems to be, in the opinion of some, little of either. There is, therefore, need to look at the planning process afresh so that the full benefits of planning may permeate all parts of the country and all sections of the population.

Planning as conceived today is more a macro-process, where Plans are formulated at national and state levels and then broken up into various component parts for field operations. Although ever since planning began, considerable lip service has been paid to the concept of 'planning from below', little of it has so far been practised. All plans tend to start with broad projections and desirable growth rates and are then broken down into individual sectoral and regional plans. Though State Planning Boards have been constituted in many states, there is, as yet, insufficient appreciation of the need for initiating planning genuinely from below so as to arrive at a national picture.

II

Planning for industrial growth forms an important segment of the total national plan. Although agriculture is, and will continue to remain, the most important activity of the country's population, a significant proportion of the national surplus must increasingly come from industry. Further, increased employment opportunities will have to be provided in this sector so as to relieve the pressure on the land. Industry, therefore, provides an important avenue of national growth which can contribute to increasing GNP as well as individual wage level.

However, industrial planning has largely tended to be looked at only from the national and state levels. At the national level, the public sector projects in important areas, such as steel, fertilizers, oil, machine tools, electricals, etc., have been based on broad national considerations, as they must be. In spite of the somewhat disappointing performance of most of these projects, there is little doubt that, in the long run, they will contribute significantly to the total industrial capability of the country and will yield the expected dividends. In any case, these are areas in which the private sector at that time (and perhaps even now) has hardly the resources or the skills to manage projects of this magnitude. The planning of industries at the national level has, therefore, been justifiably based on total considerations of long-term needs of the country.

At the state level, there has hardly been any industrial planning. Most of the states have only concentrated on vying with each other to provide the incentives for the location of the major public sector projects within their states. Sometimes, these incentives have been given at 'sacrificial' rates and it is doubtful whether the states themselves have benefited as much from these projects as they had anticipated. Many of the large-scale projects, obtained with so much effort, have not had the 'diffusion' effect that was expected of them and have tended to operate in isolation with little impact on the environment around them. Only in Maharashtra, there has been an appreciation of the need for a balanced development of the various regions within the state; for this purpose, Area Development Corporations have been set up in western Maharashtra, Konkan, Vidharbha, and Marathwada. The concept of undertaking the total development of a region through the application of all inputs—both scientific and technical—has not yet been taken up by most of the states in any meaningful manner.

Planning for industry, therefore, hardly exists except at the national and, to some extent, the state levels. The need for generating a new

entrepreneurship within the state which would utilize the opportunities available for setting up medium and small units at important locations has not been tapped as yet. Although, sporadic efforts are made in isolated districts or in a few states, there is still no adequate awareness of the need for looking at planning for industry *within* a state in an integrated manner so that the full potentialities of an area could be utilized for generating a momentum of growth. The belief, wide-spread at one time—that once the large industries are established within an area, there would automatically take place a 'diffusion' of the industrial growth to the tiers below—has not, in fact, been realized. On the contrary, the larger urban centres have tended to become conglomerations attracting more industry, while the relatively backward areas have tended to remain where they are.

Even the growth of the small-scale sector, which at one time was expected to provide the impetus for the push into the interior, has not really been up to expectations. Although the growth of the sector as a whole has been creditable, 80 per cent of the new units set up in the small-scale sector have been in the five or six large metropolitan towns, such as Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore and Hyderabad. The financing institutions which have been established by the Government have also tended to provide industrial credit to the units in a few states with the result that industrial growth has been more or less localized to isolated regions in four or five states.

It is true that some attempts have been made in last ten years to remedy the situation. Rural Industries Projects have been set up in 50 districts with additional funds at their disposal so as to promote the growth of industries in rural areas but the impact of this programme has been uneven and limited, except in a few areas where it is largely due to the enthusiasm of those in charge of the programme. The rest of the projects have become more or less stagnant, and what was expected to be a catalyst in the growth of industries in rural areas has in practice, become, merely a channel for subsidies and grants to institutions and individuals that could not fully utilize them. The same has been the case with the Khadi and Village Industries Commission that was set up in the mid '50s to operate an elaborate programme of assistance to cottage industries as well as to spinning and weaving of Khadi. In spite of the idealism and enthusiasm of many of those who had participated in this programme, the work of the Commission itself has not made the impact on the rural scene as was expected of it at one time.

The basic defect in the planning for industry in the country has been that each of the sectors—large, medium, small and 'tiny'—have been

looked upon as separate entities and not as a continuum. There has been inadequate meshing between one sector and the other and between one level and the next. Thus, there is hardly any point of contact between the rural and the small-scale industries and very inadequate contact between the small and the large industries. Government policies have tended to be mutually conflicting and since the agencies looking after these areas are different, there has been very little coordination in the policies and the plans for the three sectors. What is, in fact, a continuous spectrum of activity has, for administrative and other reasons, been broken up into three separate sectors that do not always see eye to eye with each other and at times seem to compete, rather than supplement, each other's efforts.

If one were to look at planning from below, one would have to start with the village as the basic unit for all planning. However, in the case of industry, the village—as is commonly understood in India—with a population of about 500 persons may be too small a unit for any industrial planning. There is, therefore, need for taking a wider region as the basic unit for such planning and the Community Development Block which has now come to be recognized as the unit for development planning could be taken as such a unit. A block is roughly about one-tenth of a district and, on an average, has a population of about one lakh persons. It has a team of officers from several departments who are primarily concerned with the development programmes and there is some degree of coordination, both at official and non-official levels. A block may, therefore, be taken as the basic unit for industrial planning at the lowest tier.

Within the block, it should be possible to identify one or two growth centres which have potential for industrial growth. These growth centres should be those which are traditional Mandi or market towns and which have close linkages with the rural neighbourhood. They are usually towns with a population of at least 10,000 and have the basic infra-structural facilities, such as roads, water, power and communications. These growth centres, which can hardly be more than one or two in each block, could be identified and used as the focal points for new industries at the block levels. Such industries will need to be woven round the raw materials available in that area. These could be processing of grains and cereals and also simple servicing facilities for the machinery which is increasingly in use in the country-side. Agro-service centres can be located at these growth centres so as to serve the entire block. It is at the growth centre in the block that the initial industrial planning has to begin and full use made of the resources—both human and material—available in the country-side. Entrepreneurs must be encouraged to set

up simple industries, with investment normally not exceeding rupees one to two lakhs and adequate technical support given for such persons to operate these centres.

The next tier for industrial planning is the district where larger industries, both agro as well as of consumer type, could be set up. Here again, the emphasis should be on the full utilization of skills available within the district and an identification of suitable entrepreneurs to take up new industries. The Zila Parishad, which is the District Development Council under the Panchayati Raj System, should be the body to undertake a comprehensive economic survey of the entire district and ensure that the industries that can be set up in this area have the necessary support, both financial and technical.

The economic surveys so far conducted by many agencies have tended to be largely pedestrian and give no indication of the strength and the weakness of a particular region. What is required is a more imaginative approach to the problem of industrial growth in the district and a greater use of modern innovations and technologies which could make many of the processes economically viable. The State Small Industries Corporations which have been set up in almost every state would need to take more active interest in the development of industries at the district level and the State Financial Corporations should allot to each district adequate funds out of which new entrepreneurs could be assisted. At the moment, these two bodies are largely concerned with providing financial and technical assitance to persons at the state level and industrial growth at the district level has been sporadic and dependent on the enthusiams of a few persons, both official and non-official. What is now needed is a more systematic approach to the growth of industries at the district level and below.

The practice of holding district level industries seminars and formulation of district industrial plans has been done in some states, such as Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh. But even this is not enough; there should be concrete district level plans which are fully worked out both as regards men, materials and money and which are 'action' programmes accepted for implementation rather than vague indications of good intentions.

From the technology point of view, there is already a considerable amount of knowledge at the national and regional laboratories for utilization of agricultural raw materials for industrial products. Quite often, these processes are still at the laboratory stage and there is justifiable apprehension that their industrial utilization may not be lucrative.

The State Small Industries Development Corporations have a duty in this regard to set up demonstration plants for such processes so as to assure potential entrepreneurs of the feasibility of these new processes. Where the demonstration plant has failed, it would be a warning signal to other entrepreneurs, who want to enter into these areas. The considerable resources available in the forest areas of the country also need to be fully tapped through such new processes. Though a number of states have set up Forest and Tribal Development Corporations, they have largely undertaken trading activities for the tribal and forest people. A new approach is now required to look upon the development of these areas, not in the old-fashioned terms of mere trading but in setting up small viable industries which can tap the resources of these regions and also provide meaningful employment to the people living in them.

At the state and at the national levels, some degree of industrial planning already exists and no basic change is required in this regard. Certainly, the anxiety of the states to obtain large public sector projects within the state is commendable but there is, one fears, an insufficient appreciation of the 'home work' the state itself has to do before such projects can yield the benefits expected of them. All too often, there is a naive feeling that a large public sector project, whose investment may run into crores of rupees will somehow transform the economy of the environment in which it is situated but it is being realized more and more that this does not happen automatically and a deliberate attempt is required on the part of the state Government to develop linkages with the public sector project and providing suitable facilities and amenities to entrepreneurs to act as sub-contractors for the big public sector projects. This requires close coordination between the local Industries Department of the State Governments and the management of the public sector projects so that various parts are identified which can be farmed out to local entrepreneurs, while the State Government on their part would have to ensure that adequate facilities are provided to enable the manufacture of these parts to the required degree of appreciation.

Similarly, there is a pathetic belief that a mere announcement of a 'package of incentives' would automatically attract a swarm of private industrialists to the state. A few years back, it was quite the fashion for the Minister of Industries of a state to announce such a 'package' with great fanfare, preferably at a lunch or dinner at a fashionable hotel in Bombay or Calcutta. In fact, such 'gimmicks' do not yield much results; hard-boiled industrialists are fully aware that a mere package programme means little unless backed up by an efficient administrative infra-structure. The speed with which decisions are taken and the

attitude of helpfulness displayed by the key figures at the state level—both official and non-official—are more attractive incentives than any 'package programme' which often remains a paper programme.

Another important lacuna in the planning for industries at the district and sub-district level is the lack of adequate technical back-up to potential entrepreneurs. The District Industries Officers have often tended to view their role as merely regulatory; they also do not have the aptitude to undertake promotional work in a meaningful fashion. Even the local technical institutions have often no specific expertise to help the entrepreneur with his problems. There is need for a high level industrial consultant in each district, who could advise the entrepreneurs in the district on the type of industries they can undertake. The national and state-level organizations can provide the basic formats of schemes but, in each case, these will have to be adapted to the conditions obtaining in a district. The District Industries Officer can hardly be expected to do this job and a high level industrial consultant could be employed by the Zila Parishad to perform this task. Even his salary could be partly paid by Zila Parishad and partly through consultancy fees which could be charged from potential entrepreneurs.

There is also need for scientific agencies to look upon the development planning in the district as part of their own effort. It is, therefore, gratifying to note that the CSIR, under the dynamic leadership of Dr. Nayudamma, has undertaken a pilot project in Karimnagar District of Andhra Pradesh so as to bring in all the scientific and technological inputs which are available to it for the development of the district as a whole. It is this type of focusing of the scientific and technological capability available within the state that would make ultimately the planning of industry at the district and block level a reality.

Adequate funds, earmarked for each district would also need to be provided so that these could be utilized for the specific purpose of generating new industrial growth. For this purpose, there could be a District Industrial Development agency with the District Collector as the Chairman and the Chairman, Zila Parishad and representatives of Industries Department, Development Corporations and local Industries' Associations as members. Such an agency could be provided with funds of about rupees one crore for each district so as to undertake several tasks in the identification of entrepreneurs, selection of projects, preparation of meaningful techno-economic surveys and also to provide 'seed capital' for the industrial schemes when they are ultimately implemented. Unless such specific funds are made available to each district,

there is a tendency even within a state for a few districts to monopolise the resources meant for industrial growth of the state as a whole.

For too long, planning in industry has tended to rely on the large-scale unit as the central piece of the picture and even if considerable support has been given to small-scale sector, it has been more in pronouncements rather than in practice. One suspects that there is still an inadequate appreciation of the full potentialities of the small and medium units in generating a new climate for growth. Unless the priorities are altered so as to make them the primary elements in the new strategy for industrial growth, one fears that such growth will continue to be confined to a few urban locations without making that broad-based impact which alone makes industry meaningful to the economy as a whole.

III

The experience in China, since the Communist Revolution, in this regard needs to be more closely studied. There has been in recent years a significant movement into the interior regions for setting up small and medium industries in large numbers. After the Soviet advisers left in 1957, China has followed a policy of what they call 'walking on two legs'; one 'leg' is represented by heavy industrial concentration around Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton and Nanking and the other 'leg' is represented by industries in rural areas into which a large number of personnel have moved in during the last 10 years. From Shanghai alone, it is estimated that one million people (out of its total population of 10 millions) have left in the last 20 years to work in the 'less developed' regions of China. More and more industries have been pushed into the backward regions of the country so that they can generate a new growth in those areas.

Again, the pattern of industrial development has been a multi-tiered one. At the Commune level, simple processing industries are taken up by the Commune, so as to cater to the requirements of those living in it. At the Hung Chiao Commune (near Shanghai), which produces 240 tons of vegetables per day, there are five factories allied to farming—farm tool production, insecticides, repair shops as well as a major paint shop for spraying electronic equipment. At the next higher level, the 'Hsien' (corresponding to the district) are industries which are consumer-oriented and also based on agricultural raw materials. At the national level are the large and heavy industries which are geared to the total national and strategic requirements of the country. Thus, China is operating its industries at three tiers with considerable benefit

to the economy as a whole. Targets are set by each of the units for themselves and there is a certain amount of linkages between one tier and the other. There is, however, still insufficient knowledge as to how these linkages are able to operate in practice, but there is no doubt that considerable success has been achieved in meshing the three-tiered industrial economy successfully to provide considerable increases in industrial production in the last 15 years.

IV

Multi-level planning for industry ultimately should have the objective to carry forward industrial growth to the district and the sub-district levels. The present concentration of industrial growth at the state and the national levels should give way to a greater attention being paid to industrial progress at the lower levels. The new industrial effort should be woven round agriculture and allied activities so that in rural and semi-urban areas, there is a genuine 'agro-industrial' society with agriculture providing industry the raw material, and industry furnishing the processed foods and articles for consumption by the peasant. It is only then that industrial planning will have an impact on the lives of the common people and industry as a whole will be able to generate the type of surpluses that can contribute significantly to national prosperity.

GAPS IN THE INDIAN PROCESS OF PLANNING: IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL PLANNING

P. R. Dubhashi

THOUGH planning in India has been going on for the last 22 years, it could be characterized as one with apoplexy at the centre and anaemia at the periphery. There is a big machine of planning at the Centre—the Planning Commission with many experts assisted by a huge staff and advisory bodies. They indulge in sophisticated and esoteric exercises and processes of planning. But the base on which the planners at the apex operate is not always very strong. It is only now that the State machineries of planning are expanding beyond the rather limited capabilities of the Planning Department doing mostly the function of compilation of various schemes. At the district level, the burden of planning is borne by the over-worked Deputy Commissioner though he is now being assisted by the Development and Planning Assistants. At the block level, the block itself was expected to be the machinery of planning and development. But, in the beginning, it never went beyond the community development programmes and, later, the specific development schemes entrusted to it. At the village level, though farm and village plans have been attempted from time to time, they are more the result of compliance with instructions of higher authorities than serious attempts of planning based on scientific compilation and analysis of data which lie beyond the capacity of most of the village level workers and organizations.

The weaknesses in the different horizontal levels in the various sectors of planning are equally serious. Sectors, like agriculture, industry, and trade, and infra-structure activities are ultimately reduced to the activities of various departments and the strength of overall planning ultimately depends on the strength of departmental planning. Sophistication in overall planning leads to no results if there is chaos in intra-departmental planning. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case. After all, there could be no planning unless it becomes an essential feature of the working of each department, handling specific aspects of development. Planning must enter into the warp and woof of departmental activity and indeed should be the normal method of its functioning. Unfortunately,

planning still remains as something of an appendage externally attached by the planning department to a substantive department. The process of planning has been reduced to a fine ritual of filling up numerous *pro formae* and the job of the Planning Departments in a State is to compile data from the *pro formae* filled up by various departments and send them on to the Planning Commission. This *pro forma* filling exercise takes place at the centre also. The very core of planning process consisting of an integrated, inter-linked and synchronized system of operations or programmes seems to be missing. Even a single activity handled by a single department is not governed by the method of planning, *viz.*, that of analysis of the present prognostication of the the future, determination and specification of objectives and orderly arrangements of programmes and mobilization of resources to reach desirable results. There is no overriding common concept of planning in several departments. The best indication of this is that the function of planning (which means filling up prescribed *pro formae*) is entrusted to a minor functionary in the department called the Planning Officer, when, in fact, it should be the direct special function of the head of the department or an organization or the district head. But these heads are all the time involved in a whirl of administrative activities of all sorts which do not seem to include planning. These administrative actions are governed by expediencies of all sorts, including various pulls and pressures. In the normal method of administration, pulls and pressures prevail over everything else. Thus, while these constitute the normal stuff of administration, planning has become some sort of an independent exercise for the satisfaction of higher authorities. There could be no more telling example of the absence of planning in the normal departmental activities than our failure in spite of planning for the last 25 years to ensure timely supply of seeds, fertilizers and credit to the farmer. It is more important that normal administration is informed with the logic and method of planning than the fact that we ensure preparation of plan documents of various degrees of reliability.

The absence of regional planning is a gap of a peculiar sort in our planning mechanism. Planning in our country has been sectoral rather than spatial. As a result, spatial, regional or area planning in the scientific sense of the term has never been introduced in our country so far. Of course, we have plans at the state, district, block and village levels. More often than not, they are no more than break-ups of sectoral programmes or more accurately, schemes of departments. Regional science is itself a somewhat new discipline and has yet to be assimilated in our academic studies, and more so in our administrative system. Our units of administration, like the district or the taluka, are not necessarily rational units of planning and yet for planning

purposes we use them because they are administratively convenient. However, planning regions run across the traditional administrative boundaries. These have to be co-related with certain natural or economic homogeneties, *e.g.*, metropolitan regions or river valley areas—such as those looked after by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States of America or Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) in India. These are the more appropriate regions of planning. The identification of such homogeneous units for planning has yet to be attempted in a serious manner in our country. One of the great contributions of Khruschev to Soviet planning was to create new units of planning called 'Sovnarkhozis', different from the republics of the Union.

Regional planning differs from normal planning not only in respect of the boundaries of units but also in respect of the fact that it looks at planning from spatial rather than a sectoral point of view. This involves not just coordination of various sectors of the economy in the region. It visualises the planning as a dynamic process of development emanating from certain growth centres or central places. In this view, there is a hierarchy of such central places or growth centres, each linked up with another.

During the Fourth Five Year Plan, with the help of Ford Foundation funds, such an approach was attempted to be evolved in the pilot projects on growth centres. However, the work of these projects has been going on slowly, like the proverbial 'Birbal's Khichadi', and its product is not available for consumption even though we are already finalising the Fifth Plan in whose formulation the regional approach should have been integrated.

II

In what follows, an attempt is made to describe the various aspects of regional planning for integrated area development under the river valley projects.

Integrated regional planning for development of areas under major river valley projects has received special attention in recent years. It is identified as a programme needing special attention during the Fifth Five Year Plan. An allocation of Rs. 150 crores has been made in the Fifth Plan for command area development under 50 major irrigation projects in the country. Though planning in India has always accorded priority to expansion of irrigation potential, equal attention was not paid to the problem of full and speedy utilization of irrigation potential. The irrigation projects were looked at more from the engineering point of view than the irrigation development point of view. This led to the

time lag between the creation of irrigation potential and its utilization. It is this time lag and the causes of this time lag which led the Irrigation Commission to identify *ayacut* development as an important concept and programme in its own right and the commission devoted a special chapter to the subject in its report. The task force under Dr. B.S. Minhas, appointed by the Planning Commission, has also recognized irrigation project command area development as a special case of integrated area development in the country. The National Commission on Agriculture considered the programme of integrated area development and modernization of irrigation system as of such importance that they too have brought out a special interim report on the subject. Finally, recently a Committee of Ministers, appointed by the Union Government, has comprehensively gone into the subject and made a number of recommendations. They have pointed out that, since inception, Rs. 2,400 crores have been spent on major irrigation projects creating an irrigation potential of 9.6 million hectares, costing Rs. 2,500 per hectare. Of this potential, 1.6 million hectares are yet to be developed which means that an investment of Rs. 400 crores has remained entirely infructuous. We talk of under-utilization of plant and machinery as an important problem, the major cause of under production, and rise in prices. Under-utilization of irrigation projects is also an equally significant factor. The Minister's Committee has, therefore, forcefully pointed out that the nation cannot afford anything less than the quickest possible use of investment in irrigation projects. They have given examples of Tungabhadra, Kosi and Chambal projects, which were started years back and have yet to yield full results. They have felt that the only way to remove shortages of agricultural commodities in our country is to ensure fullest utilization or irrigation potential under every major irrigation project within 3 to 5 years. They have suggested plans for command area development on this basis for every major irrigation project in the country.

OBJECTIVES OF COMMAND AREA DEVELOPMENT

Immediate Objectives

The objective of the *ayacut* development is to utilize the *irrigation potential*, described above, as speedily and effectively as possible and, to this end, initiate a process of *ayacut* development involving the following items:

(1) Formation and implementation, year after year, of a coordinated and integrated development plan, involving the *conjoint efforts* of the Departments of Public Works, Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries, Cooperation,

Marketing and Town and Country Planning as well as the work of Development Blocks and institutions like the District Cooperative Banks, Primary Cooperative Credit Societies, Primary Land Development Banks, State Land Development Bank and Marketing Societies, and Agro-Industries Corporation.

(2) Undertaking *conjoint operation for developing soil and water resources* consisting of water distribution and management system, land levelling and reshaping, drainage, and consolidation of holdings, and crop planning.

(3) Providing *agricultural inputs* like hybrid seeds, fertilizers and implements, commensurate with the requirements of modern irrigated agriculture.

(4) Setting up a number of agro-processing units mainly on a cooperative basis.

(5) Developing villages and towns in the *ayacut* area as modern communities.

Ultimate Objectives

In the ultimate analysis, the objective is nothing less than to usher in an economic and social revolution in the project area in order to raise the level of living of the people and make it richer, fuller and better.

It is to provide permanent protection and insurance against droughts. Throughout the centuries, the areas under many projects have suffered from severe famine once in 10 years and acute scarcity once in five years.

The project is protective but it is also productive and would additionally produce 3.08 lakh tonnes of foodgrains like jowar, sweet corn (maize), wheat—0.95 lakh tonnes of oil seeds, and 1.89 lakh tonnes of cotton, in addition to pulses, fruits and vegetables.

The objective is also to develop supplementary occupations, like dairies, poultry and fisheries.

Tasks of Development

The specific tasks of various departments, as a part of integrated development, would be as follows:

(1) *Tasks of the P.W.D.* are as follows: (*i*) developing distribution system; (*ii*) developing system of *ayacut* roads; (*iii*) providing general drainage system; (*iv*) maintaining a proper system of water management; and (*v*) localization of crops.

(2) *Tasks of Agricultural Department* are as follows: (*i*) providing field drainage; (*ii*) providing technical guidance to farmers and, wherever possible, directly undertake land shaping, through a scheme of land shaping and land development; (*iii*) undertaking a massive demonstration programme to educate the farmers in soil and water management; and (*iv*) providing inputs, like hybrid seeds and fertilizers.

(3) *Tasks of Agro-Industries Corporation* are as follows: (*i*) setting up sufficient number of Agro-Industries service centres; and (*ii*) providing machinery and services for undertaking task of land-levelling and reshaping.

(4) *The task of Land Development Banks* is to provide necessary long-term credit to farmers for land development.

(5) *The task of D. C. C. Bank* is to provide necessary short-term and medium-term credit to farmers for agricultural operations and subsidiary activities.

(6) *The task of Cooperation Department* is to promote formation/rejuvenation of cooperative societies to ensure adequate and smooth flow of credit and inputs for agricultural development marketing and processing facilities.

(7) *The role of the Block Organization* is to undertake extension and development activity at the grassroot for rapid utilization of irrigation potential. [For this task the job charts of the Extension Officers and Village Level Workers (Gramsevaks) and indeed of the organization as a whole, have to be redefined. Block Development Officers have to function as irrigation development officers].

(8) *The role of Animal Husbandry Department* is as follows: (*i*) providing and developing better breed of cattle through intensive cattle development scheme; (*ii*) providing veterinary services; (*iii*) developing grass and fodder for animals; (*iv*) undertaking marketing and processing of milk; and (*v*) stepping up production and marketing of poultry products.

(9) *Tasks of Fisheries Department* are: (*i*) developing fisheries in the lake; (*ii*) establishing fish farms to exploit the fish; and (*iii*) organizing fishermen to undertake processing and marketing of fish.

(10) *The task of the Horticulture Department* is to promote cultivation of fruits and vegetables.

(11) *Tasks of the Marketing Department are*: (*i*) providing adequate marketing facilities by establishing new regulated markets or developing existing ones; and (*ii*) arranging for adequate warehousing capacity.

(12) *Tasks of Directorate of Industries and Commerce* is to promote establishment of agro-processing industries on modern lines, such as oil-extraction plants, cotton ginning and pressing units, etc.

(13) *The task of Town and Country Planning* is preparing physical plans for villages and towns and growth centres in the *ayacut* area.

(14) *The role of farmers* is as given below: (*i*) using water economically according to technical advice of the Department of Agriculture; (*ii*) undertaking land shaping on their land; (*iii*) using hybrid seeds, fertilizers and modern agricultural practices; (*iv*) following localized cropping pattern; (*v*) not using water unauthorizedly; (*vi*) deriving full advantage of credit and marketing cooperatives by joining as members; and (*vii*) taking full advantage of demonstration and training facilities to get educated in irrigation agricultural practices.

(15) *Tasks of Project Administration* are coordinating activities of the foregoing departments and ensuring timely realization of the objectives set out above.

SETTING UP PROJECT AUTHORITY IN PROJECT AREA

The project Authority has to take up comprehensive area development programme. It has to undertake responsibility for all activities in the command area, including maintenance and operation of the irrigation system.

The normal departmental structure and their administrative jurisdictions and methods are not entirely appropriate for a change-oriented and innovative, and yet a time-bound and speedy area development programme for the following reasons:

(1) The jurisdictions of departmental officers are not coterminous with the project area since the project area extends beyond the normal administrative jurisdiction of the officers. They work in terms of the whole district or the whole taluka and are unable to think in terms of project area. They are used to district plans and block plans and not project plans. Their statistical and information systems are in terms

talukas and districts and not in terms of the project. Nor do they find it easy to exhibit data for the project area.

(2) The departments are hierarchy bound. Their normal means of communication and the whole system of command and compliance runs along vertical lines. Departmental Officers look to the departmental authority at higher level in the hierarchy for issue of instructions. Their tour programmes are to fulfil departmental obligations and not the project development effort. In other words, their loyalty is to the departments rather than to the project. As a result, it becomes difficult for officers of various departments to work together and continuously as a project team though this is what is essential for the successful fulfilment of the project plan. This traditional fragmentation on departmental lines is not conducive to unified area development since it scatters responsibility, creates chances for buck-passing and alibis which prevent fixing responsibility and frustrates accomplishment in terms of project goals.

(3) This impedes the task of unified and cohesive area development. The departmental officers are unable to provide necessary intensive attention to the task of area development. This delays formulation of programmes. Moreover, timely achievements of targets in the project area becomes almost impossible. This may be illustrated by examples. It is found that seeds are not available in adequate quantities on time. Demonstrations are delayed. The technical sanctions of departmental officers for approving programmes do not come in time.

It is for these reasons that the comprehensive area development can be satisfactorily accomplished only by setting up a *horizontal rather than a vertical authority*, an agency for the area than for a department. Such a horizontal authority should have three characteristics.

(1) Firstly, it should be a *multipurpose agency* cutting across the traditional functional lines of the departmental agencies.

(2) Secondly, it shou.d be a regional agency with adequate *decentralization of authority* to take all final decisions for regional area development.

(3) Thirdly, it should be able to undertake area development as a large *business type operation.* In other words, the authorities should not be bound by the rigid rules of the department, but must have a necessary degree of managerial flexibility.

All the three desiderata could be fulfilled by setting up a River Valley Authority as an independent agency under a corporate form, deriving its administrative status from a broadly conceived statutory charter. A corporation, registered under the companies Act or an autonomous body, set up under an administrative order of Government, could be alternatives to the statutory corporation suggested above. Such a body should be clothed with powers of Government but possess all flexibility and initiative of private enterprise.

Tasks and Structure

The River Valley Authority may be entrusted with the following tasks:

(1) Construction of the dams and the irrigation system *i.e.*, rebuilding river and maintenance and operation of irrigation system;

(2) Levelling of land;

(3) Drainage;

(4) Land consolidation;

(5) Arrangements for supply of agricultural inputs and agricultural credit;

(6) Crop planning;

(7) Infra-structural development;

(8) Agricultural extension and adaptive research;

(9) Marketing and processing of agricultural produces; and

(10) Town and country planning and development.

The Project Authority may be composed of three Directors. The Administrator could be the Chairman-Director while of the other two, one should be an expert Chief Engineer and another a specialist in agricultural science with high level experience of successful conduct of agricultural development programmes.

The authority may appoint such additional technical and managerial staff as may be necessary. It should have full freedom to appoint staff entirely on merit and efficiency free from all traditional administrative considerations (*i.e.*, mere seniority) or political pressures.

It is only with such an organization that the plan of area development can be accomplished within a specific period of time.

LESSONS OF WORK ON GROWTH CENTRES FOR MICRO-LEVEL PLANNING

Sudhir Wanmali

OUR planning efforts, whether at micro, meso- or macro-levels have often tended to exhibit two characteristics : the schematic budgets for different sectors of development and the period of time during which the targets, aggregated at the state or district levels, were to be achieved. Both the characteristics tend to be shaped at the Central or State Government's level and the sub-state agencies are left to decide the implementation in their respective territories. Although the district has been accepted as a unit of planning and development administration, not much thought seems to have been given to the spatial matrix within which all developmental activities take place. Thus, it should not come as a surprise, that the development administrators at the district level tend to base their decisions on operationalizing the sectoral programmes on judgments born of experiences or tend to be guided by local political and other pressure groups.

In order to correct growing inequalities between regions or areas of a state, the Planning Commission decided to evolve a policy for securing territorial balance of activities and functions through appropriate "clustering" or "dispersal". In evolving this policy, it soon became apparent that it is not possible to do everything nor to act everywhere at once. In all regions or areas, there tended to appear certain points around which the rural life revolved. One of the basic tasks, thus, was to identify these points and to facilitate the process of rural socio-economic interaction. One of the concepts which could have helped in analysing the Indian rural scene was that of growth (development?) points, and centres and of service centres. This concept has tended to influence a number of policy decisions in different countries for development purposes and "the Planning Commission had, therefore, new dimensions of regional development uncovered".[1] A report prepared by the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, and the Council for Social Development, New Delhi, stated "As a part of studies on area planning, a centrally sponsored scheme of pilot research projects

[1] C.D. Deshmukh, "On Rural Growth Centres and Area Development", *Community Development and Panchayati Raj Digest*, Vol. 2, 1970, pp. 174-179.

in growth centres is being launched. The aim of the pilot projects would be to evolve a broad research methodology and pattern for identifying emerging growth centres and to indicate how the growth potential of these centres could be promoted through comprehensive and scientific study of overall development needs and how these centres could be meaningfully woven into the framework of the district plans and thus help in the process of planning from below. The scheme will, thus, bring under close study action strategies relevant to the acceleration of integrated area development around potential growth centres".[2]

The growth centres project is, in terms of time, five years old. It would not be a bad idea to review its strengths and weaknesses with a view to strengthening the former and minimising the latter in future exercises as the air now is full of expectancy that the Central Government is thinking of extending the project over a much wider area in the Fifth Plan Period. The present discussion, without ignoring the contribution of theoretical analysis, attempts to emphasize the lessons which can be drawn from the exercises conducted during the Fourth Plan.

Micro-level planning is defined for the sake of this discussion as an exercise where the socio-economic and politico-administrative needs and details are assessed on the basis of factual information from the grass-roots. For the sake of clarity, the administrative unit of reference is the district. The growth centres are defined on those focal points around which the rural life tends to revolve for such socio-economic services as trade, transport, communications, agricultural inputs, finance, administration, education and health. There could be a series of growth centres in a district with varying range and complexity of the services mentioned.

A number of lessons could be drawn from this novel experiment to rejuvenate and revitalize rural India. In all, about 20 cells were operating under the centrally-sponsored scheme and a few were taken up by some Institutions.[3] There were some other institutional and individual

---

[2] The Ford Foundation *and* Council for Social Development, *Pilot Projects for Integrated Area Development*, New Delhi, The Ford Foundation and Council for Social Development, 1969 (mimeographed).

[3] The Planning Commission made a reference to the pilot projects on growth centres in the Fourth Plan where under the auspices of the Union Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, a nationwide study was launched. It covered 20 'cells' in different States and Territories of the Union and some additional 'cells' were given to research institutes engaged in studies on regional development and planning, such as the Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi and the National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad.

studies available just before the nation-wide project was launched.[4] The strengths and weaknesses of these experiments are not difficult to note, but in all professional fairness, one must concede that it is too early in the game to point out the weaknesses in specific terms, more so, since some of the States have yet to submit their preliminary reports to the Department of Community Development, Union Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi. One hopes that this critique will help in identifying broad areas of urgent attention in the growth centre project, in general, and work on growth centres, in particular.

In essence, the growth centre studies were attempting to identify the characteristics of the settlement systems of areas in which the studies were being carried out. The study and analysis of the settlement system, in general, and its hierarchical organization, in particular, has been considered as one of the many areas of research, where one can study the set of relationships that describe the mutual interplay and interdependence between the centres of the same and the different orders. Such an analytical study is very essential as it will be almost impossible to understand the functional characteristics of each centre separately in order to formulate an integrated approach to micro-level planning.

Research apart, there were two other areas where the growth centres studies (particularly projects) tended to influence the administrative scene, *i.e.*, in the application of its results and the training of personnel. The aspects that affect the rural socio-economic fabric are such services as those mentioned earlier which also happen to be the areas where sectoral programmes tended to affect a part of their characteristics. For example, budgetary allocations are made for provisions of market facilities, agricultural input centres, health and education centres, construction of roads, extension of transport facilities, and for an extensive coverage of credit facilities. Thus, any research or action-research in these sectoral areas tended to cast its shadow on the aspect of implementation. Sectoral and spatial integration, thus, became two sides of the same coin. Training personnel for carrying out action-research programmes or acquainting the developmental administrator with this new tool for decision-making and for making him aware of its potency, were the main aspects of the training programme.

[4] *e.g.*, Pandit Patankar, *Planning for Micro-Regions and the Plan for infrastructure in Wardha*, Wardha, 1968 (mimeographed); Sudhir Wanmali, *The Hierarchy of Towns in Vidarbha, India and its significance for Regional Planning*, London, Graduate School of Geography, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1968 (mimeographed); Shah Alam, Manzoor, and Waheeddudin Khan, *Metropolitan Hyderabad and Its Region*, Hyderabad, 1969 (mimeographed) (now available in print, Bombay, 1972); Sudhir Wanmali, *Report on the Provision of Social Facilities in Nagpur Metropolitan Region*, Nagpur, Department of Town Planning and Valuation, Government of Maharashtra, 1969 (mimeographed).

Research and Associated Aspects

As aspects of the spatial distribution of services under consideration are not unrelated to the theory of central places, most of the studies took that theory as a major point of reference and departure.[5] Certain modifications of the theory were necessary in order to accommodate local conditions, but the basic concepts remained unviolated and yielded very significant results after the mass of data was analysed. It is difficult to mention the outcome of each study but certain general features did tend to emerge, despite the ecological differences in the areas under study.

For example, it was observed that there existed a scale of functional hierarchy which explained and underlined the settlement hierarchy. It was also observed that there exists, in each region, a major group of settlements, which is dominated by another group consisting of a lesser number of settlements, and at the top of the regional settlement system existed only a few—one or two at the most—settlements which had the most complex services available in that area. The concept of functional specialization and settlement hierarchy held good in all the studies.[6]

For example, it was observed that for different levels of services, the villagers exhibited different sets of what has been recognized as "space preferences". For lower order services, the distance travelled was not much; in most cases, there was little interaction between different villages for such services. But for a non-ubiquitous service or a complex service, the distance travelled was quite substantial.[7]

For example, it was observed that services of different complexities have a tendency to "cluster" within certain population size-groups and following from this the more complex functions—which tended to be

---

[5] For details of the concepts, *see* Walter Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany*, (translated from German by C.W. Baskin), New Jersey, 1966.

[6] *e.g.*, *see* Sudhir Wanmali, *Regional Planning for Social Facilities : An Examination of Central Place Concepts and Their Application : A Case Study of Eastern Maharashtra*. Hyderabad, 1970 (particularly chapters 4 and 7 and Figures 4.8 and 7.1); Lalit K. Sen, Sudhir Wanmali and others, *Planning Rural Growth Centres for Integrated Area Development : A Study in Miryalguda Taluka*, Hyderabad, 1971 (particularly chapter 6 and Figure 6.9); and Sudhir Wanmali, *Settlement Hierarchy in Telengana Region : Perspective Plan for Telengana*, Technical Studies (Department of Planning and Cooperation), Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1972 (A) Hyderabad (particularly Section II and Figure 11).

[7] For services, like bus stop, secondary school, primary health centre, post office, cooperative bank and weekly market, the villagers in eastern Maharashtra tended to travel, on an average, 3,3,6,5,6 and 3 miles respectively. For the same services, the distance travelled in central Andhra Pradesh was, on an average, 8,7,13,6, 21 and 17 miles respectively. (The figures are rounded to the nearest ten). For details, *see* Sudhir Wanmali (1970), *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 5). Also *see* Lalit K. Sen, Sudhir Wanmali and others, *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 7).

located at centres with larger population—had a wider zone of influence and less complex functions, which tended to be located at centres with smaller population—had a less extensive zone of influence.

It was possible to identify zones of influences of centres—which had a set of functions, either of more or less complex nature; the number of persons and extent of area served by such centres was also identifiable.[8]

For example, it was observed that, on the basis of certain criteria, one would be in a position to exactly identify areas within a given region, which exhibited a lack of such services and others which had a surplus of them. Although obtuse in nature, such indicators were found to be useful to policy planners and development administrators as they indicated areas and services which needed urgent attention.[9]

---

[8] It was observed in central Andhra Pradesh that the services considered tended to 'cluster' within a particular population size group. For example :

Primary school, centre for medical check up and preventive medicine, branch post office, regular bus stop, primary credit society, retail market, and seeds, fertilizers and agricultural implements distribution centres, tended to occur in population size 250-950;

The middle school, the secondary school, centre for allopathic treatment and hospitalization, sub-post office, bus station, block level cooperative bank, pesticides distribution centre, animal husbandry centre and the weekly market tended to occur in population size 1,250-3,500; and

Junior (pre-degree) college, centre for sugery and hospitalization, centre for maternity care and family planning, post and telegraph office, telephone exchange, bus junction, scheduled bank, land mortgage bank, animal husbandry centre and regulated market tended, to occur in population size of 15,000 and more.

The centrality of centres performing the lowest level of services was, on an average 40, that of centres performing middle level of services was, on an average, 167 and that of centres performing highest level of services was, on an average, 2,002. There were 47 settlements of the lowest order, 12 of the middle order and 4 of the highest order. The average population served by these orders of centers was 1,380, 2,465 and 54,340 persons respectively and the average area served was about 5.5, 10.3 and 127.9 squares miles respectively. For details, *see* Lalit K. Sen, Sudhir Wanmali and others, *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 7 and figure 7.5). Also *see* Sudhir Wanmali, "Clustering of services as a function of 'Population Distance' in settlement systems", *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1972 (B), pp. 40-47.

[9] It was observed in eastern Maharashtra that the districts of Yeotmal, Bhandara and Chanda exhibited lack of services considered for the study. It was observed in the rural areas of metropolitan Nagpur that, with the exception of the zone of influence of the metropolitan city proper, all other sub-regional areas exhibited similar lack of services. Similar observations were available for Telengana, where Adilabad, Warangal, Khamam and Nalgonda districts exhibited a lack of services considered and for Singhbhum district in Bihar where the anchals of Chakradharpur, Goilkera, Sonua, Manoharpur, Dhalbhumgarh, Musabani, Chakulia, Baharagora, Kuchai, and Ichagarh exhibited inadequacy in the spatial distribution of services. For details *see* Sudhir Wanmali, (1968), *op. cit.* (particularly the Section on standards of services and Figures 8 and 9); Sudhir Wanmali (1970) *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 6 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2); Sudhir Wanmali (1972 A), *op. cit.* (particularly Section III and Tables 11,12 and 13); and Sudhir Wanmali (1973 A), "Regional Imbalances and Rural Development : A Study of Spatial Distribution of Support Services in Singhbhum District", *Journal of the Food Marketing Centre*, No. 1, Vol. 3 (forthcoming).

For example, it was observed that for individual services, like post office or weekly market, there existed, what is known as a "population threshold", a zone in terms of population size, above which all settlements tended to have the service and below which the service was conspicuous by its absence. What this meant, in practice, was that any settlement having higher than the "threshold" population, but not having the service, could be "chosen" for locating that service. Together with the distance that people are willing to travel and certain social welfare criteria for specific services, this aspect of analysis provided the development administrators with a set of "locational" priorities for the deployment of services in rural areas.[10]

For example, it was observed that if the "locational" priorities are strictly adhered to while implementing a development programme, then the disparity between a developed part of a district and the not-so-developed part of the same district would be reduced maximally.[11]

Lastly, but not the least important observation, it was found out that there exists a form of "spatial organization" where a focal point with a population of between 1,500—2,500 tends to serve an area of not more than 30 square miles and about 6,000 to 8,000 population. This was identified at the lowest level of a settlement hierarchy, where the focal point served about 7 to 10 villages. All other centres tended to

[10] In eastern Maharashtra, it was observed that services, like bus stop, secondary school, primary health centres, post offices and weekly markets tended to "enter" the settlement system at the population zones of 1,000-2,000, 1,800-2,700, 8,000-10,000, 1,250-1,500, and 1,500-2,200 respectively. In the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, the figures for the same services are 600-1200, 2,000-3,999, 2,000-5,999, 2.000-3,999 and 3000-6,999 respectively. For details, *see* Sudhir Wanmali, *Nagpur : The City and its Region*, in R.P. Mishra (ed.), *Million Cities of India* Mysore (1973 B) (forthcoming) (particularly the section on Socio-Economic Facilities : A Regional Analyses. Also *see* Lalit K. Sen, Sudhir Wanmali and others, *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 9 and Table 9.1); and Sudhir Wanmali (1972 A) *op. cit.* (particularly Section IV and Table 15).

[11] In one of the experiments conducted, it was observed that the new "locations" if strictly adhered to in the implementation process tend to reduce the disparity quite substantially. For example, in one of the sub-regions in the rural areas of eastern Maharashtra, the standards were as follow, in old and new situations (to facilitate understanding, figures nearer the value of 1, indicate better provision):

KALMESHWAR SUB-REGION

Services	*Standards by old locations*	*Standard by new locations*
Bus service	0.32	0.58
Education	0.38	1.00
Health	0.10	0.14
Communications (postal)	0.44	0.88
Finance	0.27	0.61
Trade (markets)	0.82	0.93

For details, *see* Sudhir Wanmali and Waheeddudin Khan, "Role of Location in Regional Planning", *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 65-91.

serve larger areas and greater number of people.[12]

These findings are not insignificant in their character and it would not be difficult to suggest, on their basis, specific locations for specific development programmes.

There were, however, certain areas of research which could not be attended to and remained wanting in details. Two such areas come to one's mind almost immediately and others, no less significant, follow.

The first of these is the study of land-use and associated aspects around all the centres, thus identified over a district, with a view to establishing small-scale industries which would utilize the resource base. The idea behind the growth centre exercise was also to suggest what type of resource-based industries could be located and where and why. A detailed study of the land-use pattern around each centre would have indicated: (*i*) the type of crops grown, (*ii*) the amount produced, (*iii*) the linkages between the growth centre and its zones of influence, which would facilitate the location of resource-based industries, and (*iv*) the linkages between factor and product markets. Such industries are "weight losing" and have an advantage if located as near the resource base as possible. In the second instance, the socio-economic infrastructural content for such types of industries is very high. With "clustering" of socio-economic services at the centre, the advantages of economies of scale could easily be availed of. For example, it was observed that to establish a 2 tonne rice mill at a centre, the hinterland of the centre should produce at least 12,500 tonnes of paddy. A centre was recommended for location of a rice mill after making certain that it had good access to its dependent villages, which numbered six, and which were not more than, on an average 3-5 miles from the centre. It was also suggested that the husk be sent to the major service centre of the area with a view to strengthening the forward economic linkages of the centre with agro-based industry. Thus, the backward and and forward economic linkages of the centre, as far as 2 tonne rice mill was concerned, were also studied carefully and only then the final proposal was made.[13]

---

[12] This micro-regional form was observed to be consisting of a focal point which served a dependent territory of 30 square miles and a population of about 6,500 people. For example, *see* Lalit K. Sen, Sudhir Wanmali and others, *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 9, pp. 166-167). Also *see* Sudhir Wanmali, "Zones of Influence of Central Villages in Miryalguda Taluka: A Theoretical Approach", *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1972 (C), pp. 1-10.

[13] Lalit K. Sen, Sudhir Wanmali and others, *op. cit.* (particularly chapter 9, pp. 167-175).

Such studies in land-use and agriculture have not been conducted on a desirable scale and, for want of anything, non-locational aspects of land-use and agriculture, such as irrigation and drinking water facilities have tended to creep into a project which has a strong locational bias. Not that the irrigation and drinking water facilities are insignificant or unimportant, but that they have no "locational" character and their inclusion in certain project reports submitted to the Government have tended to create confusion about the basic concept in the official circles, rather than help the cause of the project as such.

The second area which has not been investigated properly is the type of transportation network that could be provided in rural areas. In this area, again, the confusion is compounded by the fact that recommendations are piecemeal and tend to trespass the jurisdiction of certain Central and State Government departments instead of confining themselves to specific questions, like the one raised in the opening sentence of this paragraph. It has been observed that a poor farmer travels by poor means of transport, over short distances, for monofunctional satisfaction and more frequently, whereas the rich farmer travels by better means of transport, over long distances, for multifunctional satisfaction and less frequently. This pattern immediately throws up a couple of possibilities in transportation planning, such as: (*i*) a combination of cart-tracks/village roads between the lowest order centre and its dependent territory, and (*ii*) a combination of village road/other road or major district road between that centre and centres of equal importance and of higher importance.[14]

This type of conscious approach to transportation network facilitates, in the ultimate analysis, the distribution of a number of other services or goods, coming into the centre and going out of it. The centre alone is a point of contact for the dependent villages for any type of socio-economic interaction, with other areas in the district. One, thus, is in a position to indicate what types of roads will be required in the district for proper movement of goods and commodities and men and materials, and what will be their exact mileage. This helps the development administrator in having a clearer picture of problems in transportation network planning for the district.

Other areas needing closer examinations under the present project are: the spatio-temporal aspect of interaction generated by certain

[14] In eastern Maharashtra, for example, a combination of cart-track and bus service was envisaged between sub-regional centres and their dependent territory on one hand, and the former and metropolitan Nagpur on the other. However, the reference under observation is from central Andhra Pradesh. The point which one is attempting to make is that if one is aware of the type and modes of transport used in an area, one is in a better position to suggest a system of transportation network.

services, the consumption pattern of rural areas, and feasibility studies of project recommendations, to name a few. If one observes carefully, the interaction for certain services is either daily or weekly and for rest it is almost seasonal. The villager tends to combine his other "interactions" with that associated with a weekly market. The time interval of interaction goes on increasing as one goes up the scale of specialization of a service for which interaction takes place.

What would be the import of such studies on restructuring the spatial fabric of rural India is a question to which no answer has been even attempted. Empirical evidence needs to be collected before any generalization could be made in this regard.

Not much is known also about the consumption of day-to-day items, particularly branded goods, in rural India. The lowest order spatial organizational form, with a centre dominating the rural hinterland of about 30 square miles, seems to be the appropriate spring-board from which one could "jump" into the rural market. Consumption patterns of different classes of people need to be studied carefully, which could be of assistance to both public and private business in identifying the elusive "rural market".

Feasibility studies of the set of recommendations for a given region are a necessity. To take refuge behind the argument that prices tend to fluctuate, which in turn prevent one from conducting an unbiased study, is to avoid the issue. Some kind of costing of the whole operation would be of immense help to the development administrator.

One tends to get the feeling that the studies conducted so far have, nadvertently or for reasons best known to those involved, treated the block or the district as a "closed system". This is a rather dangerous course of action, even at this stage of game. All regions for one purpose or the other are "open systems" and, therefore, extra-regional linkages and flows need to be studied in detail before recommending anything of an inter-regional character for the study area.

Application and Associated Aspects

As was mentioned in one of the earlier paragraphs, the sectoral budgets at the state level are further sub-divided, for sub-state implementation, in almost all cases, taking the district as the unit of aggregation. On the one hand, therefore, one observes an aggregated sectoral budget, with its time horizon, for many a development programme at the district level and on the other, a set of 'locational' priorities identified

with the help of a project, like growth centres. Thus, the problem of integration and coordination of both these aspects at micro-level are brought face to face with each other for the first time. The following observations are made in the context of some experience that the author had while facing similar situations in reality. The observations, therefore, are not the last word on this aspect.

It is a general observation of those who have been working in the field of growth centres that subject-matter specialists and development administrators have little interest in the findings of the project, thus reducing its applicability for development planning. Nothing is as far from the truth as this statement.

Two possible reasons could be attached to such a note of despair. The first is that the time to complete a study of one block, is, perhaps, in the opinion of the development administrator, interminably long. He cannot afford to wait, for example in the case of a project in hand, for three years to get a preliminary plan report on a part of the district. In the second instance, perhaps, the researcher is not in a position to "sell" his ideas to the developmental administrator with a view to getting at least some of his proposals accepted.

The solutions to this problem are not easy to seek, but a few could be offered as a tentative plan for effective coordination between the developmental administrator and his sectoral plans and the researcher and his spatial plan. One could investigate the possibility of analysing whatever data exists with the developmental administrators to acquaint him with the techniques of regional analysis at the micro-level. The results should be within certain acceptable bounds of statistical credibility. A number of analyses can be conducted with the help of secondary data and, if permitted to say, even tentative "locational" priorities could be suggested for immediate consumption of the development administrator.[15] Once this exercise is complete and, if the developmental administrator realises the potential of such an analysis, a depth study could be undertaken of one of the areas in the district with the help of primary data. If shorne of frills, the primary data questionnaire could be fairly simple and a district could be covered within about 9 months to a year.

---

[15] This type of approach has been used by some researchers in the past, particularly in the field of rural development and planning, in order to help deliver the final product. Following studies were conducted to achieve the final goal:

Sudhir Wanmali (1968), *op. cit.*; Sudhir Wanmali (1972 A) *op. cit.*; and Waheeddudin Khan, *A Note on Growth Centring Policy for Telengana Region: Perspective Plan for Telengana*, Technical Studies, Hyderabad (Department of Planning and Cooperation), Government of Andhra Pradesh.

A series of depth studies followed these initial exercises.

One must always bear in mind that the job of the growth centre expert is to give "locational" priorities and the reasons thereof and not view the qualitative aspects. There are competent persons to do that job, both at the district and state levels. A subject-matter specialist should be allowed to work out the qualitative details of a locational decision, but a growth centre expert attempting to do that would create unnecessary psychological barriers between them.

Similarly, the implications in terms of finance and personnel of a proposal should be also left to subject-matter specialists who work under the development administrator. One can always submit a feasibility report, but the final evaluation has to come from the other group. It is quite possible that some of the recommendations may get through, if this approach is adopted. The locational priorities, with their potentiality in reducing regional imbalances, is a sufficiently powerful tool in the hands of a growth centre expert. He should not overplay his hand. The developmental programmes in the district could be hampered if psychological and professional barriers get erected inadvertently between the development administrator and the growth centre expert.

Training and Associated Aspects

This brings us to the last, but not the least important aspect, of the whole exercise, namely training.

To acquaint the subject-matter specialists, development administrator and others with the potential of such studies is a task by itself. Short duration workshops-cum-seminars could be undertaken to achieve this purpose. The strong points of the growth centre strategy are too obvious to be overlooked by anyone and the audience that one is aiming at, in this instance, is the last group of persons who would do so. This was not done in the Fourth Plan period, under the pretext, perhaps, that studies on Indian conditions did not exist then. Once this is achieved, it becomes less difficult to sell the final product to the development administrator.

The officials who are now looking after the state cells were trained at the National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, and the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, some three years ago. Considering the fact that only one of them was a trained planner, the state officials have done an excellent job of their projects. All were fairly well acquainted with socio-economic details of their respective states. However, one feels, not by wisdom of hindsight, that the content of these earlier training programmes could have been

improved by giving more emphasis on how to tackle a specific set of data and what techniques to choose. Such an approach would have fore-warned and forearmed them with the knowledge and use of specific techniques which would have yielded specific results. Pretexts, again of the nature mentioned above, that studies on Indian conditions were not available, in order to describe the methods of analysis for such a project, were, to say the least, baseless. At least two studies were available which had received a wider attention by 1968[16] and some more were almost complete. Examples from empirical studies regarding data handling, data analysis, tabulation, interpretation and report writing would have enhanced the quality of the content of the earlier training programmes. Analysis and limitation of both secondary and primary data could have been indicated.

In the none-too-distant future, the growth centre project is likely to enter the rural countryside once more. The Fifth Plan period envisages 30 pilot projects along the lines of the Fourth Plan. The lessons from the work on growth centres in the Fourth Plan are behind us. This article would have served its purpose if it succeeds in acquainting those associated with this project—both at the Ministry of Agriculture and other related Institutes—with its strengths and weaknesses in the areas of research, application and training.

---

[16] *e.g.*, *see* Pandit Patankar, *op. cit.*; Sudhir Wanmali (1968) *op. cit.*; also *see* Sudhir Wanmali (1969), *op. cit.*; and Shah Alam, Manzoor and Waheeddudin Khan *op. cit.*

DISTRICT PLANNING IN MAHARASHTRA

N. R. Inamdar

DISTRICT planning is a species of regional planning in a broad sense of the latter term. In this broad sense, regional planning covers in its objectives national planning seeking to achieve balanced regional integration, investment in particular geographical areas to boost up their retarded growth and regionalized economic planning. In its application, the concept of regional planning includes metropolitan development, comprehensive growth of resource complexes and rural reconstruction programmes. District planning could be conceived as an offshoot of regional planning in its objective of regionalized economic planning and programmatic aspect of rural reconstruction.

Apart from the areal, economic, social and political implications of unbalanced regional development, the organization of economic space affects the pace and structure of economic growth. So, it has been by now unanimously accepted that developing societies in the transition of industrial development take to the process of regional planning, which is expected to play the role of an instrument to hasten the transition as well as of a palliative to soothe its injurious effects. The western literature on regional planning[1] generally overlooks the equally urgent need for regional planning to step up the pace of comprehensive rural development so as to set in motion quicker industrial growth. In the west, a naturalistic frame is assumed for the operations of regional planning. In the context of planned development in developing countries, like India, regional planning has to start on the assumption of the planning objectives and strategy at the national level in applying itself to the specific spatial features of the national plan in a particular region.[2]

---

[1] J. Friedmann and W. Alonso, *Regional Development and Planning : A Reader*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), M.I.T. Press, 1964 (fourth printing 1969) is a good introduction to the subject and gives a comprehensive bibliography; and W. Isard, and J. H. Cumberland (ed.), *Regional Economic Planning Techniques of Analysis* (Paris, 1960); *Surveys of Economic Theory*, Vol. II (ed.) by American Economic Association and Royal Economic Society (New York, 1965) are among several other books on the subject. Bhat, *Regional Planning* (Calcutta, Stat. Pub. Soc., 1972); M. D. Sathe, *Regional Planning* (Poona Saraswat, 1972); S. Wanmali, *Regional Planning* (Hyd., NICD, 1970) are some of the scarce Indian literature on the subject.

[2] D. R. Gadgil, *District Development Planning* (Poona, Gokhale Institute of Politics & Economics, 1967).

Regional planning in the west is different from urban planning in both its theoretical concerns as well as practical tasks. The theoretical concerns of regional planning revolve round the economics of location and the central places concept developed respectively by Alfred Weber in the first decade of this century and Christaller in the thirties, both in Germany. The theory of urban planning, on the other hand, is rooted in the science of ecology, land economics and the aesthetics of form. The practical tasks of the regional planner involve resource allocation and augmentation, while those of the urban planner are concerned with physical land use and design. In the perspective of Indian planned development, an awareness of the need of reducing the gap between regional and urban planning, both in conceptual and practical aspects, has grown recently. District planning in this country, as a variant of regional planning, has to use the mechanism and techniques of urban planning, among those of other categories of planning, such as project planning and programme planning. In taking over the objectives of regional planning—*viz.*, achievement of balanced regional integration, areal investment and regionalized economic planning—district planning has to take note of planning of urban areas. Further, within and across the districts, metropolitan development is really an amalgam of city planning and planning for preservation of the rural landscape as well as of social facilities within the rural fringe.[3] The towns, along with large villages, within the districts form hierarchies of nodal points or control centres for location of infrastructure and social facilities to activate multisided development in the rural hinterland or 'density-field'.[4] In fact, within the districts in the country, the lines of distinction between towns and villages and also among towns are blurring.

The main tasks of the regional planner are to state the ordering of control centres within the area, to identify the functions to be performed by each centre, and to study interregional effects to the expansion of economies. The overstress in these tasks on the physical aspect of the inputs and their functions puts aside the role of human inputs, the most significant factor in the viability of the process of district planning. The visualization of the district economy as an integrated unit with internal consistencies and balances is taken care of by the concept of

---

[3] *Vide* Government of Maharashtra, *Report on Metropolitan Regional Planning in Bombay and Poona* (Bombay, 1967). N. R. Inamdar, "Metropolitan Planning in Maharashtra", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration* (July-Sept., 1968), pp. 670-681. Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organisation, *Reports on Rural Local Governments* (Calcutta).

[4] L. K. Sen, *Integrated Area Planning* (Cycl.) (New Delhi, Training Division, Department of Personnel, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, Sept. 1972).

The Ford Foundation and The Council for Social Development, *Preliminary Projects* (New Delhi, May 1969).

homogeneity of the planned region, the district in this case. But the role of the human inputs has not received due attention in the scheme of the 'spatial' planner. The concept of 'planning from below', an inherent element of the district planning process, seeks to correct this deficiency in the scheme of the regional planner. The practical implications and limitations of the concept of 'planning from below' are analysed in the following section.

II

Planning from below has been invariably associated by the Indian planners with district planning. Within the overall framework of the national plan objectives, financial resources and format of plan schemes, district planning has been given a high place in the consideration of the planners. This has been the position right from the First Plan. In a letter dated 11 October, 1950, the Planning Commission emphasized the vital role of the local authorities in any scheme of planned development. The Commission, however, did not overlook the essential requirement of the eventual coordination of the local authorities' plans with the State plans.[5] But the idea of district and village planning emerged clearly in 1954, during the process of formulation of the Second Plan. The Planning Commission then asked the States "to arrange for the preparation of such plans, especially in respect of agriculture, production, rural industries and cooperation".[6] Continuing the thread, the Fourth Plan expected strengthening of the planning apparatus at the State and the district level. It laid a particular stress on more active popular participation in plan formulation through the panchayati raj organizations at the district level.[7] In the framing of the Fifth Plan, the State of Maharashtra, following the organizational guidance of the Planning Commission, decided to adopt the district as the unit and to formulate the perspective plans for each district with the twin objectives of giving opportunity to all the districts to attain full development in keeping with their resources and of removing the imbalances in development as between districts and areas within the same districts to the extent possible.[8]

District planning and planning from below have been parts of the accepted strategy of the planners. Even then, until the Third Plan, a

[5] A. H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning : A Study of India's Five-Year Plans 1950-1964* (London, Oxford, 1966), p 399.

[6] Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Machinery for Planning* (Delhi, The Manager of Publications, March, 1968), pp. 47-48.

[7] *Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969-74 Summary* (New Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, January 1971), p. 12.

[8] *Vide* Government of Maharashtra, Government Resolution GAD/No. PD/SPM/1072-P-1, dated 20-10-1972.

a proper organizational machinery in the districts had not been created to facilitate the actualization of these components of the plan strategy. During 1959-62, the necessary organizational framework became available in the Zila parishads in some of the States. But the panchayati raj bodies were, by and large, helpless and mute observers of dictates from above until the needed personnel, financial and other suitable conditions were provided. This reorganization and strengthening of the district machinery was tied up with the restructuring and strengthening of the State planning process and mechanism. The realization of this double process was facilitated by the changed political temper during 1967 and after.

The formulation of the First Plan did not afford sufficient time for consulting district and local organizations. It was a hastily drawn patchwork of the departmental and State plans.[9] Framing of the Second Plan, however, gave more than adequate leeway for the fermentation of the plan proposals at different levels, including the district, block and village units. But the creation of the consultative machinery at the district, the block and the village levels did not ensure even a reasonable extent of discussion of the developmental proposals by the popular representatives, both elected and non-elected.[10] The state of affairs in Maharashtra (then a part of the Bombay State) was not different from the conditions in other States. The account of plan formulation process in an 'A' grade community development block in Maharashtra during December 1956 to September 1957—as observed by the present author[11]—indicates inadequate popular participation even during the phased plan-framing process for the Second Plan. The Block budget formulation in this 'A' grade block was looked upon as an administrative matter with which people had very little to do. The development proposals, especially in irrigation and communications, broached in the rural development registers, filled in by the revenue personnel in consultation with the villagers (perhaps the only basic village data available to the block planners) required to be processed before they were finalized. No direct popular participation was in evidence during the stage of block budget formulation. The district Congress Committee had conveyed some proposals which were taken into consideration. Neither the village panchayats nor the vikas mandals (development committees), where they existed, discussed proposals of their own for inclusion in the budget or those contained in the budget prepared by the block officials. The discussion by the whole body of villagers

[9] Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

[10] Gadgil, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Hanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-402.

[11] N. R. Inamdar, *Report of the Survey of the Administration of the Community Development Block Haveli* (Poona, University of Poona, 1962), pp. 20-21; 28-29; 35-44.

was out of the question. Nor was much discussion held in the block advisory committee meeting convened for the purpose. Later, the State Legislature Estimates Committee report noted an observation that during the Second Plan, various district development boards in the State were not aware of the schemes allotted to them.[12] The Plan Evaluation Organization (PEO) of the Planning Commission reported that only in 44 per cent of its sample of 161 villages in the whole country was any attempt made to prepare local plans, and even in these, the village bodies did not seem to have played an active role.[13]

The main factor in the paltry realization of the recognized objectives of district planning and planning from below was the States' inability to know the firm size of the States' plans until the whole process of consultations at the Central and State levels was over. Lack of reliable, and in some aspects, of any statistics and absence of an adequate complement of expertise were other factors for the sorry state of affairs. An overdrawn account of the villagers' disinclination and incapacity for an effective participation in plan formulation in some of the literature on the subject does not give a proper perspective regarding the role of the village people and their representatives in the planning process.

A near consensus by the latter half of the Second Plan period was expressed on the need for involvement of the popularly elected organizations of rural masses in the planning process.

III

On the background regarding the plan formulation and implementation related above, the Planning Commission as well as the State Governments decided to utilize the panchayati raj bodies, wherever these existed, as consultative organs in framing the district plans within the Third Plan. The most obvious advantage in the process was the possibility of closely relating the plan schemes to the physical conditions and the popular preferences as articulated through their genuine representatives in the local elective organs. The process would also help more effective mobilization of resources for the plan and a more vivid appreciation of the national objectives and policies among the local people. It might also lead to a better coordination and synchronization in the implementation of plan programmes and schemes.

[12] Maharashtra Legislature Secretariat, *Report of the Estimates Committee, 1961 Thirty-Third Report "Planning Section (pertaining to the Finance Department)"*, (Bombay, 1961), p. 10.

[13] Programme Evaluation Organisation, Planning Commission, *Sixth Evaluation Report* (New Delhi, June, 1959).

The decision of planning from below through the panchayati r organizations did not automatically solve all the problems in the wa To enable them to work effectively as planning authorities, th panchayati raj organs needed to be equipped with the requisite financi resources, delegations of development functions and expert personnel– both administrative and specialist. The expertise to prepare integrate development plans for the districts had to be posted with the panchaya raj bodies. The plan formulation for integrated development of di tricts required more extensive and deeper information on fresh aspec of social and economic development. The Government of Maharashtr claimed to possess a fairly satisfactory statistical organization goin down to the taluka level by the end of the Second Plan period. Bu even then, it made it a point to list the important gaps in th statistical information.[14]

The States had also to take decision on the basic unit of distric planning and the hierarchy of sub-units with their relative orderin The village was obviously too small a unit for overall district plannin The village was the unit for provision of civic facilities, like roads, wate and community centre. Organization for agricultural production an extension in various aspects, like health education and cooperation had to be provided for in the villages. The village was also a unit fo collection of data bearing on agriculture, land revenue, demograph and human settlement. The community development block or taluka tehsil assumed importance because it was the nucleus of rural develop ment finance and activity since 1952. Where the block coincided wit taluka/tehsil it also afforded another source for data preserved in th taluka/tehsil records, such as those on land revenue and proprietorship certain demographic aspects, like birth and death, marriage, etc. Th block was also the next closer administrative unit to the village people Perhaps, the only asset of the district as the overall roof unit of unifor regional planning throughout the State was its long career as the uni of coordinated administration for various departments of the Stat Government. Recognisedly, it was not a rational unit for spatial as wel as locational planning.[15] Natural regions, like drought areas or coasta areas or ghats (*e.g.* 'malnad'), or resource regions, like mining area or harbours, were accepted by the geographer as most suitable units fo regional planning. The district was not a homogenoeus region in thi sense. But no other higher unit above the block/tehsil was readil available which did not contain diverse sub-regions or which did not cu

[14] Government of Maharashtra, Finance Department (Planning), *Third Five-Yea Plan Maharashtra State* (Bombay, November 1961), p. 145.

[15] L. S. Bhat, *Regional Planning* (Calcutta, Statistical Publication Society, 1972), p. 103.

across a natural region. The States of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, which had introduced panchayati raj earlier than Maharashtra, also experienced the inadequacy of the block as the overall unit of district planning.[16] This analysis would tend to confirm the soundness of the widely accepted concept of the district as the unit of overall regional planning within the States and the block/tehsil and the village as the sub-units of lesser orders for varying purposes of decreasing dimensions within the directing and supervisory ambit of the district.

The zila parishads, in Maharashtra, are better equipped for the function of district planning than those in Rajasthan or Andhra Pradesh or even Gujarat. Apart from the provisions in the State Zila Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act V of 1962) enabling both the zila parishads and the panchayat samitis (which are mostly executing regional committees of the parishads) to formulate long-term and annual plans, the zila parishads are endowed with sizable financial and personnel resources. It is an obligatory function of the zila parishads to promote planned development of the districts by utilizing, to the maximum possible extent, local resources and for that to prepare annual and long-term plans giving regard to the plan prepared by the panchayat samitis [Section 100 (4)]. Similar plans are to be framed by the panchayat samitis as preparatory to the zila parishads' plans as well as for the utilization of the Block grants [Section 108(1) (a) (i) and (ii).[17] The village panchayats also have to prepare plans for development of the villages and of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors under items 59 and 60 of the Village List. The zila parishads in Maharashtra are given grants by the State Government for various ends, like land-revenue grant, plan grants, purposive grants, incentive grants, establishment grant, and deficit grant. The zila parishads have also to levy a cess on the land revenue. While the income from the plan grants, purposive grants, establishment grant and deficit grant is earmarked for specific purposes, proceeds of the matching incentive grant on the basis of levied land revenue cess and of the cess can be utilized by the zila parishads towards their own schemes and works. No doubt, this financial provision has been found inadequate to cope up with the expectations of every zila parishad to adopt schemes and works of its own choice apart from the transferred plan schemes.[18] The administrative and

[16] G. Jacob (ed.) : *Readings on Panchayati Raj* (Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1967), pp. 145-166.

[17] Government of Maharashtra, *The Maharashtra Zila Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Manual*, Vol. I (Bombay, Government Printing and Stationery, 1965), pp. 89, 94.

[18] *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee* appointed by the Government of Maharashtra (Bombay, 1968), pp. 142-147; 153-154.

specialist personnel of the former district level offices of the State (partments are pooled in the zila parishads. The overall result of b(these financial and personnel provisions has been a better capacity of zila parishads in Maharashtra to formulate and implement devel(ment plans. To actualize this capacity, a planning branch, with planning officer at its head, has been created in each zila parish: The main functions of the planning officer are:

(1) distribution of various grants, including block grants;

(2) preparation of plan budget;

(3) review of progress of and expenditure on plan schemes;

(4) watching observance of terms and conditions on which pl schemes are entrusted to zila parishads; and

(5) collection and processing of data relating to plan schemes.

Items (2) and (5) are strictly within the purview of the plan-forn lation function.

The unhesitating conclusion of the Evaluation Committee Panchayati Raj of the State Government was that they did not find a particular evidence to show that there was any conscious and systema planning in the local sector,[20] *i.e.*, by the zila parishads and i panchayat samitis. It was earlier observed that even advanced vill: panchayats did not prepare five year plans of village developmen despite the high knowledge content and keen social awareness of 1 village and the panchayat leaders.

The neglect of the planning function by the zila parishads and 1 panchayat samitis is indicated by several trends. Meaningful physi(planning in terms of targets-setting is rarely done. In the plan allo(tions by the State Government to the zila parishads and by the parishe to the panchayat samitis specific norms, such as population or regioı backwardness, have not been laid down; this has benefited a few d zila parishads and areal pockets within the parishads. Further, 1 State Government has not attempted any categorization of schemes a resources for different sectors on the basis of certain priorities. The lir ted resources of the parishads themselves did not afford enough freed(

[19] *Reorganisation of Maharashtra Administration Report by Shri M.N. He* Vol. I (Bombay, Government Central Press, 1971), p. 133.

[20] Government of Maharashtra, Rural Development Department, *Report of Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj* (Bombay, 1971), p. 84.

[21] N.R. Inamdar, *Functioning of Village Panchayats* (Bombay, Popular, 19' pp. 75-76; 317-355.

for planning. The grant of free resources, such as a larger land revenue grant and establishment grant, latterly has no doubt improved the financial and consequently planning position of the parishads. The process of preparing the drafts of the fifth plan by the zila parishads, dealt with in the last section of this article, would show the extent to which the above shortcomings in the plan-formulation by the zila parishads have been got over.

The Planning Officer was also found ineffective in fulfilling the task of plan formulation by the Evaluation Committee. It was observed by the Committee that they were not even aware of the existence of the above cited job chart.[22] While the Heble Commission favoured discontinuation of the post of planning officer,[23] the Evaluation Committee rightly recommended the continuation of the post and the planning branch under him in view of the strengthening of his role and development of his functions.

A case study of a zila parishad in Maharashtra mentioned absence of financial and resource planning in the draft report of the Fourth Plan of the district framed in October, 1964. While the draft plan did much work in detailing the broad picture of development of the district, the pattern of schemes suggested conformed to the earlier prototype of the plan schemes.[24]

IV

In the face of the stark fact of the blurring out of the role of district planning, the Wardha district development plan, formulated in Maharashtra during 1961-62,[25] stood out both as an indicator as well as a hope. The Wardha Plan was an indicator of the tasks involved in district planning as well as the limitations on and requirements of fullfledged district planning. The Wardha Plan kindled the hope of district planning becoming a reality with the marshalling of the resources of the Planning Commission, the goodwill of the State Government and the expertise of an experienced and dedicated research institute,—the Gokhale Institute of Poona.

The objectives of the Wardha Plan were threefold: to draw up a consistent, integrated and concrete plan of development of the district;

[22] *Report of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj*, pp. 37-38.

[23] *Reorganisation of Maharashtra Administration Report*, p. 136.

[24] V.G. Nandedkar, *Zila Parishads as Local Governments and Development Bodies* (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis of the University of Poona, July 1972), p. 252.

[25] *Wardha District Development Plan Important Features* (Cycl.) (Poona, Gokhale Institute, 1963), pp. 1-15.

to plan from below; and to indicate development schemes for the uplift of the downtrodden ('Antyodaya').

A survey of the physico-geographical and socio-economic conditions of the district would indicate the specific needs and the possibilities of development. The departmental schemes, accepted till then as the basis of the State and the district plans, led to the adoption of the schematic patterns laid down by the Planning Commission. The schematic patterns did not take into account the varying situation from one district to another and even within the districts. They were also wasteful because they did not heed the existing staff in different departments capable of further utilization and the possibilities of coordination and integration. A survey of the basic physico-geographical and socio-economic data, thus, was a desideratum for the framing of a realistic and integrated development plan, within the terms of a long-term development perspective.

A detailed survey of 54 selected villages from 21 groups of villages within six broad regions of the district revealed a fairly typical picture of the actual situation and the specific needs of the district. The surveyed selected villages covered six per cent of the occupied villages and ten per cent of the total rural population of the district.

The survey, preparatory to the framing of the Wardha Plan, pointed out several 'significant and locally important problems' never conceived as being related to the development of the resources of the district. These problems pertained mainly to land utilization, soil conservation, irrigated farming and water supply, dry farming, animal husbandry and dairying, pasture development, and fodder and fuel supply.[26]

The extensive waste and pasture lands which were practically unutilized and acreage of marginal cultivation pointed up the need of land-use survey of the district. In spite of the sizable extent of waste and pasture lands and 30 per cent of the cropped area being under jowar, the district suffered from an acute shortage of fodder. A peculiar problem revealed by the survey concerned a type of water-logged area called 'Panbasan' lands. Another was that of conservation and drainage in the region of black soil and heavy rain. The problem of water-logged lands called for detailed research and experimentation, while conservation and drainage required the use of contour ploughing, strip-cropping, deep ploughing, nallah plugging and control of gullies. The survey also pointed up the fact that about 66 per cent of the total wells were

[26] *Wardha District Development Plan Important Features* (Cycl.) (Poona, Gokhale Institute, 1963), pp. 4-5.

not in use, the average land irrigated per well being below two acres. These were a few of the factual problems presented by the basic survey.

The process of 'planning from below' consisted of three stages: discussion of the district plan; consideration of the block plans; and finalization of the district plan. The zila parishads were not constituted under the new Act during the first stage, but they participated in the discussions during the second and the third stages. The participants in the discussions of the plan during the first two stages included, besides the officials and the non-officials involved, outside experts, social workers and progressive farmers as well as non-agricultural producers. This made the discussions more broad-based and representative. The third and the last stage covered discussions in the zila parishad and its constituent committees.

The deliberations in these meetings not merely highlighted unknown aspects of the known problems but also threw up novel suggestions to tackle the problems. The need of a hydrological survey to assess the underground water, as also of a survey of surface water resources was stressed in the discussions at the meeting during the first stage. A fresh suggestion to deal with the shortcomings of the forest department in the management of the grazing land was put forth at the same meeting; it hinted at transferring the work to the animal husbandry department. A cattle breeders' association at the district level would, among other things, look after fodder distribution and bull-breeding.

The discussions at the Block level proposed locations for the schools, dispensaries, drinking water wells, milk collection centres, and roads. A suggestion, disturbing a widely prevalent belief, was thrown up in the course of these discussions. The suggestion was to the effect that rearing of goats and sheep should be discouraged and separate grazing land should be reserved for them. Another suggestion deserving consideration was regarding the need of conducting experiments to increase milk production on various breeds of cows and buffaloes. Organizational problems of small cultivators and the landless labour, and utilization of water resources of a river basin were also discussed, among other matters, in these meetings.

Apart from substantive suggestions on the contents of the district plan, these deliberations also briefed the planners on the adequacy of the procedures of the planning process, as also on the methods of implementation, such as cooperatives, for solving the problems of the landless labour. The meetings also provided forums to the planners and development authorities to explain the objectives as well as the frame of the national plan.

It was remarkable to find that the Wardha zila parishad increased the already expanded plan size from Rs. 462 lakhs to 890 lakhs, much larger than that of any other zila parishad in Maharashtra. This was due to the attempt by the zila parishad to accommodate "all conflicting claims by different panchayat samitis".[27] Certain priorities were also changed, an almost equal emphasis being placed on operations in different fields.

The Wardha Plan comprised programmes bearing on three aspects: the physico-geographic aspect or the creation of the framework of socio-economic overheads; the conservation and development of resources; and the increase in production and efficiency. The three aspects are too familiar to need elaboration. The creation of the framework of socio-economic overheads brought in the concept of mandi (market) centres. The concept of mandi centres is similar to the concept of rural growth centres conceived later by the national planners. The concept is wider than the location of market and covers both actual and potential nuclei for the creation of socio-economic overheads, for the benefit of the rural people as well as to act as catalysers for extensive and intensive development. The 37 mandi centres (13 existing and 24 new) in the district were selected in a descending order of importance on the criteria of availability of an established market, centre of administrative services, nucleus for serving a minimum size of population within a specific radius, transport and communication facilities and existence of health and education facilities. The problem of employment of the landless attracted the special attention of the Wardha planners. As prospects of increase of employment for this section of the rural community were limited, it had to be based mainly on the socio-economic overheads and the conservation plan.[28]

The Wardha Plan itself indicated a longer duration for the basic survey to feed the district plan with more meaningful and necessary data, such as on material availabilities and balances. The frame of the Wardha Plan was not as much integrated as it should have been. The Wardha Plan also revealed the need of a larger number of supplementary surveys with deeper coverage. The importance of continuing the work through evaluation during the plan-execution stage was also established. The most important factor in the evolution of a rational district plan was the setting of an order of priorities by the zila parishads. The original Wardha Plan was expanded to almost double the size by the zila parishad. The compulsive adjustment of the district plan size within a

---

[27] *Wardha District Development Plan Important Features* (cycl.) (Poona, Gokhale Institute, 1963), p. 11.

[28] D.R. Gadgil, *Wardha Plan—A Commentary* (Cycl.) (Poona, Gokhale Institute, 1965), p. 4.

normal outlay, bound to be smaller in view of the special central assistance given to the Wardha District, would underline the importance of setting of an order of priorities. From the organizational point of view also, pointers on several urgent sectors emerged out of the thinking on the Wardha Plan. The need for the departmental officials to scrutinise the plan schemes in the light of the given situation in the district was more pressing than ever before. More strenuous efforts in organization and coordination at the district level were highlighted by the Wardha Plan for the efficient execution of the Plan. A series of working plans were also necessary to streamline the plan-execution.

The entire programme outlined in the Wardha Plan was sanctioned later by the State Government to be implemented over a seven-year period.[29] Although the State Government recognized the Wardha Plan as being helpful in formulating the district plans, actually the experiment in district planning was extended only to two more districts, Kolaba and Osmanabad. The net result was that a valuable lesson of the Wardha Plan was lost sight of and the district plans in Maharashtra within the Fourth Plan were prepared without any planned collection of initial information in the frame suggested by the Wardha Plan.[30] With the vesting of a proper plan apparatus and knowledge of plan techniques, the zila parishads in Maharashtra much better equipped for planning than those in any other State, would have performed it well.

V

By the end of the Third Plan period, the situation in regard to district planning in the country,[31] so also in the State of Maharashtra was not hopeful. The difficult economic situation in 1966-67, the changed

---

[29] Government of Maharashtra, Finance Department (Planning), *Annual Plan 1966-67 Part I—Outline* (Bombay, 1966), p. 13.

[30] D.R. Gadgil, *Supplementary Note to the Notes on the Present Position of Wardha Plan* (Cycl.), (Poona, Gokhale Institute, 1965), p. 2.

[31] A survey of the formulation of Block Plans in two blocks in a district in Uttar Pradesh presented dismal findings. The basis of target-fixation mostly by higher officials was unscientific and inconsistent. Non-officials in general and the panchayat secretary and the lekhpal among officials were not well-disposed towards plan formulation (R.B. Das and D.P. Singh, *Formulation and Execution of Block Plans—A Case Study*) (Lucknow, The Institute of Public Administration, Lucknow University, 1968, pp. 69-70). A majority of the respondents of survey in the same State on the topic for earlier years were not familiar with the national as well as the village plans [P.N. Masaldan, *Planning and the People: A Study of Public Participation in Planning in Uttar Pradesh* (Bombay, Asia, 1964), pp. 23-29].

The situation about the awareness of the community development programme in Maharashtra was relatively consoling during about the same period as Das-Singh's study [P.A. Bhagwatwar, *C.D. Programme—A Psycho-Social Study* (Nagpur, Anand Prakashan, 1972), p. 69].

political environment during 1967 and the compulsions of planning strategy made for a substantial turn in the thinking about the State and district planning. This turn in thinking was clearly reflected in the various reports of Administrative Reforms Commission and its Study Teams during 1967-1970. The Study Team on District Administration (February, 1967),[32] that on Centre-State Relationships (September, 1967),[33] the Commission's Report on Machinery for Planning (March, 1968)[34] and the Commission's Report on State Administration,[35]—all these were unanimous on the need for making State and district planning a genuine exercise, strengthening the State and district machinery for planning and delegating the district planning function to panchayati raj bodies in districts. Prospect of decentralizing the formulation of the contents of a large segment of plan schemes to the States also brought in districts and democratic representative bodies in the districts for consideration as participants in the same process.[36] The Commission's Report on State Administration has also stressed overall involvement of the Divisional Commissioner in large States, *inter alia*, in regional planning for urban and rural areas with special reference to environmental purity,[37] without disturbing the primary responsibility of the district planning set-up. The revised Fourth Plan[38] recorded the consensus regarding the role of the State and the district plans.

The PEO report on District Developmental Staff in Maharashtra pointed out, among other things, disproportionate per capita development expenditure in different selected districts.[39] The defect called for

---

[32] ARC, *Report of the Study Team District Administration* (Delhi, 1967), pp. 115-116.

[33] ARC, *Report of the Study Team Centre-State Relationships* Vol. I (Delhi, 1967), pp. 134-135. On an examination of the Third Plan of three states selected at random, the Study Team found that in the agricultural programmes 80-90 per cent schemes suggested in the 'central (government) group' reports were adopted while health and education plans were almost totally built upon the centre's thinking.

[34] ARC, *Report Machinery for Planning* (Delhi, 1968), Ch. V, pp. 46-48.

[35] ARC, *Report on State Administration* (Delhi, 1970), pp. 64-65, 69-70.

[36] H.K. Paranjape, *The Reorganised Planning Commission* (New Delhi, IIPA, Sept. 1970) mentions absence of an independent planning machinery in the States, but does not dwell on district planning. His *Centre-State Relations in Planning* (IIPA, Sept. 1970) (Original article in IJPA, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan.-Mar. 1970) refers to the States' failure to develop a proper machinery for effective district planning (p.13).

[37] ARC, *Report on State Administration*, Recommendation 34, pp. 64-65.

[38] *Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-74 Summary* (New Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, Jan. 1971), p. 12. The document also refers to the inclusion in the revised Fourth Plan a centrally sponsored pilot study in growth centres with a view to integrating the centres into the frame of the district to help planning from below (p. 64).

[39] PEO, Planning Commission (Government of India), *Study of Development Staff at the District and Lower Levels* (New Delhi, Nov. 1968), p. 201. The study also deals with the under utilisation of the development schemes by individual schemes and lack of coordination between the district development authority and other authorities like the District Collector, Irrigation Department (pp. 202, 203).

rationlization of the district plans and plan outlays on the basis of well-defined objectives and criteria. A basis for a revised practice relating to district planning in Maharashtra was laid down in the beginning of the framing of district perspective plans during 1970, *i.e.*, the early years of revised Fourth Plan.[40]

VI

In keeping with the changed planning strategy, for the Fifth Plan, the State of Maharashtra decided, *inter alia*, to adopt the district as the unit.[41] Earlier, the Government had prepared indices of development for districts and tehsils and also village-wise index cards.[42] The decision favouring the district as the planning unit was prompted by twin objectives. The first objective was to give opportunity to all the districts to attain full development having regard to their potential, available manpower and other resources. The second objective was to remove steadily the imbalances in development as between districts and areas within the same districts to the extent possible.

With the formulation and implementation of the plans, various bodies in the districts were connected. These were government departments, local bodies—*viz.*, zila parishads and its constituent organs and municipalities—financial institutions—like district cooperative bank, district land development bank, nationalized and commercial banks—the public enterprises and the corporate sector. The coordination was so far effected through the *ad-hoc* District Planning Advisory Committee and, in the main the District Collector. The District Collector has been undoubtedly an effective coordinator for non-developmental administrative matters. But in developmental administration in Maharashtra, he has not been in the centre of the picture since the setting up of zila parishads in 1962. This anomaly has now been removed by the State Government by constituting district planning boards and entrusting secretarial responsibility for the boards to the chief executive officers of the zila parishads. Earlier, the State Government had strengthened the zila parishads by vesting larger financial resources in them and transferring to them most of the remaining development

---

[40] T. V. Parvate, "District Perspective Plans", *Lok Rajya*, February 16, 1970. (Fortnightly in Marathi) (Bombay, Government of Maharashtra, Director of Publicity), pp. 7-9. *Also see* D. G. Tungare : "Some Features of District Planning", *Lok Rajya*, February 16, 1969.

[41] Government Resolution GAD/No. PD/SPM/1072-P-1, dated. 20-10-1972.

[42] Government of Maharashtra, Planning Department, Circular No. FFP-1073/P-3, dated 13-4-1973 (Ref. G. R., Finance Department, No. FFp/(V) 1073/P-3, dated 12-5-1972).

schemes with the State departments. This step was taken on the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee on Panchayati Raj.

The changed district planning process has given a greater freedom to districts in adopting individual schemes within the broad patterns of major and minor heads. Secondly, districts have been intimated a firm minimum limit of the size of district plans. This size, which does not include zila parishad's own resources, is to be double the size of district plans during the Fourth Plan. This size is, however, to be discounted to an extent in view of the outlay of some of the State-level schemes, such as irrigation schemes, being included in district plans. The purposiveness of district plans has now certainly been pinpointed by compulsive translation in plan formulation by these district planning boards of definite criteria laid down by the State Government in keeping with the proposals of the Planning Commission and its own priorities. Barring these criteria laid down by the State Government, district planning boards are free to frame their own schemes within both the State's and their own outlay. These definite criteria referred to the national programme for minimum needs covered by the Approach Paper and the Draft Fifth Plan, of the Planning Commission, the State's own 15-point programme and the special requirements of the critical areas.

The national minimum needs programme covered seven aspects of education, drinking water supply, public health, rural electrification, rural roads, house sites for rural landless, and slum improvement and clearance. In education, the minimum programme is to attain 100 per cent enrolment in the age-group of 6-11, 60 per cent enrolment in the age-group of 11-14 and to ensure that there is a primary school within 1.5 kms and a middle school within 5 kms from each village. In respect of drinking water supply, the Approach Paper of the Planning Commission has not laid down any specific norm, but the State Government has decided that by the close of the Fifth Plan all villages should be provided with this minimum need that has eluded the grasp of the government through all the four plans. In public health, the minimum programme laid down is one primary health centre supported by 8-10 sub-centres for 80,000 persons. Further, at least 40 per cent of villages in each tehsil are to be electrified by close of the Fifth Plan. All-weather roads are to be laid to link every village with population of 1500 and above and in hilly or coastal areas to link a cluster of villages. House sites of 100 sq. yards are to be furnished to rural landless persons. Besides, in urban areas in the districts, a programme of slum-improvement and slum clearance is to be adopted. The 15-point programme of the State Government is supplementary to the minimum needs programme of the Planning Commission; it stresses improvement in the condition of the

under-developed sections of the community. The schemes under the 15-point programme include the following guarantee of employment in manual work to all adults needing work, local employment works, self-employment of the educated unemployed, uplift of adivasis, provision of hostel facilities for economically backward classes and special welfare schemes for denotified tribes and navabouddhas. The district plans have also to include special programmes for the critical areas, drought prone areas, hilly and adivasi areas, coastal and industrially backward areas.

The district plans formulated for the Fifth Plan in the State have provided for national minimum needs programme. They have tried to deal with the 15-point programme of the State Government, but not to the desired extent. The district plans seek to accommodate standard schemes to tackle the problems of the critical areas affected by chronic drought or industrial backwardness or natural handicaps of hilly location. But the provisions for these areas in sectors, like communications, animal husbandry, and soil conservation, have been withdrawn from other areas in the districts. The district plans also indicate a special attraction of irrigated areas, even irrigated by wells, for additional cooperative sugar factories. The State Government is also willing to sponsor and assist the new cooperative sugar factories as sources of excise and other revenue. But alternative channels of economic development and utilization of irrigation facilities ought to have been experimented in some areas. About 50 per cent of the district plan outlays has been devoted to irrigation, which is a desirable priority in a chronically drought-affected state like Maharashtra. The district plans expect outlay on irrigation above 55 per cent of the total outlay to be available through loans from the Sixth Plan. This needs rationalization at the state level.

Formulation of draft district plans commenced hardly one month before the constitution of district planning boards. This haste has naturally favoured adoption of departmental schemes leaving practically no time for fresh local surveys to suggest and to test the viability of new types of schemes. The composition of district planning boards does not indicate much expertise in various aspects of planning and administration. The larger district planning consultative councils, consisting of legislators and officials, have also not included any such expertise. The appointment of a State minister as chairman of the district planning board would provide for a link with the thinking of the State Government, but how for it would be conducive to free thinking of development proposals is a moot question. The draft district plans do not seem to have been placed before the zila parishads;

probably the posting of the plans with the state Government by the end of August, 1973 has left no margin for this step. The availability of a planning and a statistical officer with an administrative branch to support should enable the zila parishads to be equipped with local surveys to suggest experimentation and improvements in the types and contents of plan schemes suited to local situations.

This kind of district planning process has certainly made for a change in favour of autonomous thinking on plans by zila parishads. Availability of a longer time and better expertise would enable the new district planning apparatus to put the process to a still more fruitful purpose. The district plans have not integrated within them the plans of other public authorities in the districts, including nationalized banks, the cooperative sector and the municipal bodies, despite the declared object to that effect.

MULTI-LEVEL PLANNING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Deva Raj

IN the formulation of the Fifth Five Year Plan, multi-level planning has been looked upon as the arch-stone for regional development strategies. Similar hopes of correcting regional imbalances were entertained through district planning and area planning in the earlier Five Year Plans without success. Unless appropriate steps are taken to provide the necessary administrative and technical infrastructure and certain anomalies in the present planning processes—particularly at the local levels—are corrected, all the excellent work being done in Planning Commission may fail to yield any results.

Multi-level planning, to be a reality, stipulates certain basic factors such as:

(1) identification of levels of planning with territorial, spatial and administrative jurisdictions;

(2) a hierarchy of levels inter-related to a hierarchy of functions, in matters of planning and implementation;

(3) a system of inter-level or inter-governmental relationships—technical, financial and administrative—including arrangements for reviewing and determining policies, programmes and priorities as well as providing an integrated framework for local, state and national plans;

(4) viability of the local and the regional planning and executive units, agencies or levels of government for effective functioning and availability at each level of appropriate expertise for project formulation with necessary guidance and support from higher echelons; and

(5) a basic commitment to an all out local planning and development efforts with its attendant responsibilities of mobilization of local resources and exploitation of local potential with such outside support as may be necessary to induce self-generating growth.

Planning Machinery

Before analysing the administrative problems in multi-level planning, it will be desirable to have a quick look at the performance of the planning functions, particularly at the local levels. India has been a pioneer in national planning in the third world and the Planning Commission, with all its limitations, has been an outstanding institution, with a high degree of expertise. Its dominant character, however, combined with detailed schematic approaches had a stifling effect on the initiative of the States, which were themselves hardly equipped for any long-range exercise in planning. The pre-occupation of the Planning Commission with detailed sectoral planning also left some vital gaps in the planning mechanism at the Centre. There were at least three areas essential for multi-level planning, which did not receive adequate support:

(1) In spite of recent solicitations, spatial planning has not yet found a berth in the Planning Commission and there has hardly been any expert group engaged in integrated rural-urban planning to link up socio-economic development with physical and natural resource planning. The continued omission of urban areas and urbanization processes from the plans is an admitted fact and it is a measure of this unconcern that even the National Malaria Eradication Programme did not recognize the existence of urban areas and it is urban malaria today that threatens to undo the tremendous achievements of this internationally prestigious programme.

(2) There are problems of planning and development involving inter-state regions for harnessing resources, developing communications and building up the necessary infrastructure in larger national interests. There is need of a special organization for the purpose in the Planning Commission.

(3) A neglected field has been the development of administrative infrastructure to match the tasks of planning and implementation. The administrative organization has been taken for granted and no attempt was made to build up and try out administrative models to meet the new challenges.

The State plans reflected less of policy planning than programme budgeting combined with strong pleas of backwardness with their eyes on maximizing their share in central assistance. It was not till 1963 that the States considered setting up of Planning Boards following a recommendation by the Planning Commission. However, these *ad hoc* bodies did not meet the requirement of an expert high level planning

agency that could provide an integrated planning framework and necessary guidance and supervision to the field organizations in the districts. It was as late as May, 1972 that the Planning Commission addressed a letter to the State Governments indicating broad lines of organization of an apex planning agency with separate units for Perspective Planning, Regional/District Planning, Project Formulation, Plan Coordination and Monitoring, Plan Information and Evaluation. The additional expenditure involved in strengthening the planning apparatus was proposed to be shared between the Centre and the States.

Local Planning Scene

It is, however, planning at the sub-state levels that is fundamental and crucial to the concept of multi-level planning. As one scans all the sectors at local level, one comes across a variety of isolated *ad hoc* planning effort by various agencies with differing objectives. Some of these plans, their scope and perspectives are discussed below.

District Plans have been the foremost instruments of local planning, which are reflected, however, inadequately in State and national plans. It was 20 years ago, on the eve of the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan, that village, block and district plans were required to be prepared. Ever since, attempts have been made to make them more realistic but even at the time of the preparation of the Fourth Plan proposals most district plans were mere collection of felt needs of the people and demands for financial provisions in the State plans for allocation to the districts. Many States did make an attempt to prepare analytical plans but it was a long way towards planning based on assessment of resource potential and development of local infrastructure that could sustain higher rates of growth. During 1968-69, the Planning Commission undertook an exercise for Karnal and Amritsar and developed guidelines for the preparation of district plans which were circulated to the State Governments, but it is realized that the necessary expertise for such integrated planning is hardly available at the district level.

Even these plans, as all their forerunners, can in no way be considered to be complete for the following reasons:

(1) The district plans have been purely rural plans and totally ignore the existence of urban areas, and their growth processes;

(2) These have been mostly sectoral programme plans without spatial dimensions, practically oblivious of physical planning.

> These hardly reflect an awareness of the existence of local planning authorities under town planning enactments in a number of States.

It would be utterly unrealistic to have any regional development plan without taking into account the interaction between these elements and the rural sectoral activities.

District planning, in fact, failed even to take note of urbanising processes wihin the panchayat raj areas leading to haphazard growth and land speculation, particularly in the periphery of municipal jurisdictions or at other growth points. Even the Rural Industrial Estates were laid out without any integrated rural-urban spatial planning and no wonder they came to grief. Even the recent thinking in respect of development of growth centres and rural service towns is a case of isolated micro-level planning. Growth points, growth centres and growth poles represent an interrelated hierarchy, requiring intergrated land-use and communication planning.

Towards City and Metropolitan Planning a provision for the 'preparation of detailed Master Plans for urban and regional development' was made in the Third Five Year Plan under the growing strains of urbanization. A hundred per cent central assistance was given through the Town & Country Planning Organization of the Government of India, for planning of metropolitan cities, State capitals, port towns and industrial centres. About 72 cities and towns were covered during this plan period and it was proposed under the Fourth Plan to cover all cities and towns with a population of 50,000 and above, although the programme was transferred to the State sector. In sharp contrast to district plans, these urban area plans are largely physical, land-use and communication plans for cities together with a minimum of the peripheral areas being backed by town planning laws in some of the States. A number of plans for major cities embrace somewhat wider metropolitan area within the district, such as Master Plans for Bangalore, Hyderabad, Cochin, Ahmedabad, Poona, Nagpur, Kanpur, etc. The recent plan for metropolitan Bombay, the plan for the Calcutta metropolitan district covering about 36 municipal areas along with some rural districts and the Master Plan of Delhi have, however, the character of regional plans crossing district limits. In the case of Delhi, the National Capital Region presents the problems of an inter-state urban complex. Another type of a plan prepared under the scheme covering a mixed rural-urban area has been the Asansol Regional Plan, including the Durgapur industrial area, which was developed as a counter-magnet to Calcutta. Sometimes, these plans are drawn up by

temporary statutory boards, while mostly the exercise is carried out by the State Town Planning Directorates without much involvement of the local municipal authorities.

It would be pertinent to remark here that these physical plans do not bear any relationship with economic plans and in spite of the intention of the Third Plan to bring at least cities of 1,00,000 or over into the national planning process, it has not been possible to integrate these physical plans with the District or State Plans. Another serious handicap from which all urban plans have suffered is that with minor exceptions, they are not backed by an overall administrative machinery for implementation or legal powers of enforcement. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA), set up only towards the end of 1970, is but a halting attempt to provide a coordinating mechanism. In Bombay, the City and Industrial Development Organisation (CIDCO) is an *ad hoc* device to undertake the Twin City Project within the framework of the larger metropolitan regional plan. Delhi is an exception in many ways insofar as the entire Union Territory is within the Master Plan area making for some integration between the urban and rural plans but plagued by a multiplicity of authorities. Nor could any satisfactory arrangements be evolved for dealing with problems of development in the parts of the National Capital Region that lie in the adjoining States.

There are also programme plans of a number of Central and State agencies which are being executed in a city or its peripheral areas or elsewhere often without reference to the city master plans, if any. These may include State Housing Boards, Electricity Boards, Industrial Development Corporations, and various departments dealing with water-supply and drainage, communications, trade and commerce, agriculture and industry, and social services. This has created far-reaching problems of coordination, duplication and often wastage of resources, too often decried and too well known to be enumerated here.

Fragmentation of District Administration

This brief survey presents a confused picture of multiplicity of plans with varying objectives, often overlapping or working at cross-purposes with no organization for a coordinated approach to the problems of the district—to say nothing of integrated planning and development. Multi-level planning at the crucial level of the district calls for an overall planning and development authority. Instead, we have the administration in the district hopelessly bifurcated and fragmented with decision-making and accountability scattered between various local statutory and administrative agencies, subject to checks


and controls exercised horizontally and vertically. In the early years of the century, local district administration was unified under the Collector and District Magistrate with lines of control running through the provincial governments to the centre—leaving, nevertheless, wide authority and decision-making in local matters to the District Officer. The vast changes that have since come about on the political and developmental fronts have culminated in a pattern shown in Chart I.

It is clear from the organization chart that district administration, instead of being looked upon as local government as a whole, is a queer admixture of State Departments and their field institutions and a host of not so important statutory local bodies as concessions to democracy and local-self government, which can be terminated at the will of the bureaucracy or the political bosses at the State level. Alternatively, some important local developmental tasks are entrusted to not-so-democratic, special purpose agencies—starting a vicious circle of weak truncated and inefficient local government. What authority, under the circumstances, can undertake integrated local level planning and how? And what departments and ministries at the State and Central level are to provide the necessary guidance and support? In most States, at least the urban sector of local government is split into two or three departments, dealing separately with municipal administration, town planning and housing and water supply and drainage. Even at the Centre, it was only in February 1973 that all these aspects of urban local government were brought under one Ministry—that of Works and Housing. Rural local Government has been under a separate ministry at the Centre since 1958-59.

The picture would be somewhat different in Maharashtra, where Zila Parishads have come to constitute a level of Government bringing under its canopy all the development departments at the district level or, where the District Collector has been relieved of developmental responsibilities, and a separate senior officer has been entrusted with these responsibilities. To that extent, there has been a distinct improvement in the capacity and effective functioning of local district governments. Nevertheless, the compartmentalization between rural and urban governments in the district continues and whatever plans are drawn up are rural sectoral plans without any spatial perspective. This is district government minus the urban areas.

Administrative Infrastructure for Planning

Under the circumstances, multi-level planning is a far cry. It must only continue to be planning from above in spite of all protestations


AGRICULTURE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, ETC. (RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT)
WORKS AND HOUSING (URBAN AREAS)
STATE GOVERNMENTS
DEPARTMENTS
AGRICULTURE, PANCHAYAT RAJ, RURAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENTS
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING
TOWN PLANNING ETC.
DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONERS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION
RURAL
URBAN
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE/COLLECTOR
ZILA PARISHAD
BLOCK SAMITIS
VILLAGE PANCHAYATS
LAW & ORDER
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
MUNICIPALITIES NOTIFIED FIELD AREAS TOWNSHIPS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
WATER & SEWAGE, AUTHORITIES, HOUSING BOARDS -OTHER SPECIAL AUTHORITIES
CENTRAL AND STATE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES EXECUTING SECTORAL PLANS

to the contrary. The organization of local and regional planning and development agencies at the sub-state level is a pre-condition of any approach to multi-level planning. This will require identification of viable areas under unified administrations which could ensure effective organization of productive and social activities and appropriate institutional frames with due regard to socio-economic and geographical factors. They must have the necessary capabilities for data collection, processing and analysis of information to work out probable alternatives and priorities for the most effective utilization of scarce resources. That they will require higher level support and guidance is conceded, but some basic expertise must be provided by proper redistribution of available talent.

District as Local Planning Unit—The existing boundaries of districts and the wide variation in their area and population have come in for considerable criticism. Sometimes district boundaries cut across physico-agronomic regions; it is an expert's view that a district is not the most appropriate planning region as it often does not represent homogeneity or possess the attributes of an internally viable entity. That the area and jurisdiction of districts will bear some considerable adjustments cannot be denied. On the other hand, the district has, because of its strong administrative identity, asserted itself as the basic unit for economic and sectoral planning as well as plan implementation. Moreover, if the district is to yield place to scientifically demarcated regions or sub-regions, it would be necessary to reorganize the entire administrative and institutional structure and it will raise a number of political issues and other problems of territorial orientation and adjustment of records. While the adjustment of district boundaries may remain a long-term objective, the odds are overwhelmingly in favour of the district being adopted as the basic unit of local-level planning and implementation. This will, of course, require an overall district level authority for integrated planning for both rural and urban areas.

Metropolitan Regions—There will still be some highly urbanized areas of inter-district dimensions or covering the major part of a district. This will need demarcation of Metropolitan Regions of which there may be about a dozen in the country.

Sub-State Regions—While district reorganization can be deferred, it is necessary to identify and demarcate regional areas at the sub-state level. In most cases, a combination of districts would make a region, and would also help to overcome the inadequacies of district as a unit of planning. The Commissioner's Divisions as well as the Superintending Engineer circles have been there with us, although without the


necessary administrative frame that could enable them to play a broader role in planning and development. It should not be difficult at all to work out a regrouping of districts with common characteristics and area problems and set up a planning and development machinery at that level and even clothe it with certain authority and power.

It may be mentioned in this connection that most countries have undertaken a regrouping of their traditional local areas. In France, for instance, about 89 departments (more or less corresponding to our territorial districts) have been regrouped for purposes of planning in 21 regions with one of the Prefects (the administrative head of the department), functioning as the regional Prefect having a special supporting technical team, as well as the deliberative body known as the Commission de Development Economique Regione (CODER). It is true that the administrative structure of these 'regions' is still evolving, but it is significant that even in France, where the departments as local units of administration have survived many a revolution, it has been found necessary to give them a regional perspective to meet the challenges of growth and development, due to the widening range of governmental activity and the change in the scale of operations due to technological advancements. Similarly, the Local Government Act of 1972 in U.K. divides the entire country into 6 predominantly urban metropolitan counties with second tier authorities and 38 counties with lower level rural and urban units of appropriate size.

There is no reason why we should not approach this question of identifying district groupings and set them up as regional units for planning tasks and for coordinating and guiding programme implementation at the district or city levels. The *Perspective Plan of Gujarat* 1974-84 (Vol. III) suggests six possible regions. It may be that in the smaller States, with a few districts, the State level organization may be in a position to function as both the State and regional level organization because of sheer size. But most of the major States will find it convenient to undertake this exercise of identifying groups of districts which are: (*a*) administratively feasible and manageable, (*b*) economically viable, and (*c*) have a hierarchy of settlements and technical and financial institutions, necessary for a self generating effort.

Needless to say that such a regional set-up will require strong support from the States and the Centre, which should have separate expert Regional and Multi-level Planning and Development Cells to demarcate the regions and to lend technical and administrative support to the field organizations. In this regard the following diagrammatic model is put forward as a basis for debate and detailed analysis (Chart II).

Chart II



Conclusion

The discussion can be briefly summed up as follows:

(1) The existing district units should, apart from any possible boundary adjustments, be oriented in the following respects:

(*a*) They should become apex units for both rural and urban authorities and their plans should cover both rural and urban areas;

(*b*) The plans should be based on a physical spatial plan, interlinking the rural and urban areas for a balanced development of infrastructure in relation to identified growth points and the hierarchy of rural and urban settlements in the district; and

(*c*) All other agencies and organizations should function within the framework of the plan so prepared and dovetailed into the State and National Plans.

This will obviously require a much stronger planning and development authority at the District level.

(2) Apart from the district units, there are in some of the States dominant metropolitan areas, which will have to be treated as separate urban sub-regional planning and development units.

(3) In the larger States, these basic district units and metropolitan regions may be grouped into suitable regional units which should have a technical supporting team for coordinating physical and economic plans within the framework of a broad State Plan. This regional authority may also undertake programmes and works of an inter-district nature.

(4) Grouping of districts cannot, however, be an arbitrary matter. The State Planning Departments should have a inter-disciplinary team including physical planners to divide the State into adjacent administrative units having internal problems of such a character and scale that they need to be brought together as a region for planning and development. The adequacy and viability of the area from the point of developmental administration will also have to be taken into account. The State Plans can then be based on regional plans and the programmes of the respective State Departments will need channelling through the Regional, District and Metropolitan authorities except in the larger spheres of technical and financial support and studies and research.

(5) At the Centre, the Planning Commission's Multi-level Planning Cell must not only attune itself to lend support for developing appropriate techniques but should concern itself with the planning of inter-State regions and national infrastructure, particularly in matters of Water Management and Communications, in the context of resource regions cutting across State boundaries and ensure necessary allocation of funds for such purposes on a priority basis.

In the end, it must be emphasized that we have too long been preoccupied with administrative reforms at the top. It is, however, the reorganization and strengthening of local government and field administration that is looked upon around the world as providing the necessary balance between centralization and the compelling need of decentralization of power to lower echelons of Government. The superstructure of the State and Central Government can only be raised on sound foundations of local and regional authorities encouraged and equipped to shoulder the field responsibilities. The field administration has received

little attention and is being steadily denuded of capable managerial and technical talent. Realistic planning and effective implementation depends on sound and viable local government structure which at once needs smaller and larger units reconciling democratic aspirations with a strong executive to carry out programmes and policies.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF MULTI-LEVEL PLANNING

Mohit Bhattacharya

MULTI-LEVEL planning envisages planning through a hierarchy of discrete decision-making levels. To the extent State governments have been influencing the national plan exercises, our planning has been the product of interaction between two levels of governmental decision-making. With the constitution of State Planning Commissions, as in Tamil Nadu and a few other States, the hierarchic nature of planning is expected to be much more pronounced. Current thinking seems to be to add one more level by including the district in the hierarchic pattern. We assume that these three levels—Union, State and District—are going to be accepted as three distinct levels in the hierarchic system which together will lead to what is being called 'multi-level planning'. Our purpose, in the present article, is to examine the status of urban planning and development within the framework of this three-tier system.

Urban Development and National Planning

Planning and development at the urban area level has been undertaken and encouraged mainly for two important reasons. One of these is to meet the abysmal shortages in the supply of essential civic amenities, such as water, roads, housing, drainage and sewerage, and so on. Here, the approach has been to try steadily to augment the quantum of basic civic services in a bid to satisfy, as best as possible, the rising demands for them. In practice, what has happened is that a number of functional schemes have been launched from time to time on specific civic facilities. It has been an exercise in what has been termed as 'single-purpose planning'. The linkages between facilities, such as water supply and housing, for instance, were not so much considered as the augmentation of supply of each facility separately. Nor was there any thinking, at least at the initial stage of national planning, to put specific functional plans into a broader perspective of an integrated urban area development. Being far removed from the local situations, the national planners had perhaps found it easier to undertake the simplest job of financial allocation functionwise.

This process of single-purpose planning was reinforced by vertical relationships that developed over the years between a functional Ministry at the Central level and its counterpart at the State level. Since State planning has, at best, been an intelligent aggregation of departmental plans, the nature of the State planning exercise itself has fostered vertical relationship between the funcional departments at both levels of government. Two other factors contributing to this kind of 'verticalism' are: (*i*) the existence of a multiplicity of governments at the urban area level, especially in the major urban complexes;[1] and (*ii*) weak municipal government that has neither financial resources nor adequate technical expertise to evolve a planned strategy for integrative action at the ground level.

The state of governmental fragmentation has necessarily led to myopic demands for allocation of funds for specific functions falling within the domain of each governmental authority, be it an improvement trust, a State department or any other special purpose body. At the other end, the debilitating condition of municipal government has been instrumental in reducing it to a passive receiver of anything that comes in its way. Thus, single purpose functional planning and development has been the resultant of a number of forces that have their roots in the very mode of plan exercises and in the pattern of organizations at different levels—centre, state and local.

The other important reason for undertaking urban planning and development can be attributed to a sudden awareness of the need for an 'integrated' approach to solving urban problems. This marks a distinct shift from single-purpose to multi-purpose planning. The earlier *functional approach* to urban development was sought to be replaced by comprehensive, and *integrative strategy of areal development*. Departing from the initial policy of piecemeal infrastructural developmnet, the Third Five Year plan visualized urbanization as "an important aspect of the process of economic and social development" and linked up urban planning with the broader goals of economic development and "balanced development between large, medium-sized and small industries, and between rural and urban areas".[2] The Third Plan indicated certain minimum directions in which action should be taken. These are:

(1) Control of land values through public acquisition of land and appropriate fiscal policies;

---

[1] See, in this connection, Mohit Bhattacharya, *et al*, *Government in Metropolitan Calcutta : A Manual*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1965.

[2] Planning Commission, *Third Five Year Plan*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, Government of India, pp. 689-93.

(2) Physical planning of the use of land and preparation of master plans;

(3) Defining tolerable minimum standards for housing and other services to be provided for towns according to their requirements and also prescribing maximum standards to the extent necessary; and

(4) Strengthening of municipal administrations for undertaking new development responsibilities.

These action plans are suggestive of a broader prospective. The emphasis on land use plans and master plans and the idea of strengthening municipal administrations testify to a policy shift toward a more comprehensive urban planning and development. In 1962, the Planning Commission wrote to the State Governments about the urgent need to draw the urban areas into the scheme of national planning in an organic manner and suggested that, to begin with, cities and towns with a population of one lakh or more and especially those with municipal corporations might be invited to prepare 'city development plans'. The Commission went further to say that the State Local Self-Government Departments should hold consultations with the State Planning and Finance Departments to incorporate City Development Plans in the respective State Plans and ensure allocation of funds to provide loans, grants and other necessary assistance from the Central and State Governments for implementation of approved city development plans.

The Planning Commission's exhortation for broad-based city development plans did not produce much result. But the idea of preparation of master plans appeared to have stuck. During the Third Plan period and afterwards, the town planners indefatigably turned out a series of beautiful blueprints of city master plans, thanks to liberal central assistance for the job. When it came to implementation, nobody seemed to be in a hurry.

From the conceptual point of view, the Third Plan marked a watershed in urban planning thought. Since then the national planners have been used to operating at two levels of existence, one at the practical level and another at the theoretical level. Conceptually, it has more or less been acknowledged that urban planning and development should be thought of in comprehensive areal terms rather than piecemeal functional terms. Practically, however, a series of specific functional programmes on water supply and sewerage, urban housing and related

functions are being sedulously pursued.[3] From current indications, it appears that a few more isolated schemes, such as the much-publicized environmental sanitation scheme in larger cities, are going to be added to the already bulging list of specific functional programmes. The Third Plan had rightly placed emphasis on strengthening of multi-purpose municipal government to lend institutional support to the concept of comprehensive and integrative planning. It is quite likely that with the proliferation of specific functional schemes, actually the predilection will be for special purpose bodies and not municipal government.

Two Kinds of Planning

From what has been stated earlier, it seems that there is some confusion about the objectives or goals of urban planning. As a consequence, two different kinds of planning are being advocated at the urban area level. Traditionally, city planning has been looked at as essentially land-use planning. This is the engineer-architect's point of view which wants to see a city develop in a particular physical shape with specific allocations of space for particular uses and commensurate infrastructural developments in the form of roads, schools, hospitals and other community facilities. It finds concrete expression in the all-too-familiar, neat, multi-coloured city master plan. The second type of urban planning is an altogether different concept for which one needs a different 'breed of planners'. Insofar as it seeks to accept some of the concerns of national planning for economic and social development, it is closer to the dominant ideas governing planning at the national level. The only difference is that the exercise has for its focus a distinct spatial unit. Another important concern of this type of urban planning is to formulate policies and programmes for provision of essential urban infrastructure and to ensure minimum essential standards of the social overheads. Both the concerns are highly interrelated as the goal essentially is to promote economic and social development.

If the town planners' main aim is to achieve the 'city beautiful', the economic and social planners' chief target is 'city productive'. What we have been practising so far in this country is the first kind of planning in our urban areas with its primary emphasis on regulation of use of land and engineering and architectural aspects of planning. Since the days of the British Raj, city development in India has been the overt expression of certain values about living cherished by the colonialists

---

[3] For an analysis of the specific functional schemes, *see* Abhijit Datta and Mohit Bhattacharya, "A Functional Approach to Indian Federalism—Case Study of Urban Development," *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (April-June, 1967).

and the upper middle class. Hence, there were attempts at creating pockets of cleanliness and orderly habitation in the otherwise chaotic and congested cities. This value orientation persists to this day, the only difference being in the scope of planning which has changed from the insular 'civil lines' idea to a more broad-based city master plan. Possibly, the continuing 'tradition' of town planning, the socio-economic background of practising town planners and architects and social pressures put on them by economically and culturally dominant groups have all contributed to the kind of town and country planning that we have in contemporary India.

Another important cause for the persistence of two kinds of planning at macro and micro levels is the absence of spatial orientation of our national and state planning. National planning has generally been concerned with the choice of sectors to be developed and with separate larger projects. Aside from occasional expressions of anxiety about 'regional imbalances' and location of industries (as in the Third Plan), planning at the national level has not been consciously related to the natural endowments and the needs of specific space units at sub-national and sub-state levels. The way urban planning has so far been conducted provides a glaring testimony to the disharmony that exists between planning at the national and state levels and planning at the urban area level. Whatever is postulated at the Central level in terms of achievement of growth targets does not seem to have any significance for the different space units down below. If the Fifth Five Year Plan has for its major objectives removal of poverty, achievement of certain growth targets and distributive justice in the shape of the minimum needs programme, the different space units, such as states, districts, blocks and municipalities, are expected to move in concert to fulfil the promises made in the plan. This 'top-down' linkage needs, of course, to be supplemented by 'bottom-up' contacts and feedbacks. Depending on the natural endowments and needs of specific space units, each unit will be formulating a plan framework to suit its own conditions and requirements. In Polish City planning. this kind of integration between national and urban planning is achieved through what is known as the 'stage plan'. "The stage plan method links the process of city planning with the rhythm of economic planning. The realization of the long-term master plan, or, as it is called in Poland, the perspective plan, of a city is expected to take place by stages, each stage determined by the national economic five-year plans."[4]

Organizational Preconditions

Urban planning can be integrated with national planning, if the

[4] Jack C. Fisher (ed.), *City and Regional Planning in Poland*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 66.

element of space is deliberately introduced into the latter. To quote Tinbergen, "In order to be systematic, different size categories of space must be distinguished; and a nation should be sub-divided into a number of regions, together covering the whole nation. Each region should be sub-divided into smaller units, let us say districts, and so on, until we arrive at the area served by one village or serving one village."[5] For the purposes of urban planning in India, the space units can be urban regions comprising bigger metropolitan complexes, like Calcutta, Bombay and others, and municipal units and their adjoining influence or command areas which might include rural hinterlands. The linking up of urban planning with planning at higher levels will become possible provided a strong and well-equipped planning machinery is set up at the state and district levels. Apart from self-contained plans of larger metropolitan complexes, in most other cases municipal plans have to form parts of relevant district plans. The district plans will be taking care of the comlementary needs of urban and rural areas and their balanced development. For the purposes of planning, the giant metropolitan complexes will have to be treated as 'districts' and their plans can be integrated with other areas at the State level.

There are certain organizational bottlenecks that need to be removed to enable urban areas to plan in the context of multi-level planning. It is assumed that the requisite planning machinery will be set up at the state and district levels. Planning at different levels should, however, be related to the structure of government at each level. At sub-state levels, the foci of public decision-making are either missing or very weak. For instance, district planning is going to be crucial as a meeting point of rural and urban plannings at locality levels. But the districts are generally lacking in elective governments. Even where zila parishads exist, these are wholly oriented to rural problems.

In future, from the standpoint of multi-level planning, the governmental structure at the district level has to be made more broad-based by incorporating urban interests as well. The existence of dual government—district administration and representative government—would necessitate harmonizing mechanisms to blend together the approaches and problems of both. At the level of urban areas, two problems might pose difficulties: (1) fragmentation of governments, and (2) weaknesses of municipal organization. Especially in the bigger metropolitan areas, one frequently encounters a maze of authorities dealing with specific urban facilities, and the current trend seems to be toward multiplying

[5] J. Tinbergen, "Links between National Planning and Town and Country Planning", *Urbanization in Developing Countries*, The Hague, International Union of Local Authorities, 1968.

them. The geographical and functional fragmentations that follow from the situation would inevitably lead to the baffling problem of coordination. Ultimately, another coordinating super authority has to be created to hold a precarious balance.

Much of this problem can be solved if attempts are made to create, as far as possible, multi-purpose organizations. Many a time, special purpose authorities are set up to 'depoliticise' local development. In consequence, the multi-purpose municipal organization goes on gradually losing functions to the special purpose bodies. Instead of running down municipal government and depriving it of its functions, in a democracy, efforts should be made to identify and remove the weaknesses of municipal organization.

This leads us to the second major problem standing in the way of urban planning. Municipal participation in multi-level planning would depend on the quality of municipal administration. The basic structure of municipal administration in India has not altered much since the days of Lord Ripon. Within the organization, the decision-making apparatus is indeterminate largely because of a high degree of diffusion of authority through the committee system and the 'ward' system of election. Also, our urban areas have not been able to send enough councillors of calibre, thus rendering dispassionate and balanced discussions of urban problems difficult in a majority of municipal councils. For lack of space, we do not intend to go into a detailed discussion of this important aspect of municipal management. But meaningful involvement of municipal government in multi-level planning will, in the ultimate analysis, hinge on the appropriate structure of municipal administration and the functional behavioural disposition of the elected representatives and the urban administrators.

SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MULTI-LEVEL PLANNING

A. P. Barnabas

SOCIOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN PLANNING

DEVELOPMENT which is the end-product of planning, is undertaken to improve the quality of life of the citizens. The problem, however, is that development is often conceived mostly in terms of mobilization or allocation of physical resources. The human factors in the improvement of the quality of life of a citizen are either overlooked by default or have a low prioiity. The emphasis on economic factors in the planning process is only one of the factors that is of concern to sociologists. Some sociologists have basically questioned planning as a means to bring about change. One termed it 'absurd effort to make the world over', while another contended that it is a 'futilitarian view of social change'. Other sociologists have felt that it is possible to plan for the future. One of them goes to the extent of saying that creative manipulation of society is not only possible but necessary. He further asserts that this manipulation is possible within a democratic framework.

The controversy among the sociologists arises out of differences of opinion regarding the assumptions that are made when planning is undertaken. Planning for development means directed change. The fact that change is directed, has many implications. It must be assumed that the direction of change is clear and desirable. Planning is meaningful, only when a society knows what destiny it has in mind to plan for. It must then be assumed that the planners in a society are aware of what destiny to work for. It would also mean that there is unanimity or at least consensus with regard to the goals to be achieved.

Another factor is that it must be taken for granted that it is possible to plan for the destiny which the society has decided upon; otherwise planning cannot be used as a means to reach the desired end. Man must have the knowledge to control his own destiny. The knowledge, which the man has, could be used in the process of bringing about the directed change. It must, however, be noted that having knowledge and using that knowledge are two different things.

If the plan is for the society, group action would be the process to

arrive at a destiny decided upon. The question of the acceptance of the plan does not arise because of the assumption that the plan is for arriving at the destiny, which the society desires. It is then a matter of mobilizing the active participation of the members of the society. If the plan is to succeed, participation has to be channelled so that there is an organized effort. In the last analysis, people must carry out planned change. The support and involvement of the people are necessaryi ngredients of a plan.

Another assumption is that the process of planning does not restrict freedom in society. But 'freedom can only exist when it is secured by planning'. The essentials of the freedom must be guaranteed by the plan itself. This is not easy for basically, planning calls for controls. Without controls, change cannot be directed. Planning within a democratic structure is, thus, difficult. Controls, on the one hand, in a way deny freedom: on the other hand, they are a necessary for a plan to succeed. This implies that the planners control the means of the forces to bring about the required change. The dilemma between planning and freedom cannot be just wished away. It may be noted that planning is a phenomenon that occurs, by and large, in totalitarian societies. The problem in India, with regard to planning, is two-fold—it has to be operated within a democratic frame and it is partial.

Factors in Social Change

The point has aready been made that usually planning has tended to emphasize the economic factors and neglected the social aspects. The destiny of any society cannot be determined only in terms of economic goals. In the ultimate analysis, planning is a process to improve the quality of human life—in other words, to bring about economic and social change. What then are some of the factors that need to be given attention to? Whether the planning be at macro-level or micro-level, the problems indicated here would be relevant.

The problem in development is not only alteration of values or attitude changes but changing the social environment which is relevant to the learning of new behaviour patterns. Values have to be changed because they are the motives for action. The new behaviour must persist and hence the need to nurture the new behaviour patterns. Simey puts it more succincly when he says "it was necessary to understand how the day-to-day social life was shaped, including his everyday thinking. It also ought to be understood how the social values that motivated the routine of social behaviour could be examined so that higher standards could be achieved and social habits should be im-

proved in the interests of establishing a cumulative improvement in the patterns of culture." It is important to note that behaviour is not determined by a single cause as is often assumed by planners but by a multiplicity of factors. Apart from the economic motivation, the social structure, religious beliefs, family organization, political affiliation, all these influence human behaviour. There would be tension in any social system when change is introduced. The acceptance would, therefore, be on the basis of the net social gratification. If the perception tends to create anxiety with regard to the gratification in social relations, the acceptance of a change will be difficult.

Planning is purposefully induced change. In such a situation, it is natural that the change-agent is of critical importance for the success of a plan. The relations between the target system (the society planned for) and the change-agent are vital. In the Indian setting, the administrative system is the change-agent. The perception of the public regarding the change-agent according to the studies made are not positive. If the target system and the change agent system are alienated from each other, the possibility of introducing and, more particularly sustaining the changes are meagre.

Changes to be meaningful must last over a period of time. The legitimization of a change, therefore, is a must. The process is not easy. The question is not only who the inducers of change are but who are the legitimisers of change. Rationalization of the change, internalization of the changed values, and continuation of new behaviour patterns are elements in the legitimization of change. Does the social environment allow this? The need for creating a social environment, which would allow continuation of new behaviour patterns, as a part of the planning process, has already been made.

The process of legitimization may involve re-arrangements or changes in the institutional set-up. The system of land rights may have to be changed (*e. g.*, land reforms). A new form of banking may have to be introduced. The distributive system may need to be altered (*e. g.*, wholesale trade takeover). The social system may have to undergo changes. These changes may include the following, which could also help in the persistence of change:

(*i*) Change in the combination of persons who participate in the system;

(*ii*) Change in the roles people play in the system; and

(*iii*) Change in the statuses of the persons within the system.

The problem of the coming about of such changes, when change is externally induced, need hardly be stressed. Planning has, by and large, meant imposed changes.

Sociological Implications

The concept of multi-level planning is an effort to plan from a more local level. Basically a "multi-level operation will seek to reconcile territorial distribution of a planned resources with adequate scope for the development of strategic industries and sectors which alone can sustain a rapid tempo of economic development". It also seems to be recognized that investment in education, health, nutrition, etc., are just as essential for sustained growth with social justice. The attempt, therefore, seems to be the rational use of resources for developing specific areas. It is assumed that these plans would be dovetailed into the State and National plans.

What are the sociological implications of such a strategy? Development should result in human well-being. The changes in the social structure or the improvement of economic resources do not by themselves indicate human well-being. There is, at present, not quite adequate knowledge regarding the great variety of elements in a society and their determining relationship to development. A considerable amount of research is required before concrete implications can be indicated. However, sociological insights do allow for projections.

It may be useful to recall that the planning process involves the following steps:

(*i*) Identification of problems;
(*ii*) Gathering the necessary information to deal with the problems;
(*iii*) Mobilizing the resources, economic and social, also local and external;
(*iv*) Mobilizing the people;
(*v*) Creating an organization for implementation of the plan;
(*vi*) Implementation of the plan;
(*vii*) Legitimization of the change; and
(*viii*) Increasing the tempo of change.

It would be easier to go through these steps in a meaningful way in a situation where people are involved in the total process. The plan would be to meet the problems that have been identified.

There are two problems that must be given thought to in introd ing multi-level planning. As indicated, the multi-level planning wo have a territorial distribution. The concept of homogeneity may sor times be based only on soil conditions, crop patterns, natural resour ecology, etc. To base a plan on such homogeneity can go against social homogeneity which would take into consideration ethnic affin language barriers, religious differences, and differences in social syste Similar needs have been met in different ways by different cultu groups. If planning at more local level has to be successful, it can afford to ignore the social realities in a particular territory. The otl problem is that the national plans may conflict with a plan of a parti lar area. The implications of a conflict in such a situation are obvio People whose hopes are raised with regard to the fulfilment of th needs would feel let down. This would make the implementation programmes of national plans in the area difficult. A careful analy and proper balancing of national needs and of the needs of the area very necessary.

It must be assumed that such problems will be anticipated a necessary steps taken to overcome or at least to minimize the imp of such problems. As has been said earlier, the planning l tended to be, as far as the Indian society is concerned, somewhat of external phenomenon, in the sense that the involvement of the peo has been minimal. The present effort—the multi-level planning seems to be an effort to involve the people by trying to meet the nee at a more localized level. If the plan is perceived by the people as me ing the needs—which they can identify—their involvement and partici tion become more easy.

Looking at problems within specified territories should allow fo balanced growth within the area between various sectors. Such balance could provide for the stability of the population. One of t problems today is a purposeless migration. Such a migration is creati problems both for the urban areas and the rural areas. If the plans a meaningful, and the people can see that there is possibility of a rap tempo of change within the area, it might be possible to hold t population within the territory.

Changes in any area are bound to bring about certain changes the social system. The roles of some of the people might chan and the status of the people might become different. If these chang are perceived by the people as helping in meeting the needs of tl community in the area, there will be less resistance to the differe roles to be played by the people from within the area. The relationsh

between the change-agent system and the target system are likely to be more positive if the target system has some involvement in indicating its needs and having some share in the implementation of the plan. Such relationships would also make it easier for the legitimization of the change, because the people themselves would be the legitimisers of the change. Changes usually have a chain reaction. When a change is legitimized, there is bound to be an increased tempo of social change. When changes are directed to meet the needs of the people and create a sense of well-being in them, the quality of the life of the citizens is bound to improve. This is the ultimate purpose of planning.

PLANNED CHANGE IN TRIBAL AREAS

*S. P. Sinha**

PLANNED change in tribal areas in India could be understood pr(perly if we begin with a study this phenomenon from the time (the Britishers' rule. They are rightly credited with having been the fir: to extend the arms of government most seriously (may be due to imperi: listic design) to the inaccessible hilly fastnesses which had the traditio of being in oblivion, paying occasional tribute and professing loo: loyalty when pressed to do so. The constitutional obligation in fre India to make the tribals catch up the non-tribals in the race of socia political and economic prosperity, which is the kernel of planned actio in different Five Year Plan periods, cannot be fully appreciated, if th special situation in tribal areas, ecologically, socially, politically an administratively is not fully discussed. But paucity of space limits th study to administrative situation only, which is of course the mai fountain of all activities directed to bring about change in ecolog society, polity, economy in any area. Therefore, this article has bee divided into two parts: (*i*) planned change in British tribal India wit the sole purpose of isolating the tribals from the mainstream of nation: life, and (*ii*) planned change in free tribal India during the four Fiv Years Plans with the sole purpose of integrating the tribals into th mainstream of national life. The study is limited in its coverage t the situation in the tribal areas of Bihar which is a typical example (what is happening in tribal areas in India today.

PLANNED CHANGE IN BRITISH TRIBAL INDIA

Bringing about transformation of the tribal people living in hill fastnesses and out-of-way places, unattended and unknown, has bee the special concern of administration right from the days of Warre Hastings, when first governmental attempts were made to bring band 'Hill men' or Pahariyas of Rajmahal Hills under the pale of civilizatio through an indefatigable Brooke, Browne, or Cleveland in the late part of the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century saw th utilitarians, like Munro, Elphinstone and Metcalfe, the three princip: representatives of a patriarchal, unitary system of administratior

---

*The views expressed in this article are author's own.

devising the pattern of field administration which was military in form but personal in orientation.[1] They devised a steel frame of administration to bring about a change in tribal areas by discarding Cornwallis's division of judiciary from executive; they would allow no one to be glued to his chair in court or office. The man who collected the revenue was also responsible for order—he was policeman, Magistrate, and Judge.

This system of government stood for different ideals. To the rayot, government must be represented simply, not by a multiplicity of officers and a multiplicity of written forms, but by a single officer, who had powers to enquire, to judge, and to punish without the delay and intricacies of Western legal process. This officer was not to be a distant and awful figure, presiding in his cutchery like a deity in his temple, but a familiar lord, visiting and speaking with them of their quarrels and their crops and looked up to as Ma-Bap—father and mother. In practical terms, this meant a union of powers, at least at the district level.[2] The emergence of new ideas, *viz*., liberalism, utilitarianism, and humanism which called for a new view of the functions of Government, paved the way for combination of magisterial and revenue functions in the person of the Collector. It was considered most desirable because it was in consonance with the contemporary philosophy of liberalism which advocated functionalism on the one hand and centralism on the other.[3]

It is to be noted that no civilian officer was preferred for the tribal areas; the criteria seemed to have been efficiency as a military officer in suppressing the unrest or tribal rebellions as well as the prevailing notion that the military officers were best suited for administration and pacification of such turbulent areas. This attitude came in such a bold relief that the provinces where such military officers were employed were known as Non-Regulation while civilians were exclusively employed in Regulation provinces.[4]

Dent and Wilkinson, Special Commissioners to suppress the Great Kole Rising of 1832, must have been influenced by these ideals. Wilkinson's thinking was more due to the direct experience he had in running administration in tribal areas of Nagpore for more than a decade

---

[1] Haridwar Rai, "Politico-Administrative Bases of India: Field Administration", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, p. 474.

[2] Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959, p. 20.

[3] B.B. Misra, *The Central Administration of the East India Company*, 1773-1834, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 289.

[4] L.S.S. O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service*, 1601-1930, London, Frank Cass, 1965 (2nd edn.), p. 53.

where he drew heavily on his experiences and upon the ideas workec by Munro and Elphinstone. But his model was W. Blunt, who hac considerable experience of tribal administration of Civil justice in Arracan[5] in 1828. W. Blunt, who rose to be the third member o the Governor-General's Council, was the most important of the paternalists under the reforming Bentick.

Thus, the system of the administration of specially tribal areas by these utilitarians was paternalistic in mode and depended more for its successful operation in large measure upon the personal qualities of character, initiative and vigour. Similar to the arrangement at provincial level, the districts in which military officers were employed were known as Non-Regulation, while those where civilians were exclusively employed were Regulation districts—these were governed by the laws made under the Charter Acts called Regulations till 1834. Elements of administration in Non-Regulation areas (predominantly inhabited by turbulent people, whose pacification was the greatest necessity) were predominantly military with the civilian's part relegated to a secondary position.

The system had certain merits which served the British cause in Arracans in 1828, when Blunt framed the famous the Arracan Rules, in Chotanagpur in 1834, when Wilkinson's Rules were promulgated, and in 1855, when a separate Santal Parganas District was created. British policy in those Non-Regulation areas remained isolationist and as the time went on the idea that special arrangements were necessary for the isolated tribal regions gained general acceptance. The whole of the nineteenth century was punctuated by one tribal rebellion or other. This compelled British administrators to experiment with one measure or the other—legislative or executive—till such time that these areas were turned into practically "ethnological parks", protected and safeguarded by different tenurial steps and executive actions. Pax Britannica was meaningless without the religion of Christ being the major persuasion of the subject people and, therefore, a thorough and systematic induction of christian missionaries started in the tribal areas. They were actuated by an "obligation to convert our erring brethren to the faith of Christ".[6] They thought "to make Government effectual to all the good purpose of it, there must be a religion".[7] We are aware of

[5] Communication from W. Blunt, Special Commissioner for Arracans, to H. Shakespeare, Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, Fort William, dated 19th June, 1828.

[6] Rev. Alexander Duff, *India and Indian Missions*, London, 1840 (second edition) p. 308.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 294.

the various christian missionaries' exploits and their persistent approach to keep the tribal converts away from the national movement.

The Mutiny brought into bold relief the merits of paternal despotism, because it was considered that paternal despotism was not only the happiest but the only regime for India.[8] Therefore, in the year 1874, when the Scheduled District Act was passed, or in 1919 and 1935, when Government of India Acts were passed, the tribal areas in different states were kept excluded from the purview of the legislature and were kept as wholly excluded areas and areas of modified exclusion—'Partially excluded Area' and 'Excluded Area'. This exclusion served to a great extent the British purpose of keeping the tribal areas isolated, away from the mainstream of national life, so that the 'contagion' of the Freedom Movement did not affect the tribal people. Therefore, extensive tribal tracts in the provinces of Bihar, Bengal, Orissa, U.P., Madhya Pradesh, Bombay, and Madras, were declared 'partially excluded areas', whereas frontier and border regions in Assam, Laccadive and Minicoy Islands, and the Lahul and Spiti areas in Himachal Pradesh were declared 'excluded areas'.

In spite of the enforced isolation, the tribals responded to the call of Mahatma Gandhi and other nationalist leaders.[9] In Bihar, the Tana Bhagat movement got mixed up with the Non-cooperation movement launched by Gandhiji. Some of the valiant Tanas walked on foot to Lahore, Belgaum, Nagpur, Calcutta, Gaya, Ramgarh, etc., to attend sessions of the Indian National Congress and participated in other agitations, like Flag Satyagraha at Nagpore, and courted arrest many times. The national leaders got first hand knowledge of their conditions and they became anxious to reintegrate the tribal society with the main current of Indian life from where they (tribals) had been kept away all along by the British masters for reasons suited to their imperialist designs. Protests were raised against the British policy of isolation through protection. After the formation of popular ministries in 1937, committees were appointed in the provinces of Bihar, Orissa, Bombay and Madras, to enquire into the condition of the tribals; but the resignation of the Ministries postponed adoption of any new policy for tribal welfare until Independence.

Shri A. V. Thakkar and some other workers of the Servants of India Society did pioneering work among the tribes and they prepared the

---

[8] Thomas R. Metcalfe, *The Afternath of Revolt, India 1832-1870*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 250-252.

[9] S.P. Sinha, "Mahatma Gandhi's Impact on Chhotanagpur Tribes (1920-30)," Gandhiji & Social Sciences and other papers, New Delhi, 1970.

ground for a new attitude and approach towards the tribals by the national leaders, who were getting conscious by and by of their responsibility towards them (tribals). A vast literature on tribe and caste by early British administrators, like Dalton and Risley, by Census Officers, like Grigson and Hutton, by anthropologists, like S. C. Roy B. S. Guha, etc., gave good insights into tribal problems. Verrier Elwin's contribution towards understanding tribal problems is still a landmark which helped Mahatama Gandhi and, later on, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in formulating their ideas regarding the tribal problems.[10] Missionaries, like Knowles, Wood, Hislop, Nortrott, Bodding, Hoffmann, etc., placed their view points on tribal life and aspirations, though they interpreted these in their own way.

PLANNED CHANGE IN FREE TRIBAL INDIA

When India attained Independence, the leaders were greatly benefited by such literature and one of the first acts of the Constituent Assembly was to appoint the 'Excluded and partially Excluded Areas' (Other than Assam) Sub-committee with Shri A. V. Thakkar as Chairman which showed that the new democratic state is aware of its responsibility towards the welfare of the tribal people living in areas however remote and inaccessible they might be.

The Constituent Assembly accepted this and the tribal problem at once became an integral part of the development of Indian people as a whole. Sardar Patel would not like to rest till every tribal reached the level of Sri Jaipal Singh.[11] Thus, the Constituent Assembly passed some of the provisions, like Article 46, which embody the new policy, its 'message of hope',[12] for millions of our citizens hitherto neglected. Out of Article 46 flows all safeguards for members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Thus, the goal set by the Constitution assures a progressive life to the members of these weaker sections of our community. Our goal is to emancipate them from all forms of exploitation.

Five Year Plans

In tune with these objectives, the Five Year Plans were launched with some special priority to eradicate different handicaps and disabilities imposed by the working of the earlier governmental machinery. The under privileged groups, such as scheduled tribes, scheduled castes,

---

[10] Verrier Elwin, (1) Philosophy of NEFA, (2) New Deal.

[11] *Constituent Assembly Debates* (Discussion on 30th April 1947), Vol. 3, page 467.

[12] *Ibid.*

denotified tribes, nomadic tribes and semi-nomadic tribes lacked adequate opportunities for group and individual self-development, specially in increasing their income, employment, facilities of health, housing and education.

At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan, there were (they are still continuing unchanged) about 427 tribal communities (their number is 38.2 million according to census of India 1971) at varying levels of development, some of them living in isolated hilly fastnesses which are almost inaccessible. To promote their welfare, Article 275 provides for grants-in-aid from the consolidated fund of India to States for implementation of developmental programmes, in addition to general developmental outlays accruing to the tribal people and areas. In 21 years of planned development, a sum of Rs. 358 crores was spent up to 1971-72 of on welfare of backward classes through special schemes alone. The table below would give the idea of plan provision and expenditure incurred on scheduled tribes during the first three plans.

Table 1

Plan Provision and Expenditure on Scheduled Tribes[18]

Plan	*Total Plan*		*Scheduled Tribes*			
	Provision	*Expenditure*	*Provision*	*Percentage to total plan provision*	*Expenditure*	*Percentage to total expenditure*
First	2378	1960	25.00	1.05	20.05	1.03
Second	4800	4672	47.00	0.98	40.93	0.94
Third	7500	8608	59.39	0.79	53.40	0.62

The report of the Task Force on Development of Tribal Areas, Planning Commission in January 1973, gives Table 2, on page 369, to show as to how the proportionate size plan expenditure for scheduled tribes diminished in comparison with the total plan.

As a matter of fact, the special provision in the plan for scheduled tribes and other backward classes is not in lieu of the provision in the General Development Programme but it is intended to supplement it.

[18] Report of the Study Team on Tribal Development Programmes, Planning Commission, 1969.

Table 2

Size of Plan for Scheduled Tribes

Plan period	*Total plan*	*Scheduled tribes*	*percentage*
First plan	1960	19.93	1.0
Second plan	4672	42.92	0.9
Third plan	8577	50.53	0.5
1966-69	6756	32.32	0.5
Fourth plan	15,3902.2 (Outlay)	75.00	0.04

Except Andhra, no state government, unfortunately, has been founc alive to this fact.

Table on page 370 shows the expenditure incurred on differen sectors of welfare of the scheduled tribes during the first, second anc third five year plan periods and the average per capita expenditure pe annum on the three groups of schemes.

Except the Education sector, under which stipends and scholarship were given to the Scheduled Tribe students, invariably the welfar content in other sectors was general and diversified. Therefore wher as the expenditure under the head 'Education' might have helped i throwing up a new elite among the tribes (very beneficial for them, in deed), expenditure under other sectors has reportedly accentuated th tensional situation between the parochial tribals and the exploitin non-tribes causing severe hindrance in integration of the tribes with th mainstream of our national life.

This also shows that there has been increase in expenditure fror plan to plan but in the third plan, expenditure on it is 21.56 per cer more than that during the second plan period. In the first plan, th main emphasis was on health, housing and communication, but in th second plan the emphasis shifted to 'economic development' (agricu ture, cottage industries, forest cooperative societies and setting up c multipurpose tribal blocks). The Third Plan renamed these blocks a 'Tribal Development Blocks' with the priorities on economic uplift, edu cation and health, housing and communications. The same priority wa adopted for the fourth plan also. The Study Team on Tribal Develoj ment Programmes, set up by the Planning Commission in 1969, did nc feel enthusiastic to give a clear verdict as to whether the progress wa 'appreciable or marginal' but it was very clear to the team that "

Expenditure incurred on the Welfare of Scheduled Tribes

Scheme	*First Plan*		*Second Plan*		*Third Plan*		*Expenditure in 1966-69*	
	Total Expenditure incurred (Rs. in crores)	*Expenditure per capita (Rs.)*	*Total Expenditure incurred (Rs. in crores)*	*Expenditure per capita (Rs.)*	*Total Expenditure incurred (Rs. in crores)*	*Expenditure per capita (Rs.)*	*Total Expenditure (Rs. in crores)*	*Expenditure per capita (Rs.)*
1. Education	5.10	0.48	7.84	0.78	13.51	0.98	9.32	N.A.
2. Economic Uplift	4.59	0.41	20.00	1.78	30.71	1.82	24.07	N.A.
3. Health, Housing Communication etc.	10.14	0.90	15.08	1.34	6.31	0.78	1.93	N.A.
Total :	19.83	1.79	42.92	3.90	50.53	3.58	35.32	N.A.

progress is to be judged by what remains to be done to bring the tribals on par with the rest of the population, the leeway to be made up is still considerable and that the delay in the implementation of considered recommendations made by the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission and other high level bodies in the past to protect the rights of the tribals has worsened the position which these recommendations were intended to correct, while the failure to pay attention to and profit by their advice on matters pertaining to the formulation and implementation of tribal development programmes has resulted in the failure of ambitious schemes and consequent waste of valuable resources."[14]

Experience shows that most of the programmes in the backward classes sector, in the absence of adequate financial backing and organizational support, had little impact on the poverty, educational backwardness and social disability of backward classes.[15] Even in the cases of area based programme, such as Tribal Development Blocks (taken up since the Second Plan), the impact has not been satisfactory on account of the limited area covered and the absence of substantial investment called for on such programmes as minor irrigation, development of communication and electrification, etc.[16] According to a recent report,[17] allocation under welfare of backward classes, which was meant to be supplementary to the outlays in the general sectors of development have, in fact, substituted the latter. The policy of productive schemes in the fourth plan was not only to increase productivity as a whole but also to remove huge disparities in development that exist between different regions and classes. It is regrettable that so far as backward classes are concerned, the disparities have tended to increase between them and the rest of the population. As on April 18, 1973, there were 504 Tribal Development Blocks in the country but the philosophy of tribal development has miserably failed.

Fifth Five Year Plan

The current thinking is that in view of the magnitude of the problem of scheduled tribes, which has baffled our planners as well as executors in the period of four five-year plans, some time bound programmes have to be formulated to provide increase in the level of literacy, major changes in occupational pattern and development of infrastructure in terms of marketing, provision of credit, communications and irrigations

[14] *Shiloo Auo Committee Report*, New Delhi, 1969 (Mimeographed), p. 25.

[15] *Approach to the Fifth Plan (1974-79)*, Planning Commission, 1973, p. 57.

[16] *Report of the Steering Group on Development of Backward Classes and Social Welfare for the Fifth Five Year Plan* (Planning Commission), 1973, p. 10.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

so that they could come up to an adequate minimum level of living, comparable with that of the general population.

Once again, hopes have been pinned on the Fifth Five Year Plan. Perspective plans have been prepared up to 1988-89 through which least minimum facilities of civilized existence to the members of scheduled tribes and other backward communities are also provided so that disparities that exist between them and the general people can legitimately be narrowed and finally eliminated. With such an end in view, the Fifth Five Year Plan strategy of development of backward classes places greater emphasis on the role of the general sector in providing major developmental programmes. The public consumption programmes, specially in regard to the minimum needs, will give high priority to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

In the Fifth Five Year Plan, it is considered that utmost priority is to be accorded to drawing up an integrated area plan after identifying specific tribal areas. In formulating plan programmes, review of legislative measures regarding preventing land alienation of both scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, removing indebtedness, restoring land to the landless scheduled castes, providing infrastructure for economic and social services, and modification of personnel policy in tribal areas should receive prior attention.

Some Pre-conditions

But no plan strategy can work well unless we pragmatically honour some of the compulsions of the tribal situation. The imbalance in development not only requires comprehensive planning but also a different type of administrative edifice. There are certain preconditions for the success of the Fifth Five Year Plan to be launched from 1974.

For drawing up a comprehensive development plan for tribal areas, identification of specific tribal areas is essential. Taking the criterion of concentration of tribal population, compact areas can be demarcated at macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Macro-areas could generally correspond to a sizable scheduled area, meso-areas may be coterminous with a district or taluk and micro-area may be a Tribal Development Block. Even after identifying and categorizing as macro-, meso-, and micro-tribal areas,[18] there would still be a large number of tribal pockets

[18] *Report of the Task Force on Development of Tribal Areas*, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 1973.

scattered throughout the country which deserve special attention and multi-level planning at the district level or even taluka level.

By and large, we have some clear-cut segment of tribal areas throughout the country; some of them have attained their status of statehood recently. We have the tribal areas in the north-eastern regions, like Meghalaya, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram where state plan benefits are largely for the tribal population. They have presently no problem of getting step-motherly treatment from the dominant group of people, but nonetheless it is very difficult to say that in those tribal states the dominant groups of tribals are not maintaining some sort of hegemony over less dominant ones.

Of the remaining states (except Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab, which are mostly without tribal population), the districts with substantial concentration of tribal population can be listed and comparable administrative units on taluka or block level can be identified for graded backwardness on the basis of economic status in the district and their literacy rates as compared to the general level of literacy of the district.

There is need for declaring more areas as scheduled area having more than 40 per cent of tribal population so that ameliorative measures could be taken on the lines suggested in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. According to 1971 census, there are 17 districts having 70 per cent or more tribal population (Laccadive and Minicoy Islands and Mizoram have 90 per cent tribal population), 13 districts with 50-69 per cent, 18 districts with 39-49 per cent, 46 districts with 10-29 per cent, and 89 districts with 1-9 per cent tribal population. The last two categories of the districts could be suitably grouped into a compact development zone and special development projects could be tried there for their all round development. The report of the Scheduled Area and Scheduled Tribes Commission has already suggested some more areas in the states of Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur and Union territories of Andaman and Nicobar islands for scheduling, since tribals living in the areas have similar conditions as of those in scheduled areas under Scheduled Area Order, 1950.

In this connection, mention could be made of some of the state governments setting up Area Development Authority. Bihar State Legislature, in 1971, constituted the Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas Autonomous Development Authority for "formulating short term and long term plans for this region as well as advising the State Government on matters connected with the preparation and implementation of

development programmes for this region" for the first time in the history of the authority areas. Some special attempts to identify the special problems of development of this region were made and are being made when group of bureaucrats and technocrats formulated and revised Rupees 1033 crores draft plan of the Authority. There is every chance of this plan being a wasteful exercise if it fails to arouse popular enthusiasm (which is difficult in view of the unwieldiness of deliberative bodies of the Authority) and the greater sincerity to execute it on the part of the powers that be at Patna and Delhi. The need of the hour is that when a plan has been prepared, the executing machinery should be yoked with all seriousness to take out the backward people living in the Authority's areas from morass. The important question of development of any such area could not be decided on the political plane only (analogies from Telengana with regard to earmarking separate fund); rather it is by the policy of ruthless implementation through a resolute will that we can expect the Authority to deliver the goods. It is said that procedural wrangles, mutual bickerings, wilful apathy, slothful bureaucracy and people's representatives might make this Authority a paper tiger which will not be in a position to check the rising extremist and separatists' fissiparous tendencies which can run diametrically against the interest of the people of the area and the State. Therefore, the Government, it seems, requires greater alertness in setting its own house in order.

About 85 per cent of the tribal population are engaged in agricultural pursuits and, therefore, their relationship with land, legislative and administrative measures and their execution is very significant. A thorough understanding of tribal customary land and forest right *vis-a-vis* changes which are taking place in the socio-economic tenure system in the tribal areas due to social contact between the tribals and non-tribals is imperative. Tribals and non-tribals have the tradition of living together peacefully over thousands of years; but the follies of neo-settlers during the aftermath of the Permanent Settlement of 1793 and subsequent waves of outsiders in wake of urbanization and industrialization have created a tensional situation between them creating a cleavage among the people as 'Diku' and 'Hor', and 'We group' and 'they group.' The problem of land alienation[19] and indebtedness have assumed grave proportions. Therefore, there is need for having a uniform approach in different parts of the country for identifying the tribal rights about land and forests through a thorough survey and settlement operations and preparation of records of rights. Measures to protect the

---

19 S.P. Sinha, *The Problem of Land Alienation in and Around Ranchi City*, Patna, 1968.

tribals against the exploitation of money lenders, land alienation, an resettling of land and other facilities would definitely better their lo

Since transactions between the tribal and licensed and non-license moneylenders are oral, it is very difficult to meet the situation. Som state governments have passed laws leading to debt redemption and con trol of money-lending activities by setting up of Conciliation Board and putting a moratorium on tribal loans, but the implementatio side is very bleak. The long-term remedy can be found in providin wider coverage of institutional credit in tribal areas and undertakin social education of tribals with the assistance of official and non-officia agencies. Tribal Development Corporations have been opened in som of the states but they have not been able to acquit themselves in bette ways. Land Mortgage Banks have not been able to help the triba masses and the cooperative, as a movement, has totally failed Forest Labour Cooperative Societies everywhere, except i Maharashtra, are the handmaid of forest contractors. State Triba Cooperative Development Corporations are merely sinking ships Government taccavi and other loans are practically useless for resource less tribals. Existing legal and medical aids to the tribals have not bee able to mitigate sufferings of even one per cent of them.

What is the reason for this dismal and bleak achievement of the ad ministrative machinery charged with responsibility to provide all thes facilities and advantages to the tribals ? The answer is given in th recent Report of the Planning Commission which found "the existin administrative and personnel policies for the tribal areas are far fron satisfactory". It felt that unless there is a single-agency administratio and it is within the comprehension of the tribals, whom the administra tion intends to serve, no amount of development planning would delive the goods.[20] For example, the tribal areas of Bihar in the Districts o Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas have been experiencing the wors experimentation. Ever since Independence and inauguration of th community development programme, the single-line system of adminis tration vested in the Deputy Commissioner under Non-Regulatior system started getting diversified so much that the plethora of adminis trative personnel bewildered the simple tribals. An army of official in tribal area executing one programme or another without being very much responsible have, far from serving the tribals, alienated them to the full. The plans which these officials execute, are sometime misunderstood and are taken as a clever device to entangle the tribal and dispossess them of their land which they value so much. Moreover

[20] *Report of the Steering Group on Development of Backward Classes and Socia Welfare for the Fifth Five Year Plan*, op. cit., New Delhi, June 1973.

the unsympathetic dealings of these officials with the tribals keep them practically on inimical terms with each other. Fists and blows, wordy duels, and acrimony prevail in the administration at the block and other levels. Tribals, alienated from this administrative machinery have not been able to reconcile with their present position and wistfully look to the days when their *Abua Raj* (their rule) would come.

The tribals are fast loosing their traditional autonomous system of tribal administration in Damin-i-Koh in Santal Parganas and Kolehan in Singhbhum, granted to them hundreds of years ago. They are now feeling the strain of disintegration due to unsympathetic recommendation of the State Law Commission. The matter is pending with the Tribal Advisory Council of Bihar.

While the Circuit Court of Patna High Court has been brought to the city of Ranchi, presumably to bring highest but costliest justice to the very doors of the tribals, the rough and ready justice meted out to the tribals in the Small Cause Courts in Santal Parganas under Santal Rules and Kolehan Courts under the Wilkinson's Rules with little cost are facing closure in the name of bringing uniformity to a people, who are still on a different footing of development.

The Panchayati Raj Act has been creating some complications. Zila parishads have been opened in all the tribal districts of Bihar where Adhyakshas have emerged as the co-sharer of powers with the Deputy Commissioner. The Adhyaksha is being assisted by one Senior IAS officer and several officials of Additional District Magistrate's rank in matters of development. The Deputy Commissioner is now left with revenue and law and order responsibilities only. Even here the Commissioner is concerned with some big issues. The need of the hour is to create a new cadre of leadership, which could realize the call of the time to integrate and replace those parochial elements which are vociferously demanding innumerable privileges at the cost of others just to perpetuate backwardness.[21] Backwardness has become a vested interest.

The Prospect

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we can safely see that the prospect of tribal administration is grim. So long as we do not remove the above mentioned failings most pragmatically, the dreams of our constitution makers to emancipate the tribals from all source of exploitation

[21] Prime Minister, *Smt. Indira Gandhi,* in her address to Welfare Ministers, in Newsletter, July 1971, Department of Social Welfare, New Delhi.

and to integrate them with the mainstream of national life, will remain unrealized. We do not get tired in proclaiming advantages and privileges to the tribals but, being based on the criteria of ethnic groupings, these are expropriated by the clever sections among the tribals. Any move to recognize economic criteria as the sole guidance of planning has been opposed tooth and nail by the vested interests but the Garibi Hatao from the tribals cannot be done without taking a drastic step of excluding those who are economically better off among them. A ranking of the backwardness among the tribal groups, based on a thorough socio-economic studies, can help us, but it is high time that we do not allow ourselves to become victims of sadistic pleasure of crying for the amelioration of tribals at the cost of the teeming millions but at the same time actually doing nothing for them.

MONITORING AND INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

C. S. Parthasarathy

THERE is a distinction drawn between the management function of planning and that of monitoring. Monitoring may usually be looked upon as the process of ensuring that performance takes place in conformity with plans. This would be in sharp contrast to plans which determine the objectives, means, and standards against which performance can be measured. Implementation of plans needs to be done with some degree of flexibility that would recognize the changing environment and circumstances which may make deviation from the plan not only proper but essential. The basic distinction between planning and monitoring may be somewhat sharp; but the two are inseparable because planning would be necessary before monitoring can prove meaningful and effective. Each of the two functions needs to be performed in the light of the other. Monitoring, which is a multi-dimension term like planning, may carry different meanings for its different dimensions.

Planning and monitoring, both conceptually and operationally, are inextricably interwoven. Medium-range programming and short-range budgeting, for example, are a combination of planning and monitoring activities. A manager mixes both these in managing. For instance, plans are formulated, activities then take place, corrections need to be made, new plans are evolved to meet the need for corrections and so on, for we are dealing here with a continuous process. Planning and monitoring are also inter-related in another fashion. Managers in an enterprise may be encouraged and allowed to participate in setting goals and standards for their own achievement. If this process is related to efforts to encourage self-monitoring, their performance would be intermixed with their commitment.

Despite this intermingling, planning and monitoring would need to be distinguished, both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, the development of plans without proper monitoring of activities taken to carry them out may not only lead to poor results but to developments completely contrary to plans. Perhaps, of more realistic consequence is that managerial relationships with people may be considerably

different as between planning and monitoring. The philosophy, attitude, and pursuit of planning and monitoring would differ very much depending on the centre of attention. To fail to distinguish between planning and monitoring conceptually and operationally may lead to a misunderstanding not only of the processes themselves, but of the ways in which they are inter-related.

Dependence of Government on Information

The role of information is pervasive in the operations of government. Information is rarely an end in itself; yet information—its availability, relevance, accuracy, timeliness, completeness and presentation format—plays a crucial role in almost every activity of government, namely, in policy-making, planning, decision-making, project/programme formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Thus, the excellence and effectiveness of government at all levels is, to a considerable extent, based on the quality of its information.

By the very nature of the functions assigned to it, government collects a tremendous amount of data and information. Among other things, government is the custodian of public resources and records, and has to account for this trust by reporting the results of its stewardship to the public. Government has also to play the role of chosen management agency of a public 'plant' and as such has not only to operate it on a day-to-day basis, but should also develop long-range projections and plans which will ensure economic and social well-being of the people at large.

Plan Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

Planning plays a dominant role in Government. Planning involves a process of extrapolation from a current data base and current trends, and the prediction of consequential effects. The latter are evaluated in terms of probabilities of occurrence, and the necessary facilities or monitoring mechanism has to be postulated and built into the Plan. Plan implementation, monitoring and evaluation involves measurement and review of the achievements or progress of programmes, projects, schemes, etc., against state objectives, or at times comparatively against other programmes, projects, schemes, etc. Government is called upon to perform, among other things, the following monitoring functions in regard to the implementation of Five Year Plans:

(1) Indicate the factors tending to retard economic development and determine the conditions which, in view of the current social and political situation, should be established for successful execution of the Plan;

(2) Determine the nature of the machinery necessary for securing successful implementation of each stage of the Plan in all its aspects; and

(3) Appraise from time to time the progress made in execution of each stage of the Plan and recommend adjustments of policy and measures that such appraisal may show to be necessary.

The monitoring function to be performed by government would involve the following:

(1) Review of progress of implementation of the Plan, its programmes, projects, schemes, etc., as compared with (*a*) the plan, (*b*) the target, and (*c*) standards, etc;

(2) Comparison with various programmes/projects/schemes or implementing organizations/agencies; and

(3) Performance appraisal, which may include: (*a*) schedules (*b*) physical quantities, (*c*) budget (costs), and (*d*) technical, performance.

This would require obtaining data and information—which are relevant, timely, accurate, complete, comparative, predictive, exception-oriented, question-raising, etc.—leading to: (*a*) programme/project status analysis, and (*b*) decision-making and action(both are parts of the Plan management cycle).

Role of Information

The role of information is to provide the data base by which government and its technical/functional departments can discharge their monitoring function. The information characteristics mentioned above would exercise a profound influence on Government's ability to perform its monitoring function effectively. Data and information are collected, stored, retrieved and used at various jurisdictional levels (both vertically and horizontally) in the organizational hierarchy and also exchanged between them. It should be a specific objective of a Monitoring and Information System (MIS) to improve the information handling character of government and its departments, sub-divisions, projects, etc., when viewed as a total integrated system and to reduce the costs attendant on the information activities.

Information Needs of Government

MIS can play a major role in solving some of the significant Plan implementation problems and information challenges. The solution

to these problems has to consider large geographical dispersal of programmes, projects, schemes, etc., involving a number of departments, regional units/district authorities, local self-governments, project administrations, etc. Effective approaches to these problems require availability of proper volume of data and information. While the data are generally collected, for one reason or the other, by various agencies, these are often not usable without extensive manipulation to bring them to any meaningful and compatible form.

Inter-Departmental Needs

A number of information problems may arise from use of the same information by different technical and functional departments of government. These problems ultimately relate to the efficiency by which government is able to perform its monitoring and information handling requirements. A need for solution to these problems constitutes an important consideration motivating the design and development of a MIS.

Clearing House for Information

There is need for improved knowledge on the location of relevant data and information of potential use to personnel in various departments and levels of government. As a corollary, there is also a need for identifying or determining which departments have had contacts or taken action with reference to particular objective (s) of Plan implementation and monitoring.

Problem Condition Monitoring

Government departments may be hampered in effectively correcting certain problems for want of current or timely data and information, and an effective monitoring mechanism to facilitate 'exception' or reporting of key factors or indicators of performance.

Information Environment

The quantum of data and information used by government for planning and monitoring purposes continues to expand as a result of increase in the size of the Five Year Plans, its complexity and the increasing number of agencies involved in the Plan formulation and its implementation, commitment of government in respect of various services, and several other factors. The monitoring and information handling problem may be compounded by these elements since they may

produce non-linear increases in the total volume of data which Government may be called upon to handle. These combine to produce an avalanche of data unless one proceeds on the basis of the 'exception' principle. Also, it appears that a major portion of the operating expenses of government offices may be attributable to information handling activities which include: (1) receiving data and information, (2) processing data, and (3) transmitting information.

Information Explosion

As part of the analysis of the present information environment in government, it would be necessary to consider the causes and consequences of information explosion that may currently be facing Government. Two major factors closely related to, and contributing to, the growth in the quantum of information being handled by Government may be: (1) increase in size and complexity of the Plans, its programmes, projects, schemes, etc.; and (2) increase in government's work force. There seems to be an urgent need for action implied in these facts of the life of government and its monitoring and information handling problems. Government would need to pursue vigorously the development of a comprehensive MIS so that it would be in a position to meet the challenges of future in the area of data and information with particular reference to implementation and monitoring of the Fifth Five Year Plan.

Information Challenges

The system may be offered as a solution to the data problem as an integrated system to serve the needs of government as a whole as well as its individual departments and sub-divisions—full consideration being given to the requirements of individual jurisdictional units, but the needs of government as a whole should be the primary concern. The creation of an integrated MIS, to be located in what may be styled 'Monitoring and Evaluation Organization' (MEO), may provide a tool of much greater value than the sum-up of its individual monitoring and information handling facilities. It should be a total system—an entity magnifying the capability of each monitoring and information handling department or organizational unit, and making available to each the resources of the whole (total systems approach). The establishment of a focal point of action to coalesce various elements and to respond to information challenge by taking advantage of the latest information techniques, hardly needs emphasis.

II

System Design Philosophy

MIS is the facilities, procedures and operating personnel organized for collection, transmission, storage, processing and output of information. It is not an end in itself but only a tool to support the functions of the user organization, namely, Government and its various departments. Information handling and processing facilities, storage media and operating personnel may be organized in any of the following ways: (1) functionally or geographically decentralized, (2) centralized, and (3) federated system.

System Objectives

MIS should have the following broad and basic objectives:

(1) promoting the maximum utilization of the acquired data and information for monitoring; and

(2) improving the efficiency in monitoring and handling of information.

Particular attention needs to be directed to the performance of tasks and services that are not now being carried out for some reason or other. For instance, the envisaged MIS should provide capability to:

(1) make available relevant information for effectively watching progress on Plan implementation, programme/project monitoring and evaluation, etc.;

(2) perform statistical studies and trend analyses requiring the total data base;

(3) correlate data from various sources on a timely basis;

(4) permit rapid retrieval of information in response to specific enquiries within and outside the Government; and

(5) permit timely determination of the status of performance and cost of specific programmes/projects or related groups of programmes/projects, etc.

In its broad connotation, the system should include the individual department data processing facilities. The continuing development of these facilities needs to be guided by the overall system principles if the MIS is to accomplish its objectives. Although the overall system would cover functional tasks relating to individual departments, etc., the

emphasis, as indicated earlier, would need to be placed on the major overall considerations and those elements of the system which inter-relate departments, etc. The system, apart from including functional data processing facilities in the participating departments, etc., would also embrace processing facilities common to various departments (MEO).

System Design Considerations

Various considerations for requirements need to be satisfied by the design of the MIS. To a greater or less degree, the considerations relating to the following would serve as guidelines for the system design: (1) technical, (2) organizational or jurisdictional, and (3) implementation. These are briefly discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

Technical Considerations: The system design needs to be based on the latest information techniques in regard to generation of data, reporting (upward), storage and retrieval, processing and analysis, presentation of output reports, decision-making and action, and information flow channels (vertical and horizontal).

Organizational Considerations: The system will primarily be based on the present organizational relationships between government departments, etc.

Implementation Considerations: The system concept and design should be such as to lend itself to practical realization. An adequate programme of familiarization and training of personnel in the various technical and functional departments, regional organizations, district administrations, local self-governments, projects, etc., is essential to maintain the pace of system implementation efficiently.

System Design Criteria

The following criteria, among others, may guide the system development:

Performance:

(1) The system should satisfy monitoring and information needs of technical and functional departments and government as a whole (say, Planning Departments).

(2) The system should eliminate unnecessary duplication and redundancy in regard to both acquisition and storage of data and information.

(3) The information should be presented in the most useful form—ordered or formatted or processed—so as to be question-raising and provoke management decision and initiation of action.

Implementation:

(1) The system design should lend itself to phased implementation leading to, say, total computerization in the ultimate phase of system development.

(2) The design should be such that each phase of implementation would provide incremental benefits independent of any further implementation.

Training:

The system and its operation with respect to its personnel interface should be forthright in concept to facilitate training of personnel concerned and to allow government and its constituent departments and units to take full advantage of the capabilities of the MIS.

Centralization Vs Decentralization

The question of centralization versus decentralization is basic to the concept of MIS and would arise at almost every juncture of system consideration. Various combinations of centralized and decentralized systems could be considered. There may be no necessity to make a choice as to whether the system should be all (*i. e.*, wholly) centralized or all decentralized. The magnitude and complexity of the system and the wide diversity of requirements imposed on it may be such that the task cannot be satisfactorily accomplished by a wholly centralized system, although some elements of the total system may be better served with a centralized approach. On account of the magnitude of the complete or full task involved, it may be expedient to centralize those portions of the MIS which are most amenable to this treatment, and allow other portions to operate in a decentralized fashion, thus achieving overall optimization for the entire or total system.

Evolutionary Approach

The system design concept may be such as to lead to an optimum final system through an evolutionary approach. The dynamic nature of the system requirement would suggest that the needs of government may be best satisfied by an evolutionary approach, in which MIS capability is

provided in a series of improvements which may continually increase the total capability of the system. In this way, one need not necessarily be committed to a large programme at the outset, and an opportunity could be afforded to operate the system and determine what each successive step, or increase in capability, should be. This would be a realistic and intelligent way to proceed. The evolution of MIS may start from a nucleus exhibiting the flexibility to permit an orderly pattern of development while possessing the necessary substance to weld the system into a unified entity. A 'federated' system would be a unique solution to this problem. It would favour neither a fully centralized nor a wholly decentralized arrangement and, in fact, would contain necessary elements required by a comprehensive system.

Monitoring and Information System Concept

The MIS proposed may be composed of the following two basic, but related, elements namely:

(1) A monitoring and communication network styled 'Monitoring and Evaluation Organization (MEO) located, say in the Planning Department; and

(2) Organizational monitoring and information processing facilities for departments, units of district administrations, local self-government, projects, etc., inter-connected by, and integrated with, (i) above.

This MIS development would provide for greater coordination of monitoring and information processing activities, while maintaining a certain degree of departmental independence. The elements of this system may have the following basic functions.

Monitoring and Evaluation Organization (MEO)

The MEO will be a central unit, say, in the Planning Department to integrate the monitoring and information efforts of departmental and geographical units. An underlying principle is that independent, distinct monitoring and information processing and analysis facilities in the various technical and functional departments should be integrated without being physically 'consolidated'. The functions of MEO would be to provide the missing link (s) in the organizational or departmental MIS picture in government—that of linking individual departments and geographical units and providing an integrated MIS based on more consistent and greater availability of data and information.

The federated system with MEO as its nerve centre would require less standardization than a completely centralized system. However, a compatibility study may be suggested as part of the development plan of the proposed system to identify and define significant parameters that determine compatibility between MEO and monitoring and information processing activities of the participating departments and geographical units. The compatibility study may also seek to determine the appropriate balance between departmental independence on the one hand and benefits of standardization on the other. Briefly stated, the advantages of standardization are lesser time and costs of the system implementation and information exchange; a common terminology, which would afford a basis for comparison and more efficient utilization of scarce resources, etc.

Organizational Considerations

The emphasis should be on the system elements which inter-relate departments. Since an integrated MIS will be a cooperative venture among all the user departments and territorial units, a Task Force of users or departmental representatives may be established to guide the system design, development and operation. All departments concerned need to be consulted or involved in system development and should participate in any standardization activity, etc.

Personnel and Facilities

In addition to its own operating personnel, the MEO should maintain liaison with each participating department. A liaison officer is necessary and needs to be designated in individual departments to work out day-to-day operating problems in relation to monitoring and information.

Department Facilities

There would be individual department and geographical unit monitoring and information facilities. In general, it may be desirable to maintain the individual department's freedom of action. There need be only the essential and minimum degree of compatibility, necessary to effect information exchange and comparison.

III

MIS Development Plan

The design of a development plan for a project, as important and as pervasive in its scope and potential effect on the operating methodology

as the proposed MIS, would be a task calling for great care and attention. The very fabric of the system will primarily be the individual contribution of the departmental efforts which together would add to a great drive towards the integrated system. A major objective of the MIS development plan would be to promote and offer only as much coordination and guidance as absolutely necessary to reach the desired goal of an integrated MIS. The department plan may cover or extend over a period of years. The selections of such a period would be based largely on the development sequence of the MIS envisaged. The development plan would need to provide for incremental implementation.

The initial development plan for a long-term project would identify and develop two basic elements, namely: (1) broad strategy for reaching an objective; and (2) insight into the necessary steps of implementation. Special emphasis needs to be given to recommended studies, policy formulation and preliminary system design activities covering the initial period after the inception of the project.

Implementation Strategy

The implementation strategy for the MIS may be developed in the context of following major considerations:

(1) inter-action between MEO and participating departments, district administrations, local self-governments, projects, etc;

(2) phasing of district and local self-government participation in the total communication/information network; and

(3) desirability of an early, small-scale demonstration of the capabilities of the system by a suitable 'pilot' programme.

The master development plan may be broadly divided into two major categories, namely: (1) MIS management (MEO), and (2) departmental facilities. These are discussed below.

MIS Management

This would relate to technical and managerial activities connected with the creation of MEO itself, say, in the Planning Department. It also involves formulation and carrying out of policies to be set forth in regard to MIS, and would be the central focus for coordination of departmental monitoring and information activities. The MIS management function may be carried out by MEO under the leadership of a cognisant programme director, reporting to a high executive level within the government.

Departmental Facilities

These constitute the foundation for the overall system. These activities, which may be currently performed in a general, disjointed, piecemeal fashion, would be subject to review and coordination by MEO in the context of departmental participation in the total integrated system.

Phasing of System Implementation

In considering phasing, it may be useful to identify the following milestones in the system implementation:

(1) activation of MEO;

(2) activation of the MIS with departmental tie-in;

(3) complete operation of the total system with participating departments, district administrations, local self-governments, projects, etc., fully tied-in to MEO;

(4) start computerization of the system; and

(5) complete computerization of the system.

IV

Participation of Departments, District Administrations, Local Self-Governments, Projects, etc., in the Total System

Monitoring and information inter-action between government organizations may be considerable and the desired benefits would accrue from the activation of the MIS right from the start to include departments, district administrations, local self-governments, projects, etc. They should tie into the overall system (Planning Department—MEO).

Pilot Programme

A valued concept in the development of a large and complex effort such as the MIS is the 'pilot' programme. The 'pilot' may be looked upon as smaller-scale version of the total programme, which can be implemented on a shorter time scale (in parallel with the design of the larger or comprehensive programme), and which can be used to test and verify the precepts and concepts of the overall programme. The pilot programme may assist in modifying the total programme based on experience derived from its operation.

MIS Management

The implementation of the MIS is an activity involving a high degree of inter-action with various technical and functional departments, district administrations, local self-governments, projects, etc. The success of this effort will to a large extent be determined by the substance and staffing of its management organization. It is suggested that the management technique of 'Programme Officer' be employed to implement the MIS. Accordingly, the MEO (*i.e.*, Programme Office) may be charged with the responsibility for the system implementation. The programme office may be composed of a Programme Director and a compact, tightly-knit staff of officers. The group may manage the programme and operate through other State personnel, consultants, contractors, etc. The major functions of the programme office (MEO) will be:

(1) programme implementation and control including schedules and budgets;

(2) technical direction; and

(3) coordination with other governmental jurisdiction—departments, local self-governments, projects, etc.

MIS Managment Activities

The master development plan would have to spell out the major areas of development activities connected with management aspects of the MIS. These are described below:

(1) *MIS Policy* would include: review of departmental facilities; relationship with local units, projects, etc.; personnel; financing; activation priority; and operation. It will be a continuing function during the entire life of the programme. After finalization of the initial policy document, it will be concerned with administration of the policy and updating of the policy document as may be required.

(2) *Compatibility and Interface Study.*

(3) *Organizational Activation Plan Development* would include the following:

(*a*) Study of the nature of the existing organizational monitoring and information facilities and any plans for developing the requirements of MEO;

(*b*) Preliminary identification of relevant data needed for monitoring and reporting on Plan implementation;

(*c*) Development of time schedules for the system; and

(*d*) Development of a training plan.

(4) *MEO Development* would include the following:

(*a*) Systems analysis and determination of departmental/organizational objectives, analysis of information interdependence, and preparing information flow map, present information handling activities and future requirements of information;

(*b*) Developing a conceptual design of the MIS; and

(*c*) Implementation of Plan and Schedule and means of funding.

The emphasis may be more on inter-departmental flow of information and interfaces rather than the internal flow within individual departments, regarding the undertaking of the study for design, installation and implementation of the MIS, with a view to obtaining their full cooperation and assistance in facilitating discussions and study, data collection, etc., and for expressing their own information needs.

Departmental Facilities

The integration of individual departments into the overall MIS may be effected with assistance from the MEO. As indicated earlier, the philosophy would be that the system may evolve from the coalescence of purpose of individual departmental or organizational or project sub-system, as indicated and coordinated by the MEO.

The foundation of the overall system will be the individual department's participation and cooperation. Hence, the overall system would have to recognize and satisfy the departments' information interdependencies. A basic objective of the concept is to amalgamate the information resources of all the organizational jurisdictions into a single integrated system to serve the information requirements of individual departments and organizational units as well as the needs of the entire Government.

In essence, the MIS needs to be developed as a 'federation' of departmental or organization monitoring and information units tied together by the MEO (Planning Department) and operating within a framework of compatibility procedures. A federated system with the MEO as the nerve centre would require lesser degree of standardization than a fully centralized MIS. The federated system would give

some freedom of choice in monitoring in respect of individual participating departments. There may, however, be need to strike a balance between standardization and operating autonomy.

System Values and Benefits

The value and effectiveness of a monitoring and information system is directly related to how well the system would support the monitoring and information needs of the various departments, district administrations, local self-governments, projects, etc. Significant gains may result from the system's potential for affording new insights into problems resulting from the growth in Plan size and the resultant complexity. Conventional data provided in conventional channels may become less and less adequate as problem boundaries expand beyond the traditional jurisdiction of individual functional departments. One department may need, say, land-use data, and another, demographic data, etc. Taken as a whole, government may possess a substantial proportion of the aggregate data needed by individual departments. An integrated MIS would unlock the mass of data and provide a sound data base corresponding to the problem system.

The more specific benefits that may be expected to accrue by the installation and operation of the system may be set out as follows:

(1) Cost avoidance and reduction by application of more efficient procedures to current operations, and in respect of operations planned for the future;

(2) Increased revenues—those which produce additional income;

(3) Better services—in respect of inter-actions among different agencies, as well as to departments in the performance of their own operations; and

(4) New services, *i.e.*, making possible those services that cannot be undertaken by the existing monitoring and information arrangements or methods.

V

MIS on a 'federated' basis, would be feasible and government may proceed with its development and make it operational at an early date, the ultimate objective being computerization of the overall system.

THE DISTRICT AS A PLANNING UNIT:
STYLE AND LOCUS*

Rakesh Hooja

ALL planning is based on information. Centralized planning without reference to the constituent parts only results in paper plans far removed from reality. The plan formulating decision-centre is thus not the key structure in the planning process; equally important are data collectors, transmitters, 'gate-keeping' information sifters, memory-banks, receptors, and the like (all of which may be considered as minor decision-making centres). Further, with both the work of government, and complexity of life, having vastly increased in the twentieth century and the ensuing need for expert specialization, it has become very difficult for a single decision-centre to cope with all the problems of plan-formulation on a national scale. This problem is naturally accentuated in a large country with a huge population. Therefore, it becomes necessary for advisory-centres or/and parallel decision-centres (with specified sectoral or areal jurisdictions) to evolve so that the planning machinery may prove adequate. Thus a multi-level approach to planning (with greater say in the hands of decision-centres at various levels) is beginning to be considered more and more suitable.

In India, with its federal structure and commitment to democratic decentralization, the advisory-centres were to be found not only in the national capital but also at the state levels (where State Planning Departments functioned as information sifters, memory banks, transmitters and—to some extent—parallel decision-centres, because the planning process was broken up into both sectoral and areal parts (so that information could be handled and processed adequately) with extensions in Panchayat bodies.

---

* This article is a spill-over from a project on "Urbanization and its Challenges—A Politico-administrative Study of Jaipur City", sponsored by the Rajasthan Regional Branch of the I.I.P.A. on which the author is working in an honorary capacity as Deputy Director. It was realized that Town Planning and District Planning may lead to differing, antithetical policy decisions affecting the same area. Viewed from the point of view of Urbanization, a *prima facie* case for the reorganization of District boundaries seems to exist. This article, however, attempts to view the problem from the other (district administration) point of view. A very simplified version of this argument is available in Rakesh Hooja, "Various Units of Regional Planning—A Case for Improved District Planning" in *Prashasnika*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan.-March 1973.

Recently, the scope of the State Planning Departments has been broadened by the decision of various State Governments to set up State Planning Boards on the lines of the Planning Commission.[1] It was but natural for lower level sectoral and areal units of planning to simultaneously gain in significance[2] (due to reasons of administrative convenience), even if the plan-formulation decisions continue to be taken at the higher levels and the lower levels remain more implementational as well as data-collection and transmitting units. Hence we find that the adoption of the multi-level planning framework in India has led to the formation of, among others, National, State, District, Command Area, and City Plans.

It is with the sub-state-level units, especially the district and the economic area, that this article is chiefly concerned.

II

Starting with the establishment of 'Sirdars' (or 'Sircars'), each under an 'Amil' or 'Amalguzar' in Moghul times, the revenue district has gradually emerged as the basic administrative unit in India. So much so that the Collector has become the key figure in Indian administration. It was, therefore, but natural that when Independent India went in for planning, Panchayati Raj and Community Development, it decided to base all the three on the district. While the Panchayat structure was always district-based, district Planning (as opposed to the District-wise implementation of national plans) took some time to gain currency. Originally, Panchayat institutions at the district and lower levels used to be asked to make suggestions before a plan was formed, and, after the finalization of the plan, resources were forwarded for utilization to the districts for whom department-wise targets had already been set. But now, with the setting up of State and District Planning Boards, under the guidance of economists, the nature of district planning is undergoing a welcome change.

I intend to discuss in the following pages, the district planning process, as it previously existed, and shall attempt a critique of the present views on the subject. I also intend to question the validity of persisting with historical areal entities (the districts) as basic units of

[1] For detailed arguments in favour of stronger, more important, State level planning bodies see, "Planning Commissions at the State Level in India—Some Reflections on Problems and Prospects," *Journal of the National Academy of Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Autumn 1972.

[2] For an example of the case for sub-state-level areal Planning units, see *Draft Fifth Five Year Plan 1974-79, Rajasthan*, Jaipur, Planning Department, Government of Rajasthan, 1973, section on "The Planning Machinery".

planning. Wouldn't it have been more appropriate to establish new, and, from the planning perspective, more viable administrative units, that is, wouldn't it be more appropriate to re-organize the districts now that planning and developmental activities have become as important as, if not more than, revenue collection and the maintenance of law and order?

III

Y. Raghavaiah[3] feels that the most suitable areal unit for the co-ordination of developmental and planning activities is the district and goes on to list numerous reasons for his assertion. With an average population of a million (Raghavaiah's figures) and an area of about 4,000 square miles, such a unit is large enough for planning purposes. It has a settled pattern of administration with a high degree of internal consistency and well-established administrative inter-relationships. This, and the long history of district administration, have ensured that the citizen's awareness of administrative processes in a district is adequate (implying that a new administrative or planning unit would need major reorientation as regards mass knowledge and awareness of new administrative procedures). Similarly, people living in an established district have a sense of belonging to that one entity—a community of feeling that takes years to build up. The new centres of political decision-making, the Panchayati Raj organizations, are also district-based, as are several federal, state and quasi-governmental agencies, which set up area or sub-area headquarters in the district town. It would be easier for the few agencies which follow different areal zones to switch to a district-based system than for the opposite to be accomplished. The only alternative (according to Raghavaiah) to retaining the district as the unit, would be a regional body consisting of several districts and this would not only be unwieldy, but also tend to go against the economic, social and political identity-consciousness and feeling of oneness and solidarity of the people. And, lastly, since the district already exists as an administrative unit, to take up planning at the district level would mean that the evaluation of the overall impact on the people of the *total* administrative effort in the area would become easier.

However, on the other hand, we find economists emphasising the need to adopt 'mandi areas', or 'Economic Regions' as the basis of planning. Increased urbanization has necessitated the evolution of

[3] Y. Raghavaiah, "District Planning and Development Administration—A Case for Unified and Integrated Approach", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (October-December, 1967).

concepts like 'city feeder regions', 'satellite townships', and 'National Capital Region', thus indicating that towns, with their contiguous, complimentary regions, or the 'city area' may be a more relevant unit for planning. Town planners, who are currently busy preparing Master Plans of the more important urban centres, certainly tend to look upon the city and surrounding areas as a more important unit than the district.

As Nath says, the principal units of administration for planning are the Centre, State, District, Block and the Village and administrative and institutional arrangements exist at these unit-levels for formulation and execution of plans, and for association of popular leaders in planning. "*However they are not adequate for all planning purposes and have to be supplemented by other regions for some purposes of planning, and may even have to be replaced for other purposes.*"[4] Shri Nath mentions the river-valley system as a unit for the planning of the utilization of water resources, socio-cultural regions and economic areas (following the definition of August Losch, *The Nature of Economic Regions*) as examples and suggests the following three sets of parallel and, perhaps, overlapping regions to facilitate planning : Administrative Regions, Resource Development Regions, and Metropolitan Regions.

I would like to suggest, not proliferation of parallel units of planning, but redrawing of some district boundaries on the basis of geographic, socio-economic and similar criteria, so that we in India can enjoy the best of both worlds. It is definitely not necessary for us to continue with units formed due to chance or the accidents of history if they do not coincide with our developmental needs. We could thus retain the advantages of district administrative set-up, while we gain from the formation of viable planning units.

More on this later. Let me digress a bit and move on to an analysis of district planning in practice.

IV

I shall first deal with the form in which it was originally introduced and then move on to the 'new' district planning approach being envisaged by economists today.

The introduction of Panchayati Raj, increased efforts at involving the masses and small communities in the mainstream of the political

[4] V. Nath, "Regions for Planning", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January-March, 1966).

system, as well as the recognition of the value of increased local flexibility led to the call, originally sounded at the time of the First Five Year Plan, for decentralized grassroots planning.[5]

Thus, in the Third and Fourth Plans, district Panchayati Raj institutions were involved in the planning process.[6]

Panchayat bodies had already been given charge of all community development scheme funds. In addition, a large number of schemes which are being executed by various Government departments are 'transferred' to the Panchayat Samitis, which also receive the necessary financial assistance in the form of grants, grants-in-aid, loans and subsidies. Thus, at the beginning of 1959, developmental functions had been transferred to the Panchayats, the Collector becoming a mere coordinator.[7]

The practice adopted for purposes of district plan formulation was that the various state-level Heads of Departments would, under the supervision of the State Planning Department and in conformity with the Approach Paper to the Plan, draw up a list of the funds available (for a district) under various 'departmental heads', as well as a list of the schemes and projects (situated or proposed in that district) under the jurisdiction of the various departments.

These lists were sent to all Collectors, Zila Parishad Secretaries and Vikas Adhikaris (BDOs). The Vikas Adhikaris were to communicate this information to the Panchayat Samitis. Then the Panchayat Samitis, with the assistance of the Vikas Adhikaris, Samiti or Block (Vikas Khand) were to formulate plans on the basis of the information received. These plans were to be in three parts: (1) in respect to schemes transferred to the Panchayat Samitis, (2) in respect to schemes not transferred to the Samitis (where the Samiti could only make suggestions), and (3)

---

[5] For a discussion of the various rationales of decentralization, *see* P.R. Dubhashi, "Decentralization, Planning and Public Administration", *The Indian Journal af Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 1966).

[6] *See* M.Y. Ghorpade, "Centre, States and Panchayats : The Planning Process", *Economic Weekly*, July 1964. The process as witnessed in Rajasthan is described, for the Third Plan, by (1) D.K. Saxena : "Planning from Below in Rajasthan", *Political Science Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Oct., 1962), and (2) Yoginder K. Alagh, "Formulation of a State Plan—Rajasthan—A Case Study", *Economic Weekly*, July 7, 1962; and, for the Fourth Plan by P.C. Mathur, "Multi-Level Planning in Rajasthan—A Study of the Formation of the Fourth Plan in Jaipur District, *Voluntary Action*, Vol. VII, No. 4 (July-Aug. 1966). *Also see*, M.V. Mathur and Iqbal Narain (eds.), *Panchayati Raj Planning and Democracy*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1969, especially "Introduction" and the section on "Panchayati Raj and Planning".

[7] Also refer to Iqbal Narain: "Development Administration Under Panchayati Raj—The Rajasthan Experience", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (Jan.-March), 1968.

in respect to schemes to be undertaken independently by the Samiti without any assistance from the State Government (which were seldom taken up due to the reluctance of the local bodies to raise their own resources through taxes). These plans were to be discussed and finalized at Gram Sabha and Panchayat Samiti meetings and, after the final approval of the Samiti, forwarded to the Secretary, Zila Parishad (who was also the Deputy District Development Officer by the Vikas Adhikari).

The Secretary, Zila Parishad, with the help of the District Statistical Officer, was to compile the various Samiti plans into a District Plan which would be discussed at a meeting of the Zila Parishad (which was to be attended, in addition to its ordinary members, by senior departmental officials) before transmission to the various Heads of Departments.

The Collector (in his capacity as District Development Officer) was specially instructed to supervise the formulation of the Samiti and District Plans, as also to supervise their implementation later (the Collector is also Chairman of the Zila Parishad in some instance. Similarly, various Heads of Departments were asked not only to supply the samitis with statements of schemes already undertaken as well as envisaged and of the funds available for the purpose but also to instruct subordinate officials to guide and cooperate with the Samitis and Zila Parishads in preparation of local plans. The Zila Parishad approved plans were to be forwarded by the District Development Officers (DDO) to the Heads of Departments, who scrutinized them, consolidated the proposals, added their own comments and proposals and forwarded them on to the State Planning Department, which, after processing, submitted the State Plan Proposals to the Planning Commission.

Later on, after the National Plan had been finalized, various district and samiti targets were to be transmitted by the concerned state-level departments (who would learn of them through the State Planning Department) to the local authorities, who, under the supervision of the DDO and Deputy District Development Officer (DDDO) were charged with the implementation of schemes and fulfilling of targets. Such an exercise was undertaken once in five years on a crash-campaign basis.

A number of problems immediately came to light in the application of this method of plan formulation. The Heads of Departments sent in their information about tentative physical and financial targets to the samitis late. After that, Vikas Adhikaris and other

officials at the block level faithfully adhered to the suggestions and instructions received from various departments, as they hurriedly patched together Samiti Plans. (While two meetings of the Panchayat Samiti were supposed to be held; one to approve a draft plan for circulation among the Gram Sabhas and the other to subsequently finalize the plan, only one meeting could normally be held due to lack of time). In fact, it was found that Pramukhs, Pradhans and non-official members of the Panchayati Raj institutions were rarely consulted[8] and suggestions made by the Heads of Departments dutifully incorporated into the Samiti Plans by the BDO and other extension staff. The transfer of some Vikas Adhikaris during the plan formulation stage also affected, detrimentally, the process, for it was found that most Panchayati Raj non-officials were apathetic and indifferent[9] since they knew that the plans had already been prepared and their views would not amount to much, and thus, freedom would be given fully to the BDOs. In any case, Panchayati Raj non-officials were more interested in setting forth demands expressing felt-needs and in making proposals that would gain them popularity and votes, and such proposals were neither desirable, nor feasible considering financial and other guidelines set before the Samitis.[10]

---

[8] A slightly better view of it is set forth by C.P. Bhambhri in "Official Non-official Relationship in Panchayati Raj", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1967).

[9] P.C. Mathur, *op. cit.*

[10] Summing up his analysis of the formulation of the (Fourth Plan) Jaipur District Plan in 1966, P.C. Mathur *op. cit.* has highlighted the following eleven points: (summary mine).

(*i*) The experience gained during the Third Plan formulation was not put to use and thus *ad hoc* coordination of the plans formulated at various levels had to be resorted to, putting great pressure on the local bodies. A plan coordination and formulation procedure should have been established previously.

(*ii*) This *adhocism* meant that some departments could not even transmit detailed physical targets and financial allocations to the Samitis since even their overall quota in the State Plan had not been determined in time.

(*iii*) All detailed instructions about plan preparation were sent to administrative officers after formally consulting only the Panchayati Raj non-officials and that too after the plans had been prepared.

(*iv*) Some state departments circulated such a detailed set of physical and financial targets that no Samiti could deviate from them without up-setting all state-wide allocations.

(*v*) Block officials, Samiti and Parishad members all tended to look upon 'approving' the plan as a necessary 'ritual'.

(*vi*) The consolidation of Samiti plans at the district level was done with a view to conforming to district targets set by the various departments.

(*vii*) The District Plan consisted only of 'transferred' schemes with the Samitis. No effort was made to include the schemes to be run by the municipalities in the towns of the district.

(*viii*) No detailed economic analysis of priorities and the pattern of financing or of the sources of local contributions was made in the District Plan.

(*ix*) The team of district-level officers, while taking a keen interest in the planning operation, did not attempt to exercise their own initiative and discretion.

(Continued on page 400)

This also leads to the question as to whether grassroots political (elected) figures should be entrusted with plan formulation. For they are liable to attempt and use the plan formulation meetings as a forum for expressing their felt needs and for the transmitting of demands to the government, thus converting the plan into a mere list of demands as perceived from a narrow local perspective. This failing, they are liable to passively accept whatever proposal is set before them even when the needs of the sub-area are being overlooked. In any case, neither Panchayat politicians nor local bureaucrats are adequately qualified to undertake a real exercise in planning and, therefore, local plans have so far tended to be mere financial statements and lists of targets, all based upon instructions and suggestions received from the Heads of Departments.

Another question that arises is whether the preparation of statements of funds available and targets being set is all that planning is supposed to involve. Should not the locating of industries, houses, commercial and cultural centres, providing of civic supplies, building of roads, planning of specific education and employment opportunities, etc., all be a part of the District Plan? Can such comprehensive District Plans (something like the Master City and Town Plans but much broader in scope) be prepared by Panchayat Samitis and (transferable) Vikas Adhikaris? Or should a separate, well qualified District Planning Officer be stationed, either permanently, or for long periods, in each district for this purpose? (Such an officer would have to be attached to the Collector's office and have the same coordinating powers as the Collector. He could perhaps be a member of the Indian Economic or Administrative Service.)

In this context, I would also like to suggest the replacing of economic planning by complete societal planning (so as to lead to economic growth, social change as also political development) with all aspects of life in the district figuring in the plan. Here, I might caution that I am not advocating centralized control, on totalitarian lines, of human life. A societal plan, as envisaged by me, could be in two parts: one implementable and/or enforceable by the government, and the other in the form of suggestions for the people.

Another major problem that arose in district planning during the Third and Fourth plans was the fact that various departmental officers

(Continued from page 399)

(*x*) All modifications suggested at the local levels were ignored or eliminated at the district or higher level.

(*xi*) After the plan had been framed, most officials who participated in its making, tended to file away the final documents, and perhaps even to forget its provisions until prodded from above.

in the districts are jealous of their rights and powers and tend to look only to their Heads of Departments for instructions thus, making the Collector's coordination task more difficult,[11] and also ensuring that the District Plan is formed in segmented parts on a departmental basis. It is a welcome trend that the Collector's coordinating role is being strengthened, making coordination between various district departmental officers easier and thus making possible the formulation of a fully integrated District Plan.[12]

V

Let me now turn to the newer approaches of economists to District Planning.[13]

It is generally recognized that the district is essentially a local administrative unit and need not have homogeneous economic features. Hence, it is often suggested that each district be sub-divided on the basis of economic homogeneity into 'economic areas' or 'Mandi areas', which may be considered to be the lowest units for the integrated provision of socio-economic overheads and services.

Such an economic area may be either: (1) the main centre of marketing and exchange, where the plan must provide for additional services, like technical assistance, and institutionalized economic facilities, like credit, storage and processing, or (2) (in a less farm-dominated area) a centre of growth of industrial (or other) activity which helps to transform the economy of the surrounding area.

Viewed in this context, District Planning involves the proper selection of economic areas and the coordination of the national plan (and

---

[11] *See* Haridwar Rai, "Coordination of Development Programmes at the District Level with Special Reference to Role of District Officer in Bihar", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 1966); M. Santaranarayanan, "Role of the District Officer in Changing Administration", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1966); and M.K. Chaturvedi, "The Elephant and the Tortoise (The District Collector and his Role Identification)", *Journal of the Society for Study of State Governments*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 1971). Also see C.N. Bhalerao, "Changing Pattern of Development Administration in the District", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1966); and Raghavaiah, *op. cit.*

[12] *See*, for example, Otima Bordia, "District Administration—Problems of Coordination", Jaipur, H.C. Mathur State Institute of Public Administration, 1970 (Mimeo).

[13] I am grateful to Shri Subodh Mathur, Lecturer in the Department of Economics, University of Rajasthan, for suggestions as also for making available to me a note on "District Planning" (unpublished) that he had written for the Collector, Barmer, in Nov.-Dec. 1972. The following section is adapted from that note. It also borrows from D.R. Gadgil's *Kale Memorial Lecture* 1966 delivered at the IIPA Delhi as well as from the unpublished *Report of Indian Mission to Kenya* by Raj Krishna, Government of India, 1972.

special district) programmes with the needs of the economic areas.[14] Thus, all possible attempts should be made to link the district or one of its economic areas to a national or state project, located in the district so as to ensure that the project implementation is speedier and better, and the infrastructural changes affected by the project are fully made use of. However, this approach also builds up a case for the re-organization of district boundaries so as to coincide with those of the groups of economic areas.

In preparing a plan, the district planner (who has to look to speedy economic growth, integrated and effective utilization of resources—both natural and human—increase in employment, increase in social services and social consumption, redressal of regional imbalances, improving the lot of socially and economically backward sections of the population, and speedy abolition of poverty)[15] has to work at two levels; the District and the Economic Area, with overall frames and strategies being decided at the district level. While details of plans for conservation of natural resources and for production, etc., shall have to be worked out at the economic area level, area-wise and sectoral financial allocation, distribution of employment oriented schemes, and solving of organizational problems are best done at the district level. Coordination and synchronization efforts shall have to be made at both levels while overall integration shall have to be done by the district planner who, as has already been mentioned, shall be conversant with state and national plan priorities.

A district planner must identify his district's resources, extent of their utilization, the nature and extent of the infrastructure needed for optimum utilization, district's social and cultural profile and its relevance with respect to the human factor, pattern of land cultivator relations and their relevance to programmes for increasing production and bettering distribution, nature and extent of social infrastructure (in terms of education, health centres, family planning, nutrition etc.) and its relevance to both economic growth and social justice, employment and production generating infrastructure, and facilities, such as banking, markets, transport, construction, storage, supply of inputs and procedural requirements, and the measures needed to strengthen them.[16] He must also study consumption, requirements for drinking water, housing, and village access roads, social stratification, the position of the

---

[14] *See* N.V.A. Narasimhan, "Principles of Integrating of Local and National Plans", *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, Vol. 1, March, 1967.

[15] V.K.R.V. Rao, "District Planning Concept—Getting to the Grass Roots", *Times of India*, May 23, 1973.

[16] V.K.R.V. Rao, *op.cit.*

scheduled castes and tribes, wage levels, unemployment and under-employment and the prevailing income distribution. Only then logical district priorities can be drawn up taking into consideration the existing constraints.[17]

Further, the planner has to learn to anticipate local reactions and responses since plan implementational success shall depend upon the interest aroused among the people and consequent local assistance forthcoming. Here the need for incorporating panchayat bodies in planning becomes obvious. While care should be taken to see that wishful thinking on the part of panchayat non-officials does not lead to over-ambitious plans (which are mere collections of more or less popular demands) being formed, a discussion of plan proposals in panchayat samitis and zila parishas would be very welcome. Cooperative institutions can also be gainfuly associated with planning and execution.

Similarly, as has already been mentioned, a district plan should not be a mere collection of various departmental, or sub-departmental proposals. This, besides non-integrated, lop-sided development, may also result in duplication of staff (who have to prepare the various proposals separately without assistance from the personnel of other departments) and breakdown of coordination. Of course, an integrated district plan, once prepared, may later be segmented sectorally or even departmentally for implementation purposes. This is because a development plan consists of a bundle of projects, each having a separate sectoral identity, geographic location, time horizon and scheme of estimated costs and benefits, thus, each being in need of separate administrative apparatus within the framework of the district planning machinery. Here, the planner must combine knowledge of local and district conditions with technical knowhow available from the state or national department before indulging in project formulation.

The practice of 'crash programmes', 'campaigns' and the tackling of problems on a 'war footing' are all antithetical to the canons of long-term planning and may even be taken as a symptom of faulty planning. Thus, the planner should be able to anticipate crisis situations and avoid them and the linked need for the adoption of emergency measures.

Given knowledge of Central or State projects in the district (for example large irrigation, famine relief, road building and power projects,

[17] This is in contrast with the previous practice of targets and financial allocations being decided at the national, state and departmental levels and being formally approved by Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads.

fisheries and forest programmes, etc.) and their outlay and the employment generated thereby; natural resources (through soil, water and geological surveys, census operations and the like); production—agricultural and industrial—land-use, supply of credit, public expenditure, etc.; and existing transport, communication, educational and health facilities, the district planner has to utilize it giving priority, while making the plan, to the development of socio-economic overheads and resource development, and not to social services which local pressures demand. Plan production targets in their present form should get lower priority than the development of the infrastructure. However, the government has to continue to provide incentives and assistance to individual producers to encourage them to produce goods according to the overall objectives and strategy of development. These incentives also fall within the scope of the district plan.

Thus, we see that the district plan should not be a mere spelling out of targets and financial allocations, but a much more comprehensive document, which, keeping in mind financial restraints, spells out logical relations between sectoral and departmental plans and between various economic areas, and which determines the chronological order in which schemes are to be started and implemented. It is based on calculations of supply and demand, where the need for equipment, trained personnel, buildings, raw materials, unskilled labour, all have been checked against the available supply, and where an attempt has been made to improve the internal organization of the agencies which will implement the schemes and thus help bridge the gap between supply and demand.

It should also be kept in mind that planning is a continuous process and that each five year plan should not be viewed as a separate entity, as is done by a few officers and politicians.

VI

Viewed from the point of view of urbanization and town planning also, one finds that the process of district planning adopted during the Third and Fourth Plan periods was inadequate.[18] Master Plans,

[18] K.V. Sundaram in his "Towards a National Urban Policy in India", *Fulbright Newsletters*, March 1973, points out that, while isolated city development plans and urban community development plans were suggested in the Third Plan period, spatial planning started getting attention only in the Fourth Plan. He also emphasizes that a traditional anti-urban bias exists in the minds of our planners and that the problem of integrating urban growth with the development of the surrounding rural areas so as to make the two mutually interdependent is not getting sufficient attention, nor have urbanization and national economic development been linked in the minds of the planners. He thus emphasises urban regions for planning. *See also* Leo Jacobson and Ved Prakash, "Urbanization and Regional Planning in India", *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. II, No. 3(March, 1967).

(Continued on page 405)

which are being prepared for all cities and major towns, are comprehensive documents dealing with the entire range of urban functions and activities, and relate them to one another on a city-wide basis. These are prepared considering the overall land requirements of the community *regardless of municipal or administrative boundaries.*[19] These plans also take into consideration expansion possibilities for at least 20 years to come and thus large tracts of peri-urban land have to be included in the Master Plan. With urbanologists focusing attention on the need to supply food stuff and industrial raw material to the cities as also to coordinate the sale of finished goods in adjoining areas, the concepts of integrated 'city feeder areas' and 'satellite towns' are finding their way into Master Plans. It is quite feasible for such metropolitan or town areas not to coincide with district boundaries and, thus, complicate the formulation of district plans. Town areas, being based on socio-economic relations, are often liable to be the same as economic areas, suggesting that only rationalization of district boundaries can make it possible for Master City Plans, Economic Area Plans and District Plans to be coordinated and integrated (or merged).[20]

VII

To sum up, I feel that, with our developmental needs necessitating more comprehensive planning and a switch over to real planning from below (the district thus becoming the basic unit of planning) it has become imperative that district boundaries be redrawn along economic,

---

(*Continued from page 404*)

Also see Sudhir Wanmali and Waheeduddin Khan, "Role of Location in Regional Planning with particular reference to the Provision of Social Facilities", *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sept. 1970), where a city-periphery model of planning at the city level is set forth with reference to Nagpur.

[19] Town Planning Organization (Rajasthan), *Draft Master Plan for Jaipur*, Jaipur, 1972. District Plans should be similar in approach but have a much wider scope so as to encompass all facets of life.

[20] *See* V. Nath, *op. cit.*, where he has tentatively set forth a case for urban regions to be adopted for plan purposes. In his six-fold classification, the central places of the different regions are: (1) Metropolitan City, (2) Sub-regional Centre, (3) Multi-District Centre, (4) District Centre, (5) Mandi Centre, and (6) Rural Service Centre. *Also see* V. Nath, "Area Development at District and Block Levels", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XI, No. 2 (April-June, 1965).

For earlier views on Urbanization and Planning and a backgrounder to urbanization problems in India, *see* Roy Turner (ed.), *India's Urban Future*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962.

geographic and social lines (as opposed to their present historical basis) so that all sorts of regions (administrative, economic, metropolitan and resource development) can start coinciding in India.[31]

[31] *Also see* Planning Commission, *Research Development Regions and Divisions of India*, New Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1964; Planning Commission, *Guidelines for the Formulation of District Plans*, New Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969; and Lalit K. Sen, *Integrated Area Planning: Concepts and Methods*, New Delhi, Government of India (Training Division, Department of Personnel), Cabinet Secretariat, 1972.

PLANNING MACHINERY AND PROCESS IN THE STATES AND UNION TERRITORIES

The experience of the last two decades in the field of planning has brought home to us the need for building up planning from the grass-roots level, for intimately associating the people with the plans and for integrating State, regional, sectoral, district and even panchayat level schemes of development into a Central National Plan. If our schemes of progress and prosperity are to succeed they have necessarily to be woven into an intricate but integrated pattern of multi-level planning.

The Planning Commission, therefore, suggested to all the States and the Union Territories the need for setting up planning bodies at the State level and strengthening the machinery at the State and district levels to effect improvements in the formulation and implementation of plan programmes. The planning machinery and process in all the States and Union Territories have been accordingly modified.

At our request, some of the States and Union Territories have given us an account of their planning machinery and process. These have been summarised and given below. Information from other States and Union Territories received after we have gone to the press this time will be included in the next issue. The information collected will be of very great help to planners and students of developmental administration in getting a comparative picture of the process of planning and its implementation in the various states of the country. We hope that our readers would find this information about the various states and Union Territories interesting and useful.

STATES

ANDHRA PRADESH

A scheme for the strengthening of the Planning machinery in the State has been formulated. A Planning Board, consisting of the Chief Minister as the Chairman, a Deputy Chairman and the Finance Minister, the Planning Minister, the Chief Secretary and the Finance Secretary as Members is to be constituted. Some technical experts will be appointed as part-time Members. The Planning Board is to be assisted by two wings, namely, the Board Wing and the Secretariat Wing.

The Board Wing will have the following functions:

(*a*) to prepare perspective Plans, indicating overall regional and sectoral strategies on the basis of continuous economic analysis and detailed studies.

(*b*) to formulate projects in the light of overall policies of the Central, and the State Governments and the perspective indicated for the State, so as to enable rational choice of projects and allocation of resources;

(*c*) to translate the perspective into operational, regional and district plans, thus bringing adequate integration between the project formulation and locational aspects in the context of the overall perspective;

(*d*) to help formulate medium term plans on the basis of the above exercises;

(*e*) to ensure continuous evaluation of the projects being taken up as well as completed from time to time;

(*f*) to monitor progress in regard to the implementation of the plan; and

(*g*) to suggest such modifications and re-orientation in policies and Plan programmes as may be necessary as a result of the evaluation and monitoring done.

The Planning Board will have five divisions, namely, Perspective Planning and Economic Analysis Division, Project Evaluation, Monitoring and Information Division, Project Formulation Division and Manpower and Employment Division and Regional and District Planning Division.

The Plan Process

The Plan process starts with a preliminary assessment by the Planning Department of the levels of development that are likely to be reached by the end of Fourth Plan, the spill-over commitments, etc., and the general approach that may have to be adopted in regard to the Fifth Plan taking these into account. A study, has, therefore, been undertaken to review the economy of the State since 1950, the performance of the plans during the period and the financial position of the State. Based on the broad objectives defined in the Fourth Plan and in the light of the specific schemes included in the Fourth Five Year Plan, a number of issues have been raised and communicated to the Heads of Departments to enable a quick evaluation of the on-going schemes and

their relevance to the objectives of the Fourth Five Year Plan. Further effort is being made to build up data on manpower availability and utilisation and to prepare basic information on manpower for use in the formulation of the Fifth Five Year Plan. The institutional arrangements and procedures during the Fourth Plan would also be studied.

Twelve Working Groups have been constituted for the subjects of Financial resources, Agricultural production, Marketing, Irrigation, Power Industries, Transport and Communications, General and Technical Education, Medical and Public Health, Housing, Water Supply and Urban development, Rural Water Supply, Social Welfare and Manpower.

Each working group is empowered to form sub-groups to consider some special or distinct aspects of the subjects assigned to it.

The Planning Department initially prepared a paper setting out some of the basic elements in the preparation of the Fifth Five Year Plan. This was done on the basis of the studies that have been initiated, the national approach and the regional perspective plans already undertaken.

Plan Strategies

The Planning Department will continue its work in regard to the quick evaluation of specific identified schemes. It is expected that meanwhile more detailed studies would continue to be made in the Planning Department, regarding sectoral priorities and in each sector scheme-wise implications of investment, output, employment, etc., on the basis of rough assumptions relating to the size of the Plan. A preliminary plan for each sector will be finalised by the working groups.

The Planning Department will scrutinise the reports of the working groups for consistency; (*a*) within the sector; (*b*) between sectors; and (*c*) in spatial terms;

Plan Frame

On the basis of the reports of the working groups, the Planning Department will work out: (*a*) a preliminary plan frame; and (*b*) a dimensional hypothesis for the district sector. These will be communicated to the district planning authorities.

The district authorities will be expected to prepare district plans on the basis of : (*a*) the district profiles already prepared by them;

(*b*) the dimensional hypothesis communicated; (*c*) the sectoral strategies as indicated in the preliminary plan frame of the regional physical strategies. The preliminary plan frame will be placed simultaneously before the regional bodies also for obtaining their views.

Planning and Cooperation Department
Government of Andhra Pradesh

ASSAM

The Government of Assam has set up a State Planning Board, consisting of the Chief Minister as Chairman, a Deputy Chairman and three Members.

The functions of the Board are:

(1) to make an assessment of the various resources of the State, material, capital and human including technical personnel and investigate the possibilities of augmenting and improving such resources;

(2) to formulate a long-term perspective plan for the most effective and balanced utilisation of the State's resources with due regard to the balanced development of its component regions;

(3) to advise on the preparation of the Five Year Plans, Annual Plans and the priorities of the State Plan which should be determined within the framework, of the priorities in the National Plan;

(4) to ascertain the factors which tend to retard economic development of the State and determine the conditions to be created for the successful execution of the plan;

(5) to identify the areas of coordination between the various Departments, the Panchayats, Mahakuma Parishads and other institutional agencies and to advise as to how best such coordination for proper implementation of the plan-programmes can be brought about;

(6) to watch the progress, evaluate the achievements and make periodical appraisal of the Plan programmes and important projects in the Plan; and

(7) to make such interim or ancillary recommendations as appear to be appropriate either for facilitating the discharge of the duties assigned to it or on a consideration of the prevailing economic conditions, current policies, measures and development

programmes; or an examination of such specific problems as may be referred to it for advice by the Government.

Multi-level Planning

The multi-level planning approach has been accepted by the Government. Area studies, industrial complex studies and urban growth centre studies are being undertaken. At the grassroots level, planning has been linked to the panchayat machinery. The Mahakuma Parishads, elected on adult suffrage, are being styled Sub-divisional Planning Councils and another smaller representative body under the new Panchayat law, the Planning and Review Board, is being styled the Sub-divisional Planning Board. Pending the election and formation of these bodies under the Panchayat law, Sub-divisional Planning Cells with non-official members and convenors, and the Sub-divisional Planning Officers as Secretary, have been set up. Guidelines for preparation of Sub-divisional Plans have been issued and considerable statistical data has been collected and provided to serve as base for local planning.

Discussions have been held between the Board and the Cells and this process is expected to continue. In fact, a wing of the Board is proposed to be set up to deal with the needs of Sub-divisional Planning bodies. The Sub-divisional Planning Bodies in turn are expected to make use of the panchayats for more detailed examination of needs and for arranging involvement of the people.

Apart from compilation of the local statistics as an aid to planning, resource maps are to be prepared to indicate the resource endowments of local areas which will help in throwing up obvious lines of development for optimum utilisation of local resources. It is proposed to explore the possibilities of economic stimulation, particularly in the field of industry, by inviting representative teams of industrial organisations like the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry to study the local situation and make suggestions. The Government policy of giving further permission for expansion to large industrial houses only for developing backward areas should be of help in this matter.

The Board has opened links with the Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi, and is in touch with other bodies concerned with economic research. The Board has also initiated an exchange of information and experience with other State Planning Boards. Specific teams for helping in formulating the outlook for development in different fields are also being invited from outside the State.

Department of Planning
Government of Assam

GUJARAT

The Government have set up a State Planning Board, consisting of the Chief Minister as the Chairman, the Minister for Finance and Planning as the Deputy Chairman, and four prominent economists as part-time members.

The functions of the Board will be:

(*i*) to assess the human and material resources of the State and advise the Government on the formulation of Plans ensuring its balanced and effective exploitation;

(*ii*) to indicate a scale of priorities at the State level within the national planning apparatus;

(*iii*) to undertake a study of material balances;

(*iv*) to formulate an integrated framework of inter-sectoral interdependence;

(*v*) to advise the Government on the preparation of a scheme of projects and programmes;

(*vi*) to undertake ex-ante evaluation of investment projects;

(*vii*) to undertake examination of five year and annual plans to establish interdependence between long term and short term plans, synthesising spatial and sectoral plans into a balanced and operationally integrated State Plan;

(*viii*) to undertake formulation of guidelines for framing district plans and evaluation thereof;

(*ix*) to advise effective procedures for monitoring of plan schemes and review progress of plan implementation;

(*x*) to undertake comprehensive evaluation of all plan schemes;

(*xi*) to undertake periodic revision of the perspective plan in the light of achievements of development programmes in different areas, developments in technology, identification of new resources, institutional changes and adoption of new policies and objectives at the national and state level;

(*xii*) to recommend steps for progressive introduction of modern management information systems including the setting up of an integrated computerised data bank at the State level and indicate its meaningful relationship to the nature and size of data collected at the regional level, district level and taluka level;

(*xiii*) to examine the main recommendations made in the perspective Plan document 1974-84 and to recommend to Government, in order of merit, the various steps to be taken indicating the time frame for implementing the same; and

(*xiv*) to draw an input and output model for the State with a view to facilitate the updating of the Perspective Plan from time to time.

It may, however, be mentioned that the responsibility for drawing up the annual and Five Year Plans and discussing them with Government of India will continue to vest in the Planning Division of the General Administration Department of the State Government.

The State Planning Board may appoint from time to time as many panels and sub-panels as it may deem fit in exercise of its functions. Each panel or a sub-panel will have a chairman and a reasonable number of experts.

General Administration
Department (Planning)
Government of Gujarat

HARYANA

The process of economic and social development through planning was initiated in the State twentythree years ago and during that period most of the development programmes were framed at the State level in accordance with the overall objectives and draft guidelines given by the Planning Commission. In the initial stage, such an approach was considered necessary to build up a network of infrastructural facilities and services. Now that the necessary infrastructure at the State level has been established and it is possible to concentrate on the aspirations and requirements of specific areas in the matter of development by harnessing to the maximum extent, the local initiative, potentials, capacities and resources, a high-power State Planning Board under the Chairmanship of the State Chief Minister with a whole-time non-official Deputy Chairman and some non-official & official members has been constituted.

The functions of the Board are:

(*i*) to assess the level of development in important sectors of the State as a whole as well as of various districts and regions;

(*ii*) to assess the financial manpower and material resources and organizational and institutional capabilities;

(*iii*) to determine the priorities for the state in the light of the overall national objectives;

(*iv*) in the light of (*i*), (*ii*) and (*iii*) above to formulate a long term perspective Plan for the most effective and balanced utilization of the state resources;

(*v*) to assist the State Government in the formulation of the Fifth Five Year Plan and annual plans;

(*vi*) to suggest policies and programmes for removing the imbalances prevailing in various regions in the State and to assist in the formulation of district area plans;

(*vii*) to make critical appraisal of on-going programmes leading to a determination of the extent to which some of the identified on-going programmes would need to be continued;

(*viii*) to review the implementation of plan projects and other development schemes;

(*ix*) to advise on the problems of unemployment and suggest ways and means of tackling it; and

(*x*) to advise on such other matters connected with economic development as may be assigned by the State Government.

Planning Machinery

It has been observed that during the previous Plan periods some sectors of economy and certain geographical areas did not receive the same benefits of development programmes as certain other sectors and areas. Accordingly, Haryana Government has taken some definite steps to strengthen its planning machinery in order to remove such imbalances. It proposes to reorganize the State Planning machinery into various Units, namely; Perspective Plan Unit, Plan Formulation, Coordination, Administration & Monitoring Unit, Plan Implementation Unit, District Planning Unit and Plan Evaluation Unit with adequate and qualified staff.

An important feature of the Fifth Five Year Plan is to take the planning process to grass roots and therefore to formulate the district Plans, which will also take care of the sub-Divisional/Tehsil level and Block level needs and aspirations. This grassroot approach will not only help in identifying backward pockets and in making appropriate plan programmes for them but also in having a proper perspective Plan for the entire state. Obviously, it involves the collection of basic data concerning the existing infrastructure, identification of purely regional

problems of the particular district so that the district plan ultimately become a really integrated plan of the whole State which, of course, in turn would have the same objective as the National Plan.

To ensure that the District Plans will promote economic growth and social justice in accordance with the aspirations of the local people, District Planning Boards have been set up which consist of all the District Heads of Government departments, representatives of the public such as members of Parliament, Members of State Legislature, Chairmen of the Zila Parishad and Panchayat Samitis, Presidents of the Local Bodies and other notable social workers. In addition, District Planning Committees and District Executive Committees have also been set up. The Deputy Commissioners have been made overall in-charge of the Planning work in the districts and it has been emphasised that they should give due priority to this work. To help them in this process, they have been provided with District Planning Officers who are senior and experienced officers of the State Civil Service, having proper knowledge and experience of developmental administration and who are expected to be fairly effective in performing their duties.

Problems

Several problems crop up in the planning process which deserve constant attention. These relate to the policy formulation and decision-making process and achieving cooperation between different levels of administration and intra-departmental levels. Citizen's response to plan programme is another important aspect. Lack of systematic reliable information is widely recognised as one of the main obstacles to development planning. Also some of the agencies which are connected with the collection of information are not clear about the significance of information required by the planning agency. Some of the problems may even pertain to reconciliation of sectoral and regional targets, and designing of a plan that takes into account the regional disaggregation of economic and social policies. Regional distribution of resources is an important aspect of overall efficiency in allocation. The question regarding regional allocation becomes sometimes baffling in view of various pulls and pressures.

Efforts to secure regional balance tend to create problems of deviation from the optimum and sometimes they do not admit of easy solution. The taking up of decisions with regard to long term and short term programmes and priorities also pose certain problems. Attempts are being made to tackle all these problems.

Department of Planning
Government of Haryana

KERALA

The Government have set up a State Planning Board, consisting of the Chief Minister as the Chairman, the Finance Minister and three other eminent persons as Members.

The functions of the Board are:

(1) to make an assessment of the States natural, material and human resources and to formulate long term plans for their effective utilisation and development;

(2) to identify factors which retard development and determine conditions for the successful execution of Plan programmes;

(3) to undertake continuous appraisal of the progress of the State's economy and to formulate the broad objectives of the Development Plan;

(4) to elaborate the plan objectives into long term, medium term and short term plans and specific projects and programmes;

(5) to assist the district authorities in formulating their development plans within the spheres in which such planning is considered feasible and to coordinate these plans with the State plan; and

(6) to evaluate the implementation of the plan schemes and recommend such adjustments in policies and measures as the review may indicate.

The State Planning Board has four Divisions:

(1) *Economics Division* : This Division will deal with long term strategy of economic growth for the State, perspective planning, natural resources, employment and manpower development, economic policy including financial resources, prices and income policy.

(2) *Agricultural Division* : This will deal with agricultural production including allied fields of activity like animal husbandry, fisheries, forest resources, cooperation, marketing, rural electrification, irrigation and land reforms.

(3) *Industry and Infrastructure Division* : This will dealw ith large, medium and small scale industries, power, mineral development, export and import trade, state trade and commerce and transport and communications.

(4) *Education and Social Service Division*: This will deal with education, health and social welfare. In addition, there will be an Evaluation Division.

Department of Planning and
Economic Affairs
Government of Kerala

MYSORE

The Planning Machinery in Mysore State is organised on a functional basis, geared on the one hand for effective resource appraisal, technical analysis, monitoring, programme formulation and evaluation and on the other for a vertical and horizontal coordination at the State as well as the regional (groups of districts and district) level.

State Planning Board

There is a high-power apex Body at the State level, the State Planning Board, with the Chief Minister as Chairman and Finance Minister as Vice-Chairman and eight other members (two Economists taken from the Universities in the State, one Industrialist, two representatives of the Legislature and one representative of the general interests). The Planning Department functions as the Secretariat of the State Planning Board.

The functions of the State Planning Board include initiating and coordinating systematic studies for identification and assessment of natural resources of the State, formulation of a Perspective Plan, offering concrete proposals for mobilising financial resources for planned development, identification of regional imbalances and suggesting concrete measures for their progressive reduction, arranging for the preparation of District Plans and coordination of these plans with the State Plans, appraisal of the plan programmes on the basis of scientific progress reporting and evaluation with a view to ensuring their effective implementation and initiating such other action as may be necessary to bring about rapid economic development in the State.

Four Functional Divisions

The Planning Department, which assists the State Planning Board in discharging these functions, has four distinct functional divisions. They are : (1) Coordination, Plan Formulation and Administrative

Division, (2) Economic Adviser's Division, (3) Evaluation, Manpower and Project Formulation Division, and (4) The Bureau of Economics and Statistics.

The four Divisions of the Planning Department meet once a week for ensuring overall coordination and also for determining the type of studies and action needed for achieving Plan objectives. At these meetings, work in progress in the various divisions is reviewed, fresh allocations are made, and bottlenecks, if any, are looked into and solved.

Integrated Functioning

The organisational set-up in the Planning Department provides for integrated functioning. A Steering Group which ensures the utilisation of specialised skills available for the technical tasks has been set up.

There is proper coordination between Planning at the State level and Planning at the District level. At the State level, the Planning Secretary is the Development Commissioner who is concerned with all development programmes and is assisted by a Joint Development Commissioner, who is the Secretary to Government in the Development Department. The Planning Secretary is also *ex officio* Commissioner for Agricultural Production in which capacity he directs the functioning of the Agriculture Department, thus ensuring perfect coordination. At the regional level, the State is divided into four Divisions each comprising of four to five Districts and each Division is in charge of a Divisional Commissioner who is the Joint Development Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner of each District is the Deputy Development Commissioner. This administrative structure has facilitated vertical integration of the planning work both in formulation and in execution.

District Planning Machinery : An Innovation

At the District level, planning work is carried out by a Planning Committee of which the Deputy Commissioner (Deputy Development Commissioner) is the Chairman. The various technical departments offer their technical services for Planning and the entire work gets coordinated at the meetings of the District Development Council.

The District Plan has to determine the overall strategy for the development of the district in the context of the National and the State Plan objectives. There has to be resource appraisal with an emphasis on local resources, synchronisation of the programmes of development,

fixation of priorities and mapping of an overall perspective. Spatial and locational aspects have to be given careful attention and are to be integrated sectorally. The existing machinery for district planning was found to be thoroughly inadequate. A Lecturer/Reader in Economics has been taken on deputation to work on full-time basis in each district. The District Planning Committee is supplemented by a nucleus group comprising the Lecturer/Reader in Economics, the District Planning Officer and the Deputy Director of Agriculture. The nucleus group was given intensive practical training in District Planning at a Training Programme organised at the state level by the Planning Department and the Institute for Social and Economic Change. This has set the pace for active collaboration between the Government and Research Institutions in the process of planning.

For each district, an approach paper was prepared by the nucleus group and it was discussed at the special meetings of the District Development Council and the Taluk Development Boards. People's representatives and the public have thus been involved right from the very beginnings of the District Plan. Their views and criticisms have been taken note of in the analysis and formulation of the detailed District Plan which is expected to be ready by the end of this year.

Task Forces

In the process of planning, the Heads of Departments function as Technical Advisers to the Planning Department. The Plan formulation is preceded by detailed exercises carried out by Task Forces set up for the purpose. A Task Force, with the Head of the Department as the Chairman, is set up for each of the sectors like Agriculture and Forests, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, Industries, Irrigation and Ayacut Development, Power, Transport, Education, Manpower and Employment, Health, Nutrition and Family Planning, Housing, Urban Development, Slum Clearance, Water Supply and Drainage, Marketing and Cooperation. Their Reports are discussed by the Planning Department with the concerned Task Forces, Ministers and the Secretaries. The strategy, outlays and priorities are critically examined at these discussions and the recommendations are placed before the Cabinet and the State Planning Board for final decision.

Involvement of Universities in Planning

All the Universities and Research Institutions in the State have been involved in the planning process. Research studies, relevant for planning in the State, have been entrusted to them; these studies are utilised in the plan formulation.

The crucial importance of skills in the planning work at different levels has been recognised by the Planning Department. It has therefore given special attention to improving the skills by organising in-depth training programmes at the Administrative Training Institute, which is under its control, and also by involving the Institute for Social and Economic Change in organising special training programmes for the officers of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics and other officers connected with planning and development.

Planning in Command Areas

At the disaggregative level, area development has received careful attention. To make investment yield the expected results, it is essential to ensure that the various components move in unison. In some areas, marginal investments may be needed to make earlier outlays bring the flow of output in the quickest possible time. These considerations are highly relevant for planning in command areas of irrigation projects. To deal expeditiously with these matters, administrators with adequate powers and complementary technical staff have been appointed for each of the major irrigation projects in the State. Further innovations like having a control room for each project are contemplated.

Planning Department
Government of Mysore

ORISSA

The State Planning Machinery in Orissa consists of an Advisory Board, called the State Planning Board and the Planning & Coordination Department of the State Government. In the wider sense, however, the planning process is in operation in various departments of Government which are looking after the development of different sectors of the State's economy. In most cases, the proposals and blueprints for development and of individual projects and schemes originate with these administrative departments and officers working under them in the districts and the field. Therefore, even in a formal sense, these departments as also the Planning Department together constitute the institutional arrangement for Planning.

The Bodrd and its Functions

The State Planning Board consists of the Governor of Orissa as the Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, and eight other members who have

distinguished themselves in different walks of public life. The Secretary to Government, Planning & Coordination Department functions as Secretary to the Board. The Board advises the Government on all matters relating to planning, formulation of Perspective and Five Year Plans as also the formulation and implementation of Annual Plans.

The Department and its Role

The Planning and Coordination Department of the State Government provides technical and administrative expertise in the formulation of Five Year and Annual Plans and also reviews the progress of Plan implementation. At the time of the formulation of Five Year Plans, functional working groups consisting of the representatives of the various Departments of Government are formed for various sectors of the economy in order to formulate proposals to be included in the plan document. These proposals are processed and examined and these are synthesised into an operational plan in the Planning & Coordination Department.

Apart from formulating the Five Year and Annual Plans for the entire economy, the Planning Department has also a technical wing for undertaking post-project evaluation of completed projects and schemes. This evaluation wing has Research Officers and Economic Investigators to carry on evaluation of these projects and schemes implemented in various sectors of the economy.

It has now been proposed to reorganise the existing Planning Department into five functional cells for efficient discharge of its functions in planning and plan implementation. These five cells will be as follows: (*a*) Perspective planning cell, (*b*) Plan information, monitoring and evaluation cell, (*c*) Project appraisal cell, (*d*) Regional and district planning cell, and (*e*) Plan formulation and coordination cell. These five units will be staffed with experts, administrators and other technical persons drawn from various disciplines and with varied experience.

Another organization which plays an important supporting role in planning is the State Bureau of Statistics & Economics. This is the central agency in the State for collecting data on various sectors of the economy.

Difficulties

In formulating the Five Year and Annual Plans, a number of difficulties and problems have been encountered. One of the major

difficulties has been lack of suitable background and orientation (in planning) on the part of personnel in different departments of the Government. The State Government have been trying to provide suitable training and expose these personnel to modern ideas of planning and related matters so that these difficulties can be removed in course of time.

Secondly, availability of the required statistics has been a major problem. The existing statistical system has a number of deficiencies. Sometimes it is also difficult to rely on the statistics which are used for making projections and for formulating policies and programmes. The State Government have been taking steps to improve the statistical system available in the State.

Another lacuna in planning has been the absence of area plans in the State. All our planning has been sectoral in character. There is need for preparing regional and district plans as also integrated area development programmes for potential growth-centres and command areas of the irrigation projects. The needs of the backward areas also require immediate attention. Till recently, there has been no institutional arrangement for preparing integrated area development programmes. Steps are now being taken to create organisations for preparing regional and district plans.

Planning and Coordination Department
Government of Orissa

UTTAR PRADESH

The State Planning Commission constituted in August 1972 is the highest planning organisation in the State. Sri Kamlapati Tripathi, M. L. A. and former Chief Minister of the State is the Chairman, and Sri Narain Datt Tewari, M. L. A. and former Finance and Power Minister of the State is the Deputy Chairman. The Commission has eminent non-officials who have specialised knowledge in certain important sectors and senior officers of the State Government as its Members. It is responsible for the Five Year and the Annual Plans.

The functions of the State Planning Commission are:

(*i*) to assess the physical, financial and manpower resources and suggest their best use for the proper development of the State;

(*ii*) to prepare area-wise, programme-wise short and long term plans in accordance with the needs and resources and capacity

of the State and in consonance with the aims and priorities of the National Plan;

(*iii*) to point out impediments in the economic and social uplift of the State and to suggest solutions for successful implementation of the Plan;

(*iv*) to frame policies and programmes for removal of regional imbalances;

(*v*) to review progress of the Plan programmes; and

(*vi*) to suggest suitable modifications in planning and development processes.

It had been felt for quite some time that the planning machinery in the State required strengthening so that it might undertake certain specialised functions. It was, therefore, decided to have a State Planning Institute in order to undertake studies, surveys and preparation of functional plans in an integrated and coordinated manner, with the following functional divisions:

(1) The Economics and Statistics Division;

(2) The Planning Research and Action Division;

(3) The Evaluation and Training Division;

(4) The Area Planning Division;

(5) The Perspective Planning Division;

(6) Manpower and Employment Division;

(7) Monitoring Information and Scientific Management Division;

(8) Materials Planning and Coordination Division; and

(9) Project Formulation and Appraisal Division.

The first three divisions had actually been working even before the constitution of the Planning Institute but as separate departments. Specific functions have been assigned to each division.

Apart from the State Planning Commission, the State Government has also constituted a State Economic Advisory Council with eminent economists from all over the country as its Members to advise the State Government in economic, financial and planning matters. In each important department of the State Government, a planning cell has been set up.

The State Government has recognised, from the very beginning, the necessity of multi-level planning, involving people and people's institutions, *viz.*, Gaon Sabhas at the village level, Kshettra Samitis at the block level and Zila Parishads and elected representatives of the people at the district level in the formulation and execution of the local plans. Planning Cells have been set up in each district.

The State Government has been constantly making attempts to improve and strengthen the planning machinery in the State at all levels. It has been the constant endeavour of the State Government to involve the people and their representative institutions at all levels in the task of planning and development.

Planning Section
Government of Uttar Pradesh

UNION TERRITORIES

ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ADMINISTRATION

This is a Union Territory without a legislature. The planning machinery at the State level is part of the Chief Commissioner's Secretariat and the Development Commissioner-cum-Secretary is in charge of Planning. There is a planning section under him and it deals with the formulation of Five Year and annual plans, the plan budget and all matters relating to the implementation of the plans.

The Planning Process

On receipt of the directives and guidelines from the Planning Commission, the Administration sets up task forces for different developmental sectors. These groups consist of both officials and leading members of the public. Each task force prepares the framework for the Five Year Plans on the basis of the priorities given in the National Plan, performance of the previous years, the present and projected population of the territory, the total area available for development, local conditions and the felt needs of the people. This framework is then scrutinised, vetted and modified, if necessary by the steering groups and after certain broad conclusions are arrived at, an approach paper to the Five Year Plans is prepared. On the basis of the apporach paper the concerned departments prepare detailed schemes. These schemes are then forwarded to the Planning Commission for their approval.

The Plan is further scrutinised by working groups set up by the Planning Commission, consisting of the representatives of the Ministries

concerned, the Planning Commission and this Administration. Finally, a summary note prepared on the basis of the recommendations of the working groups and containing the salient features of the Plan is circulated and thereafter the Adviser (PA) on behalf of the Planning Commission fixes the outlay for the Territory's Plan.

For the finalisation of Annual Plans, this Administration has again to go up to the Planning Commission every year for getting approval. The local task forces and steering groups are left out. Otherwise, the procedure is the same as for the Five Year Plans.

Problems

Year after year, the plan activities are increasing and they cover more and more fields, but so far the Planning machinery consists of only a nucleus staff, mostly non-technical. The Statistical Bureau in this territory also consists of only a skeleton staff. No economic survey which is a pre-requisite for planning has been done so far. In order to overcome this difficulty, it has been proposed to strengthen the planning machinery by appointing more statistical and research staff during the Fifth Plan period for the formulation, implementation, monitoring of the progress, and evaluation of Plan Schemes.

Chief Commissioner's Secretariat
Andaman and Nicobar Administration

DELHI

Development planning in the Union Territory of Delhi is mainly of urban nature and is conditioned by the special problems of Delhi, arising out of its position as the national capital. The second important factor in the planning process is the peculiar political and administrative set-up. Delhi does not have a separate consolidated fund of its own and its budget forms part of the central budget.

Till the end of the Second Plan, Delhi Administration was the sole plan implementing agency. The Delhi Development Authority was created as an autonomous agency and a Master Plan for the development of Delhi for a period of 20 years (1961-81) was framed and was passed in Parliament. The number of agencies charged with plan implementation also rose to four, *viz.*, (*i*) Delhi Administration, (*ii*) Municipal Corporation of Delhi (with its undertakings), (*iii*) New Delhi Municipal Committee, and (*iv*) Delhi Development Authority. Apart

from these four agencies, there are quite a few other central agencies like the Town & Country Planning organisation of the Ministry of Works & Housing, etc., concerned with perspective Planning of Delhi.

There is a *Five Year Plan Advisory Board* under the Chairmanship of the Chief Executive Councillor. Members of this Board are drawn from various walks of life to induct the maximum amount of public participation in the planning process.

There is also a Plan *Implementation Committee* under the Chairmanship of the Chief Executive Councillor and with heads of departments/agencies as its members. This committee is directly responsible for supervising proper implementation of the plan schemes through periodical reviews and it initiates appropriate remedial measures for avoiding shortfalls.

The various departments of the Delhi Administration, the local bodies and their undertakings formulate developmental schemes under the guidance of the Planning Cell, which is located in the Administration Secretariat under the charge of the Secretary (Planning & Finance).

Problems

The problems experienced in the formulation and implementation of plan schemes are mainly due to lack of coordination among the multiple agencies functioning within this territory and the limited financial and administrative powers with the Administration. Apart from the problems inherent in the peculiar administrative and organisational set-up, the rapid growth of population (52.9% as against the All-India growth rate of 24.8%) has been mainly responsible for throwing out of gear the public utility and social services.

Owing to the fast process of urbanisation and the impact of shift of immigrating population, there is a tremendous scarcity of land. One of the major problems confronting the metropolis is the emergence of slums and Jhuggies in large number. The land-use pattern laid down in the Master Plan is completely out of date because of the unprecedented population growth and non-implementation of the recommendations made in the Master Plan for the development of the National Capital Region and the Ring Towns.

Solutions

With a view to ensure effective coordination among the multiple agencies, a high-power committee under the Chairmanship of the

Lieutenant Governor has already been set up to sort out inter-agency problems.

The Administration has also taken steps to strengthen the planning machinery both at the apex level as well as at the level of the implementing agencies. The proposal made by the Administration in the Fifth Plan includes the setting up of a more effective central planning cell with separate units for specific tasks relating to Perspective Planning, Manpower Planning and Monitoring of plan progress.

The Planning Commission has also suggested the setting up of a small but effective Planning Board under the Chairmanship of the Lieutenant Governor which should include a few non-official experts besides the heads of the local bodies.

A special Task Force of the Planning Commission is also reviewing the existing administrative procedures involved in the planning process and is expected to suggest ways and means to reduce delays and remove bottlenecks.

Delhi Administration
Delhi

TRIPURA

A State Planning Board has been constituted with the Chief Minister, as Chairman, Cabinet Ministers, some members of the State Legislative Assembly, and some technical experts as members.

The functions of the Board are:

(1) to advise the Government in all matters relating to development schemes;

(2) to review progress of development schemes and make recommendations for removal of bottlenecks and expediting the progress;

(3) to consider Five Year Plans and Annual Plans;

(4) to consider and recommend steps which would facilitate mobilisation of public participation in the various aspects of planning and their execution; and

(5) to make an assessment of the State resources and formulate plans for the most effective and balanced utilisation of these resources.

Departmental Planning Cells

Each Department has a separate Planning Cell which assists the department and through it, the Planning Department in formulation of plans by undertaking necessary preparatory work such as collection of data. The Cell is also entrusted with scrutiny and coordination of detailed projects and schemes of several sectors under that Department, assessment of the requirement of inputs and administrative implications of each project. Each development department has a statistical unit.

The Planning and Coordination Department is the Administrative Department in respect of all plan schemes and this Department is responsible for preparation of Five Year Plans and Annual Plans.

The various Heads of Departments formulate the plan schemes in res ect of the heads of development for which they are the executing agency.

To assist the Board in plan formulation the scrutiny of implementation, it is proposed to strengthen the State Planning and Development Department by creation of Perspective Plan Unit, Monitoring, Information and Evaluation Unit, Plan Coordination and Manpower Employment Unit. In all these units, technical experts will be included to assist the work.

Block Development Committee

Each Block has a Development Committee consisting of all the M.L.As., Gaon Pradhans and nominated knowledgeable individuals of the Block. The Committee functions in an advisory capacity in the matter of framing and implementation of all rural development programmes. The Government is considering the question of setting up Distict Development Boards.

Development Department
Government of Tripura

THE INDIAN JOURNAL
OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Vol. XIX October-December 1973 No. 4

ORGANISATION FOR PUBLIC POLICY IN GOVERNMENT*

Ishwar Dayal

THIS paper† examines the organisational demands of effective policy formulation in public administration. Such an examination would have to be preceded by clarification and review of the decision process and an analysis of the characteristics of the task.

Since interpretations of terms differ in the literature in the field, I shall define the terms that are used here.

> *Decision* is the commitment of the decision-maker to act, thereby committing the personnel, material and financial resources of the organisation toward the action-objectives.
>
> *Policy* prescribes the aims, the objectives, the targets that are to be achieved, and the methods that would be used to achieve the objectives. Operationally, the policy statement in this sense must specify the expected results, the measures for achieving them, and the mechanism, or method, with which the results are expected to be achieved. In so far as this definition provides both a statement of *intent* by the decision-maker and the *method* of achieving it, it is specific and covers both the perspective and the choice of administrative action.

There is another issue that needs clarification here. Sometimes a distinction is made between policy formulation and decision-making.

*Discussion Paper presented at The Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Members of IIPA, 1973.

†I am obliged to Mr. R. N. Haldipur for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

It is often suggested that policy formulation relates to tasks at the to levels of the hierarchy and decision-making refers to normal day-to day functions of the administrator. In this paper, policy formulatio refers to that aspect of administration which is concerned with definin the objective and determining the choice of action. Decision-makin refers to the process by which this policy is determined. In this sense policy and decision-making are inherent parts of administration at a levels of the hierarchy.

Neither policy formulation nor decision-making is a prerogative c any one level of hierarchy in administration. Indeed policy is formula ted at all levels and decision processes are inherent in all adminis trative roles.[1]

THE DECISION PROCESS

Simon[2] suggests that the process of decision-making includes thre identifiable and essential phases.

> "The first phase of decision-making process—searching the env ronment for conditions calling for decision—I shall call *intelligen* activity (borrowing the military meaning of intelligence). Th second phase—inventing, developing, and analysing possib courses of action—I shall call *design* activity. The third phase- selecting a particular course of action from those available— shall call *choice* activity."

The *intelligence* activity in formulating public policy requires searc for the social, political, economic and technical aspects in the enviro ment that impinge upon a particular decision-making situation. Th *design* activity requires a search for relevance, inventing, developing an analysing the various decision choices and the consequences of the alternatives. *Choice* requires the selecting of a particular course action with as complete a knowledge as possible of the consequences the decision.

Before we examine the kinds of support systems required in a organisation for improving decision-making, it may be relevant here t

[1]Interesting research is now being undertaken in the emerging subject of poli science which is the study of that aspect of administration that focuses attenti primarily on factors relevant to public policy and on the processes through whi decision is made. Briefly policy science is concerned with the process of decisic making in the task of formulating public policy.

[2]H.A. Simon, *The New Science of Management Decisions*, 1960, New Yo Harper, p. 2.

examine some special circumstances in the intelligence, design and choice activities in public administration.

There are several unique characteristics of the Government system that impinge upon decision processes, the most important of these being:

Environment of the Decision Situation

(1) *Diffused boundaries*: By the very nature and scope of the work in administration, the impact of the decision is felt by masses of people in addition to the employees within the office. I shall call this a *response system* suggesting that in public administration the characteristics of the response system are complex because it consists of multiple values within itself. The kind of data required to judge the impact of public policy on an on-going basis is difficult and requires a wide data base and very careful interpretation of societal phenomena. Yet predicting the response to a decision is necessary, however sophisticated the methods required for doing so, may be.

In India, the responses on key issues are obtained more often through the channels of the political party than through the administrative machinery. The *mulki* rules dispute in Andhra was discussed and feelers of proposed solutions obtained through the party machinery of the ruling party and not through the administrative system; nor from direct sources, *i.e.*, the public. The party machinery by its very nature is selective.

The political party machinery is indeed useful and has the capacity to provide data for policy formulation when one party rule is predominant as now. But when there are severe and matching pressures exerted by opposing parties, or when the party system represents a coalition, as it did after the 1967 elections in India, the feedback machinery of the party is likely to have inherent limitations that tend to make it less effective. Under pressure of competing positions among political parties, ranks tend to become defensive about their positions and often fail to receive, and interpret, valid public response. The lack of an administrative machinery to evaluate public response could become a handicap to formulating effective public policy in Government.

The response system working through administrative channels at present mainly consists of frequent exchanges between officers in the Centre and the States. This process is casual and inadequate; basically neither the Centre nor the State levels have adequate machinery for obtaining, collating and interpreting public response to their policies.

Certain Ministries have set up policy research cells, notably the Home Ministry, but such units have had a habit of dying out in a short time, because of various inherent weaknesses.

(2) *The political system*: Because the boundary conditions of public office are diffused and the elected representatives have a legitimised role in representing their electorates and because ideological differences and perspectives of realities among parties are so vastly different, the assessment of the public response is difficult. The evaluation is often conditioned by the assumptions people make about social situations and how they are affected by their reference groups.[8] Often the data on effectiveness of public policy is slow in coming and sources of such data are uncertain. Both the party view and the administrator's analysis of effectiveness of the policy could have limitations imposed by either the phenomenon of group-think or proximity. In either case, to the working of the Government, the price of error could be heavy.

(3) *Distance between the decision-maker and the people who are affected by the decision* : The decision-makers at senior levels in the administrative hierarchy are far removed from those who are affected by the decision. The recruitment and promotion policies generally place administrators in significant policy roles toward the tail-end of their careers when they have been long removed from direct contact with the public. The supportive organisation for policy formulation must maintain contact with several levels of administration; and certain policy matters should systematically involve officers who are in close touch with the public. Perhaps a hierarchy of decision-roles is necessary in the Government system given the vast areas of its operation. Systematic data on ecology of the society is not easily available to decision-makers. In most cases, therefore, the perceptions of reality are at best obtained through secondary sources and often escape the present realities of the social situation. The closer one moves towards the top of the administrative hierarchy, the more responsible one is for basic policy formulation, and all the more distant from the people and the situations that are affected by the decision-choice.

In large and complex organisational systems such as the Government, or the public sector enterprises, the remoteness of the top personnel from base-line activity is a serious difficulty in evaluating policy alternatives. Organisational patterns have to consciously develop the inherence of providing valid data to men at the top.

---

[8] Otto Klineberg, "Tensions Affecting International Understanding", 1950, ***Social Science Research Council, Bulletin*** 62, New York.

The Administrative Situation

The intelligence and design activities require invention, innovation, analysis of data and the evaluation of alternatives open to the decision-maker. Research suggests that innovative activity[4] often requires perspectives, attitudes and organisational relationships different from routine and repetitive activities. The innovation would be possible when the analyst has a flexible perspective which is often different from that of the decision-maker. The analyst has to question his assumptions, the organisational realities and traditions in order to achieve new perspectives. If the analyst does not employ new perspectives for the same data, his contribution to analysis, and to seeking innovative solutions in policy situations would have marginal utility. The design activity thus poses a challenging question for designing an organisation, *viz.*, how the decision process could strive to be optimum in its innovativeness. The nature of the bureaucratic system and the emphasis on precedents and rules too often inhibit people within the organisation from employing perspectives that may be different from those borne out by history. These factors reflect not so much on the quality of the men in public service as on the system's inability to induce innovation and change.

The *choice* activity in decision-making requires experience, maturity and administrative judgement. Simon[5] has suggested that in adminisration we are concerned with satisfactory and not optimum decisions. A satisfactory decision implies a decision that is acceptable to the largest number of people who are concerned with it. Though it may not be an optimising decision, it is likely to work out better because it is accepted by a greater number. Through the administrator's concern for arriving at satisfying decisions the Government could maintain continuing public confidence in itself and be able to exercise its legitimised authority.[6]

The organisational implications of a satisfactory decision as against an optimising decision is that the administrator's maturity and judgement in the *choice* activity are crucial factors in decision-making.

Requirements of the Decision-Situation

This discussion of the *intelligence*, *design* and *choice* activities sugggests that support systems in an organisation are necessary to

[4] Donald C. Pelz, and H. M. Andrews, *Scientists in Organisations*, Wiley, 1966; G. Dalton and P. R. Lawrence, *Organisational Change and Development*, Irwin, Homewood, 1970.

[5] H. A. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour*, London, Macmillan, 1961.

[6] C. I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1938.

improve policy formulation and have to be explicitly recognised in order to aid decision-making in administration.

The support systems must provide data, analysis, interpretation and innovative solutions to recurring as well as new issues in public administration. Some of the systems needed for policy formulation are discussed below.

(1) *Data base*: Social, political and economic data are necessary for decision-making. More reliable our data, greater the probability of predicting the consequences of the policy-decision.

For top level decision-making in India, the information available is fragmentary. Each ministry interprets and deals with the information in its own way and for its own purposes. To take an example : an organisation of great significance to India's economy has four divisions. Each of the divisions functions as an autonomous unit. Each obtains, stores and processes data separately. There is little interchange between them, even when the decisions of one division impinge upon the tasks of the others. The cost of operating this system is high, but more importantly, the expertise in other divisions is seldom used in decision-making by any of the four divisions and is wasteful.

Effective analysis of data at design stages of decision activity requires a wholistic perspective of the data, *i.e.*, recognition of both the parts and the totality of the interacting situation. Without this wholistic perspective in basic policy decisions, the evaluation of the choice activity in decision-making would be largely ineffective.

There is less apparent concern than necessary for evaluating public response to policy except at the political level through the advisory committees attached to Ministries and through the party system. The administrative organisation seldom has a reliable built-in system for obtaining feed-back of public response. An independent mechanism to evaluate public response to Government policy is a very important factor in satisfactory policy-making.

In this connection, the work of Cantril is noteworthy.[7] During the War years, Cantril had developed a survey technique by which he was in a position to obtain the response of representative population and through this he was in a position to determine how the country, or a community, would react to a particular Government policy. These

[7] H. Cantril, *The Human Dimension : Experience in Public Research*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1967.

data helped the U. S. Government to decide on many sensitive policy matters involving war strategy on certain crucial issues.

(2) *Personnel and organisational requirements*: Experiments in organisational change and innovation suggest that innovative tasks require an open system and a certain kind of work environment.[8] The significant features of the environment are the following: (*a*) facility for interaction between peers and with reference groups within and outside the organisation, (*b*) freedom for experimentation, and (*c*) trust between the superior and the subordinates. These conditions for innovative tasks rarely exist in a Government office.

In recent years, leaders in Government have been relying on advisers from the academic environment and other professions. This is perhaps due to the recognition that a new perspective could be contributed by qualified persons who have not been conditioned by the system. The Indian conception of an independent Planning Commission is also consistent with the requirements of the planning task, *viz.*, an independent and professional perspective to the planning of growth and development.

Thus the *intelligence* and *design* activities in the decision process need an organisational environment that is designed to support innovative work towards policy formulation.

(3) *Familiarity with context and people*: Another condition necessary for effective formulation is the recognition of, and familiarity with, the special characteristics and culture of the administrative system. The search for consequences and prediction of results required both understanding of the system from within and knowledge of the environment. Far from being a mechanical exercise, the analysis of the available data is the backdrop that the analyst and the decision-maker must keep in mind while deciding.

What is suggested by this discussion of the process and conditions of decision-making is that complex organisations must design their own apparatus for effective decision-making. It is often said that the influence of political parties is all-pervasive in any policy decision in Government. Such influence is legitimate and necessary in the democratic system of Government.[9]

[8] Donald C. Pelz, and H. M. Andrews, *op. cit.*; D. M. McGregor, "New Concepts of Management", *The Technology Review*, Vol. 63, No. 4, Feb., 1961.

[9] An important basis of the election of a party to power is its programme and the confidence of the masses in its leadership. There is, however, need to see the distinction between a statement of intent and a statement of policy. Most often the

(Continued on page 436)

In recent months in India we have observed the dominance of the political system in many situations. Trade unions settle their differences with Cabinet Ministers. Recommendations by appointed Commissions of Enquiry or Committees are further negotiated at the highest levels of the ministerial command. These measures may be necessary, and perhaps justified, but they reduce the authority (decision-making capacity) of the administrator. The balance which is required to be established between the administrator and the legitimised representatives of the people is lacking. This lack introduces bias into the entire process of decision-making.

The creation of effective balance among the forces playing upon the decision-situation is important for administrative effectiveness. The essence of an effective decision-situation is balance, avoiding bias.

ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

I have briefly examined the activities involved in decision-making and the conditions necessary for optimising policy decisions. What is the nature of supportive systems required for policy-making functions of the Government?

Policy-making requires two inter-related aspects: one having to do with *intelligence*, *design* and *choice* activities in decision-making; and the other, with the personnel and the organisational environment needed for decision-making.

Data Analysis Task

Intelligence and design activities in the policy function at the top level in public administration are far from easy because the influences (discussed earlier) on Government administration are complex. It is

(Continued from page 435)

election manifesto is an expression of the end results to be sought and of a broad approach to their achievement. It is a statement of intent. It is not a policy as defined here. Administrative policy is specific, definitive and action-based. In the determination of public policy, it would be unrealistic to identify the significance of only the political or only the administrative system. The relative influence of these would vary according to the power each has in a given situation. It is a dynamic situation. In another context, Wilfred Brown (*Explorations in Management*, Heinemann, London 1960) has suggested that in any organisation several forces operate simultaneously and a balance among them has to be achieved for maintaining the viability of a system. In a business organisation shareholders, customers and employees independently influence the activities and the decisions of a corporation. In public administration the political system, the public, the employees, all influence the activities of the Government. If the political system dominates in routine administrative matters, the administrator's authority (decision-making capacity) is seriously curtailed and the political system is likely to dominate over the administrative. If the political system is weak, the reverse happens: the administrator could dominate the political system.

difficult for the Administration to control the variables. The ideological differences among political parties often result in support or denouncement of the administration causing, among other things, serious morale problems for senior levels of administration. For example, constant criticism of relief operations in Bihar by political parties during famine in 1967 had created severe morale problems for the higher levels of administrators. They had to deal not only with the conditions created by drought but with this problem as well.

Policy level tasks consist of three related areas: (*a*) review of the effectiveness of policy, (*b*) design activity for new policy decisions, and (*c*) anticipatory policy. Design activity in decision-making requires data for on-going review and analysis of earlier policy decisions because through such analyses alone, improvements in the design and choice activities become possible. Anticipatory policy tasks involve forecasts of policy needs and action that renders the administrative organisation ready for contingent changes within the system and in the environment. In Government there is a dire lack of anticipatory policy functions.[10] In the areas of economic, international and domestic policy a lack of systematic analysis and contingency planning of action is both costly and contrary to national interests.

Thus the need for basic policy formulation arises at the level of each ministry and the Government as a whole. Notionally all major decisions are Cabinet decisions; and therefore, they are seen to be decisions taken by the Government as a whole. Constitutionally this position is tenable. Administratively, the ministry and the cabinet each must have an organisation to design decision-choices.

The supportive systems for policy formulation at the differentiated level (ministries) and the integrative level (Government as a whole) rarely exist. In public administration there is emphasis on creating differentiated systems and deemphasis on integrative systems. For this the rationale lies in the underlying assumptions of the bureaucratic system: principles that govern functional specialisation, the hierarchy of technical authority, the legitimisation of rules for work and behaviour. The rational-legal system tends to create rigid task boundaries. Interactions across these boundaries exist mainly through formal committees set up for the purpose.

At the top levels in public administration, there is no recognisable integrative system. This function again is often performed by committees.

[10] V. A. Pai Panandikar, *Bureaucracy and Policy Making* (cyclostyled), paper presented at the Seminar on Public Services and Social Responsibility held at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, October 6-11, 1973.

The Cabinet and Chief Secretaries in the Centre and State governments perform distinct functions assigned to their positions which include responsibility for integration of inter-ministerial issues.

The integrating role, however, is not specific. The Cabinet Secretary obtains his sanctions indirectly by virtue of his position as Secretary to the Cabinet and its committees, and as chairman of the committees of secretaries. The same holds for Chief Secretaries at States level. These roles have no supervising function over the Secretaries, because each is responsible to his Minister. The relationship is delicate and the effectiveness of the role depends more upon the personal skill of the individual than on the design of the position.

Given the system, no single position is vested with, nor indeed can be assigned, the authority to perform the integrative task in the administrative organisation. Industrial policy, licensing, banking, company law affairs, all relating to economic development, are interdependent and policy in one area would directly influence the performance of other areas. Yet different ministries deal with them without enough coordination, except through the Cabinet committee and Secretaries' committee meant for this purpose. It is still an open question whether committees can perform the task of integration. They do not have an adequate information and analysis base.

Health, agriculture, community development have many common areas if integrated rural development is to be achieved; these aspects are separated at policy levels. Due to lack of integrative systems in Government organisation, the thrust of policy on, for instance, rural growth and development is too often lacking. This is supra-ministry level.

In field administration, integrative systems notionally exist at the block and the district levels. In most cases, the integrative role of the Block Development Officer and the District Collector is negated by strong functional links of the field functionaries with the state level departments. As a result, the activities at the field level become fragmented except in times of war or natural disaster when these extra links get submerged.

The absence of the integrative function in the organisations of the Government make it very difficult to design satisfactory machinery for decision-making. This factor will have to be taken into account in designing the organisational support for policy-formulation in Government.

The choice aspect of decision-making is clear. Familiarity with the administrative situation, maturity and responsibility for the task, are important requirements for the decision-maker. This task must be performed by those who have the responsibility for the consequences of their choice, *i.e.*, the administrator, the minister or the cabinet, as the case may be.

The intelligence and design activities require a supportive system which can perform the task of collecting relevant data, collating, analysis and interpreting the data for policy purposes. The data are necessary for both formulation and review of public policy, and for policy planning.

The support systems for the intelligence and design activities in decision-making are necessary at the top and at the critical levels of administration such as the district. The type of decisions taken may differ at different levels of administration. The decision-processes are, however, similar. The support systems for the intelligence and design activities would be required at top and at key levels. Its composition, expertise and involvement may differ from one level to another, depending upon the nature of decisions taken at different levels.

The supportive system at the top level of administrative organisation must have the capability of building a base for relevant data, analysis and design activities in decision-making. Such an organisation would be engaged on data retrieval, analysis of the effectiveness of public policies and advising on new policy. The task is innovative. It requires application of rigorous analytical methodologies and familiarity with the operating tasks of the Government.

This kind of support organisation would be needed at the level of the cabinet, some of the ministries and the district administration. There would have to be sharing of data because in many cases the basic data would be the same.

Personnel Organisation

This task requires research expertise and also familiarity with the administrative system. It will have to be a team consisting of people drawn from sources outside the Government and from within. It would also seem that such an organisation would have to encourage a system of self-renewal as a philosophy, or as an accepted practice. It may require changing by rotation of personnel from outside and from

within because a prolonged sense of routine and conditioning in such a system can be self-defeating.

If such an organisation has to be created, the Government would have to establish closer contacts with academic and non-Government personnel to utilise their talent for improving decision-making in the Government. I am persuaded that support systems of the kind suggested here are essential for the ever-increasing tasks that Government has assumed in India.

REGIONALISM IN INDIA : POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE

Shriram Maheshwari

THE term 'region' lends itself to a multiplicity of meanings. The only common thread which runs through them is—or appears to be—a basic cultural assumption that it is relatively smaller in size than the area in the context of which it is used. The United Nations Charter[1] employs this expression to mean a less-than-universal jurisdiction—more precisely, a conglomeration of contiguous sovereign states. In the vocabulary of a sovereign state, it generally denotes a territory which is smaller than itself but is larger than its single constituent units, variously called states, provinces, cantons, etc. The zonal council, established under the States Reorganization Act, 1956, covers a geographical region comprising two or more states. The country may be divided into several regions for functional or administrative purposes. Thus, from the point of view of power development, the central government has divided the country into five regions, each with a Regional Electricity Board. The railway administration has divided India into nine regions, or 'zones' as is the expression, each with its own zonal administrative set-up. It should here be noted that there is no single universally applicable category of regions—nor is this feasible.

The word 'region' is also used to stand for a tract of land which is smaller than the individual state but larger than its basic territorial unit, namely the district. This meaning has been recognized in governmental pronouncements as well. The Planning Commission, for instance, employs this term to convey such a meaning, but in none of the five year plans, it has made this explicit.[2] The Punjab Regional Committee Order, 1957 and the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1958 offer striking instances of the use of the word 'region' for a smaller-than-the state area. It is this connotation which the present paper adopts as its definition of a region.

---

[1] Article 52 of the U.N. Chapter.

[2] Vide, The following documents :

1 *The First Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 1952, p. 141.
2. *The Second Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 1956, p. 36.
3. *The Third Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 1961, p. 151.
4. *The Fourth Five Year Plan*, 1969-74, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 1964, p. 398.

REGION : A SOCIO-CULTURAL CONCEPT

Man is a territorial animal. He is born with loyalty to the soil from which he has sprung, and in course of his social living imbibes loyalty to the region of which that soil is an emotionally integral part. This regional identification is not necessarily antagonistic to the loyalty to the nation of which he calls himself a citizen. These loyalties are to be viewed as being basically complimentary, not competitive. Very correctly did the States Reorganization Commission (1953-5) remind: "National loyalties do not demand that other loyalties should be eliminated."[3]

A region is a profound sociological fact reflected in its being treated as the nucleus of social aggregation for multiple purposes. But what precise factors must pre-exist before a tract of territory could be called a region in this sense of the term is not yet fully known—nor can be firmly predicted. What is known is that several variables must be in simultaneous operation in varying degrees over a very considerable period of time which, then, set a particular territory apart from other areas: geography, topography, religion, language, customs and mores, political and economic stage of development, way of living, commonly shared historical experiences, etc. The word *et cetera* is significant: regionalism, to be sure, needs all these ingredients, but the concept is much more inclusive—and even when all is said and done, it remains at least partially elusive. The essential fact is that a region is characterized, more than anything else, by a widely shared sentiment of 'togetherness' in the people, internalized from a wide variety of sources, which might even include common prosperity, camaraderie developed in a common struggle, etc. At the centre of regionalism is a more or less intense sense of identity which is not less real to the people than the feeling of belonging to a particular state or nation or to a language group. A feeling that one belongs to Vidarbha is to suggest or at least imply that he is marking himself out from the Maharashtrians even as all Maharashtrians may feel that they are in some way different from those in other states, speaking some other language. These are cultural realities, and one just cannot wish them away. To attempt to do this is apt to invite resistance, even agitations. This opposition is bound to become more intense and resolute with the passage of time as the socio-economic programmes being undertaken by the government are seen in practice to widen the economic gap between regions. Thus the historical sense of identity on the positive side becomes fervent and glowing through reinforcement by a sense of cumulative deprivations on the

---

[3] *Report of the States Reorganization Commission*, New Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1955, p. 45.

negative side, and begins articulating itself in idioms which make up the politics of regionalism.

Diversity, physical and otherwise, has been the keynote of India. This is accepted by all. But politics and government of this land have not adequately reflected in their internal structures and decision-making processes this striking feature of the Indian society. Several states of the Indian Union are large in size—larger, indeed, than many sovereign states in the world. The large size makes the governmental action sluggish and its response slow and halting resulting in economic backwardness. The following table indicates the area and population of our states in comparison to a few other countries of the world:

Area and Population : Indian States Compared with Some Countries of the World

State	*Area (in square kilo-metres)*	*Popu-lation (in lakhs)*	*Country*	*Area (in square kilo-metres)*	*Popu-lation (in lakhs)*
Madhya Pradesh	443,000	416	Sweden	411,406	79
Rajasthan	342,000	258	Rhodesia	390,622	50
Maharashtra	308,000	504	Finland	305,475	46
Uttar Pradesh	294,000	883	Algeria	295,033	121
Andhra Pradesh	277,000	435	Ghana	238,537	84
Jammu-Kashmir	222,000	46	Uganda	236,037	95
Gujarat	196,000	267	Great Britain	230,609	514
Karnataka	192,000	293	New Zealand	103,736*	26
Bihar	174,000	563	Austria	83,849	70
Orissa	156,000	219	Sri Lanka	64,644	105
Tamil Nadu	130,000	412	Denmark	43,069	48
West Bengal	88,000	443	Malawi	36,350*	40
Assam	78,000	146	Netherlands	33,808	127
Himachal Pradesh	56,000	34	Belgium	30,513	91
Punjab	50,000	135	Jamaica	11,525	16
Haryana	44,000	100			
Kerala	39,000	213			
Meghalaya	22,000	10			
Manipur	22,000	11			
Nagaland	16,000	5			
Tripura	10,000	15			

***Denotes area in square miles.**

The political boundaries of the provinces (now, states) were carved out by the British principally on grounds of administrative expediency, certainly not in the light of what the people cherished. Independent India undertook, in 1956, a massive reorganization of the states on the linguistic principle—to redeem the pledge to the nation which the national leaders made as early as 1928[4]. While language is a vital factor which integrates the people, it is not the *sole* one. Otherwise, Hindi-speaking people would have clamoured for one state but this has not happened. India is an ancient country with a long recorded history. Unlike some other ancient societies which have broken themselves violently and abruptly from their past, she has retained continuity with her bygone ages. As is to be expected in such a mellowed society, the pull of the past, which includes the regional pull as well, is deep and powerful on people's minds. In a democracy, therefore, regional sentiment is an important factor in the political ordering of affairs.

REGION AND THE CONSTITUTION

A validity of the regional identity is even accepted in an implied way by the constitution itself, for article 3 explicitly provides for the creation of new states in an amazingly simple manner—by a bare majority of those present and voting in parliament and ratification by a majority of the states in the Indian Union. There is a historical explanation of why such a provision found place in the constitution. As K. Santhanam observes:

> "It was not done in any flippant spirit. At that time the Indian states had come in, and they were of varying size—small, medium and big. Provinces had been formed through historical forces or in a chaotic and haphazard manner. There were three or four linguistic groups in a single province or state. There were insistent claims that these anomalies should be removed before the constitution was put on the statute book. The constituent assembly thought and rightly that any such attempt would delay the constitution and it was imperative for the welfare of India that the constitution should be drafted, approved and implemented at the earliest possible moment. Therefore, this wide provision inconsistent with the spirit of any federation, was put in and you know the tremendous use that has been made of it."[5]

---

[4] Vide, *The Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to Determine the Principles of the Constitution of India* (Nehru Report), quoted in S. R. Maheshwari, *The Evolution of Indian Administration*, Agra, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1970, pp. 123-4.

[5] K. Santhanam, *Union-State Relations in India*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. 7.

A large-scale reorganization of the states was undertaken in 1956 and a few others (including some which had been already reorganized) were reorganized in 1960, 1967, 1971 and 1972. Yet this article has not been deleted from the constitution or even 'frozen', which seems to imply or at least suggest that there is a probability of regions, at least some of them, gradually ripening to statehood. At any rate, such a provision entails profound implications and consequences so far as regional renaissance in India is concerned. It serves to hold the hope of statehood to regional personalities. It also tends to weaken the position of the state government *vis-a-vis* such sub-state 'centrifugalism'. In a federal-cum-competitive polity of the kind that we have in our country, it is not entirely unusual on the part of the central government to try to pressurize a persistently dissenting state by inciting or fomenting, directly or indirectly, such regional elements and demands. Nor is it utterly uncommon for the regionalists to seek a tie-up with the centre at the back of the state government to obtain support for separation and statehood. Taken all together, a region is a potentially powerful entity in Indian politics.

In practice also selected regions in some states have secured varying measures of recognition. This governmental response has assumed three principal forms. The structure visualized for a particular region might be assigned purely or substantially coordinational responsibilities in specified matters for the region concerned, an example of which is the Rayalseema Planning and Development Board. The other examples of such coordinating bodies are the development boards for Bundelkhand and the hill districts in Uttar Pradesh, for Vidarbha and Marathwada in Maharashtra, for Saurashtra in Gujarat, for north and south Bihar in Bihar and for Ladakh in Jammu-Kashmir. To attend to the problems of Darjeeling, West Bengal has created a hill areas portfolio; besides it proposes to establish a separate secretariat to coordinate economic growth in the Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong region of the state. There could also be a political apparatus in the form of a sub-legislature clothed with a measure of financial authority. The Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee (popularly called the Telangana Regional Committee) is a striking example of this style of governmental response, others being the Hindi and Punjabi Regional Committees which functioned in Punjab from 1957 till 1967 when the state was bifurcated into Punjab and Haryana. The third form in the state government's regional recognition is best depicted by the one-time (1970-72) Meghalaya which became a sub-state within the state of Assam. The institutions of the latter two categories acquire a distinctly special character inasmuch as they can be ushered into formal existence only by the central government. This marks them off the bodies falling in the

first category which may be set up by the concerned state government itself.

The major regional arrangements are being discussed in the following.

THE RAYALSEEMA PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

The old Madras province had constituted as early as 1941 a regional board—the Ceded Districts Economic Development Board—to coordinate the activities of various departments for the prevention of famines in Rayalseema, a region which comprises the four districts of Anantpur, Chittor, Cuddapah and Kurnool. This Board hardly had any use as it was bereft of executive or financial powers. It was abolished in 1949 and in its place the Rayalseema Development Board was set up in the same year. The latter, too, had no financial power and so was bound to be, like its predecessor, ineffective in attending to the problem for which it was ostensibly created. The mounting Telangana agitation of 1969 reminded the people of Rayalseema of their own depressed economic plight and also suggested a possible weapon—that of agitation—to seek amelioration of their none too enviable fate. Not unexpectedly, they raised a demand for special economic assistance for their region. The state government,[6] obviously anxious not to add to its pile of worries, yielded, made the Board more broad-based in its membership and clothed it with functions of a developmental nature. This body bears the name of Planning and Development Board for Rayalseema. Its functions are as follows: (1) To prepare a long-term plan for eradication of famine in Rayalseema; (2) To consider and advise the state government upon schemes pertaining to development of Rayalseema such as might be included in the five-year plan or in the annual plans; (3) To recommend further measures that might be necessary to accelerate the pace of development of Rayalseema; and (4) To review the progress made in respect of the development schemes pertaining to Rayalseema.

The speaker of the Andhra Pradesh legislative assembly is the chairman of the Board and the president of the Rayalseema Mahasabha, a regional broad-based party, is its vice-chairman. Other members of the Board are: ministers and ministers of state coming from the Rayalseema region, all members of both houses of the state legislature from the area, the four zila parishad chairmen and the four district collectors of the Rayalseema region, the chairman of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, the chief engineer for irrigation, the registrar of

[6] *Indian Express*, October 7, 1969.

cooperative societies, the director of industries; the chief conservator of forests, and the secretary of the state's planning and panchayat raj department who is its member-secretary. The Board is free to invite any other heads of department, as and when necessary, to attend its meetings. The Board meets twice a year. Although this body has been in existence since 1969, the local population does not appear to be fully satisfied with such a device. One frequently hears a demand[7] for a statutory regional committee for what apparently looks like a forsaken tract of land.

THE ANDHRA PRADESH REGIONAL COMMITTEE

No princely state in India has caused, on its territorial disintegration and reorganization, such persistent instability as the area formerly under the Nizam. This appears to be typical of a large quasi-sovereign state which finds itself suddenly reduced to the status of a smaller region within a state comprising other larger regions. It may be recalled that the princely state of Hyderabad was inhabited by people speaking, in addition to Urdu, also Telugu, Kannada and Marathi—Telugu being the language of the majority. The States Reorganization Commission, while favouring merger of regions speaking Kannada and Marathi with Karnataka and Maharashtra respectively, recommended that the Telugu—speaking people should have a separate state, of the name of Telangana, and the question of this area's merger with the adjoining state of Andhra should be brought before the legislatures of both Andhra and Telangana at the end of five years, and if both approve by a two-thirds majority of votes the merger of these two states should take place. As this was a time when most Telugu hearts were amorously set on 'Vishal Andhra' conceived in terms of the union of Telangana and Andhra, the Commission's proposal of keeping separate, even though temporarily, people speaking the same language—Telugu—had none too good a prospect of gaining acceptance by the central government. By February 1956, the latter had virtually jettisoned the idea of a separate state of Telangana, and the formation of a single state of Andhra Pradesh comprising Andhra and Telangana appeared imminent. It was at this moment that the central leadership hit upon the idea of a committee for the more backward region of Telangana to safeguard its interests and advancement. In February 1956, Govind Ballabh Pant, home minister in the central government called the political leaders of both Andhra and Hyderabad to Delhi for discussion and proposed this device to win over the Telangana leadership in favour of a single integrated state, at any rate to soften their opposition to it. In return for its agreement in favour of a single state, the Telangana region

[7] *Patriot*, 28 November, 1969.

was guaranteed certain safeguards. The latter, it must be emphasized, had no base either in law or in the constitution, and as such are popularly referred to as the Gentleman's Agreement. The Gentleman's Agreement (20 February, 1956), subscribed to by the leaders of both Andhra and Telangana and, in a way, underwritten by the central government, embodied certain safeguards to the Telangana people with regard to employment, economic development and educational facilities. The prominent features of the Gentleman's Agreement were, firstly, that the expenditure of the central and general administration of the state was to be borne proportionately by the two regions and the balance of income from Telangana was to be reserved for expenditure on the development of the Telangana area, secondly, that admission to the educational institutions in the Telangana region was to be 'restricted' to the students of Telangana (or the latter were to have admission to the extent of one-third of the total admissions in the entire state, whichever course was advantageous to Telangana students), thirdly, that recruitment to the state civil services was to be made on the basis of population from both regions, fourthly, that the state cabinet was to consist of members in proportion of 60 to 40 per cent for Andhra and Telangana respectively, and, finally that a regional committee was to be established for the Telangana region "with a view to securing its all round development in accordance with its needs and requirements".

The Gentleman's Agreement cleared the way for the formation of the single state of Andhra Pradesh. Though speaking the same language, these two regions have been growing up for the last two centuries under dissimilar socializing influences. Till very recently, Andhra was part of Madras whereas Telangana was under the princely rule of the Nizam. As part of the British province, Andhra had passed through a fairly extended phase of political struggle for national independence and as such had had exposure to a process of political socialization. It could count on a political leadership with roots struck in the soil. Telangana, on the other hand, could experience and absorb only an insignificant degree of politicization—thanks to the autocratic princely regime. Its political leadership was still in the making and was hardly any match to the vastly superior and more diversified political talent thrown up by the Andhra soil. This, in short, was the make-up of the two regions when they decided, in 1956, to have a tryst with a common political destiny. It may also be stressed that, of the two, the Andhra region is considerably larger in size and also more populous. The Telangana region consists of nine districts while the Andhra region includes eleven. The former has a population of 15 millions (1972) as against that of 21 millions who dwell in the Andhra region. Thus, Andhra region favoured at once by a combination of geography,

demography, even politics was assured a dominant position in the power-structure of the unilingual state of Andhra Pradesh. So, to set the equilibrium somewhat right, special devices were considered to be desirable as well as necessary. The proposed Regional Committee for Telangana is the key stone of the whole edifice of safeguards being designed as Telangana's spokesman and watchdog with a definite status in the state's hierarchy of decision-making. It was set up under the presidential order, known as the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1958. Its powers and functions have been enlarged from time to time in deference to popular agitations.

THE TELANGANA REGIONAL COMMITTEE

The Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee, popularly called the Telangana Regional Committee, is a 104-member body of the Andhra Pradesh legislative assembly, consisting as it does of the members of the assembly who represent constituencies within the Telangana region. Although Andhra Pradesh has a bi-cameral legislature, the upper chamber is not represented in the Regional Committee. Also, the chief minister and the speaker are excluded from the membership of the regional committee even if they hail from the Telangana region. The Telangana region comprises the territories of the erstwhile Hyderabad state which have since formed part of Andhra Pradesh. This region, so far as the Regional Committee is concerned, has been territorially defined in the States Reorganization Act, 1956[8] itself in the following way:

(*i*) The districts of Hyderabad, Medak, Nizamabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam, Nalgonda and Mahbubnagar;

(*ii*) Alampur and Godwal taluks of Raichur district and Kodangal taluk of Gulbarga district;[9]

(*iii*) Tandur taluk of Gulbarga district;[10]

(*iv*) Zahirabad taluk (except Nirua Circle) Nyalkal circle of Bidar taluk and Narayankhed taluk of Bidar district;[11]

(*v*) Bichkonda and Jukkal circles of Deghur taluk of Nanded district;[12]

(*vi*) Mudhol, Bhiansa and Kuber circles of Mudhol taluk of Nanded district;[13] and

[8] Section 3(1) of the States Reorganization Act, 1956.
[9] Now a part of the district of Mahbubnagar.
[10] Now a part of the district of Hyderabad.
[11] Now a part of the district of Medak.
[12] Now a part of the district of Nizamabad.
[13] Now a part of the district of Adilabad.

(*vii*) Adilabad district except Islapur circle of Boath taluk, Kinwat taluk and Rajura taluk.

Functions

The Regional Committee was originally (in 1958) entrusted with the following matters listed in the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1958:

(*i*) development and economic planning within the framework of the general development plans and policies formulated by the state legislature;

(*ii*) local self-government (that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration);

(*iii*) public health and sanitation, local hospitals and dispensaries;

(*iv*) primary and secondary education, including regulation of admissions to the educational institutions in the Telangana region;

(*v*) prohibition of the consumption (except for medicinal purposes) of intoxicating liquors and of drugs which are injurious to health;

(*vi*) sale of agricultural land;

(*vii*) agriculture;

(*viii*) cottage and small-scale industries;

(*ix*) cooperative societies; and

(*x*) markets and fairs.

Many new items—university education, medium and heavy industries, methods of personnel recruitment to subordinate services and posts, provision of employment opportunities to the Telangana people—were added to this list in 1970—apparently in a bid to mollify the protagonists of a separate state of Telangana. Thus, at present, the Committee's jurisdiction extends to the following matters as far as they relate to the the Telangana region:

(*i*) Local self-government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration;

(*ii*) Public health and sanitation, local hospitals and dispensaries;

(*iii*) Primary, secondary and university education;

(*iv*) Regulation of admissions to the educational institutions in the Telangana region;

(*v*) Prohibition of the consumption, except for medical purposes, of intoxicating liquors and of drugs which are injurious to health;

(*vi*) Sale of agricultural land;

(*vii*) Cottage, small-scale, medium and heavy industries falling under entry 24 of the state list in the seventh schedule to the constitution;

(*viii*) Agriculture, cooperative societies, markets and fairs;

(*ix*) Development and economic planning within the plan allocations for the Telangana region as formulated by the state legislature;

(*x*) Methods of recruitment ana the principles to be followed in making appointments to subordinate services and posts (that is to say, services, and posts appointments to which are not notified in the official gazette but not including any service of tehsildars) under the state government, in the Telangana region; and

(*xi*) Securing provision of adequate employment appointments to the people of Telangana region in the state government, quasi-government institutions, statutory authorities and corporate bodies in the Telangana region.

Besides, the Regional Committee may consider and pass resolutions recommending to the state government any legislative or executive action affecting the Telangana region with respect to the above-mentioned eleven items but the rider is that the proposed executive action should, as a rule, relate to general questions of policy and the legislative or executive action is " in conformity with the overall financial arrangements contemplated in the annual budget or in the five year plan pertaining to the Telangana region".[14]

The Regional Committee constitutes an important and necessary level in the state's legislation-making affecting the Telangana region. Every bill, other than a money bill, affecting this region and pertaining to the above-mentioned eleven items, is required, upon introduction in the state legislative assembly or if it has been introduced in and passed by the upper house, upon transmission to the assembly, to be compulsorily referred to the Regional Committee for consideration and report to the

[14] Rule 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1956 (amended in March 1970).

assembly. Any dispute on whether a particular bill is a regional bill or not is clarified by the governor whose decision is final.

The Regional Committee considers such a regional bill and submits its report on it to the assembly, which is then discussed in the latter. The presidential order provides "The debate on a motion that the bill as reported by the regional committee be taken into consideration shall be confined to consideration of the report of the Regional Committee and the matters referred to in that report or any alternative suggestions consistent with the principle of the bill."[15] Also, a member of the Regional Committee who signs its report without a minute of dissent is barred under the legislative rules from moving an amendment to the bill when the latter is under discussion in the assembly.

What would be the case when the assembly does not pass a bill as visualized by the Regional Committee or passes it in a form which is substantially different from that as reported by the Regional Committee? The speaker of the assembly is specifically put under an obligation to bring such matters to the notice of the governor who, then, may "return the bill to the assembly with a message recommending either that the bill be withdrawn or that it be passed in the form in which it has been reported by the Regional Committee or in the form in which it has been passed by the assembly and the message received from the governor shall be reported by the speaker to the assembly and accordingly, the bill shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, or as the case may be, be deemed to have been passed by the assembly in the form recommended by the governor".[16]

Mention should also be made of the state government's obligation to transmit to the Regional Committee bi-annual reports indicating governmental action on the latter's recommendations. The former is also called upon to forward to this Committee "periodical reports giving the progress of implementation of central government's decisions in matters relating to the integration of the (public) services in the state consequent on the state reorganization in 1956".[17]

The Regional Committee elects its own presiding officer, known as chairman. Under the bye-laws governing the composition and functioning of this body, its meeting must be convened once in three months, a provision which has not been always adhered to in practice. The Regional Committee is spiritually contrived as a surrogate of the

[15] Rule 128-F of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Rules.
[16] Rule 152-A (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Rules.
[17] Rule 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order 1956.

state assembly but its proceedings are considered to be confidential, thus denying citizens any access to them. Nor is there a provision for putting interpellations. The members may, however, ask for specific information about matters within the Committee's jurisdiction. The decisions in the Committee are as a rule taken by a majority of votes of the members present and voting. The treasury benches have the right of participation in the discussions, but a minister is not entitled to vote if he is not already a member of this body.

Like its prototype, the Regional Committee functions largely through a network of its sub-committees—both standing and *ad hoc*. The Telangana Regional Committee has provided in its bye-laws, for the formation of three sub-committees: the sub-committee on local administration and public health, the sub-committee on education, and the sub-committee on development. Members of the sub-committees are elected by the Regional Committee itself from amongst its own members according to the principle of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. A sub-committee consists of nine members but the ministers are, as a rule, excluded from its membership.

Governor's Role

The governor of the state has been given special responsibility for securing the proper functioning of the Regional Committee "in accordance with the provisions of this (Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee) Order". Put in concrete terms, the governor has been made the final arbiter in the event of any disagreement between the legislative assembly and the Regional Committee or between the council of ministers and the Regional Committee. The Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Rules postulate:

"(1) When a bill as reported by the Regional Committee is not passed by the assembly in the form in which it has been reported but is passed in a form which, in the opinion of the speaker, is substantially different from that as reported by the Regional Committee, or is rejected by the assembly, the speaker shall submit it to the governor.

"(2) The governor shall, as soon as possible after the submission to him of the bill return the bill to the assembly with a message recommending either that the bill be withdrawn or that it be passed in the form in which it has been reported by the Regional Committee or in the form in which it has been passed by the assembly and the message received from the governor

> shall be reported by the speaker to the assembly and accordingly, the bill shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, or as the case may be, be deemed to have been passed by the assembly in the form recommended by the governor."

Rule 8-A of the Andhra Pradesh Government Business Rules also recognizes the special role of the Governor:

> "The council (of ministers) shall normally give effect to the recommendations of the Regional Committee made under paragraph 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1958, in regard to any legislative or executive action affecting the Telangana region with respect to scheduled matters but if the council is of the opinion that it would not be expedient to give effect to any such recommendation or the Regional Committee was not competent to make any such recommendation, the matter shall be referred by the chief minister to the governor whose decision thereon shall be final and binding on the council and action shall be taken accordingly."

The uniqueness of the governor's role *vis-a-vis* the Regional Committee has become, in a sense, more manifest since March, 1970 when the presidential order specifically put him under an obligation to report to the president on the working of the Regional Committee "annually or whenever so required by the president".[18]

The constitutional position of the governor as but a nominal chief executive of the state may hardly be reconciled with the discretionary authority vested in him under the order. In practice, however, the incumbent of this office has overcome this apparent contradiction in roles by tending to exercise his discretion in accordance with the discretion of the chief minister and the council of ministers. The state government did not accept several proposals approved by the Regional Committee on the plea that such matters fell outside the jurisdiction of the Committee. On being referred to the governor, as postulated under the rules, the latter also took the same view point. Even in other matters, the governor generally sided with the council of ministers, thereby rejecting the Committee's proposals. It is not known yet whether the governor sends his report to the president of India without bringing it to the notice of the chief minister. It is also not known if the president, on receipt of this report, sends a copy to the chief minister. If this is so, it is doubtful if the governor would be able to express his views very frankly in his reports to the president.

[18] Rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee Order, 1958.

The Regional Council has not been successful in ensuring the fulfilment of its primary tasks which have also been the basic aspirations of the people of the region, namely faster economic development assured through the investment of the surplus revenue accruing from Telangana into this region itself, and, secondly, safeguarding of employment opportunities of the Telangana people who happen to be, in the matter of education no less than income, more backward than their Andhra counterparts. Each point merits a detailed examination.

One of the safeguards to Telangana visualized the utilization of surplus revenue from Telangana in this region itself, not its diversion, in any form, to the already more developed Andhra region. This promise has not been honoured in practice, creating, to an extent, legitimate jealousies and ill-feelings against the dominant region. That the Telangana surplus has not always been ploughed back within this region itself is accepted, albeit apologetically, by the state government despite the fact that the state's finance minister was a member of the Regional Committee. But there has been disagreeent over the precise extent of this surplus. Kumar Lalit, an accountant-general, was accordingly deputed by the state chief minister to assess the extent of this surplus. According to Lalit, Telangana surplus for the period from 1 November, 1956 to 3 March, 1968 amounted to Rs. 42.5 crores. The Telangana Regional Committee lost no time in challenging the correctness of this figure. The central government, therefore, announced, in April 1969, a committee under the chairmanship of Justice Vashishtha Bhargava to "examine the varying estimates made of such (Telangana) surpluses during the period 1 November, 1956 to 31 March, 1968 and of the unspent portion of such surpluses and also any representations made against these estimates; and to determine the sum which ought to have been spent on the development of Telangana region in accordance with the agreements but remained unspent on 31 March, 1968" and "also evolve and recommend precise principles on which the surpluses from the Telangana region should be determined in future".[19] This committee fixed the unspent surplus of Telangana at Rs. 2834.31 lakhs for the period 1956-57 to 1967-68.[20] Whatever be the precise figures, as the surpluses did not accumulate into reserves, they represented overspending in the Andhra region. The committee came to the conclusion that the objective of accelerating the pace of development in the backward Telangana region so as to enable the Telangana people to come up to the standards attained in the Andhra region, "has not yet been achieved".[21] It exhorted the state government to "keep in view the

[19] *Report of the Committee on Telangana Surpluses*, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1969, p. (iii)

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 27

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 29

object of that (Gentleman's) Agreement and take appropriate measures in future to ensure that Telangana is allowed adequate funds to speed up its development so as to enable it to make up the deficiency".[22]

Attention should now be turned to the safeguarding of employment opportunities to the Telanganites. The Regional Committee has been a staunch advocate of the *mulki* rules.[23] Even the Gentleman's Agreement was explicit that the future recruitment to civil services was to be on the basis of population from both regions (Telangana and Andhra) and that some kind of domicile rules, *e.g.*, residence for twelve years in Telangana region, was to be insisted upon to secure the prescribed proportion to recruitment of services for Telangana region. These provisions did not prove to be effective enough. In the first place, they were not always observed in practice, and there have been not infrequent publicly voiced complaints on this score. Secondly, it was not very difficult for people from Andhra region for getting a *mulki* certificate: a bribe to the official charged with the issuance of such a certificate usually did the trick. Thirdly, under the existing rules, an Andhra residing in Telangana would automatically acquire *mulki* rights on his completion of twelve years' stay. Finally, these *mulki* provisions got struck down, in 1969 by the state's high court which pronounced them as *ultra vires* of the country's constitution. The judicial pronouncement on the *mulki* rules governing public recruitment shook the entire Telangana psychologically as well as emotionally, which added immeasureably to the simmering discontentment and frustration already nibbling the Telangana heart. Only scarcely less shaken were the state and the central governments. The former reacted by appealing to the full bench of the state high court, and, later to the supreme court but without avail. The central government lost no time in appointing a committee to examine the whole matter.

This committee, under the chairmanship of K. N. Wanchoo, observed: "In view of the interpretation placed by the supreme court in article 16(3) it is no longer possible to make a law or rule prescribing residential qualification in a part of a state for public appointments within the part. Any law or rule so made should be bad and would be liable to be struck down as *ultra vires* of the constitution."[24] The

---

[22] *Report of the Committee on Telangana Surpluses*, op. cit., p. 29

[23] Prior to the commencement of the constitution, certain rules known as *mulki* rules had been in force in Hyderabad, having been promulgated through a firman issued by the Nizam. These rules provided that no person was to be appointed to any superior or inferior service in the state if he was not a *mulki*. One of the criteria prescribed for acquiring the status of a *mulki* was permanent residence in Hyderabad state for at least 15 years.

[24] *Report on Telangana Safeguards of the Committee of Jurists*, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1969, p. 8.

committee pointed out: "No legislative measure, therefore, whether on the form of a law or a rule promulgated under the proviso to article 309 of the constitution can now possibly enable us to continue the position obtaining under the act of 1957 and the rules framed thereunder in 1959 with respect to the Telangana area. Therefore, if any law is to be passed providing for residential qualification within a part of the state, then first there will have to be a constitutional amendment of article 16(3) by which the words 'or a part thereof' have to be added after the words 'any requirement as to residence within that state or union territory'. Without such a constitutional amendment, it would not be possible to provide for a residential qualification within part of a state or union territory either by law or rule."[25]

This committee advised against constitutional amendment to guarantee employment to the people of Telangana and instead suggested that recruitment be decentralized to achieve this purpose. It sugggested decentralization of authority in recruiting personnel for class III and class IV posts. "We may point out that in the states in northern India (and one of us knows personally about Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan), recruitment to subordinate services, *i.e.*, what is equivalent to class III and class IV services under the Government of India, is made by local heads of offices for their own offices. Thus, for example, a district judge recruits class IV and class III staff for his office locally after such publicity in the district as is considered necessary and desirable and after such tests, oral or in writing, as may be considered suitable. There is no constitutional bar to such a procedure for recruitment to local offices to fill class III and class IV posts therein for there is no impediment to any one competing for such appointment. But in actual practice, the experience has been that the recruitment being made for local offices by the heads of those offices and the vacancies in each case being small, the persons who compete for such posts are, by and large, local people and a person from outside the district hardly competes for such posts. The result of this kind of recruitment by each head of a local office for his own office is that practically all vacancies in local offices are filled by local people so far as class III and class IV staff is concerned . . . . We would, therefore, suggest in order that the Agreement of 1956 as modified by the Government of India's statement tabled in the Lok Sabha restricting it to subordinate services only may be substantially carried out, the method of recruitment to local offices by the heads of each office is introduced. Rules for such recruitment as the Andhra Pradesh Government may consider necessary may be framed and such posts in class III services as can be suitably filled by local recruitment of this type may be taken out of the purview of the (state) public service

[25] *Report an Telangana Safeguards of the Committee of Jurists*, op. cit., p. 8

commission."[26] This scheme does not conflict with the constitution inasmuch as it does not specifically debar anyone from competing with local candidates. It gets round the constitution without offending it. No doubt, it is a somewhat heavily contrived way to get over the constitutional difficulties. But it is practical.

PUNJAB REGIONAL COMMITTEES (1957-67)

The bi-lingual state of Punjab (till its bifurcation in 1967) was the first state in India to have evolved the device of regional committees to seek regional development. The blue print of these committees was finalized by the central government in 1956 after the States Reorganization Commission had turned down the demand for a purely Punjabi speaking state being carved out from Punjab. An outline of the Scheme for Regional Committees in the Punjab State which the central government placed before the Lok Sabha in 1956 visualized:

> "For the more convenient transaction of the business of government with regard to some specified matters, the state will be divided into two regions, namely, the Punjabi-speaking and the Hindi-speaking regions. For each region there will be a regional committee of the state assembly consisting of the members of the state assembly belonging to each region including the ministers from that region but not including the chief minister. Legislation relating to specified matters will be referred to the Regional Committees. In respect of specified matters proposals may also be made by the Regional Committees to the state government for legislation or with regard to questions of general policy not involving any financial commitments other than expenditure of a routine and incidental character. The advice tendered by the Regional Committees will normally be accepted by the government and the state legislature. In case of difference of opinion, reference will be made to the governor whose decision will be final and binding."[27]

The regional committees came into being in November 1957 under the presidential order, called the Punjab Regional Committees Order, 1957. Two Regional Committees were set up, one for the Hindi region[28]

[26] *Report on Telangana Safeguards of the Committee of Jurists*, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[27] *Outline of the Scheme for Regional Committees in the Punjab State*, No. F. 48/1/56-SRI, Ministry of Home Affairs, laid on the table in Lok Sabha on 3rd April, 1956.

[28] The Hindi Region included (*i*) Kangra district, (*ii*) Simla district, (*iii*) Karnal district, (*iv*) Rohtak district, (*v*) Gurgaon district, (*vi*) Hissar district, (*vii*) Mohindergarh district, (*viii*) Ambala district excluding the Rupar, Morinda and Chandigarh assembly constituencies, and (*ix*) Jind and Narwana tehsils of Sangrur district.

and the other for the Punjabi region, consisting[29] respectively of the members of the state legislative assembly who represented the constituencies within that particular region. The chief minister and the speaker of the assembly were barred from the membership of either Committee. Ministers enjoyed the right to speak and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of any Regional Committee but were not entitled to vote at any meeting of the Regional Committee of which he was not a member.

Each Committee was empowered to discuss the following fourteen subjects so far as these related to its region. In addition, it could pass resolutions or recommend to the state government any legislative or executive action with respect to these subjects provided that the executive action related to general questions of policy and the legislative or executive action did not involve any financial commitment other than expenditure of a routine and incidental character. The fourteen subjects were as follows:

(*i*) Local self-government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration including panchayats;

(*ii*) Public health and sanitation, local hospitals and dispensaries;

(*iii*) Primary and secondary education;

(*iv*) Agriculture;

(*v*) Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases, veterinary training and practice;

(*vi*) Ponds and the prevention of cattle trespass;

(*vii*) Protection of wild animals and birds;

(*viii*) Fisheries;

(*ix*) Cottage and small-scale industries;

(*x*) Markets and fairs;

(*xi*) Inns and inn-keepers;

(*xii*) Cooperative societies;

(*xiii*) Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions; and

(*xiv*) Development and economic planning within the framework of the general development plans and policies formulated by the state legislature.

---

[29] The Punjabi region included: (*i*) Gurdaspur district, (*ii*) Amritsar district, (*iii*) Bhatinda district, (*iv*) Jullunder district, (*v*) Hoshiarpur district, (*vi*) Ferozepur district, (*vii*) Ludhiana district, and (*viii*) Kapurthala district.

The Regional Committee formed a necessary link in the state's legislation-making in the sphere of these fourteen subjects. The non-money bills dealing with any of these subjects were, upon introduction in the assembly or if they were introduced in and passed by the upper house, upon transmission to the assembly, were compulsorily referred to the appropriate Regional Committee for consideration and report to the assembly. The presidential order stipulated:

> "Any bill referred to the Regional Committees may. . . , if so recommended by them, be passed by the assembly with such variations as may be necessary in its application to the two regions."[30]

Both the assembly and the state government were normally expected to fall in line with the concerned Regional Committee's recommendations. The cases of difference and disagreement were as a rule referred to the governor whose decisions were final. The presidential order explicitly charged the governor with "special responsibility for securing the proper functioning of the Regional Committee in accordance with the provisions of this order."[31]

The rules governing internal functioning of the regional committee and transaction of its business were strikingly similar to those operating in the case of the Telangana Regional Committee. In fact, the Hindi and Punjabi Regional Committees were the prototypes of the Telangana Regional Committee (until its revamping in 1970): the two presidential orders were alike marking only minimal possible change in phraseology.

The Hindi and Punjabi Regional Committee functioned from 1957 till 1967. They were rendered unnecessary and consequently became extinct with the bifurcation in 1967 of bilingual Punjab into Punjab and Haryana.[32] The Regional Committee was contrived as an institution to take care of regional needs and requirements and to promote the development of the regional language. This it was expressly visualized to do within the framework of a single state. The functioning of the two Regional Committees leaves no one in doubt that this institution met with failure in fulfilling its objectives. A more correct observation may perhaps be that this unique experiment in sub-federalism in India was denied a fair trial by either the state government or the members of these bodies. The members of Regional Committees did not set their heart on it: to them it always symbolised the missing, namely, full

[30] Section 6 of the Punjab Regional Committees Order, 1957.

[31] Section 10.

[32] Some areas were added to the then union territory of Himachal Pradesh.

statehood for the region within their charge. In particular, the Punjabi Regional Committee satisfied neither the linguistic expectations nor the religious aspirations of the Sikhs. The state government, too, had little use of it, which was reflected in the consistently casual attention given to the institution of Regional Committees.

The failure of these Committees and the underlying causes are best summed up by the Parliamentary Committee on the Demand for Punjabi Suba, set up in 1966:

> "As the trend of events showed, the Regional Committees had ominous start. The committee had the benefit of hearing the views of the first two chairmen of the two Regional Committees. Both of them stated that the status of the chairmen of these Committees was not duly recognized and it was after two years of the appointment of chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Regional Committees that the Punjab Government paid salaries to them. The first chairman of the Punjabi Regional Committee further testified that the Regional Committees had been ignored and he had to suffer personal humiliation. He also drew the attention of the Committee to a resolution passed by the Hindi Regional Committee with on 4 May, 1960 relating to the removal of compulsion with regard to the teaching of Punjabi in the Hindi region of the Punjab state, which was not accepted by the state government....A prominent witness, who was closely associated with the evolution of a compromise formula between the two sections of Punjab in the shape of the regional scheme right from its inception, stated before the committee that the ruling given by the speaker of Punjab Vidhan Sabha that the Regional Committees under the formula were just like other ordinary committees of the assembly sounded the death-knell of this formula. According to him, the regional formula provided that the language of Punjab in the Punjabi region is 'Punjabi' and in the Hindi region it is 'Hindi' but it was not implemented till 1961. Even after 1961, when it was introduced as a result of the Akali agitation, it was not implemented fully. The Committee has very carefully gone into the mass of evidence placed before them—both oral and written in this behalf and they are constrained to observe that the regional formula has not worked in letter and spirit and circumscribed as it was by the various interpretations given to it, it failed to satisfy the expectations of the people for whose benefit it was evolved. As has emerged from the evidence, other drawbacks of the Regional Committee Scheme were:
>
> "(*i*) The rules of procedure for the Committees were made by the

home ministry of the Government of India and the powers of the Punjab legislative assembly to change their own rules in this behalf were completely taken away. This placed the authority of the executive over the legislature in this behalf.

(*ii*) The Committees were not allowed to initiate proposals for legislation on subjects allotted to them.

(*iii*) The Committees were not empowered to make suggestions for expenditure in respect of their regions. So the Committees could not make any contribution regarding development and administration.

(*iv*) The Committees were not given any power to question the ministers in their Committees on questions of day-to-day administration of their regions.

(*v*) The Committees were not provided with any secretariat."[33]

The Parliamentary Committee ruefully concluded:

> "The committee believe that if the regional scheme had been worked in the spirit in which it was envisaged and strengthened from time to time, the problems that face the people of Punjab would not have arisen and a new form of administration for states which are bilingual or which have sizable linguistic minorities would have been evolved which would have surely served as model in other parts of the country. But the situation after ten years of the initiation of the scheme, as it is today, has completely shaken the faith of the people in this kind of arrangement."[34]

THE SUB-STATE OF MEGHALAYA (1970-72)

Though by no means a very large-sized state, Assam has remained exceptionally overwhelmed with regional insistence which would not apparently rest content with anything short of a fully separate political identity. Assam owes this phenomenon to its topography as well as to sociology. Comprising hills and plains, this state has been inhabited by quite a sizable tribal population which is ethnologically distinct from the people living in the plains. The tribals' separateness has long since been recognized, though not completely, by the government as well. Even under the Government of India Act, 1935 the hill areas of Assam were permitted to retain their special character and were accorded, in several matters, separate administrative treatment.

[33] *Report of the Parliamentary Committee on the Demand for Punjabi Suba*. New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966, pp. 10-13.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 13-4.

The Commission on the Hill Areas of Assam (under the chairmanship of M. V. Pataskar) rightly pointed out: "No act of the federal or provincial legislature extended to these areas automatically. The provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 were based on the broad principle that the legislation passed by the federal or provincial legislature was often likely to be unsuitable for application to the hill areas. The act (of 1935) accordingly empowered the governor of the province to apply or not to apply such legislation to these areas; and, in case he decided to apply he could make suitable alterations. It was thus a mechanism for 'filtering' the legislation to the hill districts. The administration in these areas was confined mainly to maintaining the peace and undertaking sociological studies."[35] Under the present constitution, the specially designed institution of district councils and regional councils has been catering for their requirements and development. These bodies have not proved to be effective in their impact on the life and advancement of the tribal people. Although their executive authority extends to a few specified subjects, in practice they have not moved much beyond establishing and managing primary schools. Thus they have failed in the accomplishment of their primary task, namely the development of the hill areas. The Pataskar Commission observed: "The performance of these councils has generally not been satisfactory. We consider it particularly unfortunate that no enquiry into the administration of these bodies, for which a provision exists in the sixth schedule, was undertaken although complaints about their unsatisfactory working have been there for a number of years. Had such an enquiry been undertaken and suitable steps taken to improve the administration, the councils might have become more useful to the tribal people."[36] Nor were the tribal people satisfied with these institutions. The All Parties Hill Leaders' Conference (APHLC) was unrelenting in its demand for the separation of the hill areas from the state of Assam. This demand acquired a new pitch since 1960 when the Assam legislative assembly put on the statute book the Assam Official Language Act, thus making Assamese as the state's official language.

Jawaharlal Nehru, then prime minister, reacted to the hill leaders' demand by announcing that "the elected members of the legislative assembly from the autonomous districts could form a committee which would especially deal with legislation and like matters relating to the hill districts, which came up before the assembly, and their decisions should prevail after the pattern of the Committee for Scotland in the British House of Commons. There should be a separate cabinet

[35] *Report of the Commission on the Hill Areas of Assam*, 1965-6, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1966, p. 13.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

minister in the Assam Government assisted by one or more deputy ministers, who would deal with these matters and especially development plans for the autonomous districts."[37] However, the Scottish pattern for the autonomous districts of Assam, visualized in the prime minister's letter, was not acceptable to the APHLC.[38]

The central government moved forward and in January 1967 announced, for the first time, its intention of creating a sub-state in Assam. It observed: "Bearing in mind the geography and imperative needs of security and coordinated development of this region as a whole, a federal structure composed of federating units having equal status, not subordinate to one another, should provide the basis for the reorganization of Assam State."[39] The task of working out details of the scheme was entrusted to a committee under the chairmanship of Asoka Mehta, set up in July 1967 at the conference of the representatives of the All Parties Hill Leaders' Conference, members of parliament from Assam and ministers of the central and Assam governments. The committee, known as the Committee on Reorganization of Assam, was expressly directed to "make an effort to reach an agreed solution". It submitted its report on 30 August 1967.

The scheme outlined by the Committee on Reorganization of Assam did not concede a full-fledged federation of the hill areas and plains of Assam. Nevertheless, it did conceive of a sub-state for the hill districts of Assam. It observed: "Federal structure should not be the basis of re-organization of the present state of Assam. While the committee considered the unity and integrity of the present state of Assam as essential for the interest of the plains and hills , it recommends maximum autonomy to the hill areas."[40] Out of 66 subjects which figure in the state list under the Indian constitution, only five were to remain under this scheme in the 'concurrent list' to be shared by the hill areas with the rest of Assam State. These five subjects were:

(*i*) Secondary and higher secondary education;

(*ii*) Inter-district schemes having a bearing on agriculture;

---

[37] Excerpt from the prime minister's letter to the general secretary of the APHLC, reproduced in the *Report of the Commission on the Hill Areas of Assam, 1965-66*, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[38] The APHLC's letter to the prime minister, reproduced in the *Report of the Commission on the Hill Areas of Assam.*

[39] Vide *The Times of India Directory and Year Book*, 1968, Bombay, The Times of India Press, 1968, p. 326.

[40] *Report of the Committee on Reorganization of Assam*, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1967, para 12(mimeographed copy).

(*iii*) Management of any forest not being reserved forest in pursuit of general policy of conservation of forest specially in the catchment areas, any stream-lets or rivers utilised for hydro-electric schemes or inter-district navigation;

(*iv*) Fisheries in the water reservoirs for generating hydro-electric power or inter-district irrigation canals; and

(*v*) Medium industry.

The remaining 61 subjects in the state list were to be in sole charge of the hill districts, which were to have their own independent legislatures as well as an executive council corresponding to the state council of ministers. However, there was to be a common governor for the proposed sub-state and the state of Assam. The hill areas were to have each a legislature consisting of not more than 40 and not less than 20 elected members and not more than three nominated members to represent the interests of the minorities. Each legislature was to have its own chairman and deputy chairman. These legislatures were to have full legislative authority and privileges of a legislature in respect of the subjects assigned to them. The executive powers in respect of the assigned subjects was to be exercised by the governor with the aid and advice of an executive council which was to be responsible to the legislature. The executive council was to consist of a chief executive councillor and other councillors. The chief executive councillor was to be appointed by the governor, provided he enjoyed a majority in the hill legislatures. The other councillors corresponding to the ministers were to be appointed by the governor on the advice of the chief executive councillor. The executive council was to have its own secretariat. For any legislation which had a bearing on hill areas or even impinged on them the concurrence of the chief executive councillor and councillors of the hill areas was necessary before being assented to by the governor. But the police and maintenance of law and order in the whole state of Assam was to be the responsibility of the Assam Government. The committee's report provided for the merger of the hill legislatures but this could be effected only if the legislature of a hill district so decided by its two-thirds majority. It pointed out: "As each of the hill areas differ from one another in the matter of development, social customs, ethnic origin, language, inheritance, etc., they should be given maximum possible autonomy with the right to merge with other autonomous areas after a resolution is passed in their respective legislatures by two-third majority of the total of representatives of each of the legislatures."[41]

In short, what the Mehta Committee visualized was a state within a state. With the inauguration of the sub-state, the district councils

[41] *Report of the Committee on Reorganization of Assam*, op. cit., para 12(3).

and regional councils were to cease to exist. The report was discussed in September 1967 but the hill leaders unceremoniously rejected it, urging a federation in terms of the central government's statement of 13 January, 1967.

On 11 September, 1968, the central government announced the reorganization of Assam. It decided to enact legislation to constitute an autonomous state within the state of Assam, comprising the districts of Garo Hills, Khasi Hills and Jowai. The other autonomous districts of Mikir Hills and North Cacher Hills figured out of the scheme but were to be give an option to join the proposed autonomous state on the basis of a resolution to be adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of its district council. In pursuance of its decision, the central government introduced, in December 1968, the Constitution (Twenty-Second Amendment) Bill in parliament, which was passed by both the houses in April 1969. Thereupon, it was sent to the state legislatures for ratification.[48] Thereafter, the central government enacted the Assam Reorganization (Meghalaya) Act, 1969.

Meghalaya, a state within the state of Assam, came into existence in April 1970. It consists of two revenue districts of Assam, namely (*i*) United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, and (*ii*) Garo Hills. It needs to be pointed out that Meghalaya did not cover *all* the hill districts of Assam: North Cachar Hills, Mikir Hills and Mizo Hills decided to be out of Meghalaya, thus opting to remain within the state of Assam. There was to be a common governor (as well as high court) for both Assam and Meghalaya. The chief executive councillor of this sub-state was designated 'chief minister' who was the head of the council of ministers. Meghalaya enjoyed control over 61 out of 66 subjects that figure in the state list under the Indian constitution. So far as Meghalaya areas were concerned, the government and legislature of Assam exercised jurisdiction in respect of (*i*) state police, (*ii*) major industries, (*iii*) river communication and navigation, (*iv*) hydro-electric and other power generation, and (*v*) major road communications. While the overall responsibility for law and order in Meghalaya remained intact with the Government of Assam, the former had its own village and town police. Meghalaya's executive authority extended to all the remaining 61 subjects. The legislatures of Meghalaya and Assam enjoyed concurrent powers of legislation in respect of 13 subjects out of the constitution's concurrent list, such as acquisition of land and property, registration of documents, recovery of public dues etc.

---

[48] Under the constitution such a legislation can become an act only if more than half the state legislature ratify it.

Meghalaya was endowed with independent taxing authority, its taxation powers extending to all the subjects that were assigned to it including land revenue and agricultural tax, excise duty, taxes on mineral rights, taxes on goods and passengers and entertainment tax. It was also assigned its proportionate share out of the state's sales-tax. The bills passed by the Meghalaya legislative assembly were submitted to the governor for his assent. The latter acted on the advice of the council of ministers of Meghalaya except where it related to subjects concurrent to both the legislatures and where its provisions were repugnant to any law passed by the Assam legislature. It needs to be stressed that Meghalaya continued to have its usual representation in the Assam legislature. In Assam's council of ministers as well, adequate representation was to be ensured to areas within Meghalaya.

For only less than two years did Meghalaya remain as a sub-state within the state of Assam. It bloomed into as a full-fledged state on 20 January, 1972. This should not look surprising. The status of a sub-state for this region appeared to be a necessary prelude to its full statehood, for the parent state, Assam, evidently needed time to prepare itself psychologically and emotionally to let one of its parts go out of it. The area of union between Meghalaya and Assam was kept so delicate and small that separation became both easy and imminent. The central government, too, on its part, appeared only too anxious to placate the hill people and the motivation for this attitude was provided in no small measure, by strategic needs and compulsions.

EPILOGUE

It was inherent in the process of transfer of power that sovereignty along with the authority which the 'home government' exercised in the governance of this country came to be exclusively vested in the centre in India. This pre-eminent position of the centre was further legitimized by the recent political history of the country. The national struggle for independence demanded, above everything else, total, single-minded subservience to the nation, and as a result, the national political culture that emerged in the country was distinctly unitary.

The foregoing account, however, discloses that regionalism is, at present, a fairly widespread phenomenon in the Indian political system. Moreover, it is unlikely to lose its sway over people's minds, at least in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, as the various developmental programmes are carried out, regional disparities are already becoming more marked and widespread engendering, as already observed, a sense of cumulative deprivations in the people of certain regions. This coupled

with increasing politicization in the community is sure to impart sharper focus to regionalism which would emerge more prominently as a factor of no small significance in Indian polity. Even otherwise, many states are already too large-sized to lend themselves to effective administration and a measure of regionalization may seem called for. It is, therefore, only rational to read and recognize the writing on the wall and evolve a conceptual framework to respond to the regional phenomenon. To begin with, it is highly necessary that we discard, once for all, the notion of regionalism as being somewhat unpatriotic or posing a threat to national integrity. Such a mental attitude of ambivalence towards regionalism manifests itself in several ways. In many cases, the regional governmental machinery has been devised and pressed into service when the situation had already taken a turn for the worse, rendering the former unappealing and unacceptable to the people of the region. A regional machinery must not be viewed as a desperate remedy.

A land, as vast as India and characterized by cultural, social and geographical pluralities of varying intensities cannot be well-fitted into the usual stereotype of three-tiered government—federal, state and local. True, the answer could possibly be found in the carving out of a very large number of states. But such a course of action is bound to prove very expensive in view of the entire paraphernalia customarily associated with statehood—the governor, the high court, the public service commission, to name a few. More fundamental than this is the fact that statehood for each of them may be a proposition of questionable soundness. The governmental response need not always be in terms of article 3 of the constitution. The prevalent governmental system in the states (with the exception of Andhra Pradesh), is characterized by a total absence of any political institution between the state and the district levels. If a district could be a legitimate unit of governmental attention, a region as a whole, too, may conceivably hope to catch the state's eye. There are broadly identifiable regions in the country. The Telangana and Rayalseema regions in Andhra Pradesh, the Vidarbha and the Marathwada regions in Maharashtra, the districts which formed the erstwhile princely state of Karnataka, Saurashtra in Gujarat, the hill districts and the Bundelkhand region in Uttar Pradesh, the interior districts in Orissa, the Darjeeling district in Bengal, the Jharkhand region in Bihar, the Ladakh region in Jammu-Kashmir, the Vindhya and some other regions in Madhya Pradesh—each of them has a sizable area with a distinct historical, cultural and economic curve of its own. A political recognition of these, where they are in undisputed evidence, should be conducive to the contentment and well-being of the people concerned. While we must not go about indiscriminately foisting an institution in

between a state and its districts, such regions as are already firmly planted in people's mind ought to be politically recognized by a popular government. The state government should institutionalize its regional focus by setting up administrative bodies at the regional level charged with the responsibility of coordinating and integrating activities of various departments—state, preferably central too— planned and executed in the region. Such bodies should as a rule seek popular participation by involving in their deliberations the elected representatives of the people of the region. A minister, hailing from the region, should be the president of such a regional body.

The regional machinery must continually guard itself against becoming ego-centric in its attitude and conduct. It must seek the growth and development of local governmental organizations and social and economic infra-structure in the region and their participation in its tasks. This is vital to its long-term success.

It should also be necessary at the level of a region to have extra-governmental organizations which could act as the lobby for the regional cause and also perform functions of auditory and 'watch dog' nature. Without a popularly based demand structure, a governmental mechanism at the regional level is unlikely to remain very effective and productive of results. Indeed, a planned regionalization of the political parties of the country could become helpful in promoting regional development. What is intended to be communicated here is as follows: At present, the political parties have their organizations at levels like central, state and district but no one has taken steps to create an organizational structure at the regional level. A move in this direction seems to be both desirable and necessary to focus political, consequently governmental, attention on regional demands and aspirations. This device is likely to stabilize the regional administration in the state. The Telangana Regional Committee's work has not been very impressive largely because of the absence of such a demand structure at the regional level.

The success of the regional machinery hinges, to a critical degree, on the statesmanship of the large region in the state. The latter should consciously strive to disarm the apprehensions and anxieties of the younger sister by willingly subjecting itself to self-denying ordinances —by letting, for instance, more than a proportionate share of political bounties and offices go to her. It is not without significance that the successive chief ministers of Maharashtra have hailed from Vidarbha. At any rate, an early recognition of the regional claims may ensure the requisite flexibility of approach while a greatly delayed action on the part of the government is unlikely to lead to the success of the regional

machinery, and may make particularly difficult to work it in its earlier stages. It should also be stressed that a regional contrivance is unlikely to gain popular acceptance and strike roots where a minority community, more so a religious one, sees a prospect of emerging as a majority in the event of full-fledged statehood. The regional committees in Punjab met with failure precisely because the Sikhs, a minority in the composite state, were conscious of their majority status in the bifurcated state. Nagaland and Meghalaya owe their statehood, in no small measure, to the fact that tribes (who were Christians) who were a minority community in the composite state of Assam were assured a majority status under a separate statehood. Goa is another example; although the language spoken in Goa is the same as in Maharashtra, its considerable Christian population resolutely resists being reduced to an insignificant minority if it is merged with the adjoining state of Maharashtra.

Regionalism is a dynamic, pragmatic concept. It seldom sustains itself on one single factor: a coalition of factors and circumstances including politicisation of the region and a sense of economic retardation is at the back of regional revival and assertions. But the specific factors fostering regionalism are apt to vary from place to place, and even in the context of the same place, the precise mix of them and their individual potency do not remain unaltered over a period of time. The peculiar historical processes through which the various states and the regions have passed have a bearing on regionalism. What could be the criteria, then, for recognizing a region? Rasheeduddin Khan who has examined this problem quite deeply observes: "To promote discussion and further clarification it is suggested that the criteria for determining a socio-cultural sub-region in India can be formulated as follows: Maximum homogeneity within and maximum identity without; where homogeneities are to be established on ten counts: (1) language dialect; (2) social composition (communities/*jatis*); (3) ethnic regions, (4) demographic features; (5) area (geographic) contiguity; (6) cultural pattern; (7) economy and economic life; (8) historical antecedents; (9) political background; (10) psychological make-up and felt-consciousness of group identity. The main concern in this exercise is to eliminate factors contributing to heterogeneity and to coalesce factors promoting homogeneity."[43] It is also necessary to remember that a region must not be considered to be a very rigid, exclusive physical entity. It would be more correct to regard it as a part of the whole with undoubtedly distinctive features of its own but subject to extra-regional, national and secular forces. Caste, for instance, cuts across many

[43] Rasheeduddin Khan : "The Regional Dimension" in *Seminar*, No. 164, April 1973, p. 39. Rasheeduddin Khan's another paper entitled "Territorial Reorganization" appeared in *Seminar*, No. 137, January 1971. His latest paper, cited here, incorporates the findings of the earlier one and is exhaustive in its analysis.

regions, thus leading to the expansion of the emotional frontiers of people. Modernization with its concomitants of industrialization, urbanization and social mobility has also been operating to enfeeble and efface regional sub-cultures. The doaba and the manjha sub-cultures of Punjab have, for instance, all but lost their distinctiveness under the inexorable forces of modernization (and, more importantly, the partition of Punjab in 1947 and mass migration of the people across the frontiers) and have merged into single Punjabi culture. What is sought to be conveyed here is that modernization is operating in such a way that, at places, the regional fragmentation has, indeed, been showing signs of weakening.

The sharpness and separateness of a region has acquired a new meaning with the attainment of national independence. Under a welfare state, the government is apt to emerge as a cultural and economic institution also with vast manipulative capabilities. As the state government continues to extend its control over segments of economic and social activities, it is not completely unlikely for a particular region to acquire a dominating position in the state. This hegemony naturally sets in motion a chain reaction and provokes the deprived region to raise counter demands for a larger share in the state's political and non-political offices and preferments. A region, thus, acquires an altogether new dimension of importance in the state's spectrum of politics and government.

The regional institutions already in existence have not been particularly impressive in their performance. For that matter, no institution in the country has succeeded in reaching a spectacularly high level of functioning. Norms of action and behaviour, both political and administrative, are set at higher, national levels, and bodies like these may at best strive to approximate and comply with them. What is contended in the present paper is that regional institutions are likely to be a serviceable administrative device to attend to the problems of regional development and concern and thus become conducive to the happiness and contentment of the people. It is much more prudent to first press into service this mechanism than to straight away invoke the ultimate weapon in the armoury, namely article 3 of the constitution.

LAW AND ORDER : A HOLDING OPERATION*

Prabhakar Ghate

WHILE the law and order situation has an impact on the functioning and structure of administration, it also has much wider social and political implications. Firstly, popular governments are forced into taking decisions imposed upon them by violent minorities in order to avoid the stigma of using force to deal with disorder. The public reaction to the use of force seems to follow a double standard. Tolerance for force used by the public is higher than for force used by the law and order agencies. It is easy for determined groups to exploit the reluctance of popular governments to incur the odium of using force. It is important, therefore, from the point of view of ensuring that use is made of democratic means of getting one's way, that the agencies of law and order are effective enough to be able to curb disorder with the least possible force, or better still prevent it from occurring altogether by deterrent and preventive action. Secondly, a possible consequence in the long run of the kind of disorder which has become such a normal feature of our society arises from the fact that disorder, agitations and rioting lead to a steady erosion of faith in democracy and to a dangerous weakening of 'respect for authority' generally. They lead to a perpetual atmosphere of crisis. Even after allowing for the city dwellers' weakness for the kind of excitement mob violence offers him, most people, it is safe to assume, prefer normalcy and order to their opposites. If denied normalcy for too long they have been known to welcome other forms of government which can provide it. The new order has often been imposed by those who took a leading part in fomenting the old disorder. We do not seem to have reached this point yet![1] But it can do no harm to keep 'the long run' danger in sight.

In looking at the distractions and dangers of a volatile law and order situation, it is easy to forget that the existence of the option to have recourse to public protest, has its positive, as well as negative

*Awarded the First Prize in the IIPA Essay Competition for 1972.

[1] As long as a change of government lends hope of an improvement in the law and order situation the temptation to seek a change in the form of government should remain slight. The 1972 general election in West Bengal is a case in point. But what if people were to feel that the law and order situation was beyond solution by any democratic government? This is often cited as one of the factors in the rise of Nazism and Fascism.

aspects. Firstly, as against the argument that public disorder is injurious to democracy, must be weighed the consideration that public disorder has often served to make abundantly clear the depth of public sentiment on certain issues as perhaps no other means could have. The widespread agitation in the South as a reaction to what was regarded there as the imposition of Hindi is a case in point. Were the police to become completely effective in nipping in the bud such outbreaks of disorder the alternative might be much greater convulsions later on.[2] By allowing interest groups to let off steam and make their wishes known, breaches of law and order serve as a safety valve. They supplement and do not supplant the conventional democratic means of making government responsive to the people and this is not without advantage where familiarity with democratic processes is still being built up. While it is of prime importance to encourage and increase the utilization of democratic procedures by making it difficult to resort to force, the existence of institutional defects in democratic machinery, leading to the under-representation of certain interests, cannot be ruled out.

Secondly, while it is possible that defiance of law and authority in the limited context of a law and order situation weakens respect for all authority, it is at least as likely that this is not so. A person is surely not the more likely to evade paying his taxes, or encroach upon his neighbour's land, or take to ticketless travel for having taken part in an agitation which resulted in a clash with the police. If the agitation succeeds, the appeal for him of the agitational approach is likely to increase and his 'respect' for the police in the sense of fear of police action is likely to diminish. But this is a far cry from implying that the whole social fabric will collapse in chaos and anarchy as a result of the disappearance of 'respect for authority'. Indeed the very phrase smacks of a paternalism more appropriate to colonial days. What is necessary is a recognition of the legitimacy of authority, not a paternalism and authoritarianism. In fact, one of the positive aspects of the existence of the law and order option consists in its being an antidote to authoritarianism, whether political or bureaucratic. There have been instances of high-handedness which would perhaps never have come to light or have been redressed but for the law and order incidents they provoked.

Thirdly, as against the argument that disorder leads to a loss of faith in democracy must be pitted the diametrically opposite observation that participation in public protest gives the man in the street a much-needed sense of participation in the political process. It serves to bring government closer to him. Seeing its agents respond, even if only to

[2] The case of Bangladesh comes to mind. However, it can be argued here that this convulsion was not occasioned by the inability to let off steam but in spite of it.

resist him, he begins to feel he counts for something and that there is, if only temporarily and in a very elemental sense, a dialogue between him and the impersonal powers that be. This feeling can be a very important factor in his personal equation with government. Were it to become impossible for any form of public protest to take shape as a result of a policy of complete suppression, the sense of remoteness of government would be greatly heightened.[3]

The assumption behind the treatment of law and order here is that public disorder is generally coercive and rejects too lightly the democratic alternative. It is well to bear in mind, however, that there are considerations which would make it unwise to condemn every incident of disorder without considering its origins and nature, and even more unwise for the police to follow a policy of complete suppression, even if such a policy had a prospect of succeeding. What must be found continually is the delicately shifting balance between the demands of a stable and congenial environment for economic and social progress on the one hand and the openness and freedom required to give expression to dissent, sometimes spilling inevitably into disorder on the other.

II

It has been mentioned above that in practice most instances of public disorder tend to be coercive. This is certainly true of what David Bayley calls the 'violence or remonstrance'[4], the object of which is to force the hand of government by the threat or use of violence. The activity of government has been described as the making of decisions affecting society as a whole. In a democracy, these are made by the people through their representatives. However, a group may bypass the institutions set up by society for the making of decisions and attempt instead to get its way, or enforce its interests, through the threat or use of violence. It may do so because it feels, rightly or wrongly, that institutional defects in the democratic machinery lead to an inadequate representation of its interests. Or it may do so because it is in a minority and its interests are genuinely irreconcilable with those of the majority. In the latter case, it presses its interest instead of abiding by the spirit of the phrase 'minority acquiescence and majority restraint'.

The violence of remonstrance is directed against the administration since it is action on the part of government that is sought to be influenced. Direct physical conflict between rival groups, as in communal and

[3] I am grateful to David Bayley's *The Police and Political Development in India*, Princeton University Press, 1969, for this point. This is an excellent reference on the whole range of issues to do with law and order.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

other sectarian situations, can also be interpreted as an attempt by one group to dominate the other, or enforce its 'rights' and interests against it, not through the institutional means provided by the state but directly through the use of force. Other rival groups are employers and employees when they engage in gheraos on the one hand, or lock-outs backed by intimidation on the other. Both constitute rejection of legal means of redress, such as arbitration, adjudication and the weapon of the peaceful strike after due notice. Spontaneous outbursts of mob violence in which no conscious 'interest' is involved, except perhaps to express frustration, disapproval or condemnation, as when a mob surrounds and stones a police station in which an atrocity is alleged to have been committed would seem at first sight to constitute an exception to this interpretation of the resort to force. Even here, however, when the aim of the mob is to seek revenge against the persons responsible for the event instead of letting the law take its own course, this too is in a sense an attempt to circumvent due process and get one's way by the use of force.[5]

Thus for all their diversity of cause and origin, law and order situations arise mostly out of attempts to take short-cuts by using force. To the extent that these short-cuts bypass the procedures and institutions set up by democracy and law, they are 'undemocratic'. However, much the same could be said of many of the forms of illegal, non-violent direct action such as civil disobedience and satyagraha. What is really crucial here, apart from the aspect of violence, is the element of coercion entailed. Direct action is not coercive. It seeks to work through and convert public opinion, not suppress it. The difference in the mood of a peaceful demonstration, although it may be illegal, and an ugly potentially violent one is not one of degree. In the latter case, there exists an element of blackmail. It aims not at saying, "Look at us, we already represent a substantial body of opinion and we hope that other people when they see how many we are and how strongly we feel will also think and feel like us. Government will then realise how representative we are." It says, rather, "We are strong and if you do not heed our demands we can make trouble." A fast unto death while ostensibly, and in itself a non-violent means of direct action is subject to the same criticism of being in fact coercive.

A show of threat of force aims not at converting public opinion but at getting the government to act out of a desire to avoid the use of counter-force. It may not necessarily lead to violent disorder by

[5] Conflict between rival groups and spontaneous outbursts of disorder correspond to Bayley's second and third categories of violence; the violence of confrontation and the violence of frustration.

bringing into play the actual use of force. A show of force may succeed without having to do so just as the show of superior force by the agencies of law and order may deter it from doing so. Force is really used, therefore, only as a last resort.

An interesting parallel exists here with the role of force in international relations. Physical force is an instrument, but only one of the instruments, of national power, power being the ability as in domestic politics to enforce one's interests or get one's way. In the 'international anarchy' the actual physical occupation or destruction of the person and property of the enemy is the ultimate means available of bending him to one's will. In domestic politics, of course, the mob does not have a specific territory to occupy. It can, however, disrupt and destroy. On a smaller scale, it burns railway stations, wrecks trains, stones government offices. It attempts to bring public services to a standstill. It attempts to destroy the will to resist. Or it attacks the other mob. The mob being the vehicle of private force, it is the mob that has to be dispersed by the forces of law and order.

If it becomes necessary to use force on behalf of the community to counteract the illegal and private use of force, why is action by the police so often condemned? Society has a monopoly of force, or at any rate it should have. Why then does public sentiment tend to tolerate the threat and use of force by almost everyone except the police? The extreme reluctance of state governments to use force is exploited by special groups to get their interests accepted and acted upon, even when these may not be compatible with the larger interests of the community. The location of universities and public sector projects, the delineation of state boundaries, the question of higher D.A. for government servants, the banning of cow slaughter, the use of languages, the distribution of rice between states, are all questions which have been decided, or have been sought to be decided, by the threat or use of force. It is true that the passionately felt interests of a minority weigh more heavily with popular governments than those of an indifferent majority. Governments represent loose coalitions of interest, all of which have to be satisfied. Very often the course of wisdom finds itself without a majority, or even a minority behind it. Little doubt was expressed at the time on the wisdom of the reorganization of the states on a linguistic basis. But in most of these cases, the broad disposition of public sentiment was never in doubt. It was only when they took on a law and order aspect, calling for the use of force to counter them, did the government concerned defer to public opinion. It seems that while there exists the will in many cases to enforce decisions in the face of 'parliamentary' opposition, this soon evaporates

when it comes to backing them with force at the street corner. The reaction against the use of force more than offsets any support that might exist on the original question. The reason for the existence of a double standard could be the natural inclinations of the common man to side with the underdog after a clash with the police. The fact that the police have often used more force than is strictly necessary has lost them much sympathy, though as we shall see, they tend to err more often in the opposite direction. Further, violence by the mob is more often than not, except in communal conflict, directed against property, whereas the police has to use force against people. Yet another reason, particularly in the period soon after independence was the fact that force has been used till then mostly to counter the rising tide of nationalism and it was associated therefore with the oppression of foreign rule. It had been widely assumed before independence, that, with the coming to power of a democratic government, the use of force would be unnecessary.

Public attitudes in the early days of independence had an impact not only at the political and governmental levels, but also at the operational level. 'Tact' became the order of the day. It came to be considered the first qualification of the law and order man. In practice, it often meant tiding over situations by ignoring open threats to authority and breaches of the peace so as to avoid the use of force, at the expense of the longer run interests of law and order itself. More generally, it meant conceding unreasonable demands and appeasing unreasonable interests in order to maintain peace at any cost. At times, the district administration found itself pressurising the weaker party in a dispute to climb down in order to avert a law and order situation. In fact 'tact' became the most widely used euphemism in the administrative lexicon.

While private violence is still looked upon as less reprehensible than public violence, there appears at the same time to have taken place in recent years a softening of public attitudes to the use of force by the police. David Bailey's survey[6] of public attitude to the police, showed interestingly enough that very few of his respondents were critical of the manner in which the police usually handled public demonstrations, and even fewer felt that the police resorted to firing too frequently. More than half of his sample felt that demonstrators who break the law should be arrested straightaway rather than treated tolerantly, and in Bangalore, those who believed that demonstrations were used too often numbered twice as many as those who felt they were not over-used.

---

[6] David Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

In Kanpur, this proportion was about equal. However, the survey did find that, as a general rule, the public continues to believe that demonstrations are a useful way of compelling official attention.

Although there is bound to be a time-lag before the rhetoric of public debate comes truly to reflect the shift in public sentiment, some of the political parties such as the BKD, Jan Sangh and Swatantra have themselves begun to emphasise their determination to enforce law and order.[7] Perhaps as a reflection of the growing disenchantment of the electorate with the agitational approach, the public outcry on occasions when force is used appears to be growing milder and is more apparently seen to be orchestrated. However, it still remains true that few voices, including those of government supporters, are actually raised on behalf of the police. The rhetoric of law and order continues to castigate them and work up sympathy for the victims of police action. Thus while attitudes seem to be changing, perception of public attitudes has not changed to the same extent. This is only to be expected and does not distract from the significance of the new development. As violent protest loses its legitimacy, the scope for coercion will diminish and pressures and demands for change will be forced into more legitimate channels.

III

One effect of the extreme unpopularity with the electorate of the use of force has been to make it all the more important to prevent law and order situations from assuming proportions in which there is no option but to use force. The Criminal Procedure Code gives the police and magistracy ample powers to intervene long before such a stage is reached. Under Section 107 of the Code, a person can be bound down to keep the peace for a period of one year when his conduct and behaviour causes 'an apprehension of a breach of the peace'. He is bound down by being directed to execute a personal bond, with or without sureties, to keep the peace, and if he fails to do so, he can be sent to prison in default. Magistrates often send surety bonds to the tehsil for verification before accepting them, a tactic which keeps trouble-makers in custody for a few days. Section 107 is of great use in forestalling conflict between rival groups, whose ringleaders are rounded up while tempers are given a chance to cool off all round. Section 151 Cr. P. C. empowers the police to arrest anyone about to commit a cognizable offence. In addition some states have Gunda

[7] In the mid-term poll in U.P. in early 1969, a slight but perceptible polarisation of the parties between those of the left and the right took place on this issue.

Acts under which bad characters and gundas who come to the fore in agitations of all kinds can be rounded up before trouble erupts.

Section 145 Cr.P.C. enables a magistrate to attach property which is the subject of a dispute likely to threaten the peace. He may either proceed to determine himself which party was in possession of the property when it was attached, or he may refer the question to a civil court. Once the question of possession has been determined the property is released to that party and the other party is forbidden from interfering with the possession of the first party, except in due course of law, by filing, for example, a civil suit. The entire proceedings may take several months during which time the dispute loses much of its steam. Immediate attachment of the property averts attempts to occupy it forcibly. This provision is of immense use in dealing with communal disputes over graveyards, or land, or structures which have fallen into disuse but which both communities lay shadowy claims to as ancient places of use, worship, etc. Disputes of a purely civil nature often takes on a communal colouring when either side attempts to exploit this aspect of the situation.

Section 144 Cr.P.C. is a household word. It is an emergency provision, although not always used as such, which can only be invoked to meet an apprehension of a breach of the peace or public tranquillity. Under it persons can be ordered to desist from doing things which would not otherwise be illegal such as forming assemblies of more than five persons, taking out processions, holding public meetings, carrying lathis, using loud speakers, etc. If enforced effectively, and this is important, it enables the police to establish a degree of control which would otherwise prove elusive. By banning assemblies of more than five persons a crowd can be prevented from forming at all. Trouble is nipped in the bud by arresting anyone disobeying the orders promulgated under Section 144. In practice, Section 144 tends to be imposed too readily and when imposed, not enforced strictly. This has impaired its credibility.

The question of using force has not arisen up to this point except insofar as arresting someone and keeping him in custody can be regarded as using force. If extreme vigilance is exercised and if the intelligence at the disposal of the authorities is accurate and uptodate, trouble can be anticipated and nipped in the bud by having recourse to these and other steps. However, the situation may be one in which they are not applicable. For instance, property may not be the bone of contention, or known disputes or groups may not be involved. Trouble often brews up spontaneously and it takes no

time for crowds to form. If it is desired to disperse a crowd, tear gas shells can be used as a first step, but these may not immediately be available and in any case do not always serve the purpose. A strong wind may be blowing the wrong way. Water thrown over burst shells douses them, a fact which crowds are often aware of. It is only with the next stage, the lathi charge after due warning, that we come to the use of force proper.

In a lathi charge a line, or a wedge, of policemen moves into a crowd weilding lathis, seeking to disperse it. Protection against brick-batting is provided by helmets, shields and visors, which are useful aids in making it a more flexible response to different kinds of situations, but the crowd may be too large, or it may be concentrated on realtops, or scattered over too large an area. Moreover, the effectiveness of a lathi charge depends a great deal on the coordination with which it is executed, which in turn depends on leadership. If the crowd is spread over a large area, proper control is all the more necessary if the lathi charge is not to degenerate into individual forays into the crowds serving only to excite it further. In practice, the situation often escalates too rapidly through the stage, if it occurs at all, in which a lathi charge would be effective. When such a stage does occur, and a lathi charge would be enough to meet the situation, the opportunity to order one is missed due to an excessive inhibition to use force. Paradoxically, the reluctance to use even lesser degrees of force has led to an increase in the number of situations in which firing has had to be resorted to. Far from using too much force the police has often erred in doing too little too late. What an effective lathi charge could have achieved had to be left to firing.

Thus the number of occasions on which firing has to be resorted to is not infrequent. It can of course only be resorted to after due warning and when all other means of dispersing the crowd have failed. The number of rounds fired must be strictly limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the objective of dispersal, and firing must be directed at individuals in the crowd. It must be effective and aimed low. Aiming above the head of the crowd can be dangerous to innocent spectators farther away. Moreover, it may prove ineffective and may even encourage the crowd.

It might be asked, why need firing be resorted to at all? One obvious answer is self-defence. But situations in which policemen find themselves in grave and imminent personal danger are rare, except when a police vehicle or an outpost is surrounded by a violent mob. The defence of other citizens would also seem to justify the resort to firing.

If a police party were to encounter a murderous crowd looking for victims, or even indulging in arson, during a communal riot, it would seem to be fully justified in firing on it to disperse it. But on many occasions it is not easy to arrive at a quick decision. One of the questions which should perhaps be considered is what the crowd would have done, were it not dispersed. For instance, would firing on a crowd setting fire to a railway train or a post office be justified? If the incident was pre-planned and occurred during the course of a widespread agitation in which public property was made the express target, the answer, depending as in all such cases on one's point of view, would perhaps be yes, in order to deter further attacks and a spreading of the agitation. On the other hand, if it was an isolated and spontaneous attack by a mob, the answer would perhaps be no, although there is a school of thought which would argue that if a further deterioration of the law and order situation is to be prevented, any unlawful act by a mob which has been duly warned to desist and disperse, should be dealt with the utmost severity.

Sometimes confrontation with a crowd can take place accidentally. For example, a ban on processions under Section 144 may be imposed not because of any grave consequences expected from processions themselves, but as a precautionary measure. The agitators may be determined to defy the ban. They may reach a spot where they find a line of policemen blocking their way. The policemen are not numerous enough to arrest them or disperse them with a lathi charge. More people gather on the spot, mostly as onlookers, and the policemen are meanwhile reinforced with further men. The crowd still refuses to disperse and starts shouting slogans. Firing under such circumstances would surely not be justified if the procession was likely to have merely continued violating the ban on processions had it not been stopped. It would not be justified even if the crowd was liable to cause damage to property. Moreover, in a sense, the police themselves have to share part of the responsibility for the situation in having failed to disperse the procession at its inception. They would not be justified in taking recourse to maximum action when they had failed to take lesser action earlier. The best course would be to try to hold the line until enough policemen became available to defuse the situation and round up some of the demonstrators. The 'prestige of authority' is a valuable asset not to be squandered away lightly but there is a limit to the means with which it should be upheld, and in fact the greater prestige lies in the long run in acting with restraint.

It is therefore important to be able to read the mind and temper of the mob accurately. Khera refers to the importance in law and order

situations of isolating and identifying the 'essentials' and enforcing them strictly.[8] He also discusses the useful concept of 'limits of tolerance' which the forces of law and order should make clearly known to the public. The 'essentials' and 'limits of tolerance' of each situation will naturally vary. It should not be assumed, however, that their enforcement will always warrant the use of maximum amount of force.

IV

The decision to resort to firing must be taken by a magistrate, if one is present. If not, it lies with the seniormost police officer present, who must not however be below the rank of a sub-inspector. This applies also to the use of force generally; its kind, amount, timing and duration. Although the presence of a magistrate is not legally necessary, the ultimate responsibility for law and order lies with the district magistrate. Not unnaturally he prefers to depute a subordinate magistrate, generally the sub-divisional magistrate concerned, or the city magistrate if there is one, to deal with the situation rather than rely entirely on the police. The police in any case insist on the presence of a magistrate. Valuable time has often been lost by police officers in picking up magistrates before proceeding to the spot. It is easier to defend an action undertaken in the presence of a magistrate. Indeed it will be assumed, unless the contrary is alleged, that it took place under his direction. Unfortunately, however, there is a marked discrepancy between the efforts made to secure the presence of a magistrate and the extent to which his control is actually accepted on the spot. Once his presence has been secured, he is often taken for granted. Magistrates have themselves to blame for their rather unenviable position in this regard. Many of them are unsuited both by temperament and training for law and order work which requires a cool head in the face of a hostile crowd and occasionally personal danger. By failing to assert themselves and by leaving everything to the seniormost police officer in charge who is generally a Deputy Superintendent of Police, they have contributed to a position in which they find themselves saddled with most of the responsibility but with very little control. But the fault is not entirely theirs.

A magistrate has in fact very little control over the force attached to him. This is only partly due to the fact that he can take little action against subordinate police officers if his directions are not carried out except perhaps take the matter up with the Superintendent of Police

[8] S. S. Khera, *District Administration in India*, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1960, Chapter 7.

through the District Magistrate.[9] It is not so much that a particular direction of his is ignored as that the whole texture of operations over which he presides tends to be slow, indecisive, uncoordinated and half-hearted. The failure of an operation is usually the outcome not of the specific failure of individuals but of half-heartedness by a large number of persons. To take a few examples, the situation may demand the making of arrests in order to disperse an aggressive crowd and the policemen present may be directed to round up as many demonstrators as they can, particularly the leaders, and put them into a waiting police van. The policemen are reluctant to move and the greater the aggressiveness and status of a demonstrator, who may be a powerful local figure, the greater their reluctance. Instead of firmly escorting the demonstrators into the van they start arguing with them and let them slip away. Even after a few have been rounded up and put into the van, they let one or two of the more determined ones get off and wander away, perhaps shouting slogans. The whole operation instead of taking a minute takes five to ten minutes. To take another example, a sub-inspector with enough men at his disposal is directed to keep the main gate of a power house clear so that coal trucks can pass in and out. This is the 'essential' of the situation on which all else depends. He fails, however, to assert himself, and one by one the strikers move into the space in front of the gate, while making at the same time a great show of their innocence, until so many of them have collected that they have to be removed forcibly, precipitating violence. Or a sub-inspector is directed the day before polling to ensure that the space in front of a polling station is kept clear of camps set-up by the political parties so that it can be ensured that no canvassing takes place within the prescribed distance of one hundred yards. He fails to do so and the camps cannot be moved once they have been set up. Again, at a mammoth public meeting, the barriers set up are pushed down and the crowd surges forward. No attempt is made to stop them by a line of policemen stationed there for just such a contingency. In all these instances, it is not so much that the magistrate's decisions are not carried out (operational directions of this nature are best left to the police anyway) as that no one's directions are carried out, even when they are clearly given, including those of the seniormost police officer in charge. No clear chain of command is utilised and directions are bandied about by everyone to whoever happens to be closest at hand. The magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police instead of being in overall

---

[9] This is one of the arguments made against complete separation of the judiciary and the executive down to the lowest level. The main source of control by the magistracy over the police is criminal court work. Recently, the practice of requiring SDMs to contribute to the annual reports of the station officers in their respective sub-divisions has been introduced in U.P. but this has only partially offset the impact of separation.

control of the force at their disposal may find themselves having to actually goad and prod it into action. The performance of the police in some states may be decidedly better. Even within states performance can vary tremendously in the nuts and bolts operational situations which make up the stuff of law and order, so much depending as it does on the personal factor. However, such instances as the above occur more frequently than is realized, and serve to prolong and magnify law and order confrontations unnecessarily.

The feeling that it should not be left to those in possession of force to decide when to use it lies behind the arrangement by which the magistrate is made primarily responsible. It is assumed that he will somehow rise above the excitement of the moment and decide objectively and rationally as to whether to use force or not. He is expected to bring an independent mind to bear upon the situation and act as a restraining influence on the police. In practice, in these cases in which the magistrate does not assert his independence, his role is more often the opposite. In either event, he gets as involved in the situation as his police counterpart.

When the police regulations were originally framed there were no Deputy Superintendents of Police, who are gazetted officers, between the District Superintendent of Police and his Circle Inspectors, each in charge of a group of police stations. The Deputy Superintendent is as responsible an officer as a Deputy Collector, most magistrates being Deputy Collectors who have been given magisterial powers. He is not helped much in his appreciation of the situation by the presence of a magistrate. If the personal equation between the two is not a happy one, this only complicates an already complicated situation. If it is good, as it usually is, so much so that the Deputy Superintendent of Police can rely on his magisterial counterpart to endorse whatever happens in its entirety, the presence of a magistrate is redundant. The most important factors in the successful management of a law and order situation are discipline and leadership. Only the Deputy Superintendent of Police can ensure the former and effectively provide the latter. It would seem high time therefore to remove the magistrate from the picture at the operational level and place responsibility squarely on the person who has or at any rate can have effective control.

Whether the same should be done at the district level has long been the subject of heated debate. Just as the District Magistrate's noninee does not have adequate control over the police at the operational level, the District Magistrate has only limited control at the overall district level. Arrangements do exist which aim to give the District Magistrate

control over the police, but in many states they fall short of being nearly commensurate with his ultimate responsibility as for law and order.[10] The arrangements vary from state to state, but generally the District Magistrate has to be consulted on such matters as promotions, postings and transfers of station officers. He is expected to inspect police stations and is kept informed by the Superintendent of Police on all matters relating to law and order. However, most of these devices of ensuring control have tended to get neglected with the pressure of other pre-occupations and have become more formal than real. The extent to which they are effective depends a great deal on the personality of the District Magistrate and on his relationship with the Superintendent of Police. Unfortunately too much 'interference' by the District Magistrate is often interpreted as unnecessarily meddling in the affairs of the police. The only really effective means of ensuring control has been found to lie in the contributing by the District Magistrate to the confidential annual report about the Superintendent of Police, though some states do not follow this practice in deference to opposition from the police. Moreover, with criminal case work in the lower courts being taken over increasingly by separate judicial magistrates functioning under the control of the District Judge, the police are less dependant than they were on the cooperation of the District Magistrate and his executive magistrates in prosecuting criminal cases.

It might be asked, instead of seeking to enforce an illusive control, why not transfer the ultimate responsibility for law and order to the Superintendent of Police? After all law and order is exclusively a police responsibility in most countries. The necessary magisterial powers could be conferred upon the police, as has been done in the case of Police Commissioners. The answer, according to those who support the present system, lies outside the field of law and order proper and belongs to that of district administration generally. Basically, it devolves upon the need for strong leadership in the district, and the belief that a vital ingredient of leadership is the power that comes from control over the law and order machinery. The Collector has always enjoyed a position of pre-eminence in his traditional capacity as the 'representative' of government in the district. His unique status has derived as much from his law and order as from his revenue role. By virtue of it, he has been able to obtain the cooperation of other district level officers and to perform his coordinating function. Never has the need for coordination been greater than now with the proliferation of development activities and agencies in the districts, or for the thrust and

---

[10] The DM's responsibility for law and order derives ultimately from the provisions of the Police Act of 1861 which vests police administration in the S.P. subject to "the general control and direction" of the DM.

momentum which only the leadership of the Collector can provide. The Collector's traditional functions have always entailed leadership. Only he can galvanise the district into action to meet emergencies such as floods, drought and famine. He could always be approached by any officer or local body in the district, or by any agency of the state or central government, when action is sought from other officers or agencies. He is still petitioned by a host of persons everyday, with grievances concerning not only his but other departments, and his intervention often secures redress. The institution of the Collector constitutes a focal point of control and authority in every district and imparts a measure of uniformity to the rural administration of the country. The prestige of the institution, and the leadership of the Collector, in the traditionalist view, depends as much on the awe in which his office is held as his own personal qualities of leadership. The rural masses are no exception to the phenomena of a healthy respect for power. Nothing should be done, therefore, to weaken it. Instead of divesting the District Magistrate of his law and order responsibility, his control over the police should be strengthened. Some would go further to argue that since the relationship between the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police is much too important to be left to the personal equation established by their personalities, the District Magistrate should be made to contribute to the confident report of the Superintendent of Police as a matter of uniform practice.

It will be noticed that the traditionalist view bases its case not on the interests of law and order but on the broader needs of district administration and of development administration in particular. However, this is where it is the most vulnerable. In fact, the Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad (CEO) system of Maharashtra and Gujarat is based on its express rejection. The CEO system recognizes the need for leadership but denies that it needs to be concentrated in the person of the Collector. Leadership and coordination of all development activities can be provided separately by the CEO who guides and controls the team of district level development officers in the framework of Panchayati Raj. Secondly, it denies that leadership is based on power or prestige. Not only has the power of the law and order machinery been stripped from the CEO, he does not head the revenue hierarchy either. In fact, the whole purpose of the CEO system is to get away from the often chastised 'revenue mentality'. While the personal involvement of the Collector and the commitment of his prestige to particularly difficult schemes such as family planning, small savings and getting people to contribute to state development loans does make a difference in the short-term, it relies not so much on genuine motivations which produces permanent results, as on pressure tactics and the

target approach. For instance, patwari may succeed in getting their quota of farmers to open small savings accounts, but once the target has been met and the pressure of the campaign is over the accounts are more often than not discontinued. It is easier for a dedicated full-time CEO to adopt the extension-education approach than for the Collector, donned as he is with magisterial, police, revenue and regulatory caps, to remove these intermittently and put on the development cap. This is quite apart from the question of time and energy which is the other major reason for divesting the Collector of his development responsibilities. With all his multifarious duties and distractions, the Collector has to fight hard to find the time and energy for these and they tend to be the first to get neglected as they rarely call for immediate decision or urgent action. Rather, they require the patient, comprehensive, continuing and long-term attention of the kind that tends to become the first casualty of conditions in which the district administration often moves from one crisis to another.[11]

Thus the case for continuing to associate the Collector with law and order must rest on grounds other than the impact on his development effectiveness. But first let us examine some of the arguments against such an association. Just as the Collector is said to be too busy to be able to devote himself adequately to development work, he is also said to be too busy to be of much help to the Superintendent of Police. Thus the Collector is said to fall between the two stools of development and law and order to the common detriment of both. He tours less extensively and because of competing claims on his time has less and less occasion during his tours to find out at first hand about the local crime and law and order situations. Lacking his own sources of information, he adds little to what information the police themselves collect. His contribution is further limited by the fact that he tends to be inexperienced in law and order matters as a result of the increasing preference among young officers to prefer Secretariat postings and avoid the 'political interference' of the districts. As for his 'watchdog' role over the police, this is limited anyway on account of the tendency

[11] The remarkable success of the month long vasectomy camp organized by the Collector of Ernakulam in mid-1971, in which about 60,000 persons underwent vasectomy, is an instance of what the Collectors can accomplish. However, it must be borne in mind that the success of the camp was the result of a protracted campaign of education and motivation carried out throughout the district for several months by the family planning staff and other development departments Secondly, the operation is irreversible and cannot be undone. Thirdly, the personal organizational ability of the Collector probably had as much to do with the result as did the fact that he was the Collector. Lastly, the camp approach met with similar success elsewhere, including Gujarat, which has the CEO system. The important thing was leadership and this was not something that could only be provided by the Collector. However, his assistance, which was no doubt of great help, can always be requested.

to protect the subordinates against investigation by an outside agency. Only a conscientious Superintendent of Police can effectively investigate complaints against the police and provide redress. The Collector can do little more than refer complaints to the Superintendent of Police. This is as it should be, if the police prestige is not to suffer. Lastly, the police would do much better if they were to feel that they alone were responsible for law and order. They would not be able to avoid taking hard decisions by falling back on the easy expedient of consulting the District Magistrate.

Only the last of these arguments concludes that the role of the Collector and hence a sort of divided responsibility between him and the police are a positive hindrance to the maintenance of law and order, the burden of the rest being merely that his association contributes little of benefit. Neither conclusion is valid. By virtue of his broad-ranging responsibilities and regulatory functions touching upon a variety of interests, the Collector is exposed to more cross currents of opinion in the district than perhaps Superintendent of Police can ever be. The tentacles of the revenue hierarchy, of which he is the head, reach deeply into the countryside. He or his subordinates exercise regulatory functions in respect of civil supplies, liquor shops, cinemas, the press, arms shops, road transport, etc. He is often represented on the board of several of the local schools, colleges and social and cultural organizations. The District Inspector of Schools keeps him closely informed of problems in the colleges and schools which can lead to student trouble. The district level officer of the labour department does likewise in respect of industrial disputes. Local politicians vie with each other in keeping him informed of developments and seeking his intervention where their political interests are involved. A host of visitors petition him daily, often with complaints which have a bearing on the law and order situation. Thus although the Collector may not have as much time as his predecessor for detailed inspection of police stations, he is as uniquely situated as ever to get a true feel for potentially adverse developments and to sense nuances of change in the atmosphere and thereby to provide valuable advice and guidance to the Superintendent of Police. He is often associated with the genesis of a problem, and has the influence not only with political and public leaders in the district but also with the state government to help bring about a solution, or at least defuse the situation. The Collector is intimately associated with problems which give rise to food riots, land grab movements, election disputes, strikes and a host of law and order situations. He can usually do much more to steer them away from reaching violent proportions than can the police. In fact, it is hard to imagine the successful handling of a large number of law and order

situations were the Collector to be left out of the picture. The conduct of elections would become unmanageable without the closest cooperation between the District Magistrate and the police. The police themselves would be the first to acknowledge that they would be severely handicapped. This perhaps is the reason why despite all the ambiguity and scope for misunderstanding inherent in the present relationship, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, do in fact usually work closely and harmoniously together, supplementing and supporting each other's efforts to the common administrative benefit. The risks and dangers of non-cooperation are too great for both to be undertaken lightly. Only in cases of unresolveable conflicts of personality, or perversity, do the working relations between the two become unmanageable and the results are evident for all to see in terms of their impact on law and order administration.[12]

Thus there is a great deal to be said for the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police continuing to share responsibility for law and order and for the District Magistrate retaining senior membership of the team. The answer to the narrower question of whether the District Magistrate and magisterial control over the police should be strengthened depends really on a judgment on the effectiveness of the degree of control that presently exists in a particular state. It would seem desirable for the Collector, with responsibility for law and order, to be required to report on the degree of cooperation he received from the Superintendent of Police during the year, and assess his work with special reference to law and order. It must be admitted, however, that this is a matter of considerable contention.[13] As far as the use of force is concerned, responsibility should rest squarely with the police, since this is really a 'technical' and operational question (although of immense political sensitivity) in which divided responsibility makes for hesitancy, delay and sometimes disaster. Internally, the police could of course ensure that a decision to resort to firing is taken at the highest possible level, and whenever possible by the Superintendent of Police. It should be noted that force has been handled quite

[12] Some DMs had gone to the extent of asking their magistrates to acquit police cases, and the police on their part are widely believed to have had the homes of magistrates burgled. In one U.P. town a constable arrested the DM's chaprasi because he was allegedly drunk and involved in a brawl. This led to a first class crisis between the police and magistracy much to the amusement of the local press.

[13] As the ARC Study Team on District Administration points out "... once it is conceded that the DM has the ultimate responsibility for criminal administration in the district, it follows that he should be given the powers to assess the work of its main agency...." *Report of the Study Team on District Administration*, ARC, Government of India Press, 1967, p. 82. However, the question is not whether the DM has ultimate responsibility, this being clearly embodied in the existing law, but whether he should continue to have it.

satisfactorily under the system of Police Commissioners in force in some of the larger towns.[14]

V

Whether responsibility and control is unified in the person of either the District Magistrate or Superintendent of Police, or is continued to be rather ambiguously shared, as at present, does not in itself have a bearing on the problem of insulating the police officer or magistrate on the spot from extraneous considerations in deciding upon the appropriate amount of force he should use in any given situation. The problem has already been touched upon. Although it was more acute in the first decade after independence, it still persists. Restraint is of course essential. Under regimes not entirely dependent on popular support, and even dictatorships are partly dependent upon popular support, the amount of force used, quite apart from the question of what it is used to defend, is often excessive by 'democratic' standards. In fact the term 'excessive' loses its meaning except in relation to limits agreed upon by the community. The earlier discussion of when firing should be resorted to was a consideration of where these limits should be in present day Indian society. But when restraint leads to a sort of paralysis, it too becomes excessive. The channel through which restraint is exercised is often something like the following.

The use of force leads to a public outcry, led often by the very persons who precipitated the situation in which it had to be used. A judicial enquiry, sometimes by no one less than a judge, and the immediate suspension of the officers, concerned is demanded. The local MLAs and others, depending on party affiliations and on how genuine the 'outcry' is, may take the matter up in the state assembly, or personally with the Home Minister, or the Minister from the district if there is one. The District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police have meanwhile reported to the Chief Secretary and Home Secretary at length. Assuming that they justified the incident, their justification is held by the minister to be inadequate. Public sentiment has to be appeased and he wants immediate action to be taken against someone. Let us assume also that the officers all the way up the line support the action taken. However, as a scapegoat has to be found, someone is

[14] It could be argued that it is somewhat inconsistent, if not unfair, to leave the responsibility for the use of force, which is generally the most important and onerous question that has to be faced in a law and order situation, with the police, while giving senior membership and overall control to the DM. However, the advantages of unified control at the operational level combined with the DM's association at the overall strategic level would seem to outweigh by far the undoubted merits of this criticism. The police would of course have to be assured of magisterial support in such matters as the use of Section 144 Cr. P.C.

transferred or worse still suspended. As neither action is technically a punishment, the officer is provided with no means of redress. His transfer or suspension are regarded, however, as punishment by people generally. There are many variations on this rather oversimplified theme. The superior officers may themselves feel that the officers on the spot acted 'tactlessly', in which case his reputation suffers and his chances of promotion may be affected.

Too much, however, must not be made of all this. The pendulum, as we have seen, seems at last to be returning to rest at the optimum position. There is a growing realization among members of government, responsible politicians and the public that the timely use of the due force is often essential. It is heartening to note that on recent occasions when force has had to be used public opinion has been less critical than in the past. Senior officers too, such as Commissioners and Deputy Inspector Generals, perhaps in order to counter the inhibition experienced by the man on the spot, repeatedly assure their support to subordinate officers if force has to be used. The police officer and magistrate on the spot are in any case usually assured of the support of their immediate superiors, the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, except in those rare cases when these officers are involved in local politics and are eager to please a particular party or politician with whom the action might have proved unpopular. The motive for their support may be no more than the consideration that mistakes by their subordinates are in the eyes of the state government a reflection on them, a fact which, as we shall see, creates its own problems.

Thus with the return of the pendulum of public opinion to the median position, it may be hoped that the inhibitions which had affected the forces of law and order at the operational level will disappear. There is bound to be a time lag before this happens, and we would seem to be passing through it now. For the present, the problem persists. All that can be said is that there is less excuse today than in the early years after independence for magistrates and police officers not to deal with law and order situations with exactly the degree of force which they feel is warranted by the situation, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations.

VI

In considering the problem of inhibition, we have only considered situations in which the magistrate or police officer act rightly but is blamed unjustly all the same. In practice error is equally common. As Khera points out, to err is human and error is inevitable.[16] The

[16] S.S. Khera, *op. cit.*, Chapter 7.

unpredictability of crowd psychology and behaviour makes the possibility of error all the more likely in the field of law and order. Given due care and attention and the 'consciousness of the need to be tested objectively on one's good faith'[16] the possibility of error is minimized, but not eliminated. Bona fide mistakes are still made.

Yet the commission of error is rarely admitted. One reason, in the case of the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police is that although they may not have been to the spot at all, the situation having been dealt with by their subordinates, their responsibility remains, and cannot be delegated. Even so, if the error was bona fide, an attempt should be made to make the state government appreciate this. Perhaps the general lack of confidence by the administration on law and order matters leads its members to apprehend that a single omission, no matter how small, will be seized upon to find fault with. The safer course is to provide blanket justification for all that occurred. This can also be mistakenly justified as supporting one's subordinates.

It often happens that the men on the spot come in after a long day spent battling with rioters, a day during which a great deal went wrong just as a great deal was done well. Some District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police, instead of discussing the day's events with them frankly, immediately turn their attention to drafting a long and meticulously worded report to government justifying the action taken in its entirety.[17] The size and hostility of the crowd and police injuries are among the things exaggerated. In fact the administration is itself to blame for the fact that the official version is so often greeted with scepticism. As Khera points out, the proper attitude of a person who has committed a bona fide mistake should be to readily admit the mistake while at the same time expecting support.[18] Neither is error admitted nor is support expected. The exercise becomes one of self-deception rather than accurate reporting.

It is useful from the point of view of preventing repetition to examine the handling of law and order situations on a minute to minute time-scale. Could the trouble have been anticipated and why was it not? Was there a failure of the Local Intelligence Unit (LIU)? Should the LIU widen its contacts? Where did the crowd first form? Who

---

[16] S.S. Khera, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

[17] They tend not to get too directly involved themselves, in accordance with the school of thought, more prevalent in some states than in others, that it is best for the DM and SP to stay at one remove outside the fray, so that they escape any possible controversy that might develop and can support their subordinates if necessary.

[18] S.S. Khera, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

should have noticed it forming and reported the same, and why did he not? If he reported it to A, why did A not pass the message on to B before proceeding to the spot? When did A get the message and when did he leave for the spot? Could he have arranged for his force to meet him there instead of spending valuable time collecting it? When he reached the spot and could have ascertained that the crowd had moved on to Y, why did he proceed to X instead? What did B who had meanwhile got news of the crowd and had made contact with it, do? He instructed C who was with him, to take a few men to Z by a short cut and get there before the crowd did? How did the crowd manage to get there first and damage Z? When B who was with the crowd tried to stop it, how effective were his men? Did he instruct them clearly and precisely and did they comply accordingly? These are the sort of questions that should be asked and discussed within the family. Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate would get a much better picture of the events of the day and their likely future course. It would help them not only to assess their subordinates but provide them with the benefits of their own experience. More important it would help them to improve the whole texture of law and order operations in the future in their district. Only if error is admitted can it be understood. Instead, valuable lessons are lost time and again. The real weaknesses and failures go unnoticed only to perpetuate themselves.

It is for the same reason that an impartial inquiry is always to be welcomed. Moreover, it should be held immediately so as to avoid the impression, usually true, that it was held as a reluctant concession to public demand. If law and order is to be maintained effectively bona fide error must be supported and those who commit it should have nothing to fear from an enquiry. As regards mistakes which are not bona fide, it is reasonable to expect that their disclosure will tend to prevent their repetition.

VII

The occurrence of public disorder in an open society undergoing rapid transformation is no cause for despair. With the increasing politicization of groups and interests, it is only to be expected that some of them will attempt to achieve their goals through coercive disorder. The inducement to do so will depend entirely on the vulnerability of popular governments to coercion, which in turn will depend on public attitudes to violence and the response it calls forth. These attitudes appear to be changing, which is a hopeful development.

A case has been made for unifying control over and responsibility for the use of force at the operational level and entrusting it to the police.

At the same time, the balance of advantage seems to lie in retaining for the Collector his present law and order role. As important for the successful resolution of law and order problems is the need for better training, greater discipline and better leadership in the police. It goes without saying that police officers at the level at which force is used should be assured of the support of their seniors, even if bona fide errors are committed. This will lead to the more timely use of minimal force, obviating hopefully the use of greater force when it is too late and the damage has already been done. The Superintendent of Police should resist all attempts by politicians to interfere in such matters as the posting and transfers of station officers and sub-inspectors, who should not feel their advancement depends on political goodwill. Only if the lower police staff is completely insulated from political influence will it be able to tackle resolutely law and order situations in which influential political, labour or student leaders are involved. The handling of law and order situations should be post-mortemed in detail and errors frankly admitted so that improvements can continually be made. Finally, the goal should be to ensure that the law and order 'problem' remains what it essentially is, a holding operation for the more positive tasks of our society, instead of becoming the battle-field itself.

DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND DISTRICT POLICE

CONSTRAINTS, DILEMMAS AND IMPERATIVES*

G. C. Singhvi

THE term 'District Magistrate' has been defined by Section 1 of the Police Act (5 of) 1861 in the following words:

> "The words 'Magistrate of the district' shall mean the chief officer charged with the executive administration of a district and exercising the powers of a Magistrate, by whatever designation the chief officer charged with such executive administration is styled."

The term District Magistrate has, however, specifically not been defined by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 but a reading together of Sections 10 and 11 thereof makes two facts sufficiently evident: one that the District Magistrate is a Magistrate of the First Class appointed as such by the State Government, and the other that he is the chief officer charged with the executive administration of a district.

The definition of the term District Magistrate as given in the Police Act, 1861 is more relevant to the subject because the role of the District Magistrate in the administration of district Police is governed by the provisions of the Police Act, 1861.

Section 4 of the Police Act, 1861 reads as follows:

> "The administration of the police throughout a general police-district shall be vested in an officer to be styled the Inspectors-General of Police, and in such Deputy Inspectors-General and Assistant Inspectors-General as to the State Government shall seem fit."

> "The administration of the police throughout the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the district shall, under the general control and direction of such Magistrate, be vested in a District

*Awarded a Consolation Prize in the IIPA Essay Competition for 1972.

Superintendent and such Assistant District Superintendents a the State Government shall consider necessary."[1]

The administration of the police in a district is accordingly veste in the District Superintendent of Police and such Assistant Distri Superintendents of Police as the State Government considers necessar But this administration is subject to the general control and direction the District Magistrate. In this way, it is by virtue of the provisions the second part of Section 4 of the Police Act, 1861 that the Distri Magistrate has been made to play a significant role in the poli administration of a district.

By virtue of the same section (Section 4 of the Police Act, 186 the administration of Police in the whole of the State vests in the In pector-General of Police (IGP), the Deputy Inspectors-General Police (Dy.Is.G.P.), and the Assistant Inspectors-General of Poli (A.Is.G.P.). And undeniably, the administration of Police in district is subordinate to the administration of the police in the State.

But for the general control and direction of the District Magistra to which the administration of Police in the district is subject, all contr over the district police force whether it is administrative, technic professional or organisational vests in the District Superintendent Police who in turn is a subordinate to the I.G.P., Dy.Is.G.P. and A.I G.P. in whom the administration of police throughout a State stan vested.[2]

It follows, therefore, that there is dual control of the so-called la and order administration at the district level and the issue of duality control boils down to this: Only the District Superintendent of Poli is subject to a dual control—general functional control (general contr and direction) of the District Magistrate, and all administrative, techn cal, financial, professional and organisational control of the I.G.I Dy.Is.G.P and A.Is.G.P.

[1] The reader may kindly, while going through this essay, forget about policing of the three Presidency cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras as also the cities of Hyderabad, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Nagpur and Poona. For th cities do not have District Magistrates. Instead, they have what is popularly kno as the Commissioner of Police System, in which the Commissioner of Polic given all the regulatory and licensing powers under various Acts which norm a District Magistrate possesses and also powers of restraint under the code Criminal Procedure. In this system there is a complete separation of the judici from the executive.

[2] It is commonly though erroneously believed in some quarters that whate role the District Magistrate is supposed to play in the police administration o district is also to be played by the Commissioner of the division and the S Divisional Magistrate in their respective jurisdiction. This is a view which is at all borne out by the provisions of the Police Act, 1861. The Commissioner o division as also a Sub-Divisional Magistrate has no *locus standi* in the pol administration.

It is in this conceptual backdrop of duality of control over the District Superintendent of Police which stems from Section 4 of the Police Act, 1861 that the entire gamut of relationship between the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police and *inter alia* the role of the District Magistrate in the administration of district police has to be viewed and appreciated.

As to what shape this role is supposed to take structurally has been laid down by some sections of the Police Act, 1861 itself and this is supplemented by the rules framed by the State Governments under section 46 of the Police Act, 1861. The role played by the District Magistrate in the administration of district police is, therefore, governed and circumscribed by the provisions of the Police Act, 1861. These are actually the limitations set by the statute on the role of the District Magistrate in the administration of district police.

And so discreet were the authors of the Police Act 1861 that in Section 3 thereof they made it very explicit:

> "The superintendence of the police throughout a general police-district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate; and except as authorised under the provisions of this Act, no person, officer or court shall be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary."

Accordingly although the State Government can and does exercise overall superintendence over the State Police, even they cannot authorise any person, officer or court to supersede or control any police functionary except as authorised under the provisions of the Police Act, 1861.

This, in brief, is the legal position.

II

Taking the provisions of the Police Act, 1861 and Police Rules framed under Section 46 of the same by State Governments into consideration the following, by and large, comes out to be the legal and most representative description of the role of the District Magistrate in the police administration of a district.

(1) The District Magistrate is the chief officer charged with the executive administration of a district and exercising the powers of a Magistrate and the administration of the police throughout his jurisdiction vests under his general control and direction in a District Superintendent of Police and such Assistant District Superintendents of Police as the State Government considers necessary.

(2) The District Magistrate is expected to exercise no executive authority in matters which concern solely the internal administration and training of the police force and in questions of discipline as between police officers and their departmental superiors.

(3) The District Magistrate's general control extends to the spheres of employment of additional police officers at the cost of individuals, regulation of public assemblies and processions and licensing of the same, maintenance of order on public roads, etc., by the police, inspecting the General Diary of the Police Station, Village Police and being kept informed on matters relating to the crime situation of the district.

(4) In important matters affecting relations between the police and the public or the preservation of public peace, the District Magistrate is to be kept informed and his lawful orders subject to any reference, which the District Superintendent of Police may see fit to make are carried out.

(5) In exercising his powers of general control the District Magistrate is expected to avoid doing anything which may tend to weaken the influence and authority of the District Superintendent of Police. For discipline is one of the most essential features of police work.

(6) On the other hand, the primary duty of the District Superintendent of Police is to ensure that the police force working under his command work efficiently for prevention and detection of crime and preservation of public peace and order. In this behalf the District Superintendent of Police has to keep in close and constant touch with the District Magistrate and to keep him fully and promptly informed, both by general conference and by written reports of all important matters relating to crime and public order.

(7) It is the duty of the District Superintendent of Police to initiate action by police in such matters as are covered by (6) above but he has to keep the District Magistrate informed and be guided by his lawful orders.

Coming to the actual working prevalent in the districts, the role of the District Magistrate could more or less be precisely identified as follows:

(1) The District Magistrate receives copies of the following reports from the District Superintendent of Police who submits them to his

Deputy Inspector-General of Police of the Range and the Police Headquarters of the State:

(*i*) Daily Intelligence Report;

(*ii*) Weekly/Fortnightly Intelligence Report;

(*iii*) Monthly Crime Report;

(*iv*) Annual Administration Report; and

(*v*) Special Reports and Progress Reports, in all serious, heinous and important crimes.

(2) In several States, the District Superintendent of Police while ordering the transfer of Station House Officers of Police Stations has to consult the District Magistrate. (Inter-district and inter-division transfers of such officers are ordered by the Dy.Is.G.P. of the division and I.G.P. respectively).

(3) In some States, the District Magistrate initiates the Annual Confidential Reports of the District Superintendents of Police and then they go to the Dy. Inspector General of Police and the Inspector General of Police for incorporating their remarks. In others, he does not initiate these but writes his remarks on a separate sheet of paper and sends it on to the Inspector-General of Police of the State or the Chief Secretary to the State Government as the case may be.

(4) In regulation of assemblies and processions, the District Magistrate comes into the picture. If he is available on the spot, his orders prevail. Otherwise also he has got to be consulted in dealing with such situations.

(5) He can call for reports under certain circumstances from the District Superintendent of Police.

(6) He in some States inspects the Police Stations of the District.

(7) The appointment of the Village Police Officers and Village Police has also been placed under his general control although here again the action is to be taken by the Police authorities.

"The romantic view is that the Collector rises at day break and goes straight from his bed to the saddle. Then he gallops off across fields bright with dew to visit the scene of the latest dacoit robbery. In actual practice, the District Magistrate of today does not very much

bother about isolated crimes unless they are sensational. The District Magistrate in mid-Nineteen Sixties has been generally concerned with *mass upheavals. The District Magistrate and the Superintendent of* Police may not, therefore, officially meet daily unless there are indications of unrest, either due to the food situation or labour trouble or some political or communal or other agitations in the district."[3]

It is a matter of experience that what happens in practice is that the District Magistrate on his part neither generally directs nor generally controls the district police, but merely expects the district police in a routine manner to follow the aforesaid edicts.

"Therefore it comes to this that, subject to certain checks and supervision exercised by the District Magistrate, the officer actually and really responsible for the working of the force is the District Superintendent of Police. To him every man in the force looks for reward, punishment, promotion, transfer, leave and everything that concerns himself."[4]

The District Magistrate has rights and powers over the district police and the District Superintendent of Police, but no corresponding duties or responsibilities towards them with the result that the latter have invariably to look towards the Dy.I.G.P. and I.G.P. even for small things. The District Magistrate also generally tell the needy District Superintendents of Police to approach the superior officers in the departmental hierarchy for whatever they want done. All in all, rather than sitting in the driver's seat themselves, the District Magistrate resorts to what is known as back-seat driving.

The role of the District Magistrate in the police administration of a district in India thus provides a unique example of a supervisor who does not have a feeling of belonging to the group, a unique example of an authority having rights without having corresponding obligations, and, above all, a unique example of a friend, guide and philosopher who cannot in any way help even if he wants to.

III

A brief review of the historical developments which led to the creation and continuance of this peculiar situation is quite necessary

---

[3] A.K. Roy, "The Collector in the Nineteen Sixties Rajasthan", *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3, (July-Sept.) 1965.

[4] Haridwar Rai, "Dual Control of Law and Order Administration in India : A Study in Magistracy and Police Relationship," *IJPA*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Jan-Mar. 1967, p. 57.

to understand the issues in their correct perspective. The office of the Collector as sole Governor of the District was created by Warren Hastings in 1772. The Collector was made responsible in the District for the execution of Government policy in all its detail, and at his will. This position of the Collector suffered a diminution under the Cornwallis system, which separated the Magistracy from the office of the Collector. Again, the practical problems of enforcing effectively the administrative will in such matters as land settlement gave precedence to the need for strong unity of control at the district level. The case for re-uniting the Magisterial, Revenue and Judicial functions in the office of the Collector was stated in a minute of Holt Mackenzie, a Bengali Civilian, who was a member of a Commission appointed by Lord Bentinck to suggest administrative reforms. The following is an extract from this minute:

> "In a word, to disjoin the several parts of Government in a country, which is not self-governed,[5] is like placing the different members of the body in charge of different physicians severally acting with their respective limbs according to individual theory, without reference to the treatment of other parts, and each holding in his hand the power of destroying life, but helpless to save, from the blunders of his brethren."[6]

The combination of magisterial, including police and revenue functions, which was resumed from 1833 under the circumstances stated above, produced the evils inherent in investing any functionary with arbitrary power. By the 1850s, just before the outbreak of the Mutiny, the need to change the system was engaging the attention of the Government in Bengal and Madras. After examining the problem in all its aspects, the Court of Directors, in a despatch dated September 24, 1856, recorded the opinion that "the management of Police of each District should be taken out of the hands of the Magistrate and be committed to a European Officer with no other duties and responsible to a General Superintendent of Police for the whole presidency".

The draft for the Madras District Police Act was prepared on the above basis by J. D. Mayne, Professor of Law in the University of Madras. The draft, as approved by the Governor of Madras, deprived the Magistrate of executive power over the Police. This draft was duly

[5] And India is now fully self-governed.

[6] *The situation now is completely changed. Generalists have been replaced by* specialists in the field of medicine. Apart from general physicians and general surgeons there are opthalmologists, ear, nose and throat experts, orthopaedic surgeons, plastic surgeons, skin experts, gynaecologists, etc., all of whom severally are busy saving lives and in case of need act in concert with each other as well for that purpose.

sent to the Government of India at Calcutta. However, at the instance of Sir Charles Trevelyan, a member of the Covenanted Civil Service which was the precursor of the Indian Civil Service, who had by then become the Governor of Madras, a subsidiary clause which invested the District Magistrate with the power for "general control and direction over the District Superintendent of Police" was also written into the draft. The Mutiny of 1857, and the set-back it gave to the efforts to liberalise the administration by freeing it from the exercise of arbitrary power, helped Sir Charles Trevelyan to get the amendment embodied in the Act, even though it ran counter to the basic spirit and purpose of the enactment (Police Act 1861).

This is the historical setting in which it is proposed to proceed with a critical examination of the subject in all its ramifications. But in the first instance it would perhaps, in the interest of conceptual clarity, "be appropriate to mention a few comparatively lesser known historical facts, necessary for a proper appreciation of the matters".

(1) In 1860, a Commission was appointed to consider and report on re-organisation and improvement of the police. They were instructed to device a scheme which would ensure that the Police organisation was centralised in the hands of the executive government. The existing arrangement, no doubt, followed the recommendations of the Police Commission of 1860. There is, however, strong evidence to show that the Commission did not have any choice in the matter and that the issue had been pre-determined for them by Her Majesty's Government. While forwarding their recommendations to the Government, the Commission in fact had loudly asserted that they had fully complied with the instructions[7] received.

(2) While replying to the debate on the Police Bill in the Legislative Council on October 6, 1860, Sir H. B. E. Frere, the then Home Member

[7] A section of the instructions contained the following propositions:

"The working police having its own officers exclusively engaged in their own duties in preventing or detecting crime, the question is, at what link in the chain of subordination between the highest and lowest officers in the executive administration, is the police to be attached and so made responsible as well as subordinate to all above that link in the chain? The great object being to keep the judicial and police functions quite distinct, the most perfect organisation is, no doubt, when the police is subordinated to none but that officer in the executive government who is absolved from the judicial duty, or at least from all duty involving original jurisdiction.... This raises the question—who is to be responsible for the peace of the district? Clearly that officer, whoever he may be, to whom the police are immediately responsible, under him it is the duty of every police officer and of every magisterial officer of whatever grade, in their several charges, to keep him informed of all matters affecting the public peace and the prevention and detection of crime. It is his duty to see that both classes of officers work together for this end as both are subordinate to him, he ought to be able to ensure their combined action" Quoted from Dr. Haridwar Rai's article, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

admitted that, in principle, the police should be independent of the magistrate, but defended the proposed arrangement by saying that it was a compromise which was found necessary to be made in India. At the same time he expressed the hope that it would be only a temporary feature.

(3) The idea of the Police being independent of the control of the District Officer had from the earliest days of the British rule been vehemently opposed by the civil servants who have always wielded tremendous influence in the Government of India. Still there were quite a few Britishers who strongly advocated the principle of the police being independent of magisterial control.[8] In fact, a lively debate on the subject continued even after the Police Act of 1861 was passed. Sir James Stephen's minute, however, put an end to all discussion on the subject by saying that the maintenance of the position of the District Officer was essential for the maintenance of British rule in India and that, neither for improvement of justice nor for any other purpose, should this position be allowed to be weakened."[9]

Commenting on the bizarre role of the District Magistrate and the peculiar[10] relationship existing between the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police, J. C. Curry[11] had made certain interesting observations:

> "These two officers thus constitute an interesting diumvirate. They are jointly responsible for peace and good order in the district. They discharge separate functions..., the border line cannot always be clearly defined. Where two human beings have to take action in concert a clash of opinions as to ways and means is always possible... The relationship between these two officers is in fact typical of English arrangements with their lack of logical finish... How such a system will work in Indian hands is a matter for speculation, as up to the present it is virtually untried;

[8] Sir J.P. Grant, a member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General placed on record the following observations in a minute dated 9.4.1857: "The native system (combining revenue and police functions) was an abomination, as is now universally recognised, when worked in the only way its inventors contemplated its working, and but for the miracle of the country having fallen under the domination of strangers from a distant Western Island, it must now be admitted that the theory of the propriety of this union of dissimilar functions, would have become hopeless." He went on to quote Lord Ellenborough in support of his view: "have always been of opinion that the police and the revenue should be in different hands. This was the only subject on which I and my Council did not agree. I could never get them to adopt the view. I always entertained as to the necessity of separating the Police from the Revenue Department."

[9] J.P. Sharma, "Comments", *IJPA*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (Jan-March), 1968, p. 156.

[10] Philip Woodruff in his book *"The Men Who Ruled India"*, Vol. II, *The Guardians* has said: "Altogether it was an arrangement peculiarly English ......", p. 53.

[11] J.C. Curry, *The Indian Police*, London, Faber and Faber, 1932.

and Indians with equal balance, moderation and judgement have different traditions from our own. When the majority of District Magistrates and District Superintendents are Indians, they may well find it necessary to evolve new standards of relationship."

And it is in the context of this wise prophesy made some 40 years ago by a Britisher that the role of the District Magistrate in the administration of district police needs be revised, of course, after taking into consideration the innumerable additional factors which have cropped up since then.

As to what these additional factors are, was, ably brought to the force by the First Five Year Plan.[12] The following are the relevant observations:

"(1) From the maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue, the emphasis now shifts to the development of human and material resources and the elimination of poverty and want.

"(2) One important problem which arises is the relationship between the political leadership which forms the Government and the public services which carry on the administration.

"(3) While he (the District Collector) held a coordinating responsibility for the activities of all departmental agencies within the district, his primary duties were the maintenance of law and order and the collection of land revenue. Recent developments have, however, altered his position and emphasised the need for giving a fresh orientation to district administration."[13]

The authors of the First Five Year Plan envisaged a reorientation of district administration even as early as 1952 obviously after taking into consideration the additional factors enumerated above.[14]

---

[12] Planning Commission, *First Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Government of India (People's Edition), January, 1953.

[13] The Indian Civil Service was the steel-frame of administration in British days. It was created to sub-serve the British rulers' chief aim, to maintain law and order with ruthless efficiency and so enable British power to keep a firm hold on the country. Law and order has still to be looked after but with increasing emphasis on social and economic development and other diverse activities. The role of the generalist administrator has shrunk and that of the specialist has gained in importance". *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, Friday, August 31, 1973—Specialist's Case.

[14] "The important factors which have materially affected the Collector's role and which necessitate a re-appraisal of his status and functions are:

(*i*) the separation of the judiciary from the executive;

(*ii*) the introduction of Panchayati Raj; and

(*iii*) the growing resentment of technical departments and their officers toward the Collector's dominant position in the district.

A.L. Fletcher, then Financial Commissioner, Punjab. "The Collector in the Nineteen Sixties", *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1965, p. 170.

Simply saying in vague terms that the existing arrangement comprising the dual control over law and order administration in the districts "has stood the test of time and has functioned satisfactorily" would therefore not do. For that way the police state too has stood the test of times—and, therefore, where was the need for independent India to cater and crave for the establishment of a welfare state and a socialistic pattern of society? That way the British rule in India too had, in a way, stood the test of times and where was, therefore, the need for our nationalist leaders—to agitate for independence, democracy and republic?

So a change must come and it should not (and cannot) be postponed for long by dilly-dallying, particularly, if it is a change for the better.

IV

The role-playing by the District Magistrate in the police-drama of a district can correctly be appreciated if we take into consideration certain popular misnomers and misconceptions which have developed in the minds of the people and which need to be removed and rectified in order to enable them to see things in their correct perspective.

It has almost become an axiom to say that the District Magistrate is the head of the criminal administration of a district and that he is responsible for the maintenance of law and order in a district.

The criminal administration of a district can conveniently be divided into two branches—one judicial and the other executive. In so far as the criminal judicial administration is concerned, it is the District and Sessions Judge who is the head of the district. In so far as the criminal executive administration is concerned, the District Magistrate is of course the head of the district. Thus it is not correct to call the District Magistrate a head of the whole of the criminal administration of a district.

Then nowhere either in the Police Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, as discussed above, the District Magistrate has been termed as Head of the criminal administration of a district.

Coming to the second part, it may be stated that the term "law and order" has not been defined anywhere. Its significance is a matter of conjecture based on usage. Truly speaking, the person in charge of 'Law' in the district is the District & Sessions Judge. The District Magistrate could be termed as being in charge of 'Order' only.

However, even then saying that the District Magistrate is reponsible for maintenance of order in the district would not be correct and legal. For maintenance of order is the responsibility of the police as contemplated by Section 30, 30A and 31 of the Police Act, 1861. It is true, that in the discharge of this responsibility, the district police shall be and is subject to the general control of the District Magistrate as laid down by Section 33 of the Police Act, 1861. Nevertheless, it should be appreciated that being responsible for maintenance of order is not the same as exercising a general control over the agency charged with the maintenance of peace, order and tranquillity in the district which is the district police.

It is believed by many that the police force is meant to be "an efficient instrument at the disposal of the District Magistrate for the prevention and detection of crime".[15]

Saying that the police force is the instrument provided by the Government to enable the District Magistrate to enforce his authority and fulfil his responsibility for the maintenance of law and order would be a travesty of truth.

Had the preamble of the Police Act (Act V) 1861 been the same as the preamble of the Madras Police Act (Act XXIV) 1859 which declared "it is expedient to make the police force throughout the Madras Presidency a more efficient instrument at the disposal of the Magistrate for the prevention and detection of crime" there would have been justification in saying that the police force is the instrument provided by the Government to enable the District Magistrate to enforce his authority, etc.

The fact, however, is that the preamble of the Police Act, 1861 just declares:

> "Whereas it is expedient to reorganise the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime."

Obviously the instrument is in the hands and at the disposal of the State Government (and not the District Magistrate) to which the State Police is subordinate.

People generally are given to understand that a District Superintendent of Police is a subordinate to the District Magistrate.

---

[15] Haridwar Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

Apposite to this context are the observations of Mr. Philip Woodruff: "In 1861, the District Magistrate handed over to the Superintendent of Police some of his old functions. But he remained responsible for everything that happened in his district and yet acquired a colleague and not a subordinate. The Superintendent was responsible for the discipline of his force, the district officer was his director in matters of wide policy, not his superior. The one could not order the other to move a constable."[16]

But an I.A.S. Officer decries the "lack of clearcut directives on the subordinate role of the Superintendent of Police in the matter of law and order."[17] This school of thought probably wants the Superintendent of Police to concede the super-ordination of the District Magistrate in nineteen sixties whereas this is what the Police Commission had as early as over sixty-nine years ago (1902-03) to say on the subject:

> "The result has been that in some provinces and specially by some District Magistrates there has been a degree of interference which has often been most prejudicial to the interests of the department... Superintendents should not be treated in a manner which deprives them of influence over their men and of interest in their work. The language of the Police Manuals of almost all the provinces seems to encourage the same tendency to undue interference. They speak of the Magistrate as 'entirely responsible for the peace and criminal administration of his district' and of the Superintendent as 'his assistant for police duties, and, as such bound to carry out his orders'. 'The District Superintendent's office is virtually a branch of the District Magistrate's Headquarters office'. This is going too far. It is true that the absolute necessity for maintaining the responsibility of the District Magistrate demands that he should receive the fullest assistance from the Superintendent and that the latter should promptly carry out his orders. But the administration of the police is vested in the Superintendent. He is the head of the police in the District. Though he must carry out all lawful orders of the District Magistrate, he is not his assistant in the sense in which an Assistant Collector is; and it destroys Police work to put him in that position. No unnecessary interference with the Superintendent should be allowed."[18]

---

[16] Philip Woodruff, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[17] Dr. Ram K. Vepa, "Collector in the Nineteen Sixties—Andhra Pradesh," *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1965, p. 396.

[18] *Report of the Indian Police Commission* (1902-03), Simla, Government Central Printing Office, 1908, para 122.

Thus the District Superintendent of Police is not a subordinate to the District Magistrate in the sense in which a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or an Assistant Collector is. He is, however, subordinate to the District Magistrate to the extent and in the manner expressly provided by the Police Act (Act V) 1861,[19] just as in terms of Section 17(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 the District Magistrate or the Magistrates or Benches appointed or constituted under Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 thereof .are subordinate to the Sessions Judge to the extent and in the manner thereinafter expressly provided.

So that way the relationship between the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police is analogous to the relationship between the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate. In other words what the Sessions Judge is to the District Magistrate, the latter is to the District Superintendent of Police.

There is yet another misnomer, the District Magistrate has absolute power of control and direction over the District Superintendent of Police and the district police force.

As stated above the term 'general control and direction' occurs in Section 4 of the Police Act, 1861 and Section 3 of the same Act provides that except as authorised under the provisions of the Act no person, officer or court shall be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary.

Both these provisions read together could be construed to mean that the general control and direction of the District Magistrate over the administration of the district Police (and not the District Superintendent of Police) is governed by the provisions of the Police Act 1861 and that the District Magistrate cannot exercise the general control and direction except as authorised by the Police Act 1861.

As to what was the intention of the authors of the Police Act 1861 in this behalf would amply be clear by making a reference to Sections 13, 33 and 47 of the Police Act, 1861 wherein the term has been employed.

[19] "This, however, does not imply a relationship of direct subordination. The relationship between the Superintendent of Police and the District Collector is somewhat peculiar. It may more appropriately be described as one of the senior and junior colleagues rather than one of superior and subordinate." N.M. Patnaik, then Chief Secretary, Kerala, "The Collector in the Nineteen Sixties—Kerala". *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-Sept.) 1965, pp. 468-9.

Section 13—Additional Police officers employed at cost of individuals.

The term employed is "subject to the general directions of the Magistrate of the District".

Section 33—Saving of control of Magistrate of District.

The term employed is "the general control of the Magistrate of the district over the matters referred to therein".

Section 47—Authority of District Superintendent of Police over village police.

The term employed is "subject to the general control of the Magistrate of the district".

Had the intention of the framers of the Police Act 1861 been to vest unlimited powers of control and directions in the District Magistrate they would never have taken the trouble of repeating the phrase again and again in the above sections.

There is yet another section of the Police Act 1861 which lays down that the District Magistrate shall be at liberty to call for and inspect the general diary maintained at the Police Stations. This shows that there are many records of the Police Station which the District Magisrate cannot call for and inspect.

It would thus be quite evident that the powers of general control and direction over the district police force vested in the District Magistrate are not absolute.

There is a widespread feeling amongst the people that police cannot order a lathi-charge or resort to firing on riotous mobs without the order of the Magistrates. This again is a misnomer: insofar as unlawful assemblies and use of civil force to disperse them are concerned, they are governed by Sections 127 and 128 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 which gives the same powers to the Magistrates as to the officers in charge of the Police Stations.

People generally have a feeling that magisterial powers are too sacred to be vested in police officers. This feeling too is not based on law. Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with special magistrates lays down that such powers can be conferred on police officers of and above the rank of Assistant District

Superintendents of Police for preserving the peace, preventing crime and detecting, apprehending and detaining offenders in order to their being brought before a Magistrate and for performance by the officer of any other duties imposed upon him by any law for the time being in force and these powers contemplated by the Code have been vested in police officers in the State of Maharashtra and Gujarat.

Moreover, the I.G. of Police has, under Section 5 of the Police Act 1861, the full powers of a Magistrate throughout the general Police district but shall exercise these powers subject to such limitation as may from time to time be imposed by the State Government. Then under the Gambling Acts the District Superintendent of Police can issue a warrant just as any Magistrate can.

Finally, it is often urged in favour of the existing mode of the District Magistrate's general control and direction over the administration of the police in the district that it is not relished by police officers who are guided by narrow departmental considerations of "empire-building".

With due deference, it may be stated that this is far from being true. To start with, the District Magistrate does not come in the way of the so-called "empire-building" of police because he does not form part of the police hierarchy and therefore the empire and empire building would remain intact despite the continuance of the District Magistrate and his control. Even if, assuming for argument, the post of District Magistrate is abolished or his general control and direction over district police is done away with, the number of posts in the Police department would not register any increase whatsoever on that count. So the question of "empire building" in this behalf does not at all arise.

District Superintendents of Police would certainly (and particularly these days when the "Policeman finds himself squarely confronted with one of the major dilemmas of the day—he's damned if he does and damned if he does not") love and adore the District Magistrates provided they are senior, more experienced and as such really competent generally to control and direct them. Unfortunately, in practice, there are hardly a few such District Magistrates with the result that they fail to command respect.

What the District Superintendents of Police generally do not relish is not the general control of the District Magistrate but the vexations duality of control of the District Magistrate and Dy.-I.G.P. (and I.G.P.)

over them. If the control is placed in the hands of the District Magistrates only to the exclusion of the Dy.Is.G.P. and Is.G.P., the District Superintendents of Police will not only not have any cause to grumble but would on the other hand welcome it. For they have, in any case, to be subordinates and it is immaterial whether they are so to the District Magistrates or to the Dy. Is.G.P. (and *inter alia* to the Is.G.P.). One shall be as good as the other. This underscores the fact that what irks the District Superintendents of Police is not the general control and direction of the District Magistrate but the reprehensible and indefensible duality of control of the District Magistrates and the Dy. Is.G.P. (and Is.G.P.) over them.

The above misnomers and misconceptions when cleared will present a clearer picture of the relationship between the magistracy and the police and *inter alia* of the role of the District Magistrate in the administration of district Police.

Now we come to certain factors which compel a realistic appraisal of the future of the role of the District Magistrate in the administration of district police and which as such have got to be reckoned with. These factors may usefully be enumerated:

(1) In pre-Independence times, maintenance of peace and order and collection of land revenue were Government's paramount concern. Both the functions at the district level were, therefore, vested in one authority and he was designated the Collector and the District Magistrate. He was head of the Magistrates who tried criminal cases in courts in the district and was generally directing and controlling the police who investigated criminal cases and conducted their prosecution in courts.

For the perpetuation of a colonial rule, this peculiar arrangement for obvious coordination and absolute collaboration (even collusion in some cases) was very necessary.[20] The situation has, however, altered considerably since the country attained independence and a democratic government has replaced the colonial rule.

Many factors, the most noted of which are the partial separation of the judiciary from the executive[21] and the introduction of the

[20] Nearly a century ago Sir Thomas Munro wrote : "In India whoever regulates the assessment of the land really holds in his hand the mainspring of the country." The Collector, who was primarily concerned with land, was therefore, naturally entrusted by the British Raj with the key to this mainspring.

[21] The separation has been termed as partial because in the name of separation, only cases under the Indian Penal Code (and not under the preventive Sections of the Criminal Procedure Code or the minor Criminal Laws) have been transferred from the executive magistrates to the judicial Magistrates and that also not in all the States. Obviously such a restrictive separation cannot be termed to be complete.

Panchayati Raj have complicated the Collector and District Magistrate's role. The District Magistrate burdened with a multiplicity of functions and harassed and weakened by constant demands made on his time and energy is no longer able to do justice to his office.

And since the District Magistrate has lost control over Magistrates (Judicial Magistrates trying the Indian Penal Code cases) he is, insofar as maintenance of law and order is concerned, an anachronism.

The following advantage of the District Magistrate's control over the police as claimed by Dr. Haridwar Rai[22] has thus become a matter of history only: "The District Magistrate brings about coordination between the prosecution and police. In the day-to-day working of various departments connected with the criminal administration of the district, his presence resolves conflicts of interests, reduces friction, effects coordination and fixes responsibility."[23]

Keeping such an anachronistic titular head acts as an irritant and unnecessarily generates antagonism and thereby slows down the tempo of execution.

If the District and Sessions Judge can relieve the District Magistrate of his outdated responsibility of being the head of the Magistracy in the district, the District Superintendent of Police can, also equally well relieve him (the District Magistrate) of his outdated responsibility of generally directing and controlling the police so that he (the District Magistrate) may concentrate more on land revenue, panchayati raj, elections, development, social welfare and protocol work.

(2) The District Magistrate of today has no time to devote to police work. In Kerala a Collector's activity charter was analysed and the percentage of time taken on different items was found to be as follows:

(1) Establishment matters of the Revenue Department personnel, 9; (2) Revenue matters such as survey and demarcation, lease of land,

---

[22] Haridwar Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[23] Prior to the separation of judiciary from the executive in the public services of the country, the District Magistrate was the boss of all the magistrates of the district. This fact coupled with his general control and direction over the district police (including *inter alia* investigation and prosecution branches also) gave him an unquestioned authority to intervene in the criminal process as its various stages—investigation, prosecution and trial. With limited separation of judiciary from the executive the District Magistrate has lost considerable control over the magistracy. With complete separation coming into being as it should and would, this loss will also be complete and the position of the District Magistrate *vis-a-vis* the District Police will in more ways than one be unenviable. He will be reduced to the peculiar and untenable position of a departmental superior for the district police without being in the police department.

encroachments and evictions, 21; (3) Land acquisition, 15; (4) Development schemes, 10; (5) Social Welfare Schemes (old age pension, financial aid to T. B. patients, destitutes, widows, physically handicapped etc.), 14; (6) Verification of character and antecedents in respect of appointment, passport and administration of citizenship Act, 14; (7) Law and Order, 2; (8) Suits (Civil and Criminal and Execution of decrees), 5; (9) Issue of cement permits, 7; and (10) Miscellaneous, 3.[24]

A perusal of the above reveals that the Collector these days devotes 2 per cent of his time to law and order matters as against 7 per cent of his time to the issue of cement permits.

Similarly in Andhra Pradesh the Collector's time is divided between Development, 50 per cent; Revenue, 30 per cent; Magisterial, 10 per cent and Protocol, 10 per cent.[25]

The District Magistrate is thus already over-burdened with revenue, welfare and developmental work. It is for consideration whether he can do any justice to the so-called maintenance of order by devoting 2 per cent of his time and attention. The inescapable inference is that there is no justification for keeping the Collector responsible for exercising general control over the district police as he has no time therefor.

(3) Another point to be considered is whether the Collector of the Nineteen Seventies possesses the experience necessary to control and direct the professional district police force having a highly educated and very well trained Indian Police Service Officer as its head.

Here again, with advantage, statistics could be quoted from an article[26] written by Shri P. K. Dave, then Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Shri Dave has stated in that article that developments since Independence have been such as to change the character of the highest service (I.C.S./I.A.S.) in the country. Saying so he has appended a table which shows that the proportion of senior posts which could be utilised for posting of I.A.S. Officers as District Collectors had steadily fallen from 46.7 per cent in 1950 to 19 per cent in 1965. In 1965, the number of senior duty posts in I.C.S./ I.A.S. was 1689 and as against this number, the number of posts of Collectors of districts was only 321. Now, taking the maximum period an I.A.S. Officer has to serve as a senior scale officer to be fifteen

[24] N. M. Patnaik, *op. cit.*, pp. 475-76.

[25] R. K. Vepa, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

[26] P. K. Dave, "The Collector, Today and Tomorrow", *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1965, pp. 384-5.

years, on an average every I.A.S. officer will serve as a Collector just for three years only in the whole of his approximately 35 years' service. It is, therefore, for consideration if a man who in all puts in just three years as District Magistrate and who in the course of those three years devotes only 2 per cent of his time to law and order could be trusted with controlling and directing the district police force.

What useful purpose is going to be served even by giving him "in full measure the confidence, trust, loyalty and support of the Superintendent of Police?"[37]

(4) It is argued "the Police is a single organised force for the whole state, and, if it is left to itself, it would become rigid and oppressive. Therefore, the general control of the District Magistrate over the Police means a healthy, restraining and humanizing influence". The critics belonging to this school of thought would kindly do well to realise that since the attainment of independence the number of controls over the police has steadily been registering an increase day by day; in 1973, the police force is subject to the following controls in addition to the general control of the District Magistrate in a district:

Control of the Executive: The Government, Ministers, Dy. Ministers, Secretaries to the Government (Home, Finance, Law and the General Administration Department). The rules framed by the Government under Section 46 of the Police Act 1861. Budgetary control of the Finance Department, Control of the Removal of Public Grievances Department. Indirect control of the Advocate General, Government Advocates and the Public Prosecutors.

Control of the Judiciary: The Supreme Court, the High Court and the District Courts. Every arrest by the Police has to be intimated to the trying judicial Magistrate. The same is the case with searches by the Police. Remands to police custody are granted by Judicial Magistrates. Challans and Final Reports are entertained by them. Convictions and acquittals in cases are within their powers. They can also pass strictures against police officers.

Control of the Legislature: Laws of the land framed by the Legislatures control the police. So do the Public Accounts Committees, the starred and non-starred questions, adjournment motions and discussions in the Legislatures.

---

[37] *Report of the Uttar Pradesh Police Commission*, 1960-61, Allahabad, Printing & Stationery, 1961, p. 163.

Control of the Accountant-General: Audit of accounts and issue of pay slips.

Control of the Public Service Commission: Appointments, promotions, dismissals, etc. of officers of certain status are done by or in consultation with the P.S.Cs.

Control of Vigilance Bodies: Like Vigilance Commission, Anti-Corruption Department and Administrative Vigilance Department.

Control of the Politicians, the Press and the Public: The politicians in power as well as in opposition and editors and correspondents also have their impact. By lodging complaints and being in the witness box people also come in touch with and indirectly control the police.

And on top of it all is the rigorous departmental control exercised by the superior police officers in accordance with the provisions of the law of the land and in pursuance of the Rules framed by the Inspector General of Police of the State under Section 12 of the Police Act 1861 and approved by the State Government.

With so many constitutional, administrative, democratic and departmental controls over the police, it is for consideration whether the control by the District Magistrate for which the District Magistrate has neither the time nor the energy nor the equipment should stay.

Moreover, what has got to be reckoned with is the incontrovertible fact that "a system which permits one individual to combine the powers and duties of a Collector, a Deputy Commissioner, a Magistrate and an agent of Government may, in certain circumstances and in certain respects prove expedient and expeditious but, when considered in relation to the liberty of the subject, has very little to commend it. Power, when combined with judicial sanction, is liable to be abused and is frequently abused. It is so much easier to deal with a refractory lambardar, a land revenue defaulter or a frank though honest critic of executive deeds, if the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner is armed with magisterial powers, so that correction can be applied through the agency of law. If you do not contribute to a fund in which the Government is interested, you might have to face a criminal charge. If your bearing towards a high officer has not been sufficiently servile, he may order your arrest. If you do not comply with the demands of a Revenue Officer, you may find yourself in serious trouble. I am not raising imaginary phantoms. These things have happened in the past and are actually happening in free India. There is only one remedy. The

Judiciary and the Executive must be separated. They have been wedded together too long and as bed-fellows; they are capable of doing incalculable harm."[28]

The Law Commission have also examined the question of retaining or doing away with Executive Magistrates in detail and have given their verdict in the following terms:

> "Logically the argument (that the Executive Magistrate as compared to the Judicial Magistrate can exercise better control over law and order situation) amounts to an admission that the Executive Magistrate, who looks up to Government for his promotion and advancement in service, may not maintain 'cent per cent' judicial outlook and while deciding cases he may not be governed by strict rules of evidence."

All magisterial powers should, therefore, be vested in and exercised by the Judicial Magistrates. However, some executive magisterial powers for very limited purposes of preserving peace, preventing crime and detecting, apprehending and detaining offenders in order to bring them before a Magistrate, etc., could be vested in police officers of the appropriate status as envisaged in Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This has actually been done in the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat.[29]

(5) The fact that the posts of District Superintendent of Police are manned by officers of the Indian Police Service, who are recruited in the same manner as their brethren (I.A.S. Officers) and who are equally educated and efficient cannot be lost sight of.

The chain of command in the Police Department comprising the I.G.P., the Addl. I.G.P., the Dy. I. G. P., the District Superintendent of Police and then the Assistant District Superintendent of Police, etc., is also a pointer in this direction. The District Magistrate does not fit in anywhere.

For while the District Magistrate has some general control over the district police which is headed by the District Superintendent of Police, he, in turn, is not subject to any control by the Dy.Is.G.P. or I.G.P.— a fact which renders the chain of command a poorly defined one. And a poorly defined chain of command can and does create confusion, breed distrust and lower efficiency.

---

[28] G. D. Khosla, *Our Judicial System*, The University Book Agency, Allahabad, 1949, pp. 71-72.

[29] G. C. Singhvi, "Separation o Judiciary from the Executive", *Journal of Constitutional & Parliamentary Studies*, New Delhi, Vol. IV, No. 2, April-June 1970, p. 271.

(6) Maintenance of order, it is admittedly true, requires the exercise of firmness and sternness on the part of the maintainer. The Collector of pre-independence times as he was dealing with collection of revenue and maintenance of order only, could afford to be stern and firm as both these functions demanded these attributes in him. The Collector of the nineteen seventies is more a panchayati raj and a developmental officer where sternness and firmness are out of place.

It has been stated that it cannot be refuted that "the District Magistrate has more intimate contact with the public and functions as a shock-absorber between the Police and the public".[30] This theory of being a shock-absorber is rather self-negatory. That the District Magistrate has more contact with the public cannot be denied but it should not be forgotten even for a moment that these contacts he develops not in his capacity of the District Magistrate but in his capacity of a District Development Officer. Obviously when the time comes, the contacts with the public gained through developmental functions instead of proving useful in his capacity of the District Magistrate of the district prove rather a hindrance. It is, therefore, for consideration how could such contradictory functions like development and maintenance of order be combined in the same man. How can "development administrators afford to carry with them the psychology of regulatory administration, as they do at present"?

(7) It has been argued that the police looks at the criminal administration from the narrow police angle but the District Magistrate who comes into close contact with the people of all sections of the community and is the custodian of the general interests of his area looks at them from a broader angle. For the sake of argument, if this contention is extended a little farther, would it not be still better if the powers of general control and direction over the district police are vested in the Pramukh of the Zila Parishad for he being an elected representative who presides over a body which has all the MLAs of the district, all the MPs of the district, all the Pradhans of Panchayat Samities of the district and few co-opted members representing different interests as members would look at things not only from a broader angle than the District Magistrate but will be in a position better to weigh the scales between the police and the public?

Carrying the argument a little further still, if the police cannot be trusted with looking at the problems of the criminal administration except from a narrow police angle, what is the use of keeping highly paid police officers as I.G. of Police and Dy. I.G.P. having territorial

[30] Haridwar Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

and functional jurisdiction? These assignments could and should also be given to the generalist administrators so that with their wider experience of men and affairs, they may look at the police problems from a broader angle and in the process do good to the community and the police itself as well.

The idea that the Police Officers look at the problems of the criminal administration from a narrow police angle is not correct. This would be borne out by having a look at the varied functions the District Superintendents of Police have to discharge in districts in the nineteen seventies. Over and above being the District Superintendents of Police of the districts, they hold the following portfolios:

(1) Commandant, Home Guards of the districts;

(2) Licensing Authority for drivers of Motor vehicles;

(3) Foreigners' registration officer for the district;

(4) S.P., Anti-Corruption for the district;

(5) Member of the Regional Transport authority;

(6) Organiser of the Civilian Rifle Training Centre for the district; and

(7) Officer in charge training of the village volunteer force of the district.

It may pertinently be added that the above list does not include the membership of various committees of the district (including the Zila Parishad) on which the District Superintendent of Police sits. With all these multifarious functions, the District Superintendent of Police is bound to have naturally a wide outlook.

VI

With change of times the generalist administrators have changed a great deal and appreciably too. Even they have started feeling that the time has come when there should be a new orientation in the relationship between the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police. Shri G. Ramachandran, then Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Madras, wrote in 1965:

"...The Collector has thus still a good deal to do with the police and their work in the district. But opportunities for prompt interchange of views and information in critical situations between State Headquarters and districts which the police radio network

has provided and the increase in the number of Dy. Inspectors-General of Police leading to closer departmental supervision of the work of the Superintendents of Police have by loosening the bonds between the Collector and the Superintendent of Police led to some blurring of the Collector's responsibility. Political and labour agitations are increasingly directed on a State-wide basis and this results in a situation where the Government, in consultations with the Police Headquarters, issue instructions of a general nature on how the agitations should be dealt with. These trends naturally point to a new orientation in the relationship between the Collector and the Superintendent of Police."[31]

Now a word about the training of the Administrative Service Officers might also be put in. The institutional and field training imparted to them has been devised in such a manner as to cater primarily for revenue and developmental administration rather than for administration of Law and Order. This was envisaged by the First Five Year Plan which had laid down:

> "For recruits to the Indian Administrative Service and the State Administrative Services a thorough grounding in revenue and development administration is of the highest importance."[32]

Obviously in the emerging pattern Law and Order was relegated to the background and what has been the result thereof has very aptly been depicted by Shri B. Sivaraman I.C.S., then Secretary, Union Ministry of Food and Agriculture in the following words:

> "What will be the capacity of the Collector of the Seventies to supervise the police and act as the moderator? After the separation of the judiciary, the Administrator has very little direct experience of administration of the Criminal Law. As a young administrator, the Collector of the Seventies is now getting training as a Magistrate for about 6 months at the most, after a theoretical training in Criminal Law and Procedure for some months in the Training School. After that he has very little to do with Criminal Law till he becomes a Collector or Additional District Magistrate in charge of the police portfolio in the District. Though theoretically the administrator is supposed to use the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code to control disturbances of the peace, such occasions are few and far between. When an occasion arises, the Magistrate may be found wanting.

[31] G. Ramachandran, "The Collector in the Nineteen Sixties—Madras", *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3, (July-Sept.), 1965, p. 503.

[32] *First Five Year Plan*, op. cit., p. 59.

This is not just a theory but a factual observation about the recent past. The Police administrators are certainly experts in Criminal Law. Fudging of investigation or any laxity in prosecution of the case before the Courts of law will certainly not be immature work. Only a person well up in Criminal Law and Procedure will be able to spot the goat's feet. The role of the moderator is still more difficult. Moderation if it is not to be arbitrary has to be based on a sound application of the facts and the law involved. Common sense may enable one to appreciate facts but an appreciation of the legal niceties involved requires a good background in Criminal Law and Procedure. The young administrator of today is not being equipped to discharge the function of a Supervisor of the Police Administration or moderator of the laws of control. He may be able to discharge the functions of a keeper of order if he is given some special training and a number of refresher courses in administering the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and in handling a police contingent as a magistrate. Without continuous handling of the Criminal Law which with the separation of the judiciary is no more possible without considerable and continuous in-service training, the Collector of the Seventies will not be able to act as Supervisor and the moderator".[83]

And if we visualise that the District Magistrate of the Nineteen Seventies will willy-nilly not be able to act as a supervisor and moderator for the district police, it is for the Government of India and the Governments of the States (and above all for the people of India) to consider the whole matter in its correct perspective and to see to it that either the District Magistrate is fully absolved of his role in the police administration of the district or such changes are brought about in the structure of the IAS that the District Magistrate is enabled to act as a real and effective supervisor and moderator for the district police as also an absolute super-ordinate for the District Superintendent of Police.

VII

Anyway the discussion may now be summed up by stating that the time has come when the role of the District Magistrate *vis-a-vis* the role of the Inspector General of Police and the Deputy Inspectors General of Police in the Police administration of a district deserves not only an earnest re-examination but a rational reorientation to suit the needs of the present-day society. Colonialism has vanished. Shall we allow the

[83] B. Sivaraman, "The Collector of the Seventies", *IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3, (July-Sept.) 1965, p. 633.

remnants of colonialism, such as this archaic dual control over law and order administration in this country to plague our administrative structure?

For doing away with this debilitating duality of control, there are two specific alternative courses of action which could be envisioned as being open to us. (And a decision on which one of the two courses is to be chosen and pursued should be taken by a projection into the future): One couse of action open to us is described below.

The Police Act 1861 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should be so amended that the Police forces are made to act under the control, guidance and direction of only the professional police officers acting independently[34] under the superintendence of the State Government (to which they are subordinate) subject of course to innumerable constitutional, judicial and democratic curbs and controls as enumerated above and that the institution of the executive magistracy is put to an end and the Collector relieved of his role of District Magistrate for which he has neither the institutional training nor the practical training, nor the experience nor the temperament nor even the time.[35]

The other course of action open to us is given below.

The Indian Police Service (as an All India Service) as it exists today be abolished. The posts of Inspectors-General of Police of States and Deputy Inspectors-General of Police of divisions of States instead of being manned by professional police officers be manned by Indian Administrative Service Officers. The States' Commissioners for Home Affairs-cum-Secretaries to the State Governments in their Home Departments could be appointed *ex officio* Inspectors-General of Police

[34] In the Lok Sabha Debate on the Union Home Ministry on April 20, 1972, Mrs. Sheela Kaul, M.P. (Cong. U.P.) stated that the policemen were being treated as "aliens" in the society they lived in with little appreciation of the difficulties they go through. She suggested radical reforms in the police set-up to secure for senior officers of the force, now subject to orders of even a junior magistrate, power to take their own independent decisions.

[35] It may interest the reader that the Delhi Police Commission (1966-68) was also faced with a significant question. What should be the right system of policing the Union territory of Delhi? Should the present system under "which the District Magistrate exercises an overall control of law and order continue or should the Commissioner of Police system be adopted? After discussing the question in all its aspects, the Commission came to the conclusion that the Commissioner of Police system should be introduced in the city of Delhi, and to start with the Commissioner of Police of Delhi should exercise all the powers which the Commissioners of Police of Bombay and Calcutta exercise". *Report of the Delhi Police Commission*, Vol. 1, MHA, Government of India, New Delhi, Chapter 9, para 30, p. 134. The adoption of the Commissioner of Police system in all cities with a population exceeding 400,000 has been urged by a study team of the Administrative Reforms Commission also. The team says, "This system has been commended by the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and Chief Ministers as well as the various State Police Commissions."

of States.[36] The posts of Executive Magistrates could be abolished altogether and the Collectors (Deputy Commissioners) be appointed *ex officio* Deputy Inspectors-General of Police for their respective districts.[37] The posts of functional Dy.Is.G.P. and A.Is.G.P like those of C.I.D. (Crime and Intelligence), Anti-Corruption Armed Police, etc. (who could be given appropriate Secretarial status) as also posts of District Superintendents of Police could be manned by super-time scale (to be created), selection scale and senior scale officers of the State Police Services.[38] The Indian Police Service could in that event assume a new complexion as a Central Police Service to man the hundreds of senior posts in the Central Police Organisations like the C.I.B., C.B.I., B.S.F., C.R.P., R.P.F., etc.[39]

If we wish to achieve a break-through on the front of reorientation in police administration, police attitudes, and police values, we should entrust the reins of Police administration at the State and the District levels (the Divisional level could in our scheme of things be deleted for good) to such generalist administrators who are more closely in touch with public and welfare attitudes, more sensitive to popular needs and therefore better adopted to the purposes and requirements of a popular control in a welfare State. Expert knowledge is the province of services working at lower echelons in the hierarchy. The Inspector-General of Police of the State and the Deputy Inspectors General of Police of the Divisions have to hold scales between police and public and between different branches of the police, a task which is of such magnitude and delicacy and particularly so in a democracy and requires such a wide knowledge of men and affairs that it can well be undertaken by one who has had the opportunity of acquiring the exceptional qualification

---

[36] In that event the Secretary to the State Government in the Home Department will have only Police Department with him so that he could devote his full time (undivided) attention to the affairs of the Police Department. At present in most of the States Home Secretaries look after departments other than the Police also.

[37] The trend these days is towards manning the posts of the Collector (Deputy Commissioner) of the district and the Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad by two individuals. The former in that event will deal with land revenue and police and the latter with all development functions. In this set-up, it would be ideal if the Collector (Deputy Commissioner) is made to assume the role of Deputy Inspector-General of Police of a Range insofar as his district is concerned. For then he will be an unquestioned super-ordinate for both the Revenue and the Police officials in the district.

[38] This will very much, be in the fitness of things as the subjects 'Police', including railway and village Police and Public Order (but not including the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power) pertain to the 'State List' in the Constitution of India.

[39] Such re-structuring of the Indian Police Service has otherwise also become very necessary because these organisations by and large like to have and continue with those police officers who have acquired specialisation in their lines. The generalist police officers who have served in the field (district administration) find comparatively less favour with them.

necessary in some wider sphere than that of mere Police Service. And the Indian Administrative Service Officers with their variety of experience and opportunities of working with the people rightly answer all the qualifications[40] requisite for a police administrator of the nineteen seventies.[41]

The latter course of action in the considered opinion of the author is to be preferred to the former as in the Indian context it is likely to produce a visibly direct and decisive impact on the police administration of the country. The administrative and financial advantages that are likely to accrue out of it are so obvious that they do not need any elaboration. The *sine qua non* of this course of action would, however, lie in the structural refabrication of the Indian Administrative Service in such a manner that its officers may be required to deal only with the regulatory functions of the State (the Welfare functions being made over to some other Service which may be carved out of it for the purpose) and man all the superior posts of only[42] the Revenue, Police,

[40] It is interesting to note that even the Indian Police Commission 1902-05 had recommended that the post of the I.G. of Police of a State should ordinarily be held by a selected District Magistrate (and his pay should be Rs. 2500/- raising by annual increments of Rs. 100/- a month to Rs. 3000/- and whose status should be that of a Commissioner) although they did not think that the door should be absolutely closed against the officers of the police department but their experience was that ordinarily the training of a member of the Civil Service fits him better than a Police officer to take broad views on administrative matters and to deal with intricate, difficult and important matters especially in cases of differences between the Superintendent of Police and District Magistrates.

[41] IAS Officers have held and are holding divergently different States' posts such as those of Director of Education, Director of Industries and Commerce, Director of Agriculture, Director of Printing and Stationery, Director of Local Bodies, Director of Land Records, Director of Consolidation, Director of Colonisation, Director of Public Relations, Director of Rehabilitation, Director of Development, Labour Commissioner, Transport Commissioner, State-owned Industries Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Commissioner, Civil Supplies, Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries, Inspector-General of Prisons, Inspector-General of Registration and Stamps, Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Chief Panchayat Officer, Custodian of Evacuee Property, Chief Electoral Officer, Chairman, State Electricity Board, Chairman, State Transport Corpn. etc. in addition to their usual fare of the post of S.D.Ms., A.D.Ms., Collectors, Commissioners, Members Board of Revenue, Dy. Secretaries, Secretaries and Chief Secretary. Will it not be in expedient to deprive the police and public of the valuable super-ordination of the IAS officers in the general management of public matters which can be entrusted to them by appointing them Inspectors-General of Police and Deputy Inspectors General of Police ?

[42] "In the changing context, therefore, the old concept underlying the formation and role of the IAS, would require re-adjustment. We would recommend that a specific functional field must be carved out for the IAS. This could consist of Land Revenue Administration, exercise of magisterial functions and regulatory work in the States in fields other than those looked after by officers of other functional services. Posts which would go into this functional area of the IAS will be many. Examples of such posts which would be Sub-Collectors, Collectors, Directors of Civil Supplies, Directors of Settlement, Directors of Land Records, Revenue Secretaries, Home Secretaries, Municipal Commissioners, Divisional Commissioners, members of the Board of Revenue, etc.. and posts related to these functions in the State Secretariats." The Administrative Reforms Commission, India, ***Report on Personnel Administration***, Government of India, New Delhi, April 1969, p. 16.

Excise and other regulatory departments of the State. They will thus get an opportunity continuously to handle regulatory functions and be enabled to play a befitting role in the police administration by serving as supervisors and moderators (or to use a less common but more appropriate term—'friends, guides and philosophers) of not only the district police but the State Police as well.

PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN POLICE

Prabhu Datta Sharma

IMAGE studies about organisations can be called studies in public perceptions or popular perspectives on organisational behaviour which largely represent cumulative configurations of petty reactions. The images may be fake, phoney, projected and even real. They are relative and shifting and yet given a particular situation or manipulation, they may acquire mythical patterns of stability, and continuity in social systems.[1] Actually, trivials, not vitals, make images and the people who come in contact or are forced to be in the proximity of the functions of an administrative agency react to the organisational behaviour in terms of their own experiences, degrees of involvement and socio-cultural backgrounds.[2] Rumours, hearsay, stories, gossip, box news items and public comments at railway stations and bus terminals provide these images with patterns and structures, which in due course of time get hardened, stabilised and even legitimised.[3] Like a camera picture, the reality of the image depends upon innumerable variables, including the qualities and properties of the camera, the object and the cameraman. There is a great amount of irrationality and circumstantial distortions of popular images, which cannot and perhaps need not be studied with a scientific rigor. Yet no student of Public Administration or bureaucracy can deny that a wide acceptance of a shared public image by the people at large about an organisation plays a critical role in assessing its functional competence and democratic viability.[4]

While studying the police administration in India there may be a valid question whether an amorphous and inchoate phenomenon like popular image of police in India can gainfully be studied? If so, can such studies be utilised to evolve reform models in the police organisation? And again, is it not true that the image of the police is not of its own choosing and is so inextricably mixed up with the historical

[1] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, New Delhi, Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (Indian edition), 1972, pp. 58-112.

[2] Merton Roberts K., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New Delhi, Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (Indian edition), 1972, especially Ch. on "Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure", pp. 335-386.

[3] *Ibid*, pp. 185-214.

[4] *Ibid*, pp. 249, 268, 273.

functional, democratic and developmental problems and conditionings that a theory of police reform will ultimately end up as a very broad level generalisation of socio-cultural change or political development in India?[5] If images can be improved and thereby administrative efficiency as a commodity can be manufactured, then the totalitarian countries or military regimes are better placed than democracies wherein administrative structures reflect and represent the amorphous mass and its shifting opinions.[6] Therefore, what is significant for administrative purposes is not how the administrators look like, but what they accomplish and in what manner and at what cost. Of course, it partially depends upon how they do look like.

In a democratic administration, the lines between the How and What are never so neat.[7] A manufactured image is certainly undemocratic and even disastrous, but conversely speaking, a democratic process of evolving a popular image is a long and risky way to ensure genuine public participation and enhancement of efficiency and economy in organisational operations.

The image of police in India though broadly related with the national character, reflects the organisational behaviour of the police bureaucracy.[8] It also unveils the nature of police-public relations at various levels and between various strata of the Indian society. In a plural society of heterogeneous groups and conflicting interests, where a national consensus about stability and developmental goals is yet to be evolved, the image of the police should seriously help or hinder the broad goals of national policy. The democratic commitment presupposes a representative and responsible police system,[9] not only in terms of structural mechanism and functional control, but in day-to-day working with the people at all levels. As the democratic processes widen and percolate at various decision-making centres of Indian political system, it can be conveniently hypothesised that the range of police contacts with the public, criminal as well as non-criminal will be increasing.[10] Mass education and relative affluence should influence

---

[5] D.H. Bayley, *The Police and Political Development in India*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, N.J., 1969, especially Part VI "The Police and the Political System", pp. 409-26.

[6] V.R. Krishna Iyer, *Police in a Welfare State*, New Delhi, Asia Book Centre, 1958.

[7] Bayley, *op. cit.*, 'What Police Do,' p. 16, 'How Police Do it', p. 23, and 'What the Police Are', p. 25.

[8] "Police Culture : Need for Wider Perspective", *C.B.I. Bulletin*, Vol. 6, August 1972, p. 11.

[9] B.N. Mullik, "Public Trust", *Tamilnadu Police Journal*, Madras, Vol. 22, Oct-Dec. 1971, p. 229.

[10] B.J.K. Tampi, "Police and Public", *C.B.I. Bulletin*, Vol. 6, December 1972, p. 9.

the frequency and inter-personal nature of police-public contacts—situational as well as non-situational. The perspectives of public on police and police on public should visibly change as the processes of modernisation stir the society and police organisation directly as well as indirectly.

The present study seeks to survey and evaluate conclusions of a research, based on a limited but representative sample of police and non-police respondents. The study has three parts and the comparative data has been processed and analysed in an overall research design, seeking to answer the following three concrete questions:

(1) What do the police and people in India think of each other in terms of broad perceptions and how do these compare with the police image in the eyes of the policemen themselves?

(2) Why has the image of the police in India emerged and been accepted as such by different sections of Indian society?

(3) What according to police officials and non-police participants in police administration can be and should be done to better this image of the police to shape it as a more effective and responsible organisation in the political system of the country?

The study does not go as deep and as wide as Bayley's study in evaluating the determinants of public perspectives on police and *vice versa*.[11] But an attempt has been made to retest some of the hypotheses from his questionnaire, administered after 7 years of time and that too on a different kind of sample with an additional advantage of comparing it with the policemen's point of view about the image of their own organisation.[12]

The sample for the present study consisted of 75 policemen and 105 non-policewallas spread over a wide spectrum of varied age groups and ranks in the case of the former and several professions in the case of the latter. Fiftyfour respondents in the police sample were members of the Indian Police Service (IPS) while 21 of them held junior positions in non-IPS cadres in five different states of the Indian Union, but mostly in the State of Rajasthan.

---

[11] D.H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-248.

[12] Some of the items of the Bayley questionnaires employed for the present study were : Appendix B, Items 39, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 80, 84, 98, 101A, 120, 120A; Appendix C, Items 35, 36, 51, 54, 61, 74, 78A, 86, 95, 106, 113, *The Police and Political Development in India*, op. cit.

The police sample of 54 in the IPS group consisted of one IGP, 16 S.Ps., 3 D.Is.G., 22 probationers, 7 A.S.Ps., 5 retired officials. The non-IPS group of 21 members included 3 constables, 4 Head Constables, 12 Sub-Inspectors and 2 Inspectors. The professionwise break-up of the non-police sample was 52 students, 11 businessmen, 8 labour leaders, 7 politicians, 15 civil servants and 12 others, including 8 housewives. Out of these 105 non-police respondents, 87 belonged to the State of Rajasthan and 71 of them had their domicile in the city of Jaipur. Thirtyeight of the respondents in the police sample filled the questionnaire and the interview schedule method was employed in rest of the cases in both the samples of the survey. The study took two years (1970 and 71) for its completion.

I

The image of police administration in India like all other images is neither static nor exclusive to be characterised with epithets like, 'Fair' or 'Foul'. Actually, it is relative and subjective to the sections of the public, their involvement and the fluctuating extent and stakes of this involvement. Similarly, these images further vary a great deal, when the questions are posed about the Gazetted and the Non-Gazetted, the IPS and the Non-IPS and the field officials and the staff officials among the seniors. Then again different people, viewing various kinds of police officials like to use all kinds of 'Ifs' and 'Buts' before reflecting upon their reactions. Hence micro-studies alone can measure and evaluate in depth the socio-psychological and attitudinal perspectives of the people about various categories of policemen and *vice versa*. Yet a macro-level study, very much like an opinion poll, has its own validity.[13] What people in general think of the police as an organisational whole is important and still more important is what police officials think of their own job, of their own colleagues, and of their own organisation. The structured questionnaire administered for the present study pushed the police and non-police respondents to specific positions and in Table 1 is the percentagewise presentation of the categories in which they liked to place the police administration in India.

The figures in Table 1, if presented graphically will posit two different kinds of curves, bulging at 'Fair' and 'Corrupt' levels. Incidentally the apathetic and the confused respondents in both the samples were found almost at par and both the policewallas and the non-policewallas seemed to be in agreement that the present-day image of police

[13] In the area of 'Voting Behaviour' such studies have made a very significant contribution in revising the Poll strategies and future election campaigns of political parties and their candidates.

Table 1

What You Think the Image of Police Administration in India is?

		In percentage	
		Police Sample	*Non-Police Sample*
1.	Excellent	4.92	.03
2.	Fair/Satisfactory	56.01	3.17
3.	Foul	18.32	27.07
4.	Corrupt and Harassing	12.17	61.36
5.	I do not know	8.58	8.47

administration was far from being excellent.[14] Similarly, the categories of both the kinds of respondents who accepted the image as 'Foul' did not differ significantly, the difference being 8.75 per cent only. The most serious dichotomy in perceptional scale was discovered at the point where the majority of the respondents in the police sample viewed their image in their own eyes as 'fair', which the non-police public described as 'corrupt and harassing'. Here again, when only 3.17 per cent of the non-police respondents regarded the police image as 'fair', relatively narrow margin of 12.17 per cent of the police sample felt that their organisation was corrupt and their organisational behaviour was harassing.[15]

[14] This has also been the conclusion of a study on "Public Image of the Police" conducted by the *Society for Study of State Governments*, Varanasi, published in the Society's Journal, July-December, 1972, with the Director's note, which runs as under :

> "The Police is a part of bureaucracy in India ... Public image of bureaucracy itself is not very bright ... Bureaucracy is corrupt, unhelpful and very indifferent ... If we had conducted a survey of public image of bureaucracy and asked the respondents the same questions, about say Government, doctors and hospitals, responses would have been almost identical," p. 263.

[15] Dr. (Smt.) Saraswati Srivastava in her study of "Public Image of the Police" discovered the same as under:

Total No. of respondents in the mixed Sample=150

	No	Yes	Don't know
(1) The Police are a corrupt lot	8.6%	88.6%	2.6%
(2) The Police prevent and investigate crime properly	75.3%	18.00%	6.6%
(3) The Police are in league with criminals.	8.6%	84.6%	6.6%

Journal of the Society for Study of State Governments, Varanasi, July-December, 1972, pp. 243-63.

The study further revealed that 56 per cent of policewallas felt that their organisation enjoyed a fair image and as high as 62 per cent of them even maintained that their organisation was changing faster than the pace of social change in India.[16] They rejected the lag theory and believed that the reform processes initiated during last two decades were adequate. Contrary to this, the non-police respondents with a majority as high as 57.12 per cent found that the police behaviour was 'rude and discourteous'.[17]

To study the comparative perceptions of different professional groups towards the police in general and the comparative police perspectives on these groups in particular, the non-police sample was broken up professionwise and two separate questions were addressed to the respondents in both the samples. The results of the survey are given in Table 2.

Table 2

Comparative Study of Attitude of Groups Towards Police

Police Sample		*Non-Police Sample*	
Which special groups in Indian Society generally do not co-operate with the Police?		Which of the following groups in Indian Society help the Police in being corrupt and Harassing?	
(1) Students	21.92	Students	2.01
(2) Businessmen	11.08	Businessmen	16.72
(3) Intelligentsia	24.71	Intelligentsia	12.12
(4) Political leaders	15.03	Political leaders	51.02
(5) Religious leaders	5.07	Religious leaders	5.22
(6) Civil servants	10.12	Civil servants	9.28
(7) Others	12.07	Others	3.63
	100%		100%

The Table 2 revealed that to police officials intelligentsia was the biggest single group, which did not cooperate with the police administration in the country. The non-police respondents blamed the

[16] The Senior Police officers, especially the members of the I.P.S. subscribed to this view, which was not acceptable to the non-gazetted officials of the State Police.

[17] Some of the reasons for this discourteous behaviour checked by the majority of the members of the various sections of the community sample were:

(1) Students : They are power-drunk; (2) Businessmen : They are corrupt; (3) Intelligentsia : They are illiterate and unfortunate; (4) Political leaders : They are agents of the ruling clique; (5) Religious leaders : They are immoral; (6) Civil servants : They do not have professional ethics.

political leaders as the most obnoxious group, vitiating the police administration. Similarly, when students were regarded as a serious kind of 'problem-category' by the policeman, the mixed sample of non-police participants found the student activities as a very low kind of factor in spoiling the image of the police organisation. The figures in Table 2 further indicate that the police sample had presented the business group as 'third high', while the people put it as number two after the politicians in besmearing the police image in India. The policemen only in 32 per cent cases, maintained that the political leaders in the country had a low opinion of the police organisation.[18] Majority of them were found saying that most of the political leaders had a clear idea of the policeman's problems and predicaments.[19]

Although no study of interpersonal attitudinal scales and their behavioural manifestations can be quantifiable and precise, a broad measuring framework was evolved for the present study to make it possible in terms of relational descriptions. Prof. Bayley used similar scales on four different kinds of samples to evaluate attitudes of others towards police organisation and organisational behaviour of policemen in India.[20] The present study used some of these indices on its police and non-police samples of mixed nature. The way in which the respondents characterised the attitudes of each other towards one another are being given in Table 3. [21]

Table 3

Police-Public Relationship

	Attitude of Police towards people	*Attitude of People towards Police*
1. Generally	Uncooperative	Uncooperative
2. Mostly	Indifferent	Hostile
3. Often	Hostile	Indifferent
4. Rarely	Friendly	Friendly

18 Also see the reports of the Police Commissions, West Bengal (1964), Uttar Pradesh (1962), Maharashtra, 1964.

19 One of the senior political leaders of the ruling party said, "Policemen are our subordinates. They work under very difficult and trying situations.... Actually we aggravate their problems by being soft to our voters and political supporters."

20 In the Bayley Study, *op. cit.*, the samples were picked up from Bangalore, Tumkur, Kanpur and rural migrants to Kanpur. Similarly, the four Indian Universities chosen for this kind of study are Delhi, Allahabad, Osmania and Bangalore.

21 The terms are used qualitatively in descending order :
1. Friendly, 2. Cooperative, 3. Indifferent, 4. Hostile.

Notwithstanding the methodological difficulties of such value-ridden measurements, Table 3 depicted the identity of perceptions at items 1 and 4. But the strong variance at items 2 and 4 demonstrated the so-called foul and fair characteristics of the police image in public and police eyes. The common man found the policeman 'mostly' hostile, while to policeman it was 'often' the case.[22] The reasons for this kind of perceptional prejudice must not be far from to seek. The senior officials in the police, especially in the IPS exhibited a 'sympathy orientation' with the common man and after having narrated a story or two about popular misunderstandings, they summed up by saying, "People on the whole are not bad; it is a different story, that they are indifferent." But the citizens interviewed for the study were mostly fed on news items, published in the vernacular press and their orientation of hostility was mainly the result of the 'anti authority bias ' which they fondly cherished as citizens of a developing democracy.[23] The survey generally validated the commonplace belief that "people and police in India are generally non-cooperative with one another and rarely friendly with each other".

II

The general conclusions of the first part of the survey indicated that the police officials in India were not very happy with the behaviour of the people. They did not think that their public image was 'foul', although they did concede that it needed to be improved. On the other hand, the people in general maintained that the police was 'rude' 'discourteous' and 'hostile', but they simultaneously accepted that neither the police organisation nor the police officials in India were directly responsible for their foul image and hostility perceptions. It was interesting to find that these perceptional configurations were not substantially rooted in rationality.[24] The respondents in both the varieties of samples could not illustrate and justify their valuational positions. Respondents as high as 70.03 per cent in the non-police sample, when asked about their first reaction to a situation, wherein "a policeman knocks at the gate of your neighbour", checked the item, "Perhaps some crime has been committed". A very small and negligible number answered and maintained that they would have no special

[22] This situation has also been evaluated in the 'Police Image Study' conducted by the Society for the Study of State Governments, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-58, and has been depicted as under:

	Yes	*No*	*Don't know*
1. The Police is a friend of the people	21.3%	77 3%	1.3%
2. The Police can be trusted	20.0%	80.0%	Nil.

[23] Refer to Eldersveld and Jagannadham *'et al'*, *Citizen and Administration*, New Delhi, IIPA.

[24] Govind Narain, "Police of Tomorrow", *C.B.I. Bulletin*, Vol. 7, Jan. 1973, p. 2.

reaction to this situation. These people who knowingly believed th police in India had been a mechanism of harasssment had not suffere much at the hands of the police directly or personally. They open maintained that their opinion was based mostly on, what the other s called experienced people had communicated to them. The figur given in Table 4 of the non-police sample reveal the bizarre nature c these popular perspectives on police.

Table 4

	Percentage wise	
	Yes	*No*
1. Have you ever seen a Policeman beating an alleged offender?	17.30	82.7
2. Have you or any of your near friends been illtreated by the Police	40.07	59.9
3. Have you ever given bribe or illegal gratification to any Policeman?	9.01	90.0
4. Do you personally know Policemen who flatter the politicians?	28.27	71.7
5. Do you know some Police officials who are really very honest?	61.23	38.7
6. Do you think the young generation of Police officer is better than the senior generation?	92.02	7.9

The statistical figures given the Table 4 show a seriou variance in items 1, 3 and 6 which indicates that people in genera had very limited or almost negligible personal or direct experiences of police excesses and corruption in the police organisation. It was equally significant to note that the younger generation of police officers was found enjoying a much better image than their seniors, almost in an overwhelming way.[25] Similarly, contrary to the widely shared and heard popular notions about slavish submission of police officials to political bosses, 71.73 per cent respondents of the non-police sample disclosed that they did not know police officials who were engaged in flattering the political masters.[26] The

[25] On this theme an excellent Syndicate study had been prepared by the Advanced Course I.P.S. Trainees at the National Police Academy, Mt. Abu, 'Attitude Survey of Subordinate Police Ranks', Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Transactions.

[26] "Attitude Problems of Retired Police Officers" (Syndicate Study) (Cyclostyled version), *ibid.*

:vey conclusions weighed quite heavily against 'experience perception radigm', yet, on the basis of personal knowledge some 61.23 per cent ;pondents of the citizen sample revealed that "they know some police icials who are really honest". Very few persons in this sample dis- ıyed any evidence of being called or visited by the police in one ɔacity or the other. Hence the following hypothetical question was t to the respondents. "What do you think, your experience would ve been, if you would have been called to a police station?" In ponse to this most of the respondents imagined all kinds of calamities ıging from physical torture to the token payment of graft money.[27] radoxically even those, who felt that the police image in India was ınging fairly fast, also exhibited doubts, whether a glass of water ıld have been served to them in a police station.

The policewallas and the non-police public, who jointly participate the day-to-day administrations of law and order and crime-preven- n had their different reasons to explain this phenomenon. Most the police officials, who somehow felt that the image of police organi- ion was not so poor or foul, attributed it to factors of history, which 1 been against them all along. They confessed that some of the ıus factors were very much inbuilt in the negative nature of the police .ies and they were aggravated by the dynamics of democratic change, swiftly sweeping over the Indian society.[28] They also alleged that :quate care had not been bestowed upon this problem of image ause of the lack of public relations machinery and a rightly placed phasis on the routine nature of basic functions.[29] The respondents :he non-police sample were found aware of the conditions obtaining .he police organisation and they viewed the gravity of the problem m this angle also. Most of them liked to place the onus on the func- ıing of the structure and the ill-conceived personnel policies of the ice organisation, haphazardly pursued by its leaders in the face of io-cultural changes in India. The percentagewise figures of the ɔondents are given in Table 5, who indicated their first preference the one single dominant reason for the present state of affairs.

The analysis of these results indicated a significant variation on ıs 2 and 3. The police officials and the people perceived the nature

One of them said, "The same will happen even to an Inspector General of :e, if he visits a Police Station in his State *incognito*."

An Additional I.G.P. pointed out that the negative nature of the police job can mplified by the fact that when all other professions and departments have :thing to distribute as spoils, the police has relatively very little to offer to the ɜns except lathies or bullets.

See S. C. Misra, "Police Public Relations", *Tamilnadu Police Journal*, Vol. 22, Dec. 1971, p. 233.

Table 5

How Do You Account for the Present Image?

	Police Sample	*Non-Police Sample*
1. History of the Police	28.01	23.22
2. Nature of the Police Job	36.32	20.13
3. Personnel Policies	8.11	30.11
4. Democratic Change	17.27	8.02
5. Hostile Press	6.30	6.17
6. Any Other	3.99	12.35
	100.00%	100.00%

of the police job in significantly different ways. Similarly, when the former were found somewhat *pro-status quo* about the personnel system in the police, the latter felt that the personnel policies were highly defective and absolutely out of date. A gross proximity of views was noticed about the roles of history and the press in the two samples. About the nature and the processes of democratic change, causing their inevitable impact on the image of police, the two groups differed quite widely, although the difference in terms of quality may not be called very significant.[30]

One interesting conclusion of the survey was that, when the non-police respondents in general thought very high of the younger generation of the police officials in India, the majority of the police officials of all ranks (notwithstanding their sympathy with the youngsters), did not rate the young people so high as responsible citizens of the country. In 72 per cent cases, the police officials checked that "the teenagers/students in India hate the police without any rhyme or reason[31] but the respondents in the non-police sample in majority of the cases said,

[30] While discussing the impact of democratic change in police organisation, the policemen generally had a tendency to compare the present with the past, but the non-police respondents tended to evaluate the impact by keeping the model of a future policeman or his counterpart in foreign countries as a measuring yardstick for the present.

[31] This seems like a nemesis of what the Indian University students think of Indian Police. In 1969, Prof. Bayley concluded his Survey "They are inclined to doubt police honesty, impartiality and freedom from political control . . . Police are thought of . . . as rude, discourteous and given to physical abuse". *'op. cit.'* p. 344.

Also *see* C. Chakravarti, "Student Indiscipline and Police", Transactions, Nov. 1967, National Police Academy, Abu.

'No', in response to this very question. Some of the answers of the structured questions addressed to both the samples are given in Table 6.

Table 6

	Police Sample	*Non-Police Sample*
Do you think that:		
1. the police according to young people is mere authority to be hated?	Perhaps	No
2. the young people feel that police is a defender of *status quo*	Perhaps	Perhaps
3. the young people fight against the police because it stops them from fighting against establishment	No	Yes
4. the schools have failed to give a correct image of the police in India	Yes	Yes

The Survey study revealed that the police and the people in general broadly accepted the fact that the basic duties of the police included the defence of *status quo* or preservation of stability in society. But, this did not imply any value premise, whether that was the only way as it ought to be. The identical check on 'Perhaps' in majority of the cases in both the samples pointed out that both the police and the non-police did not like to defend this proposition. Similarly, unanimity was observed about the role of secondary socialisation through schools, which had failed to present the police administration in India in bright colours.[32] The people in general did not subscribe to the view that the young people in India were opposed to police merely because it symbolised authority and the latter had an anti-authority bias in their primary and secondary socialisations. The police officials also did not like to take a categorical or positive position on this. A deep variance in perceptions of significant nature was observed on item 3, where the non-police respondents maintained that the police was in league with

[32] The text books on Indian Social Institutions prescribed for school and college students carry exaggerated and unverified scandalous accounts about police atrocities, corruption and third degree methods employed by the Indian Police.

the reactionary establishment and had hindered change in the name of its primary duties.[33] On the contrary, the police officials, committed to their loyalist concepts of discipline and duty, did not agree to it. Obviously, in arranging their priority order between administrative discipline and social change, they put the former higher in preference to the latter.

To discover factors, which have a direct as well as indirect bearing on police-public relations in terms of relative and respective perceptions of image, the respondents in both the samples of the study, were given a free choice to list the causes for the sorry state of affairs in the present. They listed all kinds of serious and frivolous causes[34] responsible for the police image. Most significant factors in order of priority pointed out by these respondents in both the samples of the study are given in Table 7.

Table 7

Factors Responsible for the Poor Image of the Police

Police Sample	*Non-Police Sample*
1. Too many responsibilities.	Educational calibre of Policeman is too low.
2. Lack of popular cooperation.	The Police people are low paid.
3. Lack of Funds.	The Police job is too dull.
4. Ill-trained juniors.	The seniors corrupt the junior officials.
5. Corrupt political leaders.	Police training is inadequate.

These factors along with a host of others such as political interference, conventions, discretionary powers of the police, third degree methods of crime detection, hostile press, low morale, lack of sanctions, illiteracy-power-status syndromes of values, etc., represent the popular diagnosis of the so-called malady. To most of the policemen, it was the problem of history, ignorance, lack of will for reform and over-democratisation of the Indian polity. Still an analysis of the priority order of

[33] The Survey conducted by Dr. (Smt.) Saraswati Srivastava also confirms this with as high as 84.6 per cent respondents maintaining that "The police are in league with criminals. It also found the police under the influence of the local politicians, negative votes being 8 per cent only.", *op. cit.*, p. 256, 260.

[34] Some of these were red colour of the turban, long moustache and vacant eyes, tail-wagging behaviour before V.I.Ps. alcoholic habits and urination at public places by police constables, etc.

the most significant factors in the police sample indicated the perceptional subjectivity. Interestingly enough, the police officials put lack of funds at order number three and regarded over-work as a more major factor than the apathy and the hostility of the people.[35] Similarly, when low-salary and poor service conditions were not serious grouses of the senior as well as junior police officials, the respondents in the non-police sample observed and expressed concern about the low paid status of the policeman. None of these non-policemen ever said that the policeman was over-worked and his department was under-budgeted in the national scheme of overall development. A majority of the non-police respondents could successfully establish a relationship between the work, the worker and the cost at which the worker was available. The non-police sample being favourably loaded towards educated people, it could clearly understand the predicaments of the semi-literate policeman and sympathised with his lot. It found his job arduous and dull for which he was not paid adequately, taking into consideration his responsibilities, dedication and skills.[36] Both the samples felt hopeful about the roles and results of training, especially at the lower levels. But the low priority rating indicated in Table 7 also explained that the respondents were not very optimistic or over-enthusiastic. A comparative analysis of the factors listed in this table, quite significantly indicated that the lower functionaries of police, like Constable and Sub-Inspector had been the major agents of image-building to both the kinds of respondents. The police officials felt that they had not adequately been trained by their own organisation, but the non-police people maintained that the seniors had projected a wrong model and had rendered the the juniors, what they were or what they appear to be.[37] Surprisingly, not a single policeman found his job as dull and boring, but the non-police respondents as high as 26.07 per cent felt this way. The common-sense factors like the history of the Indian Police or interference by the political leaders, etc., were found too low to be regarded as significant in both the samples of the present study.

III

Notwithstanding the variance in the perceptions of police image by the policemen and the people and their respective reasons for holding

[35] *See* K. G. Ramana, "Police Forces of India and Their Cost", Transactions, Oct., 1962, "Police Forces in India—Their Strength and Cost", Syndicate Study, Transactions, Oct., 1963, National Police Academy, Mt. Abu.

[36] M. M. Singh, "Minimum Wage for a Policeman", Transactions, October, 1962, National Police Academy, Mt. Abu.

[37] Several eminent policemen have also supported this view. *See* S. C. Misra (I.P retired), *Police Administration in India*, Mt. Abu, National Police Academy, 1972, especially the Preface. Also *see* S. R. Nigam, *Scotland Yard and the Indian Police*, Allahabad, Kitab Mahal, 1963.

these perspectives, there was a near agreement among all the categories of the respondents on the point that some conscious and deliberate measures need to be devised to present the present police image in brighter colours. Very few police officials mentioned and fewer still maintained that serious and systematic efforts had been made in the past in this regard.[38] Even in the advanced countries of the West, this concept is very recent.[39] Some conscientious among them did talk about some sporadic, *ad hoc* and absolutely personal measures, experimented upon by them on their own initiative and risk at the district level and below. These police officials tried some of the grievance redressal measures like visiting hours, personal audiences, appointment of citizens' committees, etc., on their own initiative and with varying success. All of them, without any exception advocated and defended the utility and efficiency of these public relations measures in improving the police-community relations. But they did concede that these efforts could not reach fruition because of the absence of a well-conceived policy and its implementational follow up by them or their successors. Casual efforts like 'Press meets', or 'Police Weeks' or a seminar or two on 'police problems' always aroused considerable interest in the beginning, but it soon tapered off because of the lack of involvement and the lack of organisational commitment, so very necessary to push such programmes through on a mass scale in a sustained manner. Most of the respondents in both the samples suggested that some positive results in the field of improved police-public relations could be achieved, if the problem could have been attacked at three levels: (1) the organisational level, (2) the mass communication level, and (3) the interpersonal level of the members of the traditional community. The respondents in general showed great awareness about the effectiveness of mass media and the impact of democratic institutions, especially that of Panchayati Raj in the country side.[40]

At the organisational front, the reforms were perceived as the most difficult process by both the kinds of respondents. These respondents when further asked about the concrete measures given in Table 8 as a remedy to better the present low image of the police, checked the list in the order of preference as given in Table.

---

[38] See K.S. Puri, "Public Police Coopration," *Tamilnadu Police Journal*, July-Sept. 1972, p. 36.

[39] Police and Public must work together, *Texas Police Journal*, Vol. 20, May, 1972 p. 9. Also *see* W.H. Parker, "The Police Role in Community Relations", Chicago, *N.C.C.J.*, 1955.

[40] One of the respondents said, "If India would have opted for T.V. network in the fifties, the impact of modernisation would have been considerable and visible upon the institutions and processes of her democracy."

Table 8

Measures	Police Sample			Non-Police Sample		
	Yes	*No*	*Don't Know*	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't Know*
1. Should there be less authority at the Police station level?	7.73	80.26	12.01	63.01	26.99	10.00
2. Should there be more and faster specialisation in police bureaucracy at the District level?	59.21	10.22	30.57	67.37	10.20	22.43
3. Should there be Police Commissioners in B Class town?	75.37	16.03	8.60	51.33	11.12	30.55
4. Should a Police constable be a matriculate?	81.22	8.03	10.75	90.11	2.03	7.86
5. Should the post of the Sub-Inspector be upgraded?	77.34	17.38	5.38	72.39	10.32	17.29
6. Should there be special training of line functionaries?	45.11	46.23	8.66	42.27	30.33	27.40
7. Should there be a radical change in the system of detection, prosecution and prevention of crime?	42.17	39.80	18.03	68.35	30.35	1.30
8. Should there be intensive police research and bold experimentation in police administration?	80.91	—	19.09	70.11	—	10.80

The statistical data, given in Table 8, collated from the mixed and random sample of the present study indicated some priority measures and their effectiveness assessment by the police and the non-police participants in police administration for the betterment of the police image in India. The comparative table showed that the police and non-police respondents agreed on items 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8, while they differed quite significantly on items 1, 3 and 7 (the difference being more than 10%).

The 'do not know' category in both the samples, besides being insignificant, also varied seriously on items 3, 5, 6 and 7, which meaningfully implied their debatability and still more a professional versus non-professional approach to the problems of police administration.[41] The negative preference was nowhere in majority in either of the samples except on item 1 in the police sample. The comparative analysis of the figures on Organisational Reform Chart (From 1 to 3) indicated that both the policewallas and the non-policewallas stood for speedier specialisation and creation of more autonomous organisations in the police to do a better job of their work. The former quite expectedly, but nonetheless very strongly and overwhelmingly, felt that the powers at the police station level should stay untampered.[42] The non-police people in as many as 63.01 per cent cases expressed a keen desire for change at this level. But even in this category (non-police) the supporters of *status quo* were found in the neighbourhood of 27 per cent of the total sample. The police respondents in the *pro-status quo* group were as high as 80.26 per cent, while the revisionists could claim only 7.73 per cent of the policemen as their supporters. About the problem of policing the urban areas and especially the B class towns, the survey conclusions were found heavily in favour of the Commissioner pattern of organisation. The police officials opted for this type of organisation because of its 'image of autonomy' and police independence, about which they were found to have a widely shared common belief almost bordering on a professional myth.[43] The 'do not know' category in the police and non-police samples varied somewhat significantly (8.60 and 38.55) which in a way further implied the common man's ignorance and even disbelief about the commissioner form of organisational reform in Urban Police Administration.[44] The opponents of this reform in both the samples were almost negligible but the 'Yes' votes varied from 51.33 to 75.37 per cent. The difference could be attributed to the uncommitted 'do not know' category in the non-police sample, which exceeded the figures of the corresponding police sample by a margin as high as 30 per cent.

---

[41] For details about professional approach, *see* K.B. Vohra, "Need for Reorientation of Police", *C.B.I Bulletin*, Vol. 7, Jan. 1973, p. 2.

[42] This is in agreement with the conclusions of a syndicate study on "Manpower Requirements at the Police Station", Transactions XIV, Nov. 1970, National Police Academy, Mt. Abu.

[43] Almost all the Reports of the State Police Commissions appointed since 1950, have invariably contributed to the development of this myth. The Bihar Police Commission (1961) was especially categorical in its advocacy about the Commissioner System.

[44] The respondents in the non-police sample from the non-commissioner cities and even the junior officials in the police sample confessed that they had very little knowledge about the commissioner pattern of police organisation. Seventyeight per cent of them in the former and 67 per cent of them in the latter categories had not even heard about it.

As most of the people believed that the junior functionaries were generally responsible for making or marring the image of the police, the present survey tried to study perceptions about higher educational qualifications of the lowest police functionary, *i.e.*, the constable. It also pointedly asked about the upgrading of the key post of the Sub-Inspector as S.H.O. of the police station. Interestingly enough, both the kinds of respondents came out with a majority of 'Yes' choices and felt very strongly in overwhelming numbers that these personnel reforms in terms of position classification and direct recruitment were long overdue. Of course, the negative category had more of police officials than the non-police people.[45] This was primarily because the police repondents were comparatively less radical than the non-police respondents, who also felt that the reforms were feasible. A difference of 11.91 per cent in the 'Do not Know' category of item 2. (*i.e.*, upgrading of the post of the Sub-Inspector) quite pertinently indicates that when police people deemed it as a welcome reform, the non-police respondents in a larger number had their hunches about further abuse of powers by this functionary. On item 6 about the role of training in promoting better police community relations both the samples were found somewhat unenthusiastic and had their own doubts about its operational efficiency and overall efficiency. Even the figures of the negative vote against special kind of training in police-public relations came approximately quite close to each other in both the samples.[46] More policewallas supported as well as rejected the proposition that specialised training was a real way out for better and healthier police-public relations.[47] Again, the police officials were found more sharply divided about the utility of training programmes and the 'Do not Know' category in this case was only 8.66 per cent. But this category in the non-police sample being 27.40 per cent was found as highly significant in term of overall comparisons within the sample and between the two samples. The survey results in general were a pointer towards the futility of training programmes as a measure of attitudinal change or attitude building of the lower functionaries of the police hierarchy. Hence, upgrading the key post of the Sub-Inspector was highly opted for by both the kinds of respondents and this was also very much implied and even logical in the position on item 4, wherein both the kinds of respondents with a majority as high as 80 per cent felt that the police constable should

[45] Even among the police officials, the senior officials, especially the members of the I.P.S. felt strongly about it.

[46] The negative voters said, "Training in the Indian context has very limited value. Where education has failed, training can accomplish nothing."

[47] Refer to editorial on "New Concept in Police Training", *Texas Police Journal*, Vol. 20, Sept. 1972. Also *see* G.C. Singhvi, "Police Training Perspectives", *C.B.I. Bulletin*, Vol. 6, Sept. 1972, p. 4.

be a matriculate. Both of them maintained that this was not only extremely desirable, but was quite feasible also in the given situation obtaining in the country. Obviously, the protagonists of this reform stood for a reclassification and upgrading of the post of the constable in terms of personnel policy including job risks, responsibility situations, and working conditions at this level of the police organisation.

Most of the persons interviewed for the survey were found especially critical of the procedures, followed by the police administration in prevention, detection and prosecution of crimes and criminals. The study made an effort to discover positions which these critics maintained with regard to certain well-known procedural reforms and the speed with which these were to be introduced and processed.[48] There was almost a near unanimity on this point that archaic, harassing and process-oriented police procedures were largely responsible for spoiling the police image in India. These procedures were discovered as one of the most predominant factors causing a visible wedge between the police and the citizens. The respondents made a spirited plea to change them through scientific research and bold innovation. The 'No vote' was just nil and even the 'do not know' category was found to be quite insignificant. But this enthusiasm for research and innovation to evolve patterns of procedural change was more or less theoretical. When asked how fast this could be done and should basic changes be contemplated at the initial stage, the respondents in both the samples started giving second thoughts to the problem. The totality, the feasibility and the long range repercussions were gleaned as main conditioning factors. The figures are important because 68.35 per cent of the non-police sample was prepared and willing to hazard risks and even plunge into well-thought out reforms of radical nature. The police officials were generally classified as 'conservative' in accepting the dynamics of change.[49] Pertinently it was not because they tended to lose in the wake of change, but mostly because they had been trained in the belief that the police was an instrument of preservation rather than an agency of change. This was the implication of 18.03 per cent vote in the 'Do not Know' category of the police sample, while it was only 1.30 per cent in the corresponding non-police category of the sample. The police officials were found to be even eager to subject their fanciful reform ideas to rigorous scrutiny and empirical testing of purposeful research. In sum, when the police as compared to the non-policemen were found more keen, more curious and adequately serious about procedural reforms in their

[48] Positions with regard to procedural reforms were tested in the areas like F.I.R. writing, evidence collection, witness system, custody and remand procedures for alleged criminals etc. as they obtain at present.

[49] The consensus in the police sample was that "the woods should not be missed for the trees. The procedures had to be sacred if the purpose is really noble".

organisation, the latter exhibited more impatience and more irresponsibility in being critical of the undue delay and even non-implementation of some of the agreed reforms.

There is also a socio-psychological dimension of the administration-citizen relationship which pertains to the problem of image which a democratic administration enjoys and projects among its clients.[50]

If the police administration has to improve its image (even without really improving itself) it will have to subject itself to democratic exposure and popular conditionings. The present study revealed that the police and the people in India in the seventies were neither exposed nor conditioned to democratic experience respectively.[51] Nonetheless, they quite seriously subscribed to the view that the Radio, T. V., Press and all other means of mass media were potential weapons in democratic exposure and popular conditioning. To make these two situations available to the administration and to the citizen respectively, the respondents in the two samples were asked to arrange three alternatives in a preferential order; which they attempted as given in Table 9.

Table 9

	Police Sample			*Non-Police Sample*		
Items on the Questionnaire	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't know*	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't know*
Do you think Police image can be rendered better						
1. By a systematic, calculated and wider use of Radio, T. V. and Press?	40.11	32.38	27.51	37.32	33.37	29.31
2. By organising special police friendship programmes in schools?	81.35	3.31	15.34	60.05	20.11	19.84
3. By initiating public dialogues on problems of police administration?	37.82	18.11	44.07	67.11	9.32	23.57

[50] See Loren M. Pitman, "Put your best words forword", *Police*, Vol. 16, Oct, 1971, p. 26.

[51] Not a single respondent among both the samples was found to have listened to an academic talk or intellectual discussion on the problems of Indian Police in the Broadcasting Series of A.I.R.

An item-wise comparison indicated that there was very little variance in positive votes on item No. 1. But it tended to increase its margin on item 2 and became fairly wide and visible on item 3. Similarly, the negative options differed significantly on item 2. The 'do not know' category had the highest degree of variance on item 3. In other words, the police officials largely thought that measures to build up a desirable police image or a healthy police-community relationship should begin from primary schools and this would be fair as well as enduring. The non-police participants desired that the vicious circle should effectively be cut through by the initiation of open and public dialogues on the problems of police administration.[52] To them, this was more important, because it could lead to a more democratic exposure of the police than democratic conditioning of the people. The latter impliedly carried the risk of regimentation, especially when resorted to through schools and controlled media of mass communication. Quite significantly the police officials rated theschool approach as more sensible and practical because a majority of them was found uninterested in the manipulation of a manufactured image through Press and Radio. They knew that it was possible as well as easy also, yet according to them such short-cuts had only limited advantages and ultimately ran the risk of disasters of serious nature. Some of them quite candidly maintained that it was better to wait, work and suffer the pangs of slow change rather than to contribute to the existing social psychology of frustrations, so very natural in a lag situation between achievements and aspirations. The non-police respondents also realised the double edged nature of the propaganda-groomed-image and did concede that quiet and sincere efforts at school level were seriously warranted. The 'do not know category' in both the samples was quite sizable and the figures in both the columns approximated quite strikingly. The high effectivity and limited utility of mass media and the long range effectivity and high utility of attitudinal grooming in schools were acceptable to both, but about the question of public dialogue[53] on police problems the two exhibited great disagreement based on professional and non-professional approaches respectively. The police officials did not altogether reject the possibility, feasibility and utility these dialogues in majority of the cases while the non-police respondents almost rejected the reverse proposition. The former thought that the preconditions conducive for such democratic dialogue did not

[52] Giving a similar suggestion, Prof. Bayley wrote in 1969, "The survey has shown that major parameters of social position are not unyielding barriers to attitude change. As people move physically or socially their views change. This is an opportunity on which government must seize and especially within the student community," Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

[53] P.D. Sharma, "Law and Order Administration : Challenges of the Seventies", *IJPA*, New Delhi, Oct-Dec., 1971, p. 754-85.

exist in the Indian society, and if an experiment was hazarded, it would result in deterioration rather than betterment of the present image of the Indian Police. still quite a large number of them preferred to stay in the 'Do not know category' with little opposition, provided the public dialogues were launched with thoughtful planning and imagination rooted in experience. On the contrary the non-police participants of police administration found it as the surest method of image improvement. To them the policeman was to be democratised, not only in terms of popular control, but he should directly appraise the people and their leaders about his difficulties and other possible mischiefs and intrigues of others in the administration to which he might fall a victim.[54] The demand for public dialogue was made by enthusiastic non-police people in all consciousness about the responsibility and dangers of mutual mud-slinging that it might entail in the beginning. They preferred it as a lesser evil and even the 'do not know category' also liked to be on the 'Yes' side, if certain precautionary measures were assured, if not guaranteed.

At the third level of inter-personal relationship, the present study sought to discover the critical areas where efforts could be concentrated to improve police community relations. The sample showed a general awareness about the fact that healthy police-community relations could endure only, when they were built on a continuous basis and had some kind of inter personal and direct relationship of participatory nature.[55] The existing position being negative, and still more charged with prejudices, it was the most difficult field to enter. But the respondents in both the samples accepted in positive terms that under the given situations of rural milieu and cultural values, it had to be undertaken, if the police in India wanted (or even if only wished) to project its image of a friend and well-wisher of the people at large. This police-people confrontation or participation or cooperation in the administration of order and prevention of crime would specially create new roles of the opinion leaders, as middlemen. They might be traditionally influential caste people or directly elected popular representatives in the democratic system. The persons interviewed and covered by the present study accepted the formal and informal roles of both the kinds of opinion leaders, who according to them were already playing a decisive role in carrying tales about police behaviour. Consciously as well as unconsciously, these leaders were legitimate image-builders and rarely were they questioned about the veracity of their versions. Should police

---

[54] *See* "Police and Elective Bodies" Syndicate Study, Transactions, II, October, 1963, Mt. Abu, National Police Academy.

[55] C.J. Brande, "Improved Police Community Relations", *Police*, Vol. 16, October, 1971, p. 62.

always contact people through these opinion leaders or not? If so, in what manner should these contacts be rendered continuous and involving?[56] The answers of our respondents are giving in Table 10.

Table 10

Should Police Approach People About Problems of Police Administration

	In percentage	
	Police Sample	*Non Police Sample*
1. Through direct audience with the people at large?	11	52
2. Through elected representatives of that area?	42	41
3. Through traditionally influential people of the place?	47	7
	100 %	100 %

The answers revealed that 'direct audience' was not the 'right' and 'practical' approach with the policemen, who heavily voted for item 3.[57] On the contrary, contact through traditionally influential people was not acceptable to the people, who saw more effective redressal of their grievances in the direct-audience approach. Strikingly enough, both the samples came quite close about the democratic approach of popular contact through political representatives.[58] Besides being an index of political modernisation, contact through political representatives symbolised the legitimisation and stabilisation of democratic process in the countryside. Our study demonstrated that notwithstanding the image of the political leaders in the country and all kinds of stories prevalent about the police organisation, all the professional as well as non-professional participants in the police administration accepted the

[56] "Personnel Approach to Police Public Relations", *Police*, April, 1972, p. 2.

[57] Most of the policemen said, "The traditionally influential people in rural India being God-fearing are reliable and communicable for police purposes which is not the case with the elected representatives."

[58] Several rural leadership studies conducted to evaluate the working of Panchayati Raj institutions have established that people and public servants have been critical of leadership behaviour but they do accept the elected representatives as legitimate masters, who should be replaced only through the polls. *See* V.M. Sirsikar, "Leadership Patterns in Rural Maharashtra", *Asian Survey*, 4 (7) July, 1964, pp. 929-939: and Ranjit Choudhry, "Patterns of Leadership in West Bengal Village", *Economic Weekly* 16 (4) April, 1964, pp. 641-44.

police-people relationship operating through legitimate political leaders as normal and even healthy. Out of several good suggestions offered by our respondents to better police community relations, the following figured prominently in both the samples of our study:[59]

(1) Constitution of small citizens' Committees with elected political leaders as Chairmen.

(2) Monthly or quarterly visits by elected political leaders to police stations in an informal manner.

(3) Public audience by senior police officials, including public speeches along with other leaders of the area.

(4) Public display and inspection of some documents and police records to remove popular misgivings.

(5) Fixed visiting hours and periodic sittings of police officials and opinion leaders collectively to review problems of Law and Order in the area.

These suggestions, whatever their worth may be, brought to light the fact that public image in a democracy could not be improved by secretive methods and confidential systems.

The data presented in the preceding pages sought to discover, examine and analyse the present image of police administration in India on a comparative basis. The hypotheses postulated and tested in this study were based on common place experience and commonsense interpretation of the phenomenon. They have meaningful bearings on the larger problems of police administration in India. The study had established the conclusions as given in Table 11.

To sum up, a trend analysis can be attempted here. It is true that there has been a large area of positive disagreement between the police officials and the people in general and their perspectives differ widely yet they agree on the fundamentals pertaining to police administration in India. For instance, both of them believe that "the present police image in India is far from satisfactory and needs to be improved". In their judgment, the younger generation of police officers is not only qualitatively better, but professionally committed to the goals of their organisation. According to them, there is an absolute and immediate need for empirical research on police problems and modernisation of

[59] Also see Dr. K.V. Rao's working Paper on "Recruitment and Training and Other Related Matters of the Indian Police", *Journal of the Society for Study of State Governments*, Varanasi, July-December, 1972, pp. 179-205 and S.C. Misra, "Police Administration in India," *op. cit.*, pp. 183-220.

Table 11

Hypotheses	*Police Sample*	*Non-Police Sample*
1. The image of Police in India can generally be called foul.	Invalid	Valid
2. People are mostly hostile to Police.	Invalid	Invalid
3. Police are mostly hostile to people.	Invalid	Valid
4. Politicians are responsible for present image of police in India.	Invalid	Valid
5. The history of police has been responsible for the foul characteristic of the image.	Invalid	Invalid
6. The present image of police is rooted neither in reality nor in rationality.	Valid	Valid
7. Police according to people is mere authority to be hated.	Valid	Invalid
8. Police procedures and methods are not purpose-oriented and are out-of-date.	Valid	Valid
9. Training of junior police officials can effect the desired change.	Invalid	Invalid
10. Mass media should be used to improve police image in India.	Invalid	Invalid
11. The positions of S. I. and Constable should be upgraded	Valid	Invalid
12. Political leaders should mediate between police and the people.	Valid	Valid

the force has to be effected in pursuance of a well-conceived policy of reform designed with sophistication and imagination. Both the groups, notwithstanding their differing assessments about the role and the present calibre of political leadership, broadly agree that it has the key role in the functioning of the system and that it should be accepted as legitimate by the administration. Similarly, both the groups quite clearly perceive and realise that an intelligent and subtle use of mass media can improve the present-day image of police in India. But they summarily reject the idea of manoeuvered projection of police activities as a desirable measure. The two groups do not find training as an effective and useful instrument to mould attitudes and induct behavioural change in the functioning of the police bureaucracy. They do not think that any structural innovation of nucleus nature can be experimented upon in the given politico-cultural milieu of the Indian society. Quite contrary to the commonsense expectations, both the police and the non-police groups maintain that availability of funds or enhanced budgets for the growing police force in India are not such menacing problems, as compared to the problem of high priority acceptance of personnel reforms in police, which have been rendered indispensable by the pressures of democratic changes and developmental tensions among various pockets of Indian society.

About the disagreement area, it is interesting to note that the police officials do not think that their image is really foul or that of a corrupt and harassing organisation. They refuse to accept this widely shared belief about their behaviour, obtaining amongst other sections and professions of the Indian society. The non-police people think that the politicians use the police for their petty political ends and the latter operates as an instrument of exploitation, repression and harassment at the instance of the former. That the policemen seek to curry favours from the politician is an allegation which the police officials categorically deny. They blame the intelligentsia for being apathetic and non-cooperative. To them the masses in general are more of an indifferent lot, rather than hostile partners in the game. It is highly significant that police officials as a group and as guardians of law and order do not think high of the younger generation of citizens, while it is just the other way round, if the citizens are to assess the younger police officials. Moreover, the police and popular perceptions about image-tarnishing factors differ widely. To policewallas, the lack of funds and popular non-cooperation are not so serious handicaps as the mounting pressures of work and responsibility that expose them to all kinds of image hazards. To common people, most of these factors emanate from the ill-paid, low status and poor educational calibre of the junior functionaries of the Indian Police. In other words, unlike the non-police people,

the police approach for change, innovation and reform is more structure-oriented than personnel-oriented. They are the votaries of slow, gradual and piece-meal change in a phased manner. This is in contravention to what the people at large desire or envisage. The police officials prefer an evolutionary and stable change through school system rather than through open and public dialogues on police problems. To them the present situation is a lesser evil and the way out should not be thought of as a greater evil. Like all good professionals, the policemen in India have also developed vested interests in the game. The winds of democratic upsurge have shaken them considerably and naturally they do not tend to defend or preserve the system on any rational grounds.

In sum, it can be concluded that police officials in India are adequately knowledgeable about their own image. They are widely conscious about the organisational and environmental reasons, for their being in the present situation. They have a reasonably strong desire or even will to do something for the betterment of this image. Yet they are fairly conservative and have strong professional biases to keep their structure closed and insulated from the rocking winds of change. On the other hand, the common man or the non-policeman in India has very strong and deep prejudices against the police. His predilections are neither rooted in objective realities nor have they any basis in empirical rationality. He is highly impatient to expedite democratic control over the police, even at the cost of avoidable crises. He also has very sincere sympathies with the lot of the junior functionaries of the Indian Police. But nonetheless, he views any increase in police powers with a great amount of scepticism, suspicion and even alarm. He has his own strong reasons to democratise and humanise police bureaucracy through public debates and direct political control over the police through popular representatives. A reform strategy for modernisation and purpose orientation of the police organisation in India needs to be based on proper understanding of these attitudinal value premises and structural 'givens' of the systems, as they obtain after more than two decades of freedom in India.

NATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS

A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

R. S. Arora

FOR governments of all denominations there has been an explosion of expectations of their people during recent decades; and this has been a universal phenomenon. This explosion, however, has been more pronounced in newer societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America where sovereign entities have proliferated since the Second World War as a result of disengagement of vast colonial empires. Consequently, the Agenda of the State everywhere has been expanding. And the role of the public sector has enlarged everywhere as a means to accomplish socio-economic obligations of the State. Yet it has not been always easy for the public sector to play its expected role effectively. The growth of the public sector has been particularly difficult in those developing countries where economies for long have been captive of the ex-colonial powers. There the process of disengagement of economic empires has been frustratingly slow and often exceedingly painful. This process has usually conflicted with the ambitions of neo-colonial powers who still insist on the validity of a more or less antique doctrine of 'spheres of influence'.

The study which follows has limited aims. Firstly, it briefly explains different forms of expansion of the public sector and identifies connected problems. It is discovered that the nationalisation of foreign investments has invariably been the most challenging task which has often bred serious tensions bordering on actual hostilities sometime endangering the very sovereignty of the developing state(s) involved.

This survey is followed by a relatively detailed case study of the international petroleum industry. The enquiry has been confined to the experience of some leading oil-producing states of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Most of these nations have precious little besides vast petroleum reserves which have been tightly controlled by a handful of foreign mega-corporations. While the owners of these natural resources have been struggling hard to liquidate

the existing foreign cartels the neo-colonial forces have been sparing no efforts to replace the old ones. Presently, the Arabs' struggle for the liberation of their petroleum reserves appears to be entering into the final phase and in the process, the petroleum map of the world seems to be reshaping itself radically. Finally, some broad conclusions have been drawn which may be relevant to other developing nations pursuing identical objectives.

I

The controversy over the role of the public sector has gone on for a considerable time under the larger concept of 'the right to property'. Indeed, the view that 'property' itself is the matrix, the seed-bed, which must be conserved if other values are to flourish always had expression in individualistic societies. One need not revert to the middle ages when, as Maitland observed English constitutional law as branch of the law of real property.[1] "Property must be secured", wrote John Adams, "or liberty cannot exist." "The moment the idea is admitted into society", he warned, "that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence."[2] Property indeed, came to have a religious sanction in the evangelism of the gilded age. Paul Elmer More, in his popular essay on *Property and Law* held that to the civilized man the rights of property were more important than the right to life.

Of course these encomia on property have as many meanings as they have motivations. But for all its ambiguities, a concept of property in some form was elevated to first rank by a long line of individualists. However, individualists were challenged by Utilitarians, liberal socialists and Fabians. Particularly, during current century, J. A. Hobson, L. T. Hobhouse, R. H. Tawney, Karl R. Popper, and Jawaharlal Nehru have systematically exposed limitations of the right to property. Hobson argued that in modern conditions inequality was not only ethically wrong but economically indefensible. Improvement in the lot of the poor was not only compatible with, but a condition of economic progress.[3] Hobhouse held that differential treatment was justified only when it was required in the interests of the system as a whole. He defined the conditions in which equality and liberty might

---

1 F. W. Maitland, *Constitutional History of England*, Cambridge, 1950.

2 George A. Peek, Jr. (ed.), *Representative Political Writings of John Adams*, New York, 1954.

3 J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism—A Study*, London, 1948; also see his book *The New Protectionism*, London, 1950.

be made to complement each other and in which property as power might be reconciled with property as freedom.[4]

In his *The Acquisitive Society*, R. H. Tawney examined the social system from the point of view of its excessive concern with the acquisition of property showing how it defeated itself in the process and became morbid and diseased in consequence.[5] In his recent powerful book on *Equality* Tawney shows how society suffers and becomes less rich in the values of human life through its excessive attachment to property. He argues that most forms of power have economic roots, and produce, in turn, economic consequences. The masters of economic resources gain position, in the absence of countervailing measures to secure exceptionally favourable terms for themselves, and to exercise an unusual degree of control over the lives of their fellows. The ordinary man remains like a spider which has influence limited by the size of its web. As the scale of organisation increases, and one field of enterprise after another is conquered by monopolists, the lines of the structure necessarily tend to steepen. It takes the shape of a pyramid in which power radiates downwards from a tiny knot of 'big-business magnates' at the top, through intermediate layers of industrialists to the mass of common men, who are twitched this way and that by the masters of the show, like puppets on wires.[6]

More recently while dealing with the *paradox of freedom*, Professor K. R. Popper said: "Freedom defeats itself, if it is unlimited. Unlimited freedom means that a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom. This is why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a certain extent, so that everyone's freedom is protected by law."[7]

Popper believes that even if the state protects its citizens from being bullied by physical violence, it may defeat higher aims by its failure to protect them from the misuse of economic power. In such a state, the economically strong is still free to bully one who is economically weak, and to rob him of his freedom. Popper asserts that unlimited economic freedom, and economic power may be nearly as dangerous as physical violence. Making a case for state ownership of strategic economic resources, Popper adds: "If this analysis is correct, then the nature of the remedy is clear. It must be a political remedy, a remedy similar to the one which we use against physical violence. We

[4] L. T. Hobhouse, *Elements of Social Justice*, London, 1949.

[5] R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, London, 1921.

[6] R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, London, 1952, pp. 202-211, 262-3.

[7] K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Vol. II, London, 1957, p. 124.

must construct social institutions, enforced by the power of the state, for the protection of the economically weak from the economically strong...If we wish freedom to be safeguarded, then we must demand that the policy of unlimited economic freedom be replaced by the planned economic intervention of the state. We must demand that unrestrained *capitalism* give way to an *economic interventionalism.*[8]

In India, Jawaharlal Nehru strongly believed—that the Indian society will have to accept socialistic pattern in order to attain a durable and stable structure. His ideas consistently served as a beacon light for the progressive forces in the Congress Party. While addressing the forty-fourth session of the Indian National Congress in 1929 Jawaharlal Nehru in his Presidential speech said:[9]

> "I must frankly confess that I am a socialist and a republican and am not a believer in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modern kings of industry, who have greater power over the lives and fortunes of men than even kings of old, and whose methods are predatory as those of the old feudal aristocracy . . . But we just realise that the philosophy of socialism has gradually permeated the entire structure of society the world over and almost the only point in dispute is the pace and methods of advance to its full realisation. India will have to go that way too if she seeks to end her poverty and inequality though she may evolve her own methods and may adapt the ideal to the genius of her race.
>
> "...For India means the peasantry and labour and to the extent that we raise them and satisfy their wants will we succeed in our task. And the measure of the strength of our national movement will be the measure of their adherence to it. We can only gain them to our side by espousing their cause which is really the country's cause. The Congress has often expressed its goodwill towards them; but beyond that it has not gone. The Congress, it is said, must hold the balance fairly between capital and labour and *zamindar* and tenant.
>
> "But the balance has been and is terribly weighted on one side and to maintain the *status quo* is to maintain injustice and exploitation. The only way to right it is to do away with the domination of any one class over another."

Nehru consistently believed in such views throughout his life.

---

[8] K. R. Popper, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

[9] For the text see *Congress Presidential Addresses: From the Silver to the Golden Jubilee* (1911-1934), Madras, G. A. Natesan & Co., 1934, pp. 884-902.

Man's relationship to property has always been one of the most controversial subjects in society and has often bred tensions, and has even sometimes led to revolutions. In some states, the right to property has been abridged or redefined. For instance, in the West German Constitution of 1949 it was provided that land, minerals and means of production might be socialised. In the federal capital of Australia, ownership of land is with the Crown; the individual can only get a lease. In America, the doctrine of "eminent domain" has been enlarged to facilitate the acquisition of private property by the State. In Britain, Parliament can pass an Act authorising seizure of property. In the Soviet Union there is no private ownership of land.[10] As far as the developing countries are concerned, never before in the history of mankind have so many millions been so conscious of the sub-standard conditions of their life as today. Consequently, since the Second World War, these people have not only been fighting against foreign rule; in some cases they have been overthrowing their own indigenous systems which promised no progress. It is no longer disputed that poverty is an "economic" problem and it can be abolished. The fatalism of the free market economy now looks medieval in remoteness as well as in flavour; and people everywhere take for granted ever-enlarging governmental action.

For instance, in Britain even the Conservative Party which has been the champion, *par excellence*, of the doctrine of *laisser-faire* has lately felt compelled to resort to public ownership of vital industries to give a fair deal to workers and consumers.[11] In France, half of auto-industry is owned by the State; 35 per cent of Italy's industrial production is either controlled or owned by the government. Similarly, in the United States recent writings of Galbraith, Harrington, and Schlesinger (Jr.), etc., have noticeably influenced the policies of recent Democratic as well as Republican administrations to seek solutions of explosive problems of regional imbalances and poverty of one-fifth of the nation living in an under-world of backwardness beyond the reach of existing government programmes.

Broadly speaking, there are four familiar forms of expansion of the public sector. For instance, the state may decide to establish a new strategic industry or new units of an already developed private

---

[10] R. S. Arora, "The Right to Property", *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, February 22, 1970.

[11] *Vide* Woodrow Wyatt, *Turn Again, Westminster* (London, 1973); Edmund Dell, *Political Responsibility and Industry*, London, 1973; David Watt, "Three Allies for Public Ownership", *The Financial Times*, November 23, 1973; R. S. Arora, "Growth of Public Sector in Britain", *Lok Udyog*, September 1971; also see author's "Audit and Accountability of Public Enterprises in India and Britain", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIX, No. 2 April-June, 1973, p. 115.

industry in the public sector. This is usually less controversial and thus the more familiar way of expanding the public sector in most of the countries. For example, in England, entrusting the task of broadcasting to the British Broadcasting Corporation (B.B.C.) in 1926; and of the atomic energy to the Atomic Energy Authority in 1954 by Sir Winston Churchill's Administration did not evoke any formidable opposition in the country. In India also a large number of new enterprises have emerged in the public sector during the last twenty years or so with relatively fewer difficulties for the State.

Secondly, the role of the public sector may enlarge with the expansion of activities of the existing public undertakings. For instance, in India all the existing steel plants in the public sector have been significantly expanding their installed capacities. Such expansion may take place horizontally and/or vertically without much obstruction.

Thirdly, the expansion of the public sector may occur with the acquisition of private enterprises by the state. And, *finally*, the growth of the public sector is inherent in the nationalisation of foreign investments in a country. The last two forms of expansion of the public sector are usually most controversial and exceedingly difficult to implement. Yet a formidable case had often existed in favour of the nationalisation of essential means of production and distribution currently owned or controlled by private interests, indigenous or foreign.

It needs to be emphasised that private owners of prospective industries for public ownership may resist the state action by bell, book and candle. Quite often politico-economic pressures are employed and such pressures may threaten larger national interests, if the industries concerned involve significant foreign investments. These aspects need to be elaborated because the consequences may be drastic if a highly prosperous industry was to be taken over by the state. Nationalization may be tolerated and perhaps even welcomed by some in the case of derelict or declining industries which had ceased to be profitable and were no longer attractive to new capital investment.[12]

A classic example to illustrate the resistance of indigenous forces is the Iron and Steel Industry in Britain, the last to be nationalised by the Attlee Government in 1951. Mr. G. R. Strauss, the Labour Minister of Supply, made the case for nationalisation on the following grounds:

(*a*) that iron and steel was essential to the British economy as a whole and must, therefore, be under public ownership.

[12] As quoted by W. A. Robson, *Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1960, pp. 37-38.

(*b*) that the national interest was so heavily involved in the products of this industry that it could not safely be left in private hands.

(*c*) that the industry was highly dominated by cartels which exerted a substantial control over price and production.

The Conservative opposition in the House of Commons fought the Bill tooth and nail and made its repeal an item in their subsequent election campaign. For Conservatives the transfer of the steel industry seemed like a challenge to the central citadel of private enterprise. If that fell, everything else was threatened. Therefore, they decided to protect their interests with every possible means. The Conservative Government which took office in 1951 under Sir Winston Churchill denationalised the steel industry forthwith. This led the Labour Party to reiterate that when they returned to power, they would renationalise the industry. "This was a political response to a political act", comments Professor Robson, "which Labour politicians felt affected the prestige of their party."[13]

It is believed that in the general elections of 1950 and 1951, in several close races where Conservative candidates won, it was due to intensive anti-nationalisation propaganda by the Aims of Industry Ltd., and by other organised pressure groups. "Aims" was described as a non-profit-making organisation specialising in public relations, but was actually selling the virtues of free enterprise to the public. The defeat of the Labour Party in the General Election of 1951 brought home to them that "Aims" tactics were extremely successful. Ever since the mass campaign against public ownership showed attractive dividends, the opponents of public industries have never stopped making further investments in this sector through a brilliant band of writers, films and other techniques. For instance, in 1964-General Elections the British Iron and Steel Federation alone spent £620,000 on anti-nationalisation propaganda.[14] Nevertheless, the iron and steel industry was renationalised by the Harold Wilson Administration in March 1967.

In India, it is widely believed that the role of the public sector in general and the nationalisation of leading commercial banks in particular were largely responsible for a split in the ruling Congress Party. It may be recalled that the most important issue before the Bangalore session of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), held in the second

---

[13] W. A. Robson, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[14] R. S. Arora, "Public Relations of the British Nationalized Industries", *Lok Udyog*, December, 1968.

week of July 1969, was the economic policy of the party. In her note on this subject, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi asserted that nationalisation of financial institutions would introduce a change in credit worthiness eriteria in their lending policies so as to encourage professional and other unemployed competent persons. On the other hand, a powerful group of party leaders, otherwise called the Syndicate, intended to abridge the role of the public sector. The rift in the Congress rapidly led to a split of the party from top to bottom. Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai who believed in the restricted role of the public sector felt compelled to resign from Mrs. Gandhi's Cabinet in July 1969. Desai's departure from the Government synchronised with the nationalisation of 14 leading commercial banks with the aid of a Presidential Ordinance.

The measure was approved, as required by the Constitution, by Parliament, and a necessary statute was passed by an over-whelming majority of both the Chambers. The banks initially resisted the strategy of public ownership of their companies but did not get much support either from the press or the people.

However, the validity of both the Ordinance and the Act was challenged in the Supreme Court. For the second time in the history of the Republic a bench of the Supreme Court eleven judges held the hearings which lasted for 33 days. On February 11, 1970, in a long judgement detailing the ten-to-one decision of the Court, Justice J.C. Shah struck down the Act *in toto*. It was held that the Act violated the constitutional guarantee to "equality" and "just compensation".[15]

The Supreme Court decision on the *Bank Nationalisation Act* has proved to be one of the most controversial judgements since the inception of the Court. While the propertied class felt jubilent as if it had acquired an impregnable protection of its property from the highest court of the land, the bulk of the nation felt let down by the judiciary. It was recalled that the Constitution assured the establishment of an egalitarian socialistic society step by step. But the Supreme Court has consistently attempted to protect the right to propery. The 14 banks have since been renationalised. Subsequently in 1971 a series of constitutional amendments were passed by the Parliament in order to discourage similar litigation in future.

The Nationalisation of foreign investments has invariably proved far more difficult than the acquisition of indigenous private enterprises.

---

[15] R. S. Arora, "Nationalisation of Banks and the Fundamental Rights, I", *Lok Udyog*, December, 1969; II, *Lok Udyog*, January, 1970; and also see author's "Recent Supreme Court Judgements and People's Verdict", *Niti*, April-June, 1971.

The most serious limitation on the nationalisation of industries involving heavy foreign investments is the threat or actual use of politico-economic sanctions; or, even physical intervention, by the interested foreign powers. The concept of intervention has a voluminous and controversial history to its credit! One unfortunate fact is clear; unsolicited interference in matters which are traditionally left to the jurisdiction of individual states rests on political and military considerations which are totally at variance with their moral conceptions. There are writers in the "free" world who advocate a position that their countries would never subscribe to the view that such interventions are absolutely forbidden.[16] Wilfred Jenks writes that there are many ways in which the government of a state, or persons in its territory, may injure another state or even threaten its existence. Propaganda, espionage, infiltration, corruption, sabotage, assassination, embargo, display of force, diplomatic demands and other methods may be used to stir up disorder in another state, to destory its markets or resources of raw materials, to induce violation of its laws, to damage its prestige and reputation, to control its policy, or to subvert its government. Powerful nations often employ such techniques to protect and promote their economic interests in developing countries. Such activities are often grouped under the head 'intervention'—a term which has eluded precise definition.[17]

It may be appropriate to recall the events connected with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956. At the Suez Canal Conference held in London in August 1956, representatives of a number of states took special care to point out that, in the opinion of their governments, every state was entitled to nationalise the property of aliens within its jurisdiction, and that this right was a direct outgrowth of sovereignty.[18] It was particularly significant in this connection that, while the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt was not a case of expropriation "without" compensation, some of the powers deeming themselves most directly concerned, especially Great Britain,[19] and to a somewhat lesser extent, France[20] and the United States, maintained that the expropriation as such was illegal, either because, in accordance with a "rule"

[16] *Vide*, D. A. Graber, *Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U. S. Intervention Politics and Practice*, Washington, 1959. For a different point of view see Quincy Wright, "Subversive Intervention", *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1960.

[17] Wilfred Jenks, *The Commonwealth of Man*, London, 1958. Also see Quincy Wright, *The Role of International Law*, Manchester, 1961. pp. 71-74; Ellery C. Stowell, *Intervention in International Law*, Washington, 1921, p. 378; Julius Stone, *Aggression and World Order*, London, 1958, pp. 75-76.

[18] *Vide*, *The Suez Canal Problem* (Department of State Publication, (393, 1956).

[19] Statement of Mr. L. Lloyd, August 22. 1956, *Ibid.*, at 233-234.

[20] Statement of M. Pineau, August 17, 1956, *Ibid.*, 86, 87-88. M. Pineau, however, conceded that "with certain reservations, the Egyptian Government has the right to nationalise ground and installation which are on its territory." *Ibid.*, 72, 77.

of international law invented for the occasion, a "company ... impressed with an international interest" could not be nationalised,[21] or because concession agreement from which the universal company of the Suez Martin Canal derived its rights[22] was, by incorporation into a treaty[23] or otherwise,[24] an "international compact."[25] This interpretation was rejected by Egypt but rejection invited a military intervention by Great Britain and France in 1956.

The most convincing inference, from the legal point of view, to be drawn from the above case seems to be that in international law, expropriations of aliens' property are not illegal in any meaningful sense of the term, but such expropriation merely gives rise to a pecuniary claim for compensation on the part of the aliens' government. The property side of the expropriation would appear to pertain exclusively to the internal sphere of the expropriating state, while the obligation side is to some extent governed by international law. But from the practical point of view, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal did lead to foreign intervention in and aggression on Egypt by England and France. The failure of the Anglo-French expedition had lessons for all concerned. The developing countries must have realised that economic independence for their nations was not going to be easier than political independence. On the other hand, commenting on the Suez debacle, Christopher Mayhew writes: "Our world influence has declined in comparison with others, sometimes slowly and sometimes, as after the Suez debacle, catastrophically. Critics abroad have called us 'the English disease' the debility afflicting nations which live beyond their means."[26]

Similar policies adopted by other Asian, African and Latin American countries have often led such regimes into serious complications. The most recent case is that of Chile where a democratically elected government was recently toppled by a military *Junta* essentially because

[21] *Vide*, The Tripartite Statement of the French, British and United States Governments of August 2, 1956.

[22] Convention between the Viceroy of Egypt and the Universal Suez Martin Canal Company of February 22, 1866 (For an English translation see The Suez Canal Problem, *op. cit.*, at 9-16).

[23] *Vide*, The Statement of Mr. Lloyd of August 22, 1956, *Ibid.*, at 233-234. The incorporation theory has been discussed and rejected by Huang, "Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 51, 1957, pp. 277, 286-307.

[24] *Vide*, "International Protection of Contractual Agreements", *American Journal of International Law* (Proceedings, Annual Conference, 1959).

[25] This term was used by Mr. John Foster Dulles, *loc. cit.*, above.

[26] Christopher Mayhew, *Britain's Role Tomorrow*, London, 1967, p. 11.

of progressive economic policies of President Salvador Allende invc ing nationalisation of several American big corporations in Chile.[27]

In fact, the nationalisation of foreign investments comes within jurisdiction of a much wider doctrine: "Sovereignty over Natio Wealth and Resources." The battle on this account between developed and the developing countries has had a long history and attitude of the United States and that of other affluent nations has b unfortunately consistently unhelpful. A motion passed by the Gene Assembly on December 21, 1952, included the statement that the "ri of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resource inherent in their sovereignty ..."[28] The U.S. voted against this reso tion. Her stated justification of this position was that she felt motion did not provide sufficient guarantees to private investments under international law, treaties, and other international agreemer

With specific reference to two previous resolutions: (523-VI of January, 1952) and (626-VII, above) the General Assembly passed new resolution (1803-XVII) on 14 December, 1962 on "Perman Sovereignty over Natural Resources." To the resolutions of the p vious ten years it added that this right was especially important for national development and well being of the peoples of all States. further added that any violation would be an infringement of the Uni Nations Charter and would be condemned as an obstacle to the grov of world wide cooperation and the establishment of lasting peace.[29]

Despite all this weight of world opinion and despite safeguards the legitimate rights of foreign capital, the United States categoric voted against this principle during UNCTAD-I held in Geneva in 196 The U.S. and several other western countries continue to ignore U.N. resolutions on this subject. Meanwhile the developing countr most of which are also members of the non-aligned club,—and all them are members of the United Nations Conference on Trade a Development—have been consistently reiterating on all internatio platforms their sovereign right to exploit their natural resources.

The tussle over the exploitation of the petroleum reserves betw the principal oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, the Mid

[27] Marcel Niedergang, "Washington's Role in Chile : The Curtain Comes Dov *Le Monde Weekly* (English edition) reproduced in *The Times of India*, [Novembe 1973.

[28] General Assembly, Resolution 626-VII, 21 December, 1952.

[29] R. S. Arora, "UNCTAD-II : The Background", *Seminar*, February, 1968, p.

[30] Cmnd 2417. (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, F Act with Related Documents).

East and Latin America on the one hand and the leading oil consuming nations of the west on the other has been going on for more than twenty l-o-n-g years. The owners of these vital resources have been trying to nationalise them whereas major international cartels which have been controlling the oil industry of the world, fully supported by their governments, have been sparing no efforts to frustrate the ambitions of the owners. There have been a series of encounters and the confrontation now appears to have entered into a decisive stage. In the study which follows an effort will be made to examine various aspects of this subject.

II

Petroleum is a mixture of gaseous, liquid, and solid hydrocarbons found in varying amounts in sedimentary rock deposits throughout the world. In its crude state petroleum is practically useless. When refined it supplies fuels, lubricants, illuminants, solvents, surfacing materials, and many other products. The fuels derived from it account for more than half the world's total supply of energy and are used not only to power the engines of automobiles, tractors, trucks, ships, airplanes, and missiles but also to heat buildings. Petroleum lubricates machines, and petroleum cutting oils make possible much of the drilling and grinding basic to mass production. Asphalt from petroleum covers floors, and highways. Either directly by combustion, or indirectly through the generation of electricity, petroleum supplies many people of the world with artificial light. Petroleum products are also used in man-made-fibres for clothing, synthetic rubber for tires and other uses; cleansing agents, such as soap and detergents, paints, and plastics; and numerous ingredients used in the production of fertilizers, insecticides, medicines, etc., and for food processing. Everyday new uses of petroleum are being discovered.

Although the products of petroleum are consumed everywhere, crude petroleum is produced in relatively few places and often in areas of desert, jungle, or swamp. In 1963, four-fifths of the total production of crude petroleum occurred in seven countries; the United States, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. In the past half-century, the Middle East and North Africa together with Persia (Iran) have become a vital source of crude oil. These countries now produce nearly two-thirds of the oil in world trade. Even more importantly they possess some three-fourths of the total world reserves outside the communist countries. During the spring of 1964, a moment of history was made in the petroleum industry; in the month of March, for the first time ever, production in the Middle East exceeded that of the U.S.A.

The exploitation oil resources had caused a basic transformation of the Middle East; barren tracts of desert have become hives of industrial and commercial activity and centres of communication. Obscure little Shiekhdoms of the Persian Gulf have grown immensely rich in a short time. The growth of the oil industry during recent years is best seen from the following two tables:[81]

Table 1

Oil in the Middle East

Crude Oil Production (Millions of tons p.a.)

	1960	1965	1970
Abu Dhabi	—	13.6	33.4
Algeria	8.6	26.5	46.5
Bahrain	2.3	2.9	3.8
Dubai	—	—	4.2
Egypt	3.1	6.5	19.0
Iran	52.6	94.8	191.7
Iraq	47.6	64.4	76.4
Israel	0.1	0.2	0.1
Kuwait	81.9	109.0	137.3
Neutral Zone	7.3	19.1	26.3
Libya	—	58.7	159.6
Morocco			0.04
Oman			16.4
Qatar	8.2	11.0	17.0
Sa'udi Arabia	62.1	100.8	175.7
Sinai			4.4
Syria			4.5
Tunisia	0.2	0.2	4.1
Turkey	0.4	1.5	3.6

[81] *Vide*, Yaacov Shimoni & Evyatar Levine (Eds.), *Political Dictionery of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1972, pp. 285-286 (Sinai belongs to Egypt; it was captured by Israel in 1967).

Table 2

Revenue from oil (in million U.S.$)

	1970
Abu Dhabi	220
Iran	1,225
Iraq	495
Kuwait	840
Libya	1,300
Qatar	125
Sa'udi Arabia	1,300

Since the Second World War, oil has displaced coal as the principal source of energy in Western Europe and Japan. Three-fourths of the Europe's oil and 90 per cent of Japan's comes from the Middle East. In the years ahead both the demand for oil and the proportion supplied by the Middle East will continue to grow in both areas, increasing the importance of Middle Eastern oil to their economies.[32]

In the United States, the recent decision of President Nixon to remove all restrictions on oil imports, other than those imposed financially by tariffs, is a landmark in the long and controversial history of oil imports. After fourteen years of mandatory controls which sought to limit imports on the grounds of national security but which gradually broke down in the face of a fast-growing demand and a decline in domestic oil activity, it marks official acceptance of the fact that there is no longer any choice in the matter. The U.S.A. is expected to become more dependent on imported oil supplies in the foreseeable future.[33] With a sense of foresight Nasser once said: "The centre of oil production has shifted from the United States where wells are going dry to the Arab area where the wells are still virgin..."[34]

The extent of the American dependence on the Middle Eastern petroleum is the most important single factor in world oil trade today and largely responsible for the current general shortage of oil. This

[32] Thomas C. Barger, "Middle Eastern Oil Since the Second World War", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1972.

[33] "Landmark in U.S. Imports", *Petroleum Press Service*, June, 1973. p. 211; John Maddex. "The Oil Ratchet", *New Statesman*, October 26, 1973; also see USIS, New Delhi, *Economic News*, November 28, 1973.

[34] Stanton Hope, *The Battle for Oil*, London, 1958, p. 188.

single factor is obviously being reflected in the attitude of the oil producing countries in both their economic and political strategies. Recent statistics confirm the tremendous growth of U.S. oil consumption which outstripped all earlier estimates and which is currently some 30 per cent of the world total, higher than all the countries of western Europe put together. The current rate of import by the U.S. is about 6 million b/d and estimates refer to the possibility of 15 million b/d of imports by 1985 out of a projected demand of 30 million b/d. Imports on such a scale, equal to the entire production in 1972 from Sa'udi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and Iraq. This will inevitably put immense strains on world oil supply.

The origin and growth of petroleum empires of western private companies is a 20th century phenomenon. The existence of oil deposits in the Middle East has been known for thousands of years, but modern oil prospecting was discovered in 1908, east of Abadan in Persia by William Knox D'Arcy, an Englishman who had in 1901 obtained a 60-year concession. Construction of the Abadan refinery on barren mudflats at the head of the Persian Gulf between the Shatt-al-Arab and Bahamashir, where the waters of the ageless Tigris and Euphrates come together, was begun in the winter of 1909-10 to process oil which had been found a year earlier at Masjid-i-Sulaiman (Solomon's Temple). By 1911, the island of Abadan was vibrating to the sounds of a new kind of music, the industrial drums and cymbals of an oil refinery. Already the productive wells in the area of the Temple of Solomon were holding back a potential monthly flow of two million gallons of crude oil. Already the first pipeline was laid, and the first half million gallons of crude oil were being pumped across the desert and hills of Arabistan.

Exports from the Abadan refinery started at the end of 1912. Part of the cost of this major undertaking was paid from a £2 million investment in the newly formed Anglo-Persian Oil Company by the British Government, in return for a guaranteed supply of fuel oil to the Royal Navy which was then changing over from coal to oil for powering ships and needed a secure source of supply.[35]

The discovery of oil reserves in other parts of the Middle East soon led to the partition of the oil producing regions between the large oil companies of the West. In Iran (Persia) the concessionaire was British; American Groups operated in Bahrain and Sa'udi Arabia; Iraq had an International Petroleum Company called IPC (U.S.-

[35] For a detailed study, see Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, Oxford, 1968; J.R.L. Anderson, *East of Suez*, London, 1969; and Wayne Mineau, *The Go Devils*, London, 1958.

British-French-Dutch), Kuwait's oil was prospected for by a joint American-British group; and Qatar and in other Persian Gulf Shiekhdoms, subsidiaries of the IPC took out concessions.

The major forward thurst came after World War II, and particularly after 1948 when Europe's reconstruction, with U.S. (Marshall Plan) aid, created a tremendous increase in the demand for petroleum and its by-products. In 1960 the following seven corporations constituted the international petroleum cartels.[36]

1960 Assets and Income (in Million$)

	Assets	*Net Incomes*
Standard Oil of New Jersey	10,090	689
Royal Dutch/Shell	8,874	497
Gulf	3,843	330
Texaco	3,647	392
Socony Mobil	3,455	183
Standard of California	2,782	266
British Petroleum	2,019	174
	34,710	2,614

Apparently, the assets of the American and Dutch-British giants —Jersey and Royal Dutch—were greater than those of the other five combined. The assets of the three Standard companies—Jersey, Socony, and California—were nearly equal to those of the non-Standard enterprises. In the oil world these companies are known as "majors", and jointly all seven composed the consortium that extracted nearly all the oil of Iran—the world's sixth largest producing country. Three members of the cartel—Jersey, Royal Dutch, and Socony,—together with *Compagnie Francaise des Petroles*, composed Iraq Petroleum Company, in charge of the seventh largest producing country. Two of them, British Petroleum and Gulf, controlled the vast output of Kuwait, the fourth greatest producer. Four of them—Jersey, Texaco, Socony, and Standard of California owned all the flow of the wells of Arabia, the fifth largest producer. Together these seven "majors", with the French Company, controlled 90 per cent of all the petroleum in world commerce. All these major petroleum empires along with smaller

[36] *Oil & Petroleum Year Book, 1960,* Walter E. Skinner, London, 1961.

'kingdoms' have been fighting for their survival during the last ten years or so. It so happens that the threat to these foreign investments, in any meaningful sense of the term, also started from Persia.

III

Persia was the first country to attempt nationalisation of its oil industry. Commenting on the significance of the Persian oil industry, Professor Edith Penrose says: "Iran has always played a central role in the development of the oil industry in the Middle East. In Iran, the first oil discoveries in the area were made; Iran made the first attempt to nationalise foreign companies in the area and was first to establish a national oil company; and Iran is now taking the lead in the development of new types of oil contracts and relationships with foreign companies."[37] While the first part of this statement needs to be elaborated, it is relevant to record that in view of the recent developments in Persia the later part of the observation has become redundant. On April 28, 1951, the *Majlis* (the Lower House of Persian Parliament) elected Dr. Mohammed Mussadeq as Prime Minister; 79 of the 100 deputies present supporting his nomination, whilst 11 abstained. During the same sitting, after a ten-hours debate, the *Majlis* adopted unanimously, and amidst scenes of enthusiasm, the resolution of its *Oil Committee* recommending the immediate taking over by the Government of all oil installations, including those of the "late Anglo-Iranian Oil Company". In the Senate, Dr. Mussadeq's nomination as Premier as well as the nationalisation measure were approved on the following day. On may 2, 1951, the Shah of Iran, after receiving the British Ambassador, signed two decrees, the first approving the principle of nationalisation, and the second setting out the scheme of its implementation.[38]

Speaking during the Senate debate on April 30, 1951, Dr. Mussadeq alleged that the 1933 agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been made "under duress" and was "therefore not legal and binding". Since 1933, he asserted, "the oil company has acted without an agreement, and it must give Persia an accounting of its income since then. The company had no right to sell oil to the Royal Navy at a price below the world level, and we must examine the company's books and have refunded to us the rebate to the British Navy." The Persian Prime Minister maintained that "nationalization of industry is the sovereign right of every nation"; said that Persia was "prepared to examine the claims of the former oil company which, in no

[37] *Vide*, Edith Penrose, *The Growth of Firms, Middle East Oil and Other Essays*, London, 1971, p. 296.

[38] *See*, *Financial Times*, May 3, 1951.

way bears comparison with the Communist way of conducting affairs," but added that "though agreements or concessions may have been made, or granted to individuals or private companies concerning these industries, and though these may be valid in every legal respect, such agreements or concessions cannot impede the exercise of national sovereign rights, nor is any international authority competent to investigate this matter." He, however, declared, "the Iranian people were opening a hidden treasure upon which lies a dragon."

Dr. Mussadeq alleged that "the activities and behaviour of the former Anglo-Persian Oil Company had led to discontent among the Persian people, for which most of the people hold British officials responsible"; declared that "these causes of discontent would undoubtedly be eliminated upon the enforcement of the law for carrying out the nationalization of the oil industry"; and claimed that "the use of the income from oil to strengthen the country's economy would put an end to poverty, distress and discontent."[39]

Behind this daring action lay grievances long rankling, both economic and political. From 1911 when *Anglo* got into operation, to 1951, Iran had realized $ 316 million in oil revenues, and the British government, $700 million not to mention the golden flow into *Anglo's* own coffers. In 1950, the year preceding nationalization, Iran had received $45 million and the British Treasury $140 million! In that year Iran received more revenue from the state tobacco monopoly than from petroleum. Between 1927 and 1940, claimed Nasrollah Fatemi chronicler of the period, there had been no oil income in the Iranian budget as the money was being deposited in London for purchase of military equipment to protect Iran from the Soviets. In 1941, the military equipment was confiscated by the invading Allied armies and the country saw that $150 million of its revenue thus involved had vanished. "Nationalisation" he said "had its roots in the history of the last 150 years, an era of exploitation, domination, and ruthless power politics".[40]

But the British insisted that the contractual obligations under which the company had operated and had made this great investment in Persia could not be abrogated unilaterally. The British stood pat on their 98 year concession, claiming in effect that Persia had bound itself for three generations. Commenting on this claim, Walter Lippmann said: "That may be good law but it is not the kind of law

[39] *See, The Financiul Times*, May 1 & 2, 1951; Alan W. Ford, *The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-52*, Berkeley, 1954.

[40] *See*, Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy : Powderkeg in Iran*, New York, 1954, L.P. Elwell—Suttow, *Persian Oil : A Study in Power Politics*, London, 1955.

that can be enforced in a continent which is in the midst of a stupendous revolution against precisely that kind of law." In regard to Anglo-Iranian Company, Lippmann observed that Iranians "have resented its discrimination between English and Iranian employees, its unjust self-enrichment, its indifference to the economic welfare of Iran, its interference in their internal affairs, and the unqualified support it has received from the British government."[41]

It was alleged that the Company had operated as a British enclave within a foreign country, dominating the oil districts politically and economically down to nationalisation measures. The Company operated its own brewery, flour mill, brickyard, and printing press. Abadan, the biggest oil town in the Near East, was also the biggest slum. Despite 40 years of operation, only a quarter of the senior staff was Iranian. The Anglo-Persian oil dispute led to the closing down by Britain of the Abadan oil refinery in October 1951 and to the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Britain and Persia.

However, a series of developments occurred in Persia during 1952-1953. On August 16, 1953, the Mossadeq Government claimed to have crushed an attempt by the Shah's Imperial Guard to carry out a military *coup d'etat*. On the same day the Shah and Queen Soraya, accompanied only by an *aide-de-camp*, fled from Northern Persia. And on August 19, 1953, the Mossadeq Government was overthrown by Royalist forces. General Zahedi formed the new government which captured Dr. Mossadeq in pajamas and put him behind the bars. The Shah soon came back from Italy.[42] Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary observed: "The news of Mossadeq's fall from power reached me during my convalescence, when my wife and I, with my son, were cruising the Mediterranean between Greek Islands. I slept happily that night." It is difficult to substantiate the role of foreign intrigues in Persian developments; however, it was surprising that political situation in Persia stabilised only after a new oil agreement was signed with London in 1954.

Eventually a settlement on the oil dispute was evolved between London and Teheran in August 1954. The main provisions of the settlement were as follows:[43]

(1) An international consortium of the eight major oil companies would be formed in which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)

---

[41] As quoted by Harvey O' Connor, *World Crisis in Oil*, London, 1962, p. 291. For British point of view *see*, Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, Chapter IX London, 1960, pp. 189-223.

[42] *Vide*, David H. Finnie, *Desert Enterprise*, Harvard, 1958; Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, *op. cit.* Also see, Sir Anthony Eden, *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[43] For the Text see, *The Financial Times*, August 13, 1954.

would hold a 40 per cent share and the other companies 60 per cent, for which they would reimburse the AIOC. Of the 60 per cent the five U.S. companies would each hold an 8 per cent share, Royal Dutch-Shells 14 per cent, and the *Compagnie Francaise des Petroles* 6 per cent.

(2) This consortium would carry out the functions previously performed by the AIOC with regard to Persian oil, and would form four companies for this purpose.

(3) The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)—the company formed by the Persian government after the oil industry had been nationalised—would receive payment from the consortium for all oil which it exported, on terms which would ensure to Persia a 50 per cent share of profits on the standard basis of the Middle East oil producing countries.

(4) The agreement between the consortium and the NIOC would be for 25 years and could be extended for three further five-year periods.

(5) Persia would pay to the AIOC £ 25,000,000 as compensation for its oil assets in Northern Persia (*i.e.*, the Naft-i-Shah oilfield and the Kermanshah refinery) and in settlement of claims for losses suffered since the suspension of operations in 1951. This would be payable in cash over a 10 year period starting on January 1, 1957, and would be free of interest. In addition, the AIOC would receive payments from the other members of the consortium for their shares, payable over 20-25 years. The total value of the AIOC's former property was thus estimated at about $1,000,000,000.

Obviously, the oil cartels and the British Government recovered a good deal of lost ground in Persia. For Iran, the new deal was far from being entirely a defeat. In 1958, the country gained more revenue than it had in the entire half century of Anglo-Iranian's sway. The principle of nationalization had been upheld even if direct control had been evaded. Never again would a foreign company in theory own any of Iran's resources, even if for a time the government still was not master in its own house.[44] Iran did not give up the idea of nationalization of her petroleum wealth.

On the tenth anniversary of nationalization, March 18, 1961, the Shah outlined the nation's goal:

> "One of our most important endeavours is to enter the international oil market. This country, with its immense oil reserves and its skilled oilmen could in the future be more important than any oil company, because the oil which we market actually belongs to

[44] *See*, Harvey O'Connor, *op. cit.*, Chapter 23.

us. We could, in due course, produce it, market it, transport it with our own tankers, and actually retail it ourselves.[45]

The Chairman of NIOC often expressed his country's dissatisfaction with the Consortium agreement, although it was not subject to review until 1979. He thought it covered too many years. He wanted Iran to be in all phases of the oil business.[46]

Gradually the Persian oil strategy clarified its aims of attaining, more or less, complete nationalization of the oil industry in order to finance development plans. On the tenth anniversary of the White Revolution in a policy statement in Teheran on January 23, 1973, the Shah of Persia asserted: "When we signed the oil agreement in 1954, one of the clauses provided that the companies belonging to the Consortium must preserve the interests of Iran. We have in hand irrefutable proof that this part of the agreement has not been respected." The Shah further maintained that the Charter of the United Nations "explicitly underlines" not only that natural resources belonged to "the people" but also that any agreement signed with foreign companies for exploitation of those resources must be concluded only with the approval of the country concerned. Having stated this principle, the Shah declared that the companies had two alternatives. Either their producing and manufacturing assets will be taken over now under a new agreement which will allow them certain benefits; or in 1979 when the present operating agreement expires, in which case the Consortium could have no more advantage than any other buyer of Iranian oil. The Consortium companies took this statement as an ultimatum. It was inferred that Shah's policy statement came hard on the heels of nationalization in Iraq and participation agreement in the Persian Gulf.[47]

The Shah's new radical policy was most probably largely influenced by two factors. *Firstly*, he wished to achieve at least as good a deal, if not better, as that gained by the Persian Gulf states through participation, in which the final buy-back prices agreed were substantially higher than those being mooted at the time of his earlier negotiations. Here, for the companies, was the danger of leap-frogging, not over prices as at the time of the Teheran (February 1971) and Tripoli negotiations, but over the various forms of national control of the oil-producing industries. *Secondly*, the widespread awareness of a world energy crisis, and particularly the shortage predicted for the United States, had convinced him that in a sellers' market Iran could go it alone, with

---

[45] *See*, Information Department of OPEC, *Selected Documents of the International Petroleum Industry 1971*, Vienna, 1973.

[46] *See*, Harvey O'Connor, *op. cit.*, Chapter 23.

[47] *See*, "The Shah's Ultimatum", *Petroleum Press Service*, February 1973, p. 47.

r without the cooperation of the Consortium companies. This enabl-ıg factor was missing in 1951.[48]

On July 31, 1973, the Shah of Iran formally signed a 20-year agree-ıcnt with the Consortium of western oil companies bringing Iran's il industry including Abadan refinery under the direct management ›ntrol of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The new agree-.ent authorised the NIOC to regulate the future supply of crude oil to ıe companies. This agreement was earlier ratified by the *Majlis* on ıly 16, 1973.

The new agreement established a straight forward buyer-seller lationship between the oil companies and Iran, in place of the conces-›nery terms of the 1954 agreement. Control over all operations, :ilities and installations previously run by the Consortium was hence-rward to be vested in the National Iranian Oil Company, so that for ; first time Iran gained the right to control operations in the field.

The agreement further specified that the companies of the Consor-m would contract to provide technical staff and expertise in the oil-lds and for this purpose would transform their existing operating con-'n—the Iran Exploration and Producing Company—into Iranian Oil :vices, which would be registered under Iranian Law. According to ; new agreement the compensation for the Abadan refinery will be ıet book value.

It is believed that the Iranian policy will eanble NIOC to ensure ; maximum use of secondary recovery methods and the fullest ex-ıitation of associated gas resources. The Consortium on the other ıd has the guarantee it wanted to purchase the bulk of Iranian crude production over the next 20 years and can plan ahead accordingly. ; deal will give NIOC, the oldest and the most experienced of the :e oil companies, a greater opportunity for achieving the develop-ntal aims of Iran. Evidently, it took Persia more than two painful ades to implement its nationalisation plans in the field of her petro-n industry. By December 1973, Persia had acquired so much trol on her petroleum industry that it could sell its oil through the lium of auction.[49]

Very much like Persia, Iraq also had to struggle for many years to ıpture its petroleum. Down the ages Iraq had gone through several and downs. The modern Iraq is surrounded by Turkey, Persia,

---

See, "The Shah's Ultimatum", op. cit. pp. 47-48.

In the first week of December, 1973, the National Iranian Oil Company decided ·ll its oil to the highest bidder in the auction. This might be a good economic ure, but may prove to be a bad diplomatic strategy for the Middle East's long interests.

Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia and Jordan. It emerged out of Great Britain's war with the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. In March 1921, the Amir Faisal Ibn Husain was persuaded by the British to rule as king at Baghdad.

Having created Iraq, the British felt tempted to create the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). The 1925 concession, granted to IPC for 75 years, covered all Iraq except the *Vilayet* of Basra. IPC was formed on June 8, 1929, actually from elements of the first company to be established in the Arabian peninsula—the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1912. Iraq Petroleum was to pay four gold shillings a ton.[50]

Not a drop of Iraq's export oil was refined at home. It was piped to refineries in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, while domestic demand was taken care of by a small plant at Alwand or by imports from Abadan. In 1951, Iraq bought the Alwand refinery and the Rafidain marketing facilities and began the £ 10 million refinery at Doura, a suburb of Baghdad, supplied by pipeline from Kirkuk.

The oil industry is Iraq's principal source of wealth and provides the capital for all state and municipal industries. Besides the IPC and its associates, the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company have also been operating in Iraq. The main oilfield is at Kirkuk and a small refinery near Khanaqin is operated by the Khanaqin Oil Company, which acts as government agent in the internal distribution of oil products. The government operates a lubricating oil plant, opened in 1957, near the same site.

Under the oil agreement of 1952, Iraq received half of the oil companies' profit, and the companies had guaranteed a minimum annual output of 30 million tons as from January 1956.

IPC, as a holding company, published no profit figures, nor was the Iraqi government ever enlightened on this score. According to some observers, IPC existed not to make profits but to enable its owners to do so. IPC, often took arbitrary decisions which seriously irritated the Iraqi Government.

The Iraq Revolution of July 14, 1958, led by Abdul Karim-al-Kassim, touched off American occupation of Lebanon to prevent the revolt from spreading further. It was reported in Washington that "intervention will not be extended to Iraq as long as the revolutionary government in Iraq respected Western oil interests.[51] Evidently, there

[50] D. J. Payton—Smith, *Oil : A Study of War-time Policy and Administration*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1971, pp. 12-16.

[51] *Vide*, Shavarah Toriguian, *Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East*, Middle East Law series, number 1, Beirut, Lebanon, 1973.

was a powerful lobby of 'Deputies of various parties' actively working for the nationalisation of the Iraqi oil. Obviously, oil companies and their Governments recalled similar developments in Persia.

The nationalization of oil in neighbouring Iran had been powerful stimulus to demands that Iraq to do likewise. Eventually the Iraqi Government announced on December 12, 1961, that under a law (No. 80) promulgated on December 11, the combined concessions of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and its associates, the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company, would be restricted to an area of less than 750 square miles. The law also required the companies to submit to the Iraqi Government within three months all geological, geophysical, and other technical data in their possession concerning areas outside their new concessionary limits.[52]

The Iraqi Government's action followed more than three years of negotiation between the Government and the oil companies over a wide range of topics, including the areas on the concessions; the amortization of "dead rents" paid on non-producing areas; Iraqi participation in the capital of the companies; the Iraqi share of the profits and the method of payment; Iraqi representation on the boards of directors; the replacement of foreign personnel by Iraqi nationals; prices and discounts; the level of port dues at Basra; the utilization of gas by-products; and the use of Iraqi tankers. The unhelpful attitude of the oil companies compelled the Kassim Government to take drastic measures.[53]

The Iraqi Government promulgated another law on March 7, 1961, reorganizing the Ministry of Oil, which combined functions of the Oil Administration Council, the General Board for Oil Affairs, the Government Oil Refinery Department, and the Petroleum Products Departments; would lay down and execute oil policy; and would be responsible for development and exploitation of the country's petroleum and natural gas resources.

General Kassim's government fell before it had implemented the necessary law. On February 8, 1963, a military *coup* carried out in Baghdad overthrew the regime of General Kassim; the General himself was captured and shot. The new regime declared that it would ensure to foreign companies full freedom to exploit the oil resources of the country. However, Law No. 11 establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) was finally promulgated in February 1964. The

[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*,

new company was to engage in all phases of the oil industry. It enjoyed the right to exploit the areas expropriated under Law No. 80 which was seemingly confirmed by the later law. As a consequence of this law, over 95 per cent of the entire IPC group's concession area was expropriated. The Soviet and other East European countries' including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Romania were invited to assist in the exploration of North Rumaila.[54] A major ten-year expansion programme for the oil industry was announced in early 1972 which covered exploration, transport and export facilities—the target being 10 per cent a year increase in production by the state company, the building up of a fleet of oil tankers, natural gas projects and training programmes. Consequently, major Western oil interests were seriously effected. While they continued to negotiate with Baghdad for the protection of their interests, they also employed several sanctions to frustrate the Iraqi strategy. The performance of the IPC particularly remained detrimental to the Iraqi national interest.

Iraq remained most unhappy with the IPC on three accounts: (1) Iraq wanted larger participation in the operations of the three IPC companies; (2) Iraq contended that the companies owned over ID 80 million in back payment; and (3) Production targets were not attained by the IPC which had been at a low level for several years. This aggravated the financial difficulties of implementing Iraq's five year plan which depended for 80 per cent of its budgetary cost on revenue from the IPC. Apparently there were a number of disputes between oil companies and Iraq which had led to protests and counter-protests and negotiations were deadlocked.

Eventually, the IPC was offered two alternatives: "If the northern oilfields were not as profitable as the IPC expected, it could turn them on to the Government; or if the company could not export more than 30m tons from the northern fields, it could go back to the capacity production of 57m tons and hand over the extra 27m tons to the Government which would be willing to share production and transport costs with the company.[55]

On June 1, 1972, President Ahmad Hussan Al-Bakr of Iraq announced the nationalisation of the London-based Iraq Petroleúm Company. It was a daring step since it dealt with the severest blow since 1956 to the Western oil interests in the Middle East. The ownership of IPC and its affiliates: the Basrah Petroleum Company and the

[54] *See*, Petroleum Press Service, "New Deal in the Middle East", February, 1973, pp. 44-47.

[55] *See*, Selected Documents, *op. cit.*

Mosul Petroleum Company, included: British Petroleum 23¾ per cent, Royal Dutch-Shell 23¾ per cent, *Compagnie Francaise des Petroles* (CFP) 23¾ per cent, the Near East Development Corporation (ESSO & Mobil), 23¾ per cent, and Fulbenkian interests 5 per cent.

The instrument of nationalisation (Law 69) stipulated that its jurisdiction covered "the areas delineated by Law 80 of December, 1961". It declared that a new State Company would be charged with the management of funds, assets and rights of the IPC. It also provided that the IPC would be paid compensation and the Company's alleged debts would be deducted from the same.[56] The Iraqi measure did not come like a thief at midnight. It was expected by the IPC.

Immediately following the nationalisation of the IPC operations on the Kirkuk oilfields, Iraq started looking for alternative outlets for her oil. Baghdad has since concluded several agreements including those with the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Brazil and India.[57]

Within twenty-four hours of the Iraqi action, Syria decided to nationalise the IPC pipelines and pumping stations which bring the northern Iraqi oil to Mediterranean terminals in Syria and Labanon. A legislative decree issued in Damascus said that the state was not responsible for the commitments of the company before nationalisation. The State shall, however, pay compensation after deducting all taxes and debts incurred by the company towards the State.

Eventually all outstanding disputes between the oil companies and the Iraq Government were resolved in a settlement concluded on February 28, 1973.[58] In an agreement very much in favour of Iraq, the IPC group agreed to recognise Law 80 of 1961 which expropriated over 95 per cent of its entire concession area and Law 69 of 1972 which nationalised IPC's northern oilfields at Kirkuk, Jambur and Bai Hassan. The agreement covered both the terms for compensation payable to the share holders of IPC and the amount payable by IPC in respect of outstanding claims made by the Iraq Government.

Although the word compensation is not mentioned in the agreement which was ratified by the Iraqi Government on March 1, 1973, IPC will receive 15 million tons of Kirkuk crude free of cost *f.o.b.* East Mediterranean at a rate of one million tons a month commencing 1st

---

[56] *See* Selected Documents, *op. cit.*

[57] R. S. Arora, "Petroleum Nationalization in Middle-East", *Lok Udyog*, June, 1972, pp. 61-62.

[58] *See* Petroleum Press Service, "Settlement in Iraq", April, 1973, pp. 124-127,

March or possibly faster. This concession is virtually offset, however, by IPC's agreement to pay the Iraqi government the sum of £141 million in settlement of past claims relating to oil production from the north and the south, mainly attributable to arrears on royalty expenses for the period 1964-1971. An initial instalment of £30 million was payable within one week of ratification and the balance will be paid in further instalments, at 7 per cent interest per annum, concurrently with Iraq's deliveries of oil to IPC.

IPC's northern affiliate: Mosul Petroleum Company has been relinquished to Iraq without compensation. IPC's southern affiliate: Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC) have not been nationalised, and for the companies this represents the most important concession that they have been able to salvage from the recent negotiations.

This settlement ended more than twelve years of tussle between the Iraqi Government and the oil companies—and which at times, as different regimes came and went, had resulted in deadlocked negotiations, confrontations, or at best periods of uneasy truce. Finally, the role of international oil companies has dramatically declined while Baghdad has established a larger degree of control over the disposal of its oil resources. This victory has been won by Iraq at the high cost of years of stagnation in its oil industry involving shortages of revenues while oil production soared in neighbouring countries.

Iraq is now in a position to sell its oil to whichever customers it chooses and to appoint contractors or enter into partnership deals for future exploration and development. It will not have to rely on barter deals for crude. The IPC companies will now have to buy oil from Iraq like anyone else.

Let us now turn to Libya's experience with the oil companies. In some respects the economy of Libya is unique among the countries of the Middle East. In most of the Arab countries which have achieved their independence since the end of World War II, the basis for some kind of economic viability already existed; as for instance, in the Sudan or even in the Levant states. But the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, which were welded together in 1951 to make the United Kingdom of Libya, had never formed an economic unit. Moreover, their economic life, in the 20th century at any rate, had largely, if not entirely, been dependent upon help from abroad—from the Italian colonisers between the Wars; and from the British and their allies after 1943. Nevertheless, in spite of this somewhat unpromising prospect, the country's economic history began to show that the

experiment of creating an economic unit where none existed hitherto was by no means unsuccessful even before oil was found in Libya. The recent discovery of oil has now entirely transformed the country's economic prospects.

That oil was present in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica has long been suspected, and for several years after Libya became independent, many oil companies carried out geological surveys of the country. Oil was first discovered in 1961 but exports did not begin until January 1967. By the end of May 1969, 1116 wells had been completed. These discoveries elevated the country into the front rank of the world's oil producers. In 1965, Libya produced 58.7 million tons of crude and within five years, in 1970, the production touched 159.6 million tons and yielded a revenue of 1,300 million U.S. dollars.[59]

On December 7, 1971, Col. Gaddafi's Government proclaimed a 21-article decree nationalising the assets and operations of the British Petroleum Company (BP) against compensation to be determined and paid later. BP held a 50 per cent interest with Nelson Bunker Hunt (U.S.) in the big 425000 b/d Sarir oilfield. A new company under the name of Arabian Gulf Exploration Company (AGEC) was formed to take over the assets and funds of the nationalised agency. BP's assets in Libya were unofficially estimated to be worth about £75,000,000. On December 11, 1971, BP warned its customers against buying any oil produced by the Libyan Government from the seized BP. On the other hand, the Libyan Government offered a familiar explanation: that there was no violation of the concessionary agreement with BP and that the nationalisation was a legitimate act recognised by international law and exercised by many states including Britain. BP, however, claimed from the Libyan Government a total of £250,000,000 as compensation for the nationalisation of its oil interests. This figure included the value of assets plus loss of profits for the remaining 45 years of the concessions. According to the Libyan Government, it was a most unreasonable claim.[60]

The British Government alleged that the expropriation by the Libyan Government was in fact an angry gesture of nationalisation against the U.K. Government for its supposed failure to prevent the Iranians from occupying three Arab islands in the Persian Gulf on the day before Britain's treaty of protection expired. In other words, a commercial agreement was torn up for purely political ends. The British warned: "The commercial world will draw the natural conclusion

[59] *See*, M. Khalil al Miligi (ed.), *The Arab Petroleum Directory* 1972, Kuwait, 1973.

[60] *See*, Selected Documents, *op. cit.*

that it would be foolish to pour any more money into Libya while the present government holds office." It was further asserted: "If the Libyans try to sell BP's oil on the world market, the company will take legal action to prevent them. . . . If the tearing-up of contracts went much further, a politically dangerous situation could well arise. Western governments could decide that they were tired of being blackmailed by exporting countries, that international oil companies obviously could not be left any longer at the mercy of rapacious host governments, and that political action would, therefore, be taken to safeguard the legitimate interests of the customer."[61]

Libya did not care for all these threats. Gradually it linked its oil strategy with the policies of Western countries towards Israel.[62] On June 11, 1973, Bunker Hunt's assets were nationalised. In a speech delivered to a mass rally on the third anniversary of US evacuation of the former Wheelus airbase, Colonel Gaddafi accused Hunt of "lacking the legal basis" for oil operations in Libya, and added that the US deserved a good hard slap on its insolent face in the Arab area. The 12-article nationalisation decree, officially issued in June as Law No. 42/1973, provided for the setting up of a committee to estimate compensation. As a result, the Libyan Government now controls Africa's largest oilfield, proven Sarir reserves being variously estimated at 11-14 billion barrels. Production from the wholly nationalised field continues to move to the Eastern Europe under several contracts.

Meanwhile, the Libyan Government has been pressing other companies for cent per cent participation in exchange for compensation based on net book value only and the "right" to buy oil at market prices. In short, the terms amount to nationalisation—the "alternative" with which the companies have been threatened should they fail to agree.

In Libya three oil companies, namely, Oasis, AGIP and Amoseas, together account for some 1.4 million barrels of oil daily—well over half of Libya's current 2.3 million b/d total output. Apparently new terms agreed to by any one of them could be expected to be applied to all other large producers. Yet in view of the current world wide tight crude position the "majors" would be hard pressed to find this volume elsewhere, especially oil with the same light, low-sulphur qualities. On the other hand, if everything comes to a halt Libya can still survive since its accumulated gold and currency reserves are sufficient for at least one year.

[61] "Libya : A Revolution Fit for Capitalists", *The Economist*, May 1, 1971; also see Petroleum Press Service, "Policy for Importers", March 1973, pp. 82-84.

[62] "Israel and Oil", *The Economist*, September 8, 1973; also see "Faisal Fingers the Oil Tap", *The Guardian* (Weekly), May 5, 1973, p. 17.

In early September 1973, Colonel Gaddafi announced that for the time being Libya was taking over a 51 per cent controlling interest of the remaining major oil companies in his country. Libyan officials have already started treating Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Exxon, Mobil, and Shell as Libyan organisations. Tankers belonging to these companies have been prevented from loading oil; they have been told that the companies must first sign a commitment recognising that 51 per cent of the oil is under Libyan control. The Libyan Government this time remained vague on compensation.[63]

It is possible that the Libyan leaders may eventually win all the economic concessions they are demanding from the companies. They may even win more. On the other hand, the oil companies feel: if Libya, legally or illegally, starts selling most of its oil directly to consumer countries, they will have begun to lose what they most want to keep: distribution of oil.

Algeria's struggle for the liberation of oil resources has not been as painful as her struggle for political independence. Yet her strategy of nationalisation of the petroleum industry has widely influenced the Middle Eastern developments during recent years. Algeria as a political entity is a phenomenon of the last four hundred years; the history of its peoples, however, is of considerably greater antiquity. On July 5, 1830, Algeria fell to a French expedition. Unlike some other lands of the Middle East, political and national consciousness did not emerge as a force to be reckoned with in Algeria until after the First World War. However, a consistent struggle for independence after the Second World War culminated in a referendum held on July 1, 1962, during which 91 per cent of the electorate voted for independence, which was proclaimed by General Charles De Gaulle two days later, on July 3, 1962.

Algeria is one of the newer oil producing countries. Production of crude oil in the Sahara on a serious commercial scale began only in 1958. The main oil fields are at Hassi Messaoud in central Algeria and Edjeleh-Zarzaitine in the Polignac Basin near the Libyan frontier. More and more oil, mostly very light, is being discovered everyday.

Eight oil companies with marketing interests in Algeria formed a consortium to construct the first oil refinery which had an initial capacity of 2.5 million tons a year. It came on stream in February 1964. Other refineries were at various stages of planning and implementation.

---

[63] *See*, Petroleum Press Service, "Libya : Participation Campaign Starts", February 1973, p. 64; "Libya : Gaddafi's Bid", *The Economist*, May 19, 1973, p. 11; "Last Libyan Ditch", *The Economist*, August 18, 1973, p. 84; "Arabs and Oil", *The Economist*, September 8, 1973, p. 36; and *Petroleum Press Service*, "Libya Does it Again", September, 1973, p. 324.

In 1960 Algeria produced 8.6 million tons of crude oil, in 1965 the production reached 13.6m ton and in 1970 the output touched the mark of 33.4 million tons. Estimated oil production in 1973 will total 56 million tons against some 52 million in 1972, with a target of 70-75 million tons a year by the end of the 1970's ![64]

The original Saharan oil code provided for a 50/50 profit sharing between the operating company and the government, based on realised prices. This differed from the arrangement prevalent in other Middle East countries, where the split was based on posted prices which was thought to be more profitable.[65]

Government revenues for oil and gas are expected to total $1.3 billion (6 billion dinars) in 1973, of which $902 million will come from tax and royalty payments. This compares with 1972 revenues of $ 1.1 billion, which consisted of some $700 million in tax and royalty payments, $400 million net proceeds from direct sales of Sonatrach's crude oil and $130 million from natural gas production.[66]

In March 1971, President Boumidienne of Algeria decided to take effective control of the entire hydrocarbon industry: by taking over 51 per cent share in the French oil companies operating in Algeria; and by completely nationalising all pipelines and all natural gas deposits. The Algerian President said that his country was ready to continue to supply France with petroleum products at market price, and to pay compensation for expropriation; but the decision of his government was not negotiable. While explaining the policy of his government, the President declared that "the question of nationalisation or control, was of the entry of the revolution into the petroleum sector . . . forms part of the sovereignty of our country and our fundamental choices, and we shall never negotiate on those choices." Algeria had "warned the French of her intention to control the petroleum sector . . . for years past and at every opportunity"; it was "only a question of time, and the time has now come".[67] Referring to the 1965-Agreement he claimed that his country had observed that Agreement while France had violated the same more than once.

The nationalisation ordinances were published on March 1, 1971. The ELF-ERAP subsidiary company forming the French partner in the ASCOOP system was not at first included, but was finally brought

[64] *The Arab Petroleum Directory*, op. cit.

[65] *See*, Selected Documents . . ., *op. cit.*

[66] *See*, M. A. Adelman, *The World Petroleum Market*, London, 1973.

[67] *See*. Selected Documents, *op. cit.;* also see Legal Aspects, *op. cit*,

under 51 per cent nationalisation on April 14, 1971....Earlier on April 11, 1971, the Algerian President signed decrees comprising a new "Fundamental Law on Hydrocarbons",[68] which laid down the framework for operations by foreign companies confining them to the position of minority shareholders in enterprises to be managed by Sonatrach and making the latter responsible for all decisions.

Sun Oil became the first new oil company to enter Algerian exploration since the radical 1970-71 nationalisation measures, under a 49-51 per cent joint venture agreement signed with Sonatrach on March 27, 1973. It appears that to big petroleum companies a 49 per cent share in light, low-sulphur crude on the western end of the Mediterranean, even on Sonatrach's terms, looks considerably more attractive now than it might have in the late 1960's.[69]

Evidently, Sonatrach has emerged from several years of bitter dispute with the oil companies as one of the largest operators in the oil business. It now has the lion's share of oil production running at over 50 million tons-a-year for which it is finding some surprisingly new customers.

Of the 20-odd oil companies formerly operating in Algeria, in 1972 only four were working: the national company Sonatrach, France's CEP and ELf, and Getty. The most important by far is Sonatrach, which is currently producing on its own account some 42 million tons of oil a year—almost three times its output in 1970-71 and is a 51 per cent majority partner with the other three companies. The state company thus controls well over three quarters of the Algerian total oil production.

Algeria has finally settled many disputes arising out of the dramatic expansion of its oil and gas empire, which has been achieved largely by nationalisation measures since 1967. The amount of compensation paid for nationalised interests varied considerably from company to company, in accordance with the size of their former holdings. In all but one case where an indemnity has been paid or promised, Algeria has chosen to pay in cash; only Getty is being reimbursed with crude.[70]

Algeria's oil revenues in 1972 was expected to reach 3.2 billion dinars ($640 million), and it could be some 41 per cent of total fiscal

---

[68] *See*, Selected Documents. . ., *op. cit.*

[69] Petroleum Press Service, "Algeria : Sun signs 49-51 percent Joint Venture", May 1973, p. 185.

[70] Petroleum Press Service, "Algeria : Money Rolls in", April, 1973, p. 146; and "Sonatrach's Oil Empire", February, 1972, pp. 53-55.

receipts. This compared remarkably favourably with only 1.4 billion dinars in 1970 and 1.6 billion in 1971. Contrary to the expectations of oil companies, Sonatrach appears to be enjoying considerable success in marketing its vastly increased output.

IV

A study of oil-producing countries of Latin America indicates that their struggle for regaining sovereignty over their oil resources has been as painful as those of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Their encounters with oil cartels have often been more radical though they did not, sometimes, hit the headlines of the world press. During recent decades several Latin American countries have been trying to gain economic independence from foreign (mainly North American) big business. Commenting on this phenomenon Professor Osvaldo Sunkel writes: "The winds of economic nationalism are blowing strong in Latin America. This is evident in the nationalist and progressive regime in Peru, the rise and fall of the leftist government in Bolivia, the changes of policy in conservative countries like Colombia and Argentina and the spectacular election of a socialist government in Chile. There are also the numerous acts of nationalisation in various countries, most of which have gone largely unnoticed, while others like the nationalisation of petroleum in Peru and Bolivia, natural gas in Venezuela, aluminium in Guyana and copper in Chile have reached the headlines."[71] In fact the current strategy of state acquisition of private enterprises, foreign as well as indigenous, replaces the one aimed at "industrial self-sufficiency" followed by several Latin American countries from 1930 to around 1955 which had not only failed to achieve its aims, but had in fact aggravated the situation and nature of 'dependencia'. During recent years most of the countries of Latin America have become conscious of their economic distress. They have become increasingly aware of the fact that their raw materials: oil, coffee, tin, lead, copper, sugar, bananas, cocoa, beef, wool, hides are pumped out at depressed prices to feed the highly industrialised nations of the West; in turn they have to buy the machinery and industrial goods they need at artificially manipulated monopoly prices. Consequently their economies are squeezed dry. The recent wave of nationalisation is, in fact, a reaction to long term and increasingly intolerable economic imperialism of foreign big corporations.[72]

---

[71] *Vide*, Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 'Dependencia'", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972, p. 516.

[72] A Barker, "Emerging New Power: The World Corporation", *War/Peace Report*, October 1968.

For instance, there has been a significant expansion of the public sector in Peru during the last few years. In October 1968 Peru nationalised International Petroleum Company's (IPC's) oilfields in northern Peru and also its refinery at Talara. It was in Peru that oil was first developed commercially in Latin America and until recently it remained one of the minor gems in Standard's (*i.e.*, Standard Oil of New Jersey) international crown. In 1914, IPC was established with a Canadian charter to take over the Peruvian fields. In fact the demand for nationalisation of Peruvian oil dates back to 1918 when Standard threatened to shut down its operations at Talara and Negritos if certain tax concessions were not granted to the company.

Peru's annual output of oil reached one million barrels over 60 years ago, attained 17.5 million barrels 35 years ago, but by 1941 had fallen to less than 12 million, and it was not until 1956 that it recovered to 18 million, making but little advance till it was threatened acquisition by the Government of Peru.[73] Until 1945, Talara, the chief oil centre, had been a dilapidated town of shacks enclosing the preserves of the foreign employees and administrators. "No Peruvians Allowed" signs surrounded this compound. Nearly all the supervisory jobs were held by foreigners; common labour being reserved for the natives.

In response to the popular demand, oilfields were nationalised in 1968. This measure of the Revolutionary Military Government of General Velasco Alvarado provoked a serious conflict between Peru and the IPC. According to President Velasco it was a part of a larger reform programme which, he maintained, would bring about "a re-ordering of Peruvian society and an alteration in the structure of economic, political and social power".

The Peruvian measure invited serious hostility from the United States which suspended all financial aid to Peru and also ended the purchases of Peruvian sugar under preferential arrangements. However the U.S. formally maintained that there would be no official objection to expropriation provided adequate compensation was paid to the International Petroleum Company.[74] At present there are several oil companies still operating in Peru.

Venezuela, the Midas-land where oil turns all it touches into gold while the people hunger for food, is the prime example of a captive

[73] *Vide*, J.E. Hartshorn, *Oil Companies and Governments*, London, 1962; also see Petroleum Press Service, "Peru's Weakening Self-Sufficiency", September 1961, pp. 329-332.

[74] *See*, William R. Hoskins, "How to Counter Expropriation", *Harvard Business Review*, September-October, 1970.

economy. Three international corporations—Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch, and Gulf control most of the petroleum resources of Venezuela, the world's third largest oil producing country. In exchange for its oil Venezuela gets TV sets, radios, perfumes, whisky, cigarettes and food. Commenting on the situation Harvey O'Connor writes: "All the oily wealth of Venezuela of which $ 20 billion has been sucked out and poured into the United States and Britain, is tainted with fraud, embezzlement and corruption from its beginning."[75] In 1972 oil and oil products accounted for over 90 per cent of Venezuela's total exports, and over 60 per cent of the government's revenue; over 70 per cent of foreign investment in Venezuela was tied up in the oil industry. And the country's dependence on oil has increased: between 1966 and 1971, 88 per cent of Venezuela's hard currency income derived from oil; in 1971 it was 93 per cent.[76] Reaction against this phenomenon has been accumulating for a considerable time. Since no discussion of petroleum or politics was permitted within the country it was abroad that the future leaders of democratic Venezuela discovered the main currents of 20th century thought and action, and formulated their plans for the future of their country. Finally an Oil Reversion Bill, regulating the eventual return to the state of the assets of oil companies operating in Venezuela, was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on June 17 1972. The Bill had its final reading in the Senate on July 19, 1972 and was signed by President Rafeel Calders on July 30. The statute provides

(*a*) On the expiration from 1983 onwards of the oil concessions granted under the Hydrocarbons Law of 1943 these should revert to the State, together with all goods and equipment.

(*b*) Under the 1942 Income Tax Law, which distinguishes between extractive economic activity and other types, no compensation whatsoever was to be paid to companies in respect of assets which had been fully amortised on the expiration of concessions.

(*c*) The State shall have the right to nationalise within three years concessions considered inadequately exploited.

(*d*) The oil companies should be required to deposit with the National Bank of Venezuela a security calculated to 10 per cent of the value of their installation in the concession areas to ensure that equipment would be handed over in good condition at the end of the concessions.

---

[75] Harvey O'Connor, *op. cit.*; also see Walter J. Levy, "World Oil in Transition" *The Economist*, December 7, 1961.

[76] Petroleum Press Service, "Venezuelan Prospects Now", December 1972, p. 450.

(*e*) The companies should be obliged to seek from the Government a written authorisation for any action modifying their activities or their administration.

The foreign oil corporations obviously protested against this measure. They held that some of the provisions of the statute constituted in themselves a *de facto* nationalisation.

Bolivia is a land-locked country and perhaps the poorest of all the Latin American countries. Her oil history opened with the petroleum code of 1921 under which concessions granted the previous year to an American concern were transferred to the Standard of New Jersey for 55 years. Using rather outdated cable rigs, Standard found oil at Camiri, in southern Bolivia, developed some 31 wells and built two small "tea-kettle" refineries. After the Chaco war (1932-35) a new petroleum law was enacted in 1936 which ended all concessions except Standard's which in turn was annulled in 1937. The Jersey Standard's properties were handed over to *Yaciementos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos* (YPFB), a state-owned corporation.

The first foreign oil deal since the expropriation of Standard in 1937 was concluded in 1953 with adventurer Glenn McCarthy. This was followed by several concessions to private foreign capital including those to Gulf, Shell and Standard of California. Somehow the exploitation of natural resources of Bolivia has not contributed to finding any durable solution to Bolivian poverty, nay, rather has led to one threatening economic crisis after another.[77]

Ultimately, a decree issued by the Bolivian Government of President Torres on November 11, 1970, completed the process of nationalisation of Bolivia's oil industry by cancelling the concessions earlier granted to the U.S. owned Bolivian Altantic Corporation for prospecting and exploiting oil deposits in four areas in the north-western provinces of Gutierrez and Ichilo. The problem of compensation was also eventually resolved to everybody's satisfaction in September 1970.

Earlier in October 1969, a decree was issued which empowered the Bolivian Government to take over the exploitation of the country's oil resources, involving the nationalisation of the American owned Gulf Oil Corporation of Bolivia, a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation of Pittsburgh. The Government's action had received strong support from the trade unions, which called for the nationalisation of all foreign

[77] *See*, Paul Johnson, "The Plundered Continent", *New Statesman*, September 17, 1960.

firms, which included all foreign mining concession and import business and banks.

For the foregoing study to be self-contained it is almost indispensable to answer two more fundamental questions, namely: (*i*) What has been the contribution of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries during the recent developments in the international petroleum industry? And, (*ii*) What has been the role of major world Powers, particularly that of the United Kingdom and the United States, which have essentially controlled the world petroleum reserves for several decades?

V

The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)[78] was formed in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia and Venezuela; Qatar became a member in 1961; and Indonesia and Libya in 1962; followed by Abu Dhabi in November 1967 and Algeria in July 1969. Nigeria was admitted as the 11th member of the Organisation in July 1971. At the 19th Conference of OPEC, held in Vienna in June 1972, Trinidad was admitted as the 12th member. The Organisation's headquarters were established at first in Geneva from where they were transferred to Vienna in 1965 after a disagreement with the Swiss authorities over full diplomatic treatment of its staff. In terms of exports, the OPEC countries account for approximately 85 per cent of the world total petroleum outside the Soviet bloc. Western Europe and Japan heavily depend on OPEC exports for most of their requirements. This should speak for the significance of this trade union of oil exporting countries.

As early as September 1960, at the invitation of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, representatives from Iraq, Kuwait, Persia, Sa'udi Arabia and Venezuela, with observers from Qatar, and the Arab League met in Baghdad to evolve a unified policy towards the unilateral decisions of the major oil companies, taken in August, 1960, to reduce the price for crude oil paid to Middle East producers by 2½-6 per cent.

Besides decisions to meet the existing production and pricing situation the participants decided to set up a permanent 'Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' to unify and coordinate oil production policies. OPEC was formally constituted on January 21, 1961. The second OPEC conference held in Caracas from January 15-21,

[78] For a comprehensive study, *See* Fuad Rouhani, *A History of OPEC*, London 1972.

1961, adopted the following decisions:

(1) A permanent OPEC secretariat would be set up with headquarters at Geneva.

(2) While the founder countries—Iraq, Kuwait, Persia, Sa'udi Arabia, and Venezuela—would each have one member on the board of governors, only one additional member could represent any other countries which subsequently joined the Organisation.

(3) It was hoped that friendly countries would consult with the Organisation regarding quotas or restrictions on oil imports in order to reach satisfactory solutions and to protect the interests of both exporting and importing countries.

(4) The Organisation could study the possibility of unifying accounting systems in the petroleum industries, and member-countries could provide the Organisation's board with complete data on all dealings with oil companies concerning price-fixing.

(5) Member-countries were requested to report within two months on measures to be taken to restore crude oil prices to levels which were considered justified and appropriate.

(6) Measures would be taken against the curtailment of production in the Venezuela oil industry by the oil companies.

During the fourth OPEC conference held in Geneva in April, 1962 the member-countries were asked to "formulate jointly a national price structure to guide their long-term price policy". The board of governors were directed to prepare a comprehensive study "at the earliest possible date". An important element in such a price structure would be "the linking of crude oil prices to an index of prices of goods which member companies need to import".

The OPEC has been meeting from time to time to evolve and employ its strategy for the collective interests of member-countries. More recently the OPEC has been quite effective in protecting and promoting the interests of its member-nations.[79] For instance soon after the devaluation of the dollar on February 12-13, 1973, there were proposals within OPEC for a new round of talks between the oil-producing countries and the Western oil companies to consider the new situation. The question was taken up at an OPEC meeting held in Vienna in

[79] *See*, Petroleum Press Service, "New Deal in the Middle East", February, 1973, pp. 44-46.

mid-March, the official purpose of which was to "analyse carefully the present world energy crisis and all its underlying factors and circumstances". After a series of meetings, and discussions a new oil-pricing agreement was reached in Geneva on June 2, 1973, between eight of the 12 member-States of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the major Western oil companies, further modifying the terms of the five-year settlement signed in Teheran in February 1971. The agreement provided for an immediate rise of 6.1 per cent in the posted prices of crude oil, in addition to a 5.8 per cent increase payable from April 1 in accordance with the previous modification to the Teheran Agreement signed in Geneva in January 1972. The aggregate increase of 11.9 per cent in the posted prices was designed to compensate the oil producing countries for losses in the purchasing power of oil revenues resulting from the dollar devaluation of February 1973.[80]

Of late, major oil companies have been feeling the weight of unity of the oil producing nations. The idea that the governments of the main oil importing countries should get together to work out a collective strategy[81] has failed to take any definite shape. Meanwhile, during the latest Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973, the oil exporting countries of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf have established their frightening authority.

VI

Finally, let us briefly examine the role of major Powers which have huge investments in the petroleum industry. Britain has historically claimed the Middle East and the Persian Gulf areas as its sphere of influence. Somehow, her defence disengagements in this region did not keep pace with the liquidation of her Imperial possessions following the independence of India in 1947. In fact, as we shall see, Britain tried her best to protect her oil interests in this area.

During the 1950's, on average, defence had absorbed 10 per cent of Britain's gross national product—a much higher proportion of national income than that of any other European country, other than France. In 1957, Britain's defence burden was practically 80 per cent larger than the (unweighted) average of the continental NATO countries, other than France; in 1955, it had been nearly twice as large.[82] It was scarcely

[80] *See*, Petroleum Press Service, "Prices on the Move", May 1973, pp. 162-63.

[81] *See*, Petroleum Press Service, "Oil-Importers Getting Together", June 1973, p. 202.

[82] *Vide*, A.C.L. Day, "The Economies of Defence", *Political Quarterly*, January-March, 1960; T.E.M. Mc Kitterick, "What are British Interests?", *Political Quarterly*, January-March, 1961; also see Lawrence W. Martin, "The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain : The Sandys Era", *The American Political Science Review*, March, 1962.

asked: Whether Britain was a devoting the right percentage of her national income to defence, in competition with other needs. Whether the amount Britain was spending was being used in the best possible ways.

It was only during the 'sixties a few enlightened people had started doubting the viability of the defence policy of the Government. It was being realised that defence investments were not bringing in results commensurate with the loss of the other things people were having to forgo. Somehow political parties and pressure groups interested in the existing policy were yet not ready to face the realities. Consequently, a series of Defence White Papers issued by the Government often presented confused and even contradictory picture. Emotionally both the political parties insisted on maintaining the image of Britain as a big power willing as well as capable of playing role of safeguarding essential economic and political interests in different parts of the world and more particularly her oil interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. And in order to protect her national interests—real or imaginary, Britain offered from time to time different explanations. This situation in fact justified Montgomery's statement made in 1948: "We need a unified defence policy . . . we have not got one and we have no hope of getting one with our present system."[83]

However, gradually the debate on this issue acquired national dimensions: whether it was useful to hold on to widely scattered bases, the utility of which was not clear in the light of the reliance on mobile reserves and of diminishing imperial responsibilities.[84] On the eve of the party session in Scarbrough in 1963 Harold Wilson, the Labour Party Leader, maintained: "For in this shrinking world while political isolationism invites danger, and economic isolationism invites bankruptcy, moral isolationism invites contempt. So this is the role for Britain,—in Europe, in Africa, in the United Nations, in our reassertion of our abdicated leadership in the Commonwealth, not least in the role we must play in the challenging under-developed areas of the commonwealth and in the integration of Commonwealth trading relationships."[85]

Obviously once the Labour Party came into power in 1964 it followed the defence policy of the Conservative Party. Prime Minister Harold Wilson said in Parliament on December 16, 1961, "I want to make it quite clear that whatever we may do in the field of cost/effectiveness, value for money, and a stringent review of expenditure, we cannot

---

[83] *The Memoirs of F. M. The Viscount Montgomery*, London, 1958, p. 495.
[84] *See, The Economist*, March 7, 1959.
[85] Harold Wilson, *Purpose in Politics, Selected Speeches*, London, 1964, p. 11.

afford to relinquish our world role, our role which for shorthand purposes, is sometimes called our 'East of Suez' role." Evidently the Defence White Paper issued in February, 1966 confirmed the Labour Government's decision to maintain a British presence in the Middle East and East of Suez.[86] The same approach was reiterated in the Defence White Paper issued on February 16, 1967, which provided for a small increase in forces stationed in the Persian Gulf.[87] While this approach was warmly appreciated by right wing sections of Parliament, press and pressure groups,[88] it provoked serious criticism amongst the progressive backbenchers of the Labour Party and in a section of enlightened press.[89] *The New Statesman* maintained that a reduction of overseas military spending is a vital need, both to regain our economic balance and to achieve a rational view of our place in the modern world.[90]

The Middle East war of 1967 inspired the British Government to issue a supplementary White Paper on Defence on July 18, 1967. A careful study of this very important document indicates that it was a turning point in the British Defence policy. London, for the first time, clearly realised its inability to influence events in the Middle East. True, the White Paper explained vital cuts in the defence establishments in the Far East but remained silent on the Middle Eastern situation. Left-wingers in the Labour Party, however, thought that the defence cuts were not large enough, nor was withdrawal from bases on East of Suez fast enough.[91] However, right-wingers warned that it was a document that Britain will regret afterwards.[92] The Defence Secretary, Mr. Healey asked the Parliament "to approve the White Paper because for the first time since the Second World War it brought our foreign and defence policies into balance and in keeping with the nation's economic objectives at home."[93] This policy of phased disengagement from the

---

[86] House of Commons Debates, December 16, 1964, cols. 423-24.

[87] *Cmnd. Paper* 3203/1967.

[88] "Broad Picture Still Vague" (Editorial), *The Times*, February 17, 1967; "£1,500 M of Fire Power" (Editorial), *The Times*, March 1, 1967; Francis Boyd, "On the Defensive", *The Guardian*, March 2, 1967; House of Commons Debates, February 27-28, 1967.

[89] Naville Brown, "A Very White Paper", *New Statesman*, February 24, 1967; Christopher Mayhen, "Power Failure in the Middle East," *The Sunday Times*, April 16, 1967; and "Calmer Relations : Cheaper Defence", *The Guardian*, February 17, 1967.

[90] "How not to cut Defence", *New Statesman*, February 3, 1967.

[91] "The Unanswered Problem" (Editorial), *The Times*, July 19, 1967; "What the Tories Say" (Editorial) *The Times*, July 18, 1967; Rodney Cowton, "Defence Cuts Spare Yards", *The Times*, July 19, 1967; "Mr. Healey's Swan Song", *The Economist*, July 8, 1967; "What to keep East of Suez" (Editorial), *The Guardian*, July 17, 1967.

[92] "Good Luck, Harry, Good Luck, Tunku", *The Economist*, July 22, 1967.

[93] *See*, House of Commons Debate on the Defence White Paper, July 27, 1967. (Nearly 60 Labour MPs had tabled an amendment critical of the government's policy, demanding even greater cuts on a number of fronts, *The Times*, July 28, 1967).

Far East and near East was largely accepted by the British people, though a few old-timers continued to challenge its validity.[94]

The most important event which compelled the Wilson Government to review its defence policy was its utter incompetence to play its expected role during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Mr. Harold Wilson strongly believed in protecting British oil interests in the region. Whereas the Americans wanted to replace Britain before the Soviet Union seized the opportunity. Yet most of the Arab States were struggling to recapture their petroleum resources.

It may be recalled that the extreme tension which had persisted in the Middle East in May-June, 1967 culminated in the outbreak of war between Israel on the one hand and the U.A.R., Syria and Jordon on the other. In one of the most rapid and dramatic campaigns in modern history, Israel achieved within 80 hours a complete military victory over her Arab opponents. Israel virtually destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordon and Syria on the first day of the war, and its armed forces conquered the entire Sinai peninsula including Sharm-el-Sheikh and the Gaza strip.

According to the Arabs Israel's lightning military victory was predominantly due to the massive support of the United States. President Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan were reported to have alleged that the United States and Britain had provided air support to the Israel's forces.[95]

A conference of the Arab oil-producing states was convened in Baghdad on June 4, 1967—the day before the outbreak of war in the Middle East—on the initiative of President Araf of Iraq. It was attended by representatives of Iraq. Sa'udi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Lebanon and Syria. The conference resolved on June 5, to cut off oil supplies to any State committing aggression against any Arab country or giving aid to Israel. In view of subsequent hostilities, all the Arab oil-producing countries suspended oil supplies to Britain and the United States on June 6-7, 1967. In addition, several of these countries broke off diplomatic relations with Britain[96] and the United States.[97] As far as the

[94] For instance see William Luce, "Britain in the Persian Gulf Mistaken Timing over Aden," *The Round Table*; Douglas Hurd, "Would the Tories Withdraw ?", *The Round Table*, October, 1968, pp. 369-371; and Jack Hartshorn, "Arctic Middle East ? No Substitute yet for Arab Oil", *The Round Table*, January 1971.

[95] *Vide*, *The Times* (London), June 8, 1967; also see President Nasser's broadcast on the 15th Anniversary of Egypt's revolution on July 24, 1967.

[96] The United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom resumed diplomatic relations on December 12, 1967.

[97] The United Arab Republic and the United States resumed diplomatic relations in November, 1973.

U.K. was concerned, the Arab boycott affected about 63 per cent of th U.K.'s oil imports. Because of certain serious drawbacks in the Aral oil strategy Britain regarded it only a little more than nuisance value.[98] Precisely for similar reasons some of the Arab countries soon realise that the cessation of oil exports to the West might lead to the collaps of the economies of the Arab states.[99] Washington felt no likelihoo of an oil emergency threatening the United States directly.[100]

Commenting on the 1967 war Bernard Lewis said: "In the past, has sometimes been argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict prevents grea power agreement, sometimes that the great-power conflict prevents th Arabs and Israelis from coming to terms. Certainly outside interven tion has more than once increased tensions, provoked crises and pre vented solutions."[101] The British official strategy, however, came unde heavy attack both in Parliament[102] and outside.[103]

After an uneasy gap of six year Arab-Israeli hostilities once agai culminated into a brief war of 17 days starting in the first week of Octo ber 1973. This time the Arab States evolved a better strategy to us petroleum as a political weapon against Israel and its supporters. I a conference of Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countri (OAPEC) held in Kuwait it was decided on October 18, 1973, to redu crude oil productions by not less than five per cent a month from Septem ber and continue it on the same level each month "until an Israeli with drawal is completed" and until the legal rights of the Palestinian peop were restored. This Organisation included Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Egyp Libya, Algeria, Sa'udi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Bahrein. Kin Faisal of oil-rich Sa'udi Arabia ordered a 10 per cent cut-back oil production forthwith; and Abu Dhabi decided to halt all oil exports t the United States. Among the Arab States Libya and Iraq threatene to nationalise oil-fields still remaining with private foreign companie Several countries of the Organisation also threatened to transfer the currency deposits from "hostile" countries to others more sympathet to the Arabs.

[98] "Head Above Water : Oil and Markets," *The Economist*, June 10, 1967, p. 11 (In fact, the Ministry of Power gave the oil companies a flat price rise of 2 d a gall on all their products to cover the added cost of bringing crude oil round the Cape.)

[99] Sheikh Yamani's (Sa'udi Arabia) Statement on June 30, 1967.

[100] "Oil Plans for Action", *The Economist*, June 17, 1967, p. 1244.

[101] *Vide*, Bernard Lewis, "The Arab-Israeli War; The Consequences of Defeat *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1968, p. 335.

[102] *See*, House of Commons Debate on Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1967; also s House of Lords Debate on Defence White Paper, July 25, 1967. (Viscount Moac ton of Brenchley said: "We are now a toothless bulldog by deliberate intent).

[103] *Vide*, Thomas Barman, "Britain : The Middle East Scapegoat?", *World Tod* July 1967, pp. 275-278.

It will no longer be incorrect to say that from the economic stand point, the outbreak of the hostilities between Israel and Arab States like Egypt and Syria was triggered largely by the oil interests of the U.S. Whatever the other factors, the latest West Asian crisis cannot be divorced from the interests of the U.S. monopoly capital in preserving the oil *status quo* in this region.

Commenting on the significance of the oil embargo, Peter Jenkins said, "Sa'udi Arabia, which is the key to the Middle East oil problem for the United States has a more powerful card to play in the situation which has now risen. The United States badly needs the Saudis, who are sitting on the largest crude oil reserves in the world, to expand their production substantially over the coming years to meet the American energy gap. Refusal to do so unless the United States contributes to a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be a much more effective sanction than any leaky embargo on exports."[104]

Speaking on this conflict in the House of Commons on October 16, 1973, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home said, "U.N. Resolution 242 still offers the best chance of a settlement because to it and it alone both Arabs and Israelis subscribe."[105] Very much similar attitude has been adopted by other West European nations. On November 6, 1973, the Council of Ministers of the nine governments of the European Community issued a declaration in Brussels which categorically said that a peace agreement should be based particularly on the following points:

(1) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

(2) The need for Israel to end the territorial occupations which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;

(3) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundries; and

(4) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.[106]

---

104 Peter Jenkins, "US Shifts its Middle East Policy", *The Guardian* (Weekly), October 27, 1973.

105 House of Commons Debate on the West Asia situation, October 16, 1973.

106 For the text see British Information Services, New Delhi, *Press Release*, No. BIS. B. 474, dated November 7, 1973.

The Economist called this declaration as Arab blackmail of which, Europe has become the victim. It *inter alia* said: "The Arabs' use of the oil weapon now appears to win them such a resounding victory in the peace negotiations, after defeat in war, that every Arab feels it would be crazy to leave the weapon in the scabbard for long."[107]

Surprisingly enough the Dutch who were to be hurt the most by the Arab cutbacks, expressed satisfaction at what the European Economic Community is doing to improve matters. Actually Holland has a long record of favouring Israel and in view of this the Arab had decided to suspend all supplies of crude to that country and they had threatened that a similar action will be taken if any other country tried to help Holland.

Supporting the European Community's strategy the *Guardian* said: "Whatever the Arab Governments intend, their cut in production seems likely to damage industry in Western Europe (apart from France) more than anywhere else. . . the Gulf States have discovered the strength of their oil weapon only late in their conflict with Israel." The Arab rulers are anyway less dependent on oil revenue than they were. About the retaliatory measures the *Guardian inter alia* said: ". . . if Arab pressure is increased angry British citizens ought to be forwarned of the limits to effective retaliation. Any embargo on trade with the oil-producing countries will damage our interests more than theirs. Any attempt to freeze their sterling balances will undermine Britain's reputation as an international banker. Any political measures will probably assist Soviet penetration of the Arab world."[108] In fact while adopting a pro-Arab declaration almost all the member-countries of the European Community had realised the significance of such factors.

With the possible exception of Italy, Japan is in the most exposed position of any developed economy. It relies on oil for 70 per cent of its primary energy, draws 85 per cent of its crude oil from the Middle East, and depends on the major international oil companies for at least 70 per cent of its total supply. In view of a serious threat to the Japanese economy, Tokyo has explicitly supported the Arab stand and has called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied in 1967. Japan has issued a threat to break off diplomatic relations with Israel if it continued its existing policy. As expected, in view of the latest shift in the Japanese policy Tokyo has been upgraded from "neutral" to "friendly" status in the three-tier classification of oil consuming countries adopted by Sa'udi Arabia.

107 "Almost anything for Oil?", *The Economist*, November 10, 1972.

108 "Strength of the Oil Weapon", *The Guardian* (Weekly), December 1, 1973.

On November 7, 1973, in a nation-wide broadcast President Nixon catalogued a series of measures to meet the oil crisis. In his introductory remarks he said: "We must therefore face up to the stark fact that we are heading toward the most acute shortage of energy since World War II. Our supply of petroleum this winter will be at least 10 per cent short of an anticipated demands—and could fall short by as much as 17 per cent." In view of the crisis situation he suggested that "we must be sure that while the fat from our economy is being trimmed, the muscle is not seriously damped."[109]

The latest developments in the Middle East have disclosed the existence of a most serious rift between the United States and her European allies. In fact, as soon as the Arab countries thought of using the oil weapon, it became apparent that there would be a deep division between the interests of Europe, and those of the United States, since Europe is far more dependent on Arab oil than the U.S., Britain along with other members of the EEC realised that the Arab oil cut-back will affect the Soviet Union not at all, the U.S. very little but Europe very seriously. In view of this, Britain and other European governments declined the NATO support call issued by Washington.[110] In fact, they have challenged the merits of the 'emergency call'.

Evidently, the latest Middle East crisis has exposed the fundamental flow in the Atlantic Alliance. Obviously President Nixon felt unhappy about this. In fact the NATO has exposed it futility from time to time. It may be recalled that Dean Acheson in his historic 'West Point' speech on December 6, 1962 has explained at length the weakness of the Western Alliance because of lack of agreement on policy matters among its members. From time to time several member-states have tried to invoke the NATO charter but have felt disappointed because one group of nations did not agree with the other. Besides the United States, among the other leading partners France[111], Canada[112] and lately the United Kingdom[113] have been stressing for a radical revision of the NATO treaty.

---

[109] For the text see USIS (New Delhi), *Press Release*, November 8, 1973.

[110] *See*, Ian Davidson, "Why Europe Lacks Weight in the NATO Balance", *The Financial Times*, October 30, 1973.

[111] *Vide*, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson : The Exercise of Power*, London, 1967, p. 383; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days : John F. Kennedy in the White House*, London, 1965, pp. 320-22. Also see General de Gaull's Press Conferences on September 9, 1965, on February 21, 1966, and his letters to President Johnson and other Allied leaders on 'Withdrawal from NATO', March 7, 1966.

[112] *Vide*, Prime Minister Trudeau's statements on Canada's Defence Policy on April 3, 1969 : and on April 12, 1969.

[113] *Vide*, Sir Alec Dougles-Home's speech at a dinner meeting of the Pilgrims Society in London in honour of the U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger on December 12, 1973. Also see "The Strain in NATO" (Editorial), *The Financial Times*, October 29, 1973.

It should be most interesting to reflect that as early as September 29, 1954 the late Mr. Nehru had said about NATO, "When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was first envisaged, it was for defence. But gradually we found that it was supposed to cover the colonial possessions of all those powers also."[114] Later on speaking on a similar subject, Nehru observed: "When the pacts are bad in themselves it is a matter of little consequence whether you suspect any country participating in the pacts of dishonesty or lack of *bona fides*."[115] Now it is being widely realised by NATO members that the treaty has failed to serve the interests of nations who put their signatures on it mainly because their interests conflict with each other.

VII

In the end let us list our major observations of the study:

(1) In 1960 seven mega-corporations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Holland and France which constituted the international petroleum cartel controlled 90 per cent of all the petroleum in world commerce. Most of this petroleum was drawn from the cartel's wells in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Latin America. For the last twenty years or so principal oil-producing countries have been struggling to nationalise their petroleum resources. Evidently, it has been a very painful struggle for all the countries covered in the present study.

(2) Persia was the first oil-producing country to attempt nationalisation of foreign companies in 1951, and it was only in 1973 that Teheran succeeded to do so. During these twenty years there have been several spells of political and economic instability in that country. For instance, Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mussadeq who initiated the action in 1951 soon found himself deposed and imprisoned. Again in Iraq General Abdul Karim al Kassim attempted to nationalise the Iraqi oil industry in 1961, and his Government fell before it had implemented the enabling measures and the General was captured and shot. Governments of Algeria, Libya and Venezuela where similar attempts were made cartels and their governments employed several punitive measures including: economic sanctions, trade embargo, suspension of aid, withholding of royalties, arbitrary cut in prices of crude, fall in

[114] *See*, Nehru on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, September 29, 1954.

[115] *See*, Lok Sabha Debates, March 29, 1956.

oil production, etc. On the whole the entire Middle East has remained a battleground for super-powers for so many years.

(3) However, during more recent years major oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East have been successful in nationalising most of the oil resources. Their relationship with the oil companies operating in their countries have changed. In this the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) formd in 1961 has played a very significant role. OPEC has gradually refined its strategy and techniques of negotiation. Arab struggle has at the same time been fully supported by almost all the developing countries of the world on various international forums: non-aligned summits, UNCTAD, African Unity, and the United Nations.

(4) The expansion of public ownership of strategic means of production and distribution in several Latin American countries has served as a serious blow to economic imperialism of western powers. The nationalisation of major oil interests has often created serious problems but Governments of most of the Latin American countries have been willing to face the consequences. However, in spite of such progressive measures Latin America does not yet appear to be nearer to the accomplishment of the aims incorporated in the charter of *Punta del Esta*, adopted in August 1961. It may be recalled that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council met at *Punta del Esta*, Uruguay, where representatives of all the Latin American countries agreed to establish an "Alliance for Progress". The Charter provided that: "As a contribution to the Alliance for Progress, each of the countries of Latin America will formulate a comprehensive and well-conceived national programme for development of its economy." On the whole, the continent of Latin America is marching towards gaining sovereignty over its natural resources.

(5) Evidently, most of the countries in the Middle East and Latin America which have nationalised their petroleum resources, completely or largely, have not entrusted their operation to any Government Department. They have invariably employed the instrumentality of the public corporation or company to run these commercial and industrial enterprises. It should be interesting to study their organisational and administrative problems in detail.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATION

B. P. Singh

ADMINISTRATION has been variously described as the art of management, the tool of the State to achieve its goal, as an instrument of ordering of human relations to help the individual in developing "a consistent and coherent" personality or individuality. The art of administration is the direction, coordination and control of many persons to achieve some purpose or objective. From whatever angle it is looked at, its importance can hardly be exaggerated in any organized human society. The age old problem of striking a belance between individual liberty and social control has altogether a new dimension for administration in an under-developed economy, where there is growing serious imbalance between government performance and popular expectations. It was, therefore, that Aristotle called politics, a study of political system or polity, which includes administration as a 'master science' among men as it gives them some priority, some order in the rival claims on the always scarce resources of any given community. Public administration displays a history, co-extensive with organized government and under changing forms, marches through the centuries down to the specialized and highly developed systems which are characteristics of the modern industrialized state. From some remote period beyond the Egyptian and Hindu kingdoms, administration has seen the days of fedualism, monarchy and has come to democracies and totalitarian and all absorbing dictatorships of Fascists as well as of the Proletariat.

II

Coming to administration in India and without going through the myth and reality of a continuous evolutionary administrative tradition stretching from Kautilya through Akbar onto Warren Hastings down to Nehru as indicated in various writings by authorities, it can be safely said that at the time of declaration of the country as the 'Sovereign Democratic Republic' on 26th January, 1950, we had administrative traditions of high order and one of the best civil services in the world. And when the Preamble of the Constitution of India calls upon to secure

to all its citizens "Justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity" the most important instrumentality to achieve these goals is the administration of the State.

Article 53(1) of the Constitution of India makes it amply clear about the powers of the President when it reads: "The executive power of the Union shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this constitution." The officers are called upon to function in accordance with the rules made by the President for more convenient transaction of the business of the government. The constitution makes eleborate provisions regarding services in Part XIV and Chapter I in various articles *viz.* Articles 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313 and 314.

The Report of the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work rightly says "The civil servants as a group constitute the administration."[1] While speaking of the important and honoured roles of the three constitutional institutions—Parliament, Government and Administration, it sums up the position as follows:

> "Parliament is the sovereign body which controls the functioning of Government. In the discharge of this duty, it keeps Government action, or the lack of it, under continuous review, with the Administration remaining in the background. Government is the seat of the executive power and stands mid-way between Parliament and the Administration, directing the latter and being itself supervised by the former. Although situated at the tail end of the sequence, the Administration is important as an institution because it is the tool of the whole process of governance. Its contact is mainly with the Government which gives it a policy to implement and broadly supervises its doings. It has little to do directly with Parliament, but is influenced greatly by what happens there."[2]

III

Administration is not a purposeless exercise. It is this machinery which keeps order in the society without which there will be anarchy

[1] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, 1968, Delhi, Manager of Publications, Government of India, Part II, Vol. I, p. 6.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

and human life will be as Hobbes described "nasty, brutish and short". If the constitution sets the task of securing liberty, equality and social justice—it is not a new ideology but also a fact, a social reality as it creates justifiable aspirations in the millions of the people of the country. It is there that economic planning comes in. "In India the ideal has always been that the plan should always come from the people, meet their wishes and needs, and have their support in thought as well as deed."[3] The participation of the people is central to our democratic economic planning. In the words of the Planning Commission: "Democratic planning will not succeed unless the sanction of an awakened public opinion operates powerfully and the force of public action, in pursuit of constructive ends, continually grows. A democracy working for social ends has to base itself on the willing assent of the people and not the coercive power of the State.... If the direction of advance is in line with the expectations of the bulk of the people and the rate of progress is not too slow, the essential prerequisite for winning public cooperation will have been secured."[4] And here we came across the most important problem of mutual response between the citizen and the administration because democratic planning as the technique of managing affairs of public institutions has come to stay. It is said that the administrative system of the country as it obtains today has been found wanting in effectively carrying out the social and economic policies of the Government. Some of these deficiencies are inherent in the British system of administration where these goals were not set and even after Independence we have not made economic administration that strong. An inherent weakness of the system is that it is the comparatively junior official who has to meet the citizen in the street or across the counter. However farsighted the law-maker may be, individual variations cannot be ruled out and irritants which are a bye-product of paying officials at lower-levels less cannot also be wished away when our national kitty is not bounteous enough. In these situations, when relief is refused to a citizen or he is told that the matter is referred to a complicated, costly and time-consuming procedure, frustrations are inevitable. At higher levels, while dealing with files and papers the tendency to lose sight of the common man,—the article of faith of democracy, is also a probability which requires to be minimised by all concerned. A possible way to minimise the evil is to educate the public about the various wings of administration dealing with the problems of public, its nature and content and the procedure of implementation of these goals by administration. However, it is largely for the

---

[3] Gunar Myrdal, *Asian Drama—An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, 1968, Penguin Books, Vol. II, p. 850.

[4] Planning Commission, *The First Five Year Plan—A Draft Outline*, Manager of Publications, Government of India, Delhi, p. 235.

administration to adopt itself to the capacities and expectations of the people in regard to goals that have been set before the nation.

However, there is no denying the fact that the maintenance of law and order is the task of absolute priority before any administration. "It was permissible to expect that when the full democratic process of universal suffrage, periodic elections, freedom of expression and association and of an independent judiciary was guaranteed by the constitution, disturbance of law and order would be widely and instinctively recognized as violation of the law of the land and as an essentially anti-social act."[5] But this expectation has not so far been fulfilled. Law and order problems of the worst type like communal disturbances, unrest in the University campuses and violent demonstrations to achieve political ends keep on occurring every day in the country. The Central as well as the State Governments have been quick to diagnose the malady and renewed emphasis has been laid on maintenance of public peace, keeping of chaos at bay and maintenance of respect for authority in absence of which the fabric of common living would disappear and orderly progress will be a mere utopia. It is there that the pivotal role of the district magistrate holds good even now and makes Philip Woodruff's book, *The Men Who Ruled India—Guardians*, a fascinating story of achievements of men in the districts who tried to keep order and succeeded in keeping them amidst the worst odds.

IV

The first task is tuning the spirit of Government to what the people want. What the people want is formed by the synthesis of a great many diffuse elements in a given period of time. But to those who have worked with people in the villages, where India proverbially lives, one will not miss the common feeling that most of the people want only honest, efficient, prompt, just and sympathetic officers. People cannot be happy with an inefficient government. Here the quality of persons placed in position of power and responsibility becomes no less important than laying down of good rules and procedure of operation. The inner circle of every government is the political system. It encloses the administrative system and the services as one of its elements. Max Weber in his Essays on Sociology very succinctly sums up the position when he states that democracy as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy as it allows concentration of power in the hands of those who are in charge of bureaucratic machinery and that such a concentration of power is against the premises of democracy. However Max Weber

[5] D.G. Karve, "Citizen and Administration—Mutual Response", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 3 (July-September 1966), New Delhi, pp. 340-341.

was practical enough to admit that without a civil service class, democracy could be plagued by a spoils system, public waste, irregularities and lack of efficiency. Thus democracy has to promote what reason demands and democratic sentiments hate. This requires a deep insight into the problem of interaction between democracy and the bureaucratic system.

V

In a parliamentary democracy like ours, there are three partners engaged in a common enterprise of bettering the lot of the people: the Legislators, the Ministers and the Civil Servants. This is a partnership for pursuit of certain objectives and it depends upon the respective roles of the partners concerned as to whether these objectives can be achieved or not. Parliamentary democracies have established certain conventions in their political systems which are that although the executive power is vested in the President of the Republic or Governor of the State, it is exercised through the Council of Ministers at the Centre in case of the President and the Council of Ministers in the State in case of the Governor. The Council of Ministers in both the cases are responsible collectively to the Legislature. Although the responsibility is that of the Council of Ministers, conventions have developed to a certain degree that for their own departments, the Ministers explain facts and answer questions in Parliament and in Legislature and also have a sense of personal responsibility. The Civil Servants help the Ministers in policy formulation and they are also responsible for the execution of the policy decided upon by the Government. The neutrality of the civil service is an important quality. The neutrality of civil service signifies that Civil Servants are non-political and loyal to the Government in power. The anonymity of civil service is another characteristic. This means that the Civil Servants are faceless and nameless in Parliament and Legislature as the Ministers are responsible for their acts. Occasions have arisen and instances are there when the Civil Servants have been criticised by name and this has created a fear that if restraint is not practised by members of Legislature and Parliament and vigilance is not maintained by the Speaker of the House, this convention may be gradually eroded especially when some leaders do feel and publicly express that this convention holds good only upto a point. However, on the whole, the convention has been upheld. A sample survey carried out in 1969 has shown that there were 16 instances during the last 10 years when officers were mentioned by name in Parliament. The neutrality of the civil service also, by and large, has withstood the test of time. The civil service which was loyal to the Britishers in pre-Independence India has proved equally

loyal to the present Government. Sometimes, however, trends are noticed that Civil Servants develop loyalties for certain politicians and *vice versa* on grounds of caste, religion and other considerations. No civil service can expect to be treated well if they themselves degenerate and show inherent defects. The *esprit de corps* of the services shall have to be strengthened and the various local and central branches of the All India Service Associations will have to guard against such practices. Sometimes a question is raised about the extent to which the senior civil servants who are largely concerned with policy formulation can take interest in politics when they are supposed to be non-political. It is amply clear that politics, government and administration largely interact on each other. A distinction made by Appleby helps in making the demarcation. He says that every Civil Servant who has to do his job must know about party politics of the Government, but he must refrain from having any say or any participation in the matter and in fact, it goes against his conduct rules. But at the same time every Civil Servant will have to take interest in a part of politics which is called policy-politics. There can be no theoretical guidelines on the matter, it depends upon what the Civil Servant does.

Coming to the relationship between the Minister and the Civil Servants, the classical position is that the relationship should be one of complete friendship and harmony, of mutual understanding and trust. The line of demarcation in the words of Balfour is : "The job of the Minister is to tell the Secretary that up to this and not beyond will be tolerated by the Republic." But it is for the Secretary to say whether any action proposed by the Minister is all right, or whether there are difficulties. But if even then the Minister insists on his particular course of action, it is for the Civil Servant to execute it most faithfully as if the decision was his own. Far too many instances have been brought to light in various places about the interference by Legislators in the work of the civil servants. The advice of Rajaji to the then Chief Minister of Madras, Annadurai on his becoming the Chief Minister of the State was sound. He told him that the corridors of the secretariat must not be full with his party men and MPs and members of the State Legislature should not be allowed to have any say in regard to the posting of officers. If this is done and strictly enforced, much unhappiness will go as it will not allow things against which Herbert Morrison had cautioned and said that morale and efficiency of the Civil Servants can be hurt in two ways—it can be hurt by failure to check something which interferes with his work and it can be hurt by unjust denunciation of his services.

Morale has been defined as "the capacity of a group of people to pull together persistently and consistently in pursuit of a common

purpose". But morale is the inner possession of a person and a group to which he belongs and is affected by recruitment and training policies, terms of employment and working conditions, internal and human relationships, the relation that it has with the public, Legislators and Ministers and the attitude that the people have towards them in general. In regard to intra-relationship, however, as Pandit Pant said: "There has to be a greater degree of communication between those at the top and those below them so that the feeling of partnership and sense of purpose may be transmitted to the lowest in the hierarchy. There has to be a constructive role of leadership at every level; remote control and impersonalisation do not make for higher morale."[6] Morale helps the services because when the monetary emoluments are not very high, the job satisfaction and how one is viewed by the society give the person psychic emoluments.

VI

From the angle of functional analysis, I feel that the political system and the bureaucracy seem to be born of different ecologie. The question then is how to secure adjustment of rules as a means towards achieving the dominant goals in the political system. This has found its echo in the institutional set-up of comparatively recent growth of a large number of advisory committees consisting of politicians and officials for any given project or for all important functions in our districts. The politician has developed what may be termed "perception of the administrative role". There is no dearth of legislators and politicians who sincerely feel and do intervene in the hitherto reserved domain of administration—the services. The reasons for the interventionist attitude are many and somewhat inherent in our system. A legislator feels that, as a representative of the people, it is his duty to meet the demands of his electorate and to remove their grievances and in fact his political fortunes largely depend on his ability to do so. The typology of these demands which the services call complaints and interference may be grouped as follows:

(1) Developmental demands;

(2) Corruption, bribery and graft;

(3) Employment and un-employment;

(4) Appointment, transfer, posting and cancellation of these orders;

[6] G.B. Pant, "Inaugural Address", *Report of a Conference on Morale in the Public Services, January 3-4, 1959*, New Delhi, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1959, p. 10.

(5) Grant of favours by way of permit, quota, licences, etc.; and

(6) As sorted Demands.

Things, however, look differently if the legislator or the leader wields charismatic authority in his area. Socio-cultural beliefs and values that have grown in our system in respect of interventionist attitude have their own impact. There are, in fact, economic compulsions supporting this attitude. The services, on the other hand, follow the legal rational authority system except in cases of certain individual members of services seeking self-aggrandisement as referred to above. The chief features of the legal rational authority system conflict with the interventionist attitude. The main features of the system which the services seek to follow generally, although there are individual exceptions, are the following:

(1) Obedience is given to the legally established impersonal order;

(2) Person in authority occupies an office which forms part of a hierarchy with an accepted machinery for appeal and grievance;

(3) All decisions are to be made in writing in accordance with law; and

(4) There is no punishment for violation of the ultimate objects of the administrative system so long as rules are obeyed.

The new public administration attempts to make the best of these two approaches. The important points of this new administration may be categorised as follows:

(1) The bureaucratic system is continually interacting with the political, economic and socio-cultural rule-systems in a society. It is a modifying influence upon these systems and at the same time gets itself modified by activities of these related systems.

(2) The advice, support and guidance of persons actively associated with the political system are gradually being considered essential by the services in successful implementation of their administrative tasks.

(3) The political system has thrown up leaders who act as vital respondents reflecting the felt-needs of the people to guide the civil servants operating at the field level.

(4) A substantial amount of interference does take place as studies have revealed due to complicity of civil servants themselves with the beneficiaries of the political system.

(5) The areas of cooperation between the bureaucracy and the political system are actually enlarging.

(6) The new public administration is witnessing changes in socio-economic background of the services as well educational and cultural ethos of the politicians.

Thus coming to the main theme, it is more than obvious to treat the civil servant, the minister and the legislature as all parts of the democratic process and not as watertight compartments. Cohesion is emerging and the process is to be accelerated except at the peril of creating a bewildering array of cross-purposes. The new public administration has to develop built-in safeguards against forces leading to maladjustment and confusion.

VII

The new public administration is increasingly influenced by the new trends of modernization and specialization. Space and scientific and technological research is continuously forcing changes in our mode of living. As a result, administration is bound to become more and more specialized; the services cannot be an idle spectator and must keep pace with the latest developments. It is keeping this in view that the Report on Personnel Administration of the Administrative Reforms Commission addresses itself to the problem of changing conditions. It says, "There is still too great a reliance on the 'generalists'. The technical, scientific and other specialist personnel who have now appeared on the scene are not participating directly in policy formulation."[7] The modern administration of the country is bound to give wide expression to the principle of specialization. The principle involved is not merely the progressive establishment of administrative units for different types of activities organized by Government but also the employment of experts of many kinds to perform the work. The whole process of administration needs to be considered from the point of view of the expert to determine the most effective means of utilization of his techniques. A look at the American system of administration and the statistical-cum-mathematical approach to the therory of Public Administration make one tend to think of the utopia of specialization becoming true. The increasing role of the people who are known by such titles as systems engineer, operations researcher, computer programmer, data processing specialists or more simply the system designer cannot be ignored. In fact, any study of system designs and social change will prove that the

[7] Administrative Reforms Commission, ***Report on Personnel Administration***, Delhi, Manager of Publications, April, 1969, p. 11.

current system of management and administration has developed increasing impatience with human error. The applicability of automation in a democracy and that too in under-developed economies, may not be liked. But in any administration two things will have to be clearly distinguished. One is the established situation of administration in which one must have the necessary data and facts so that in times of need they can be referred to or properly utilized. The other point is the emergent situation which arises out of every day life and administrative business. The human factor here becomes very important because ideas alone do not build systems, but they are built by practical men. The increasing role of these social engineers is having its impact on administration. But one thing will have to be made clear that specialization is not merely a set of procedures; it implies study in greater depth of laws, rules and regulations, judicial administrations and customary practices which guide the official when he applies policy to a particular case. Years of study and experience alone can make a person such a specialist.

It is common knowledge that training and work assignment make every individual a specialist to a certain extent. A minister who has the responsibility of a particular department becomes to a relative degree a specialist after a certain period. Specialists and generalists in fact are relative and not absolute terms. But in recent times there has been a growing faith in the experts. The problem sometimes crops up in actual administration whether the expert should be the head of the organization or not. To take a concrete case, the question is raised whether the Secretary of the Health Department or Secretary of the Public Works Department should be a doctor and an engineer respectively or a generalist administrator. It is true that some of the experts when given specific responsibility to manage their departments have done fairly well. But many point out that a doctor who has managed that Health Department well or an engineer who has managed the Public Works Department well as its head has done so because of his other qualities and not because of the specific basic fact that he has been either an engineer or a doctor. In other words, this view takes its origin from the fact that it is not merely the interest of the doctors that are required to be looked after in the Health Department but the general interests of the public which a generalist administrator may be in a better position to know. This holds good in the case of the Engineering Department as well. The familiar dictum that the experts should be on tap and not on top which was considered to be of much practical value is being assailed. One danger which must be guarded against in the employment of experts is that specialization in administration must not be much faster compared to the intelligibility of the administration

by the public. If the formulae, the technology, the mode of obtaining information like the filling up of the forms, submission of returns and the like become too cumbersome, people to whose needs administration is supposed to cater may not understand the procedure of the administration and it may do incalculable harm in a democratic system. However, there is another aspect of the problem. We do not believe in appointing only those with specialized academic background in the particular line as Ministers for such departments. This may be the practice in communist and some other countries. The administrator has to write a language which can be understood by his political executive and has to communicate orders in a language which is again understood by his subordinates so that they are in a position to execute them faithfully and with understanding. The challenge of social change could be effectively met and it could also be given necessary direction if we modernize and specialize our administration.

VIII

While one can reasonably agree with Professor White in holding that the underlying trends of modern administration are not always easy to segregate and define and that there is yet no conclusion to the growth of administrative functions,[8] nevertheless one can easily discern the growth of a new administrative theory. The administrators of pre-Independence era often provided some natural ground for suspicion and reservation from which their successors have also suffered initially. But today one is witnessing the clearing up of these clouds. An administrator today is more accessible and committed. The spate of administrative reforms in the country has brought into limelight lapses on the part of the administrative system due sometimes to the political executive and sometimes to the administrative personnel. There is need for a broader framework within which administrative procedures can be worked out in detail. There should be a system whereby one can fix responsibility where it should rest and provide the institutional set-up which rewards efficiency and punishes the inefficient and corrupt. The system must secure division of business into manageable proportions by all concerned. It is not my argument that the new administrative theory has set out all these issues perfectly well. But this theory is developing by process of evolution over the years and making its adjustments and compromises. It is true that if Government holds society together, it is administration which gives life to Government. A theoretically perfect administration, however, is only less than half of what the administration should be; it should be run by a Civil Service which is

[8] Leonard D. White, "Public Administration", *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Volumes I-II, U.S.A. 195, p. 448.

both contented and effective. The Sarvodaya school of thought, however, believes in a classless society where people will be morally so high that they won't need a government. But that society may be an ultimate goal but does not seem to be a practical proposition. What is possible and should be expeditiously achieved is that the ends of maximization of happiness of the public that are set forth before administration should be implemented by the administration expeditiously. The new administrative theory must help in this regard and ensure the quality of men who hold and operate the levers of the administrative machine. The conventional methods of keeping the image of political parties by holding before the public vague promises of building castles in the air, and production of lengthy papers and targets which characterise the services must increasingly yield place to a new system where there is no "administrative jungle" but a "fruit-bearing orchard".

PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE SINGAPORE BUREAUCRACY

A NEGLECTED ASPECT IN ADMINISTRATION

Seah Chee Meow

PUBLIC relations has been defined as "an organised effort to communicate information and to modify attitudes and behaviour on behalf of a client or a cause".[1] The concept of public relations, as it is commonly understood today, was first introduced in 1897 in the American Yearbook of Railway Literature.[2] Since then, public relations has been systematically developed and refined as a tool of management. Philip Lesly, for example, has enumerated no fewer than twenty broad functions which can be encompassed within the scope of public relations.[3]

The importance of public relations today has never been doubted. Modern organisations have to deal with a large number of "publics", ranging from their own employees to specific interest groups. In a sense, public relations is primarily concerned with the problems of legitimising the organisation in the environment, thereby ensuring that the latter and its objectives would be accepted by the different sets of "publics" or clientele groups. Witn the growing differentiation of managerial skills required at the decision-making level, policy formulators have increasingly relied on public relations officers to assess clientele responses and demands.

Public relations is no less important to the effective functioning of the public bureaucracy. The democratic constitutional framework has often provided the environment in which the activities of the bureaucracy have come under close scrutiny. Apart from the belief in the sovereignty of individual rights, there is the underlying acceptance that the bureaucracy in a democratic political system should be accountable for its activities. A former British Premier, Lord Attlee, reiterated

[1] There are numerous books on public relations. Cf., Philip Lesly (ed.), *Public Relations Handbook*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1971.

[2] Howard Stephenson (ed.), *Handbook of Public Relations*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1960, p. 10.

[3] Lesly, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18.

this position when he commented:

> "It is essential to good administration under a democratic system that the public shall be adequately informed about the many matters in which Government action directly impinges on their daily lives, and it is in particular important that a true and adequate picture of British policy, British institutions and British way of life should be presented overseas."[4]

In developing countries, this aspect of public relations needs to be further stressed. During the colonial days, the bureaucracy in such polities was mainly responsible for regulative and extractive functions: its role was primarily to assist in reinforcing colonial rule. With political independence and mass enfranchisement there has been the need to change this role-image. At the same time, the bureaucracy has to implement a far wider range of functions like initiating programmes of economic development and nation-building. The bureaucracy's contacts with the people have become more frequent and intense, more so especially when some of its activities have the effect of modifying the attitudes and value-patterns of the masses. Effective public relations is thus indispensable to the bureaucracy if the continued support of the masses is to be sustained.

Although public relations constitute an important factor in determining the success of the activities of the bureaucracy, the idea of an elaborate public relations network is not universally accepted. The bureaucracy is generally chary of giving too much emphasis on public relations for fear that such motives could be misconstrued as deliberate attempts at manipulating public opinion. Similarly, opposition leaders have been known to opine the fear that such publicity programmes could be used for propagating the partisan values of the ruling leadership. Besides, bureaucrats are also noted for their general reluctance to keep the public "informed" of their activities since such disclosure may not be beneficial to their interests. In the United States, for example, it was partly due to the consistent agitations of Congressional members that information pertaining to the workings of the federal bureaucracy was made available. Even then, no satisfactory solution on the question of administrative secrecy could be found.[5] There remains the dilemma of how to reconcile the divergent claims for publicity and the bureaucracy's insistence on privacy in the operations of a democratic government.

---

[4] Quoted in D.N. Chester (ed.), *The Organisation of the British Central Government, 1914-64*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1968, pp. 277-8.

[5] Cf., Francis E. Rourke, "Administrative Secrecy : A Congressional Dilemma", *American Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 1960, pp. 684-694.

Public relations in the bureaucracy thus involves many dimension It includes (*i*) an analysis of the bureaucracy's perception of the public attitudes and *vice versa*; (*ii*) an appraisal of the channels by whic grievances of the public are rectified; and (*iii*) a study of the ways ‹ generating mass support for programmes implemented by the bureaı cracy. Public relations, in short, provide the vital two-way communicɛ tion flow of making the masses aware of administrative processes an decisions and also an understanding by the bureaucracy of populɛ demands and needs. This situation was posed by Pendleton Herrin some 37 years ago when he wrote:

> "It has been said that 'the evils of bureaucracy are largely tł product of staff isolation and specialisation of interest. Tł workers lose contact with the situations that make their problem with other offices that are concerned with their own or relate problems, and with the other contributors to the solution of the problems, to be found outside the government...'The postulatє of representative government dictate mutual understandin between citizen and official in carrying out the law. *The demı cratic state* fails in its purpose unless there is an accommodatio of governmental institutions to the needs of the community."[6]

In this paper we shall focus our attention on the roles of publ. relations in the Singapore bureaucracy. In the first section, we sha examine the extent to which public relations have been emphasised as function of the bureaucracy. In the second section, we shall examir the major channels for rectifying grievances. Finally, in the thiı section, we shall suggest a possible way in which public relations in tł bureaucracy could be improved. Admittedly, in such a discussion, is not possible to really isolate the bureaucracy from the other formɛ structures of government or the roles played by the political leadershiן For although the bureaucracy, a repository of administrative and prı fessional skills, can influence the policies of the government of the da: it is basically an institution which implements the programmes of tł ruling party.

ROLE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE SINGAPORE BUREAUCRACY

Singapore was founded in 1819 essentially as an outpost for tł expansion of British imperialist and commercial interests in the Malɛ archipelago region. Major political and constitutional changes too

[6] Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, New Yoı Russell & Russell, 1936, p. 26.

place only after the end of the Second World War. Partly as a result of domestic agitations and a series of political and constitutional measures, the island was able to enjoy internal self-government in 1959. Independence came four years later when the island was made a constituent state of the newly-created federation of Malaysia. In 1965, Singapore seceded from the federation to become an independent republic.

The Singapore bureaucracy is built largely on the colonial framework and is a major institutional legacy left by the departing colonial rulers. Throughout the transitional period, the bureaucracy has undergone numerous changes. Localisation of personnel was carried out with vigour following the acceptance of the Sreenivasan's Malayanisation Report from 1956 onwards while structural changes and role-expansion were also initiated to enable the bureaucracy to keep abreast with developments in the constitutional and political spheres.

In 1959, the PAP (People's Action Party) was elected to power and has remained the ruling party ever since. The political leadership, however, had serious misgivings of the bureaucracy. For example, the leaders felt that localisation did not lead to the creation of a national bureaucracy because (*i*) successor-bureaucrats were found to retain many of the values as their displaced expatriate superordinates, and (*ii*) the bureaucracy continued to remain as the stronghold of the English-educated, then a minority in multi-lingual Singapore. Bureaucrats, including the senior officers, were also found to be insensitive to the changing political realities in the island. To prevent a situation in which the bureaucracy would become an alienated institution, the PAP Government instituted a number of reforms. Recruitment in the bureaucracy was open to graduates of all language media. Senior bureaucrats were asked to attend the Political Study Centre which was set up for the specific purpose of acquainting these officers with the political and social milieu in which they were operating. In a way the leadership hoped that the confrontation between the English-educated (as exemplified by those serving in the bureaucracy) and the mass of the non-English educated would be avoided. As noted by a senior party leader:

> "By and large, the English-educated saw the struggle against colonialism only in terms of Malayanisation (localisation) and better promotion prospects for the local officers, and as soon as this was achieved, they took very little interest in the national struggle. It was otherwise for the other sections of the community. The Chinese-educated, in particular, have always considered themselves to be the have-nots under colonialism, which they

> grew to hate with an intensity which the English-educated can never understand."[7]

Implicit in the changes was the recognition of the importance of public relations. It was thus not surprising, therefore, that a high-power party committee was set up in 1960-61 to examine ways in which the bureaucracy could be improved. This committee, which included senior ministers like Dr. Goh Keng Swee and S. Rajaratnam, sifted through the complaints lodged by the public. In its report it said that a section of the bureaucracy retained hostile feelings towards the people. It added:

> "Civil servants, denied opportunities to be corrupt, have enforced laws and regulations with a strictness calculated to arouse popular animosity against the Government, so much so that some members of the public claimed that life was much easier when officials could be bribed into leaving them alone."[8]

and that:

> " . . . some officials, it is claimed, have responded to protests by members of the public by remarking: 'This is the law as enacted by your PAP Government. If you are dissatisfied, go to your PAP Assemblymen.' "[9]

It was to remedy this state of affairs that the ruling party set up the Central Complaints Bureau (CCB). It is significant to note that this bureau was staffed with Chinese-educated personnel. Apart from improving relations with the predominantly non-English educated public, the use of the Chinese-educated to examine the alleged shortcomings of the English-educated bureaucrats in a way showed the government's determination in ensuring that the bureaucrats would adopt a "correct attitude" in discharging their duties. At the same time, service conditions were tightened up especially in those areas pertaining to conduct. The CCB was able to initiate disciplinary proceedings against those found to be (*i*) speaking disparagingly of the Government in a manner calculated to bring the state into disrepute; (*ii*) being rude to the public in speech; or, (*iii*) being discourteous to the public in any manner.[10] The CCB was essentially established as an institution to exercise punitive measures against the bureaucrats for misconduct.

[7] *Petir*, Vol. 3, No. 7, January 22, 1960, p. 7.

[8] *Report of the Review Committee* (mimeo), p. 1.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Public Service (Disciplinary Proceedings—Delegation of Functions) Regulations, 1962.

While the PAP Government realised the importance of effective public relations and the need for popular support towards programmes and activities initiated by the bureaucracy, it did not believe that the bureaucracy should have an elaborate organisation to deal with public relations administration. When it came into power, the PAP Government had proceeded to dismantle the Department of Information (set up in 1952 by the colonial government). Senior officers of this department were transferred to other Ministries to perform administrative tasks while the more mechanical functions pertaining to publicity were absorbed by the newly-created Ministry of Culture.[11] As a result of the change, the Directorate and the Administrative and Press Divisions of the Department of Information (which had a staff complement of 45 in 1959) were abolished. At the same time, the budget allocation of that department which amounted to $919,000 in 1959 dwindled. In 1960, those divisions in the Ministry of Culture that were responsible for publicity and related activities were allocated only $302,000.[12]

The actions by the ruling party then could be attributed to the belief that its members should be involved, and in a sense monopolise the public relations function. The PAP leaders believed that their ability to consolidate political power would *inter alia* depend on direct communication with the masses. Political secretaries, appointed to assist the Ministers, were in fact used for public relations functions and also for improving elite-mass communication. The weekly "meet-the-people" sessions also enabled the Members of Parliament (or Assemblymen as they were then known) to perform a major public relations role.

The arrangements as outlined by the ruling party were then found to be feasible. Most of the party's successful candidates in 1959 were activists and who tended to use their own network of communications to consolidate political support. Subsequent events like the intra-party splits of 1961, the confrontation with Indonesia and the conflicts with the Malaysian (or Central) Government, had further reinforced the PAP leaders' belief in the efficacy of direct communication with the masses.[13]

---

[11] Public relations involves creation of information, improving liaison and publicity. Publicity in a sense is a mechanical function and is not as creative as the other two aspects.

[12] From *Annual Estimates of 1959 and 1960*

[13] Ample literature on this period of Singapore politics and the responses of the political leadership to the problems facing the country are available. See, for example, Thomas Bellows, *The People's Action Part of Singapore*, Yale University monograph, 1972; Chan Heng Chee, *Singapore—The Politics of Survival*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1972.

With the political leadership continuing to monopolise the publi relations role for itself, it is apparent that the bureaucracy would no have any elaborate framework to handle public relations. Publi relations became a relatively unimportant task, although bureaucrat with clientele contacts were urged to be courteous and efficient. Wit few exceptions, no provisions were made in the bureaucratic agencie for the appointment of fulltime public relations officers. Public rela tions, especially those involving answering queries posed by the citizens were usually entrusted to junior officers who had to attend to othe duties as well.[14] Partly to maintain some control over the flow o information, replies written by such officers had to be endorsed by th bureau heads or more senior bureaucrats in the organisation. Littl discretion was thus given to such "public relations" officers and who because of little training in the field of public relations, would ten to regard this activity as another of their routine functions. Also because replies to the public had to be approved by the superordinate in the organisation, a situation arose in which the latter came to b overwhelmed with having to give decisions on matters which shoul strictly be dealt with at the lower levels.

As expected, the arrangements as found in the bureaucracy ha certain limitations. First, the bureaucracy was not in a position t assess the attitudes or reactions of the clientele groups. For the bureau- cracy, this could be regarded as a crucial problem as no provisions existed for a continual assessment of the impact which the activities o the bureaucracy could have on the people. As Eldersveld puts it:

> "Administration (the bureaucracy) is a set of critical structures and processes serving as intermediaries between citizens and leaders, between the consumer-producer and planners. In this dual capacity, administration is involved, in one sense, with the utilisation, management, allocation, and development of human resources....However, it will not succeed unless it modifies public attitudes and beliefs, and redirects public and official behaviour."[15]

The importance of explaining issues to, and maintaining rapport with, the public was made all the more urgent in view of the fact that many people in Singapore were not familiar with complex bureaucratic procedures. Lack of education, unfamiliarity with rules and the brevity

---

[14] Officers assigned to answer queries raised by the public were usually executive officers or relatively junior administrative officers.

[15] S. J. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A.P. Barnabas, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy*, Glenview, Ill. Scott, Foreman & Co., 1968, p. 1.

of official communication had contributed to frustrations and inconvenience. In the first two years of its operations, the CCB received an average of about 88 complaints a month. It is interesting to note that most of the complaints were against departments which had more frequent contacts with the people (for example, the Police Department, Public Utilities Board) and that the major grievances included rudeness, misconduct, inattention and "bureaucratic" behaviour by civil servants. A study has shown that many of these complaints arose because complainants were not familiar with the rules and regulations and were thus made to believe that the bureaucrats were indifferent or arrogant.[16]

Secondly, the prevailing arrangements had highlighted a paradoxical attitude of the bureaucrats. As we have sketched in earlier paragraphs, public relations was mainly left to relatively junior officers who had to attend to other duties as well. On the other hand, senior officers in the bureaucracy were generally aware of the importance of maintaining a "good" agency image and ensuring that complaints (especially those published in the press) were reduced to a minimum. It would seem that the bureaucracy had valued the need for good public relations although it at the same time, de-emphasised the importance of effective public relations administration.

Thirdly, the Members of Parliament would have to perform some of the public relations functions for the bureaucracy by explaining procedures and regulations to constituents who solicited their assistance. Undoubtedly, this communication function had strengthened the role of these Members of Parliament at the constituency level, but this also meant that they would have less time to attend to the wider problems found in their constituencies. Besides, while the elected representatives in the early 1960s were usually activists and were inclined to handle public relations with ease, many of the elected representatives in the late 1960s (and those elected in the 1972 General Election) were professionals who were noted more for their technical expertise and organisational skills rather than their adeptness in carrying out the public relations role.

In this respect, two other developments should be taken into account. The first was the proliferation of para-statal bodies, a move which the PAP Government pursued with vigour upon its assumption of power in 1959. The E.D.B., H.D.B., P.U.B., and the People's Association were some of the bodies that were thus formed. The

---

[16] See, the writer's doctoral thesis, *Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emergent Nation : A Case-Study of Singapore,* Manchester University, 1971 on the chapter on Controls.

Government had hoped that these bodies, which would be free of administrative cumbersomeness of the central bureaucracy, wo expedite the implementation of essential and important programm Many of these organisations created posts of public relations witl their organisational structures—a move which had encouraged regular Ministries and departments which had previously treated put relations in an *ad hoc* manner, to follow suit.

A second factor which affected the bureaucracy was the crisis adjustment which the country had to undergo immediately after separation from Malaysia in 1965. Apart from having to re-define objectives, the country was further confronted with the problems rest ing from the impending withdrawal of British military forces. Dras measures were implemented by the leadership to overcome these prc lems: compulsory national service, tightening of labour laws and intensification in the pace of changing the economic base from an ov whelming dependence on entrepot trade to that of industrialisation. is interesting to note that during the crucial years 1965 to 1968, t number of public complaints brought to the attention of the CCB a the Members of Parliament had dropped appreciably.[17]

Since 1970, however, there has been an increase in these complain To a certain extent this could be attributed to the success which the public has achieved in overcoming many of the more pressing po independence problems. This concern with the rising number of co plaints was a major factor in the Government's decision to set up t Staff Training Institute. The latter to replace the former Staff Traini Centre, had among its aims the training of officers to be more courteo and polite to the people. In launching a courtesy drive, Dr. Goh Ke Swee said it might be necessary to put some heads "on the choppi block" in order to ensure that the message of social disciplir social awareness and a sense of courtesy was brought to the attenti of the civil servants. Meanwhile, new rules were laid down by t Public Service Commission (July 1970) which empowered the permane secretaries to act immediately on any complaint made against th subordinates. Depending on the gravity of the offence, officers fou guilty of misconduct would be subject to punishment ranging fro warnings to deferment in pay increments and even the imposition fines.[18] In a sense, these recent moves have suggested a growing ne for more effective public relations in the bureaucracy.

---

[17] From interview with the Director of the CCB and from discussions with so Members of Parliament.

[18] A local paper presented a two-day series on courtesy in the bureaucracy. S *New Nation*, March 21 and 22, 1972 for details.

SOURCES AND TYPES OF CLIENTELE FEEDBACK

Unlike private organisations, the bureaucracy has more channels of feedback. Demands for, and support to, bureaucractic activities can be funnelled directly to the agencies concerned or indirectly, through the newspapers. Alternatively, the clientele can always approach specific agencies, like the CCB and in cases of corruption, the CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau). They can also approach the Members of Parliament. In this section, we shall look into certain areas where clinetele demands and support are channelled. For the purpose of analysis we shall restrict ourselves to the newspapers and the CCB.

As shown in Table 1, an analysis of the requests/complaints shows that the majority of cases handled by the CCB in 1972 involved agencies which were concerned with state-building activities (for example, the Police Department). No fewer than 55 per cent of the 781 complaints belonged to this category. The next largest group of complaints/requests related to those connected with distributive activities. On the other hand, a more even distribution in the complaints/requests could be found in the newspapers. The biggest category involved distributive agencies (39 per cent in *Straits Times* and 38 per cent in *Sin Chew*) to be followed by those dealing with state-building and economic activities.

Not all the complaints/requests were of an adverse nature. As shown in Table 2, the bulk of the letters found printed in the newspapers were requests for sympathetic consideration from the governmental agencies (61 per cent in *Straits Times* and 67 per cent in *Sin Chew*). The other important categories pertained to alleged delays of service or inefficiency of bureaucrats. On the other hand, the largest group of complaints as handled by the CCB alleged illegal actions of civil servants (42 per cent). It would seem that the people on the whole are aware of the CCB's role since no complaints pertaining to illegal activities by bureaucrats were addressed to the newspapers.

It is not possible to show the extent to which the grievances/requests of complainants have been rectified. Letters appearing in the newspapers, as a matter of policy, have usually received prompt replies. Many of the replies have suggested that the complainants should get in direct contact with the agencies concerned. This approach would enable the complainants to discuss their cases more adequately while sparing the agencies involved further exposure of their alleged shortcomings. The extent to which such grievances/requests have been met is thus not known.

Table 1

Complaints/Requests Received by the CCB and Newspapers and Agencies Involved, 1972

Agencies by Functional Classification	*CCB*		*Straits Times*		*Sin Chew**	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
State-building[a]	428	54.8	190	27.2	82	27.7
Economic[b]	123	15.8	160	22.9	72	24.3
Distributive[c]	229	29.3	270	38.7	111	37.5
National-building[d]	1	0.1	52	7.5	27	9.1
Intra-bureaucratic[e]	—	—	26	3.7	4	1.4
Total	781	100.0	698	100.0	296	100.0

SOURCE: Figures for CCB are derived from data supplied by the Director of the CCB. Figures for the newspapers are derived by classifying those letters which appear in the two newspapers.

NOTES: *for half year only (*i.e.*, January to June 1972).

(*a*) Defined as the administrative and related functions responsible for establishing the writ of the Government. Agencies involved include Administrative Service, Accountant-General's Office, Audit, Film Censorship, Immigration Department, Prisons, Police, Registry of Vehicles.

(*b*) Defined as roles affecting material resources which are of industrial or practical significance. Agencies involved include Civil Aviation, Customs and Excise, Marine Department, Ministry of Finance (E.D.D.), Ministry of National Development, Postal Department, Public Works.

(*c*) Defined as activities pertaining to social services, for example, Fire Brigade Ministry of Health, Labour Exchange, Ministry of Social Affairs, Social Welfare Department.

(*d*) Defined as functions which contribute towards the inculcation of political values. These include agencies like Broadcasting, Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Education.

(*e*) Complaints/requests of general concern to the bureaucracy and which cannot be classified in any of the above categories.

On the other hand, an analysis of the CCB's investigations shows that a considerable number of the complaints/requests were valid. Apart from the 90 cases which were not substantiated and another 69 which were still in the course of investigation, the others were found to have valid grounds for complaining. Remedial action was taken in 469 cases (or 61 per cent of cases investigated). Misconception of facts or bureaucratic procedures, which appeared in 49 cases, was also resolved by the CCB (*See* Table 3).

Table 2

Classification of Complaints/Requests Received by Source, 1972

Type of Complaints/ Requests	*CCB*		*Straits Times*		*Sin Chew*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Discourtesy	27	3.6	12	1.7	2	0.7
Misconduct	54	7.0	18	2.6	—	—
Petty Bureaucracy	12	1.6	29	4.2	—	—
Unnecessary Delay of Service/ Inefficiency	40	5.2	124	17.8	88	29.7
Discrimination of Service	36	4.7	43	6.1	6	2.0
Illegal Act	322	41.8	—	—	—	—
Request for Sympathetic consideration from Government	278	36.1	422	60.5	197	66.6
Private Dispute	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pay/Promotion/Service Conditions	—	—	50	7.2	3	1.0
Total	769*	100.0	698	100.0	296	100.0

SOURCE : As in Table 1.

NOTE : *The total number of cases excludes complaints/requests made through the telephone.

Table 3

CCB — Investigations and Results, 1972

Result/Action Taken	*Number of Cases*	*Percentage of Total*
Dismissal	—	—
Warning	16	2.1
Insufficient evidence for further proceedings	76	9.9
Misconception of facts	49	6.3
Unsubstantiated cases	90	11.7
Pending Investigations	69	9.0
Remedial Action	469	61.0
Total	769	100.0

SOURCE : From the CCB.

It would appear that there remains a dire need for more effective public relations so as to increase and sustain the level of clientele support. Ignorance of bureaucratic processes and procedures and the need to cater to the specific requests of the people continue to be important in 1972 as they were in the early 1960s. Public relations, hitherto a neglected aspect of administration, should be given a greater emphasis in the organisational framework than is currently accorded.

ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM

Taking into account the unsatisfactory arrangements in the bureaucracy, it may be appropriate to give serious thought to the setting up of a common user service that is geared specifically towards providing personnel for public relations needs in the bureaucracy. Officers recruited into this service would be trained in all aspects of public relations and the allied problems pertaining to administrative secrecy and discretion in the dissemination of official information. Such officers could also be used to staff publicity posts in diplomatic missions that are being established abroad.

The proposal for this common user service rests on four major assumptions. First, there is a constant need for a dialogue or feedback from those affected by the programmes initiated by the governmental agencies. Effective public relations can ensure that only a minimum of inconvenience would be experienced by the clientele. Secondly, there is a need to maintain constant and frequent liaison with specific clientele groups. The mass media, for example, can and have been known to assist the bureaucracy by disseminating pertinent information to the public. It is essential that specific persons appointed in the bureaucracy for public relations are able to liaise with these groups and develop a healthy relationship which can be mutually satisfying.[19] Besides, as such officers would be adequately trained for the job, there would be no need for the existing practice of superordinates having to "vet" information emanating from the agencies. Thirdly, the creation of this common user service could improve intra-bureaucratic communication and liaison. For example, the success of a government bureau in launching a publicity campaign could be more easily realised when there is a ready network of public relations officers to fall back on for assistance and coordination. Finally, the creation of the new service would help remove much of the occupational frustrations among existing

[19] A common complaint among local journalists is the lack of mutual trust between them and the bureaucrats in the Civil Service who are assigned to do public relations duties. It is possible that the latter, who being not aware of the extent of discretion they have in the dissemination of information, tend to adopt a tight-lip attitude much to the frustrations of the journalists.

public relations officers who tend to regard their current positions as "dead-end" jobs. With the creation of this new service opportunities for career development and mobility in the field of public relations would be assured. Indeed, this new service, if implemented, would be a greater incentive for existing public relations officers to remain in their present jobs rather than opt for more established services (like the Administrative Service) or leave the bureaucracy altogether.

The formation of this Public Relations (or Information) Service will not over-shadow the roles performed by existing agencies like the CCB or the CPIB. These two agencies are involved in the investigation of complaints, that is to say, they are concerned more with examining the alleged malpractices of civil servants. Indeed, the creation of this new common service would expedite the work performed by these two agencies since these officers would help remove many of the popular misconceptions of the bureaucracy. It may in fact be argued that the CCB, for example, has at the present moment a heavy workload of complaints/requests because there are few competent public relations officers in the bureaucracy to answer these complaints/requests in a satisfactory manner. Thus, the setting up of this new service could help improve overall efficiency in the bureaucracy and at the same time, strengthen the bureaucracy's relationship in the society.

CONCLUSION

Public relations has developed into a highly professionalised field. Those involved in this field are expected to disseminate information, assist superordinates in decision-making, and participate in projects that would promote the objectives of the organisations they represent. In addition, they are expected to have a number of corporate responsibilities like maintaining correct relationship with the mass media and other clientele groups which can impinge on the functioning of the organisations.

Public relations in the bureaucracy is as important as public relations in the private organisations. In a democratic setting, there is an ever pressing demand that the bureaucracy should be accountable for its activities. As the scope of administration widens to encompass more aspects of a citizen's daily activities, the demand for information will continue to grow. Information is not necessarily a one-way flow from the bureaucratic agencies to the clientele. Just as it could be used to clear ambiguities with regard to administrative procedures and processes, information could also be used to mobilise support for bureaucratic actions.

In the Singapore bureaucracy, the management of public relation has not received much attention even though there is a recognition of th importance of preserving a good public image. It is proposed in thi paper that serious thought be given to the setting up of a professiona common user service for the specific purpose of fulfilling the publi relations needs of the numerous governmental agencies. Such a servic would appreciably increase the level of governmental and bureaucrati effectiveness and support. Indeed, such a proposal would help improv the "cutting edge" of administration by making the bureaucracy mor efficient, resilient and responsive to the common citizen and othe clientele groups whom it seeks to serve.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S SERVICES AND THE END OF THEIR SPECIAL PRIVILEGES

A HISTORICAL REVIEW

Udai Raj Rai

PARLIAMENT, by the Constitution 28th Amendment Act, 1972, has abolished the special privileges enjoyed by the erstwhile Secretary of State's Services under Article 314[1] of the Indian Constitution. The purpose of this Article is to give a historical review of those services and their rights.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S SERVICES

Though, as emphasised by the Joint Committee,[2] every public service in India was a Crown Service, yet from the point of view of structure and organisation, no less than in matters of their rights, all the public services could be divided into three categories.[3] First, there were All-India Services, the members of which were appointed by the Secretary of State. On appointment a member of the service was assigned to a province, and unless he was "transferred to service under the Central Government", he spent his whole career in the Province to the cadre of which he belonged. But despite their assignment to various provinces, each of the All-India Services constitute a single service, with a common status and rights. The Statutory Commission said:[4]

"The greater part of the administration of India is, of course, carried on by the provincial Governments, and upto 1924 the

---

[1] Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Constitution every person, who having been appointed by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State in Council, to a civil service of the Crown in India, continues on and after the commencement of this Constitution to serve under the Government of India or of a State, shall be entitled to receive from the Government of India and the Government of the State, which he is from time to time serving, the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit as that person was entitled to immediately before such commencement."

[2] *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform*, Vol. I (Part I), London (1934), p. 179.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175, see also, *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, *Survey*, London (1930), Cmd. 3568, pp. 264-65.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 264.

All-India Services were in principle, as they still are in practice, the main agents of the provincial administration."

Secondly, there were the provincial services which were "the middle grades of administration". The members of these services were appointed by the Provincial Governments, and were generally recruited from the province concerned. Thirdly, there were the Central Services which were engaged on matters under the direct control of the Central Government. The members of these services were partly appointed by the Government of India and partly by the Secretary of State. Thus the Secretary of State's services consisted primarily, though not exclusively, of the All-India Services.

The following were the All-India Services:[5]

(1) The Indian Civil Service,

(2) The Indian Police Service,

(3) The Indian Forest Service (including the Forest Engineers Service),

(4) The Indian Educational Service,

(5) The Indian Agricultural Service,

(6) The Indian Service of Engineers,

(7) The Indian Veterinary Service, and

(8) The Indian Medical Service (Civil).

In pursuance of the recommendations of the Lee Commission,[6] the recruitment to such of the above services as had been transferred to the control of the ministers in the provinces ended in 1924.[7] The services affected were those listed in nos. (4), (5), (7), the Roads and the Buildings branch of the Indian Service of Engineers, and the Indian Forest Service in the provinces of Bombay and Burma. The Lee Commission Report said:[9]

"In the transferred field the responsibility for administration rests on Ministers dependent on the confidence of Provincial

[5] Rule II of the Classification Rules, 1920, printed at p. 85 of the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India*, London (1924), Cmd. 2128; see also, *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, op. cit., p. 268.

[6] *Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services in India*, op. cit., pp. 7-13.

[7] *Statutory Commission*, op. cit., pp. 268-69.

[8] It had another branch known as the Irrigation branch of the Indian Service of Engineers.

[9] *Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services*, op. cit., p. 8.

Legislatures. It has been represented to us that, although Ministers have been given full power to prescribe policy, they might be hampered in carrying it out by the limitations to their control over the All-India Services, inasmuch as the members of these services, unlike those of provincial services, are appointed by the Secretary of State and cannot be dismissed except by him, whilst their salaries are not subject to the control of the local Legislatures.

"Ministers themselves have told us that the All-India Officers serving under them have, with negligible exceptions, given most loyal support in carrying out their policies, but the constitutional anomaly remains that the control over the transferred field contemplated by the Government of India Act has remained incomplete. Our proposals are framed to remedy this particular anomaly."

However, an exception was made in the case of Indian Medical ervice (Civil). This was because of the obligation of the Government f India to maintain a medical reserve for war and to provide treatment y European doctors for European personnel and their families.[10]

The Statutory Commission,[11] contemplating full autonomy for he provinces, was again faced with the old question as to how far it vould be consistent with the contemplated new status of the provincial governments to work with officers employed on an all-India basis. The Commission recommended the continuance of the recruitment of he Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police service on an all-India basis by the Secretary of State. It gave three principal reasons for this. First, the all-India recruitment would have wider field of choice, "and he status and tradition attaching" to an All-India Service would "secure or it recruits of a class for which a provincial service" had no attractions. Secondly, the responsibility of the Governor and ultimately that of the Governor-General for the administration of the provinces in case of total failure of constitutional machinery there, as suggested by the Commission, justified the recruitment on an all-India basis. Thirdly, the Commission approved the existing system, whereunder the Central Secretariat was drawn from the All-India Services working in the provinces. With regard to the remaining services, it left the question open, though its preference was for the continuance of those services on an all-India basis.

---

[10] *Statutory Commission, Survey,* op. cit., p. 269.

[11] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission,* Vol. II, *Recommendations,* London 1930), Cmd. 3569, pp. 286-290.

The Government of India[12] agreed with the view taken by the Statutory Commission on the question of the recruitment of the two security services,[13] and it also assumed that a decision to continue the recruitment on an all-India basis involved the continuance of the recruitment by the Secretary of State. It brushed aside the suggestion that the power of recruitment and control should be transferred to the Government of India, because that did not meet the basic objection "that local Governments would be hampered in the exercise of their authority".

But the Services Sub-Committee of the First Round Table Conference,[14] while recommending that the recruitment to the I.C.S. and I.P.S. should continue on an all-India basis, by a majority took the view "that the recruiting and controlling authority in the future should be the Government of India". It was only a minority which thought that the authority should remain vested in the Secretary of State, on the ground that, without a right of appeal to him, the right type of recruitment for the British element would not be available.

When the White Paper Proposals[15] provided not only for the continuance of the recruitment to the I.C.S. and I.P.S. on an all-India basis but also the continuance of the Secretary of State's authority over these services, the British India Delegation strongly objected to it. The Joint Memorandum of the delegation stated[16]: "No part of the White Paper Proposals has caused more dissatisfaction in India than the provisions relating to the Public Services." In the view of the delegation "recruitment for the Central Services should be by the Federal Government and for the Provincial Services, including the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police, should be by the Provincial Governments, who should have full power to determine the pay and other conditions of service for future recruits and also the proportion of Europeans that should be recruited".[17]

The Joint Committee[18] agreed with the White Paper proposals.

---

[12] *Government of India's Despatch on Proposals for Constitutional Reform*, London (1930), Cmd. 3700, pp. 182-84.

[13] The term was often used to denote I.C.S. & I.P.S.; *ibid.*, p. 183, para 204.

[14] I.R.T. Conference, Nov. 12, 1930, Jan. 19, 1931, Sub-Committees Reports, etc., Calcutta (1931), p. 66.

[15] Published originally as Cmd. 4263, Appendix I to the Joint Committee Report, *op. cit.* Proposal No. 183, Para. 72 of the Introduction suggested statutory inquiry into the question after a period of five years.

[16] *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform*, Vol. III, Records, London (1934), p. 221.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 221-22.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 179-89, esp. pp. 182-83.

It also "considered, but...felt obliged to reject, the possible alternative of recruitment by the Governor-General in his discretion." It said:[19]

> "The change in that case might be no doubt represented as one of form rather than of substance, since the Governor-General would be acting under the directions of the Secretary of State; but for that very reason we are reluctant to make a merely formal change, which might at this juncture have an unfortunate effect upon potential recruits."

The White Paper proposals found shape in Section 244 of the Government of India Act, 1935.[20] But Section 10(1) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947[21] deleted those provisions of the Act of 1935 which related to appointments by the Secretary of State. However, the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police became the nuclei for two new All-India Services, known as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service. The exact time when the new services came into existence is not known.[22] But they got their formal recognition under Article 312 of the Constitution. Article 312 is as follows:

> "(1) Notwithstanding anything in Part XI, if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest so to do, Parliament may by law provide for the creation of one or more All-India Services common to the Union and the States, and subject to other provisions of this Chapter, regulate the recruitment, and the condition of service of persons appointed, to any such service.
>
> "(2) The services known at the commencement of this Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created by Parliament under this Article".[23]

---

[19] *Report of Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, op. cit., p. 183.

[20] 26 Geo. V&IEdw. VIII Ch. 2. In addition to the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police (as the service was to be called thereafter) the Secretary of State was to make recruitment also for Indian Medical Service (Civil). And under Section 245 he could, until the Parliament had determined otherwise, recruit to a post or service concerned with irrigation for the purposes of securing efficiency in irrigation in any province.

[21] 10 & 11 Geo. VI, C. 30.

[22] Per Raghubar Dayal J. in *R. P. Kapoor* v *Union of India*, (1964) 5 Sc. R. 431,469.

[23] Parliament has passed the All India Services Act, 1951. Under Section 3(1) of the Act "The Central Government may, after consultation with Governments of the States concerned ..make rules for the regulation of recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to an all-India service. "In exercise of this power

(Continued on page 632)

The Article was introduced at the instance of Sardar Patel. In his letter to the Prime Minister, he rejected as out of place any possible opposition to the proposal on the ground of provincial autonomy. The proposal did not meet with any opposition of substance in the Constituent Assembly.[24] But Sardar Patel's attitude and some of the utterances in the Assembly debates about the right of the State Governments to control the State services make a mockery of the entire pre-independence debate on the subject.[25]

RIGHTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SERVICES

At the time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, a member of the Secretary of State's Services had the following principal

---

(Continued from page 631)

the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, The Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, The Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, The All India Services (Conduct) Rules 1954, and the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 have been made. Under Rule (3) of the Recruitment Rules the respective Services are to consist among others of members of the Indian Civil Service or the Indian Police, as the case may be, persons recruited to the services before the commencement of the rules and persons recruited to the services in accordance with the rules. Recruitment is to be mainly by competitive examinations and promotion from the State Civil (Executive) and Police Services (R.4). After the commencement of the Rules all appointments are to be made by the Central Government (R.6). Commenting on the Indian Administrative Service Prof. Morris Jones has remarked that "the valuable part of the I.C.S. ethos has been astonishingly preserved." *The Government and the Politics of India*, 2nd Ed. 1967, p. 123.

For the I.C.S. ethos see *The Indian Civil Service 1601-1930* by O'Malley, 2nd Ed; see also, Ralph Braibanti, *Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India, Administration and Economic Development in India*, (1963) Braibanti and Splenger (ed.). In the opinion of Ralph Braibanti the evolution of the I.C.S. "into the Indian Administrative Service was unspectacular but orderly," p. 4.

24 See, *Constituent Assembly Debates*, Vol. IX, pp. 1116-19.

25 *e.g.*, Shri Brajeshwar Prasad said : "I am now in favour of the proposition that every civil servant of the State, whether he is serving the Union or in the provinces, should hold his office during the pleasure of the President and of the President alone. I cannot agree to the proposition that every civil servant of a State should hold office during the pleasure of Governor, as the case may be, the Ruler of the State. The Governor or the Ruler means the Ministry." *C.A.D.*, Vol IX, p. 1110. For the pre-independence debate on the subject, see Richard Symonds, *The British and their Successors*, London, 1966.

For the current problems see Alice Jacob, *Centre State Governmental Relations in the Indian Federal System*, 10 J.L.I. 583, 605-608 under the head, *All India Services*. She finds that, with the emergence of Governments controlled by different political parties at the Centre and in the States, "some doubts have been expressed about the desirability of retaining the existing All-India Services and creating more such services." (p. 607). She also notes the difficulty created by the language problem and concludes that "the provision of All-India Services appears to be unusual in a federal system." (p. 608). But her own view is that "it would be in the national interest that these services be continued. *See* also Asok Chanda, *Indian Administration*, (London) (1958) Chap. III pp. 93-139. Mr. Chanda favours the extension of the all India services, but at the same time remarks that the "more one studies the profile of India's administration, the more one is struck by the lack of symmetry and mobility in its features, p. 123.

rights:[26]

"1. Protection from dismissal by any authority subordinate to the appointing authority [Section 96 B(1)].

2. Rights to be heard in defence before an order of dismissal, removal or reduction is passed (Classification Rule 55).

3. Guarantee to persons appointed before the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1919 of existing and accruing rights or compensation in lieu thereof [Section 96 B(2).]

4. Regulation of conditions of service, pay and allowances, and discipline and conduct, by the Secretary of State in Council [Section 96 B(2)].

5. Power of the Secretary of State in Council to deal with any case in such manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable, notwithstanding any rules made under Section 96 B [Section 96 B(5)].

6. Non-votability of salaries, pensions and payments on appeal [Section 67 A(3)(iii) and (iv) and 72D(3) and (v)].

7. The requirement that rules made under part VIII A of the Act shall only be made with the concurrence of the majority of votes of the Council of India (Section 96 E).

8. Regulation of the right to pensions and scale and conditions of pensions in accordance with the rules in force at the time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919 [Section 96 B(3)].

9. (*i*) Reservation of certain posts to members of the Indian Civil Service (Section 98).

   (*ii*) Appointment of persons who are not members of the Indian Civil Service to offices reserved for members of that service only to be made subject to rules made by the Governor-General in Council with approval of the Secretary of State in Council (Section 100).

10. Determination of strength (including number and character of posts) of All-India services by the Secretary of State in Council, subject to temporary additions by the Governor-General in Council or local Government (Classification Rules 24 and 10).

---

[26] The list is given in appendix VII, part I of the White Paper Proposals, *op, cit.*, pp. 373-74. A note at the beginning of the list says that "in the case of Sections, the reference is to the Government of India Act, and in case of Rules, to rules made under that Act".

11. Provision that posts borne on the cadre of All-India Services shall not be left unfilled for more than three months without the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council (Classification Rule 25).

12. Appointment of any one who is not a member of an All-India Service to posts borne on the cadre of such a service only to be made with the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council, save as provided by any law or by rule or orders made by the Secretary of State in Council (Classification Rule 27).

13. Sanction of the Secretary of State in Council to the modification of the cadre of a Central Service, Class I which would adversely affect any officer appointed by the Secretary of State in Council, to any increase in the number of posts in a Provincial Service which would adversely affect any person who was a member of a corresponding All-India Service on 9th March, 1926, or to the creation of any specialist post, which would adversely affect any member of an All-India Service, the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment, and the Indian Political Department. (Provisos to Classification Rules 32, 40 and 42).

14. Personal concurrence of the Governor required for any order affecting emoluments or pension, any order of formal censure or any order on a memorial to the disadvantage of an officer of an All-India Service (Devolution Rule 10).

15. Personal concurrence of the Governor required for an order of posting of an officer of an All-India Service (Devolution Rule 10).

16. Right of complaint to the Governor against any order of an official superior in a Governor's Province and direction to the Governor to examine the complaint and to take such action on it as may appear to him just and equitable [Section 96 B(1)].

17. Right of appeal to the Secretary of State in Council, (*i*) from any order passed by any authority in India, of censure, withholding of increments or promotion, reduction, recovery from pay of loss caused by negligence or breach of orders, suspension, removal or dismissal, or (*ii*) from any order altering or interpreting to his disadvantage any rule or contract regulating conditions of service, pay, allowances or pension made by the Secretary of State in Council and

(*iii*) from any order terminating employment otherwise than on reaching the age of superannuation (Classification Rules, 56, 57 and 58).

18. Right of certain officers under the regulations to premature retirement."

All these rights were preserved, and in some respects even enlarged, under the Act of 1935. It is needless to add that many of the rights, which were formerly protected only by statutory rules, were included in the Statute itself. In addition, the provision in Section 276 continued the rules framed under the earlier Act, so far as consistent with the new Act. As under the 1935 Act the system of responsible government was introduced in the Centre too, provisions were included in the new Act so as to confer certain powers on the Governor-General in relation to the Secretary of State's Services. Thus Section 246(1) provided for the reservation of posts, and sub-section (2) of the section required that appointments and postings to such posts should be done by the Governor-General or a Governor, as the case might be, exercising his individual judgment. Whereas formerly the benefit of such provisions was limited to the All-India Services, including the Indian Civil Service, Section 246(1) of the new Act extended the rule to all the Secretary of State's Services. Similarly, the power to regulate the conditions of service of the members of these services continued to be vested in the Secretary of State, who was to act, despite the abolition of the Council,[27] with the concurrence of his advisers.[28] But, whereas formerly he could delegate his power to other authorities in such matters and to such extent as he thought fit,[29] Section 247(1)(a) required "as respects pay, leave and pensions and general rights in regard to medical attendance they should be such as may be prescribed by rules to be made by the Secretary of State". And even in other matters the authorities in India could regulate their service conditions only insofar as the Secretary of State did not think fit to make rules on the matter.[30] This rule-making power was subject to the general limitation that no rule was to give a member of the Secretary of State's Services "less favourable terms as respects remuneration or pension than were given to him by the rules in force on the date on which he was first appointed to his service or was appointed to his post".[31] It was also subject to the overriding

---

[27] Section 278(8).

[28] Section 261.

[29] Section 96 B(2), Government of India Act 1919.

[30] Section 247 (1)(b).

[31] Proviso to Section 274(1).

provision which was as follows:[32]

> "No rules made under this Section shall be construed to limit or abridge the power of the Secretary of State to deal with the case of any person serving His Majesty in a civil capacity in India in such manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable, and no rules made under this Section by any person other than the Secretary of State shall be construed to limit or abridge the power of the Governor-General, or as the case may be, the Governor of a Province, to deal with the case of any such person in such manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable.
>
> Provided that, where any rule made under this Section is applicable to the case of any person, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him than that provided by the rule."

Salaries, allowances, pensions and government contributions to the provident fund, and sums ordered to be paid on an appeal were to be charged on the revenues to the Federation or a Province as the case might be.[33] This meant that such sums were not subject to the votes of the Legislature, whether Federal or Provincial.[34] No order or promotion or suspension, or granting leave for not less than three months, nor any order or punishment or formal censure, or one that affected the emoluments or pension rights or decided against any member of the service any subject matter of memorial, was to be made by anyone except the Governor-General or a Governor, as the case might be, exercising his individual judgment.[35] And even in other matters, if a member of the service felt he had a grievance, he could complain to the Governor-General or a Governor, as the case might be, and he was to decide the complaint exercising his individual judgement.[36] The right to appeal to the Secretary of State was, of course, there.[37] Lastly, protection against dismissal by any authority subordinate to the appointing authority, and the right to be heard in defence before an order of dismissal or reduction was passed, were incorporated in Section 240(2) & (3). One of the rights guaranteed under the Government of India Act, 1919 was that a person, appointed by the Secretary of State before the commencement of that Act, was entitled to all his existing and accruing rights or compensation for loss thereof. The Law Officers

---

[32] Section 247(7).

[33] Section 247(4) & (5), & Section 248(4).

[34] Section 79(1).

[35] Section 247(2) and Section 248(2).

[36] Section 248(1).

[37] Section 248(3).

of the Crown interpreted[38] the words 'accruing rights' to include only those rights which were created by a statute, a statutory rule or regulation. They did not think that it included mere prospects of promotion. Therefore, in their opinion, compensation could not be claimed by any person actually holding that post at the time of the abolition thereof. This interpretation was not to the satisfaction of the services. The memorandum of the Indian Civil Service Association to the Joint Committee urged "accruing rights should be deemed to include reasonable prospects in the career to which a person holding an appointment in the civil service of the Crown in India could look forward at the time of his recruitment; and the decision as to what are reasonable prospects in the case of individuals or of the Service as a whole should rest with the Secretary of State and his advisors".[39] Consequently Section 249(1) of the 1935 Act conferred a general power on the Secretary of State to award compensation, if anything done under the Act adversely affected the conditions of service or otherwise it appeared to him that compensation ought to be granted.

The Indian Independence Act, 1947[40] made serious inroads into some of the above rights. Section 10(1) discontinued such provisions of the Act of 1935 as related to appointments in India by the Secretary of State or related to the reservation of posts. Article 3(2) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947[41] omitted all references in the Act of 1935 requiring the Governor-General and the Governor to exercise their individual judgment or to act in their discretion. The Order made some further modifications and adaptations in the Act, which had become necessary, in view of the departure of the Secretary of State from the scene. A provision was added in sub-section (2) of Section 240 so as to provide that a person originally appointed by the Secretary of State, could not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the Governor-General or the Governor "according as that person" was "serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion or of a province".[42] Section 247 was replaced by a new Section, which provided: (*a*) the conditions of service of such members of the Secretary of State's Services as were serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion were to be regulated by the Governor-General; and (*b*) the

[38] *Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India*, op. cit. p., 47.

[39] *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform*, op. cit., *Minutes of Evidence* Vol II A., p. 3.

[40] 10 & 11 Geo. VI, C. 30.

[41] *Government of India Acts*, etc., Calcutta, Sarkar & Sons, p. 346.

[42] India (Provisional Const.) Order, 1947, *op. cit.*, Schedule. This provision was further amended by G.G.O. 34 and the power of dismissal was taken away from the Governor and was vested only in the Governor-General. *R.P. Kapoor* v *Union of India* (1964) 5 SCR+431, 457.

conditions of service of such members of the Secretary of State's Services as were serving in connection with the affairs of a Province were to be regulated (*a*) by the Governor-General "in regard to their pay, leave, pensions, general rights as medical attendance and any other matter, which immediately before the establishment of the Dominion, was regulated by rules made by the Secretary of State," and (*b*) by the Governor as respects other matters.[43] The provisions which exempted their salaries, allowances, etc., from the vote of the legislature were omitted.

However, subject to the above modifications, the rights of those members of the Services, who continued in the service of the Dominion or a Province were preserved: Section 10(2)(a) of the Indian Independence Act provided as follows:

> "Every person who having been appointed by the Secretary of State, or Secretary of State in Council, to a civil service of the Crown in India, continues on and after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof;...shall be entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominion and Provinces or parts under which he is from time to time serving...the same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters . . . or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as that person was entitled to immediately before the appointed day."

And Section 19(4) defined remuneration as inclusive of "leave, pay, allowances and the cost of any privileges or facilities provided in kind".

This provision was, it appears, the result of negotiations between the Indian leaders and British Government. All members of the services who retired prematurely, were entitled to proportionate pensions. In addition, all the members of the services who were of non-Asiatic domicile, were also given compensation for the loss of their careers. But Indian members of the services were given this compensation only in those cases where they were ready to continue in the service and their services were not accepted by the new authorities. The British Government had agreed to this, on the express condition that their existing service rights were to be guaranteed.[44] Consequently when Article 314

---

[43] India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, *op. cit.*, Schedule.

[44] *See* the Letter of the Home Ministry of India to the Secretary of the Constituent Assembly; B. Shiva Rao, The *Framing of India's Constitution, Select Documents*, Vol IV, pp. 335-339; see also the announcement by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 30th April, 1947, quoted in *State of Madras* v *K.M. Rajagopalan*, (1955) 2 SCR 541, 548-50.

came under severe attack in the Constituent Assembly,[45] Sardar Patel reminded the members of the circumstances in which the promise to guarantee the rights was made and urged the members to honour the promise by incorporating it in the Constitution.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 314

The Supreme Court had held[46] that, as the rights of the former Secretary of State's services had been guaranteed by the Constitution, it was not competent for the Central Government, in exercise of its rule-making power, to destroy or annul them. In *Accountant General, Bihar* v *N. Bakshi*[47] the question arose in relation to the passage benefits granted to the members of the Indian Civil Service under the Superior Civil Services (Revision of pay and pension) Rules, 1924. Under the rules, the benefits were considered as part of the pay. An amendment made in 1926 did not affect the benefit, though it was given "the character of an allowance, or benefit, or facility attached to an office". Both the High Court of Patna[48] and the Supreme Court[49] held that this benefit was part of the remuneration guaranteed under Article 314 of the Constitution. Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, Shah J. said[50]:

> "The right to passage benefits was statutory and was under the Indian Independence Act in the nature of an allowance or in any event privilege or facility paid in kind. It was expressly made part of the remuneration earned by the members of the Indian Civil Service. The conditions of service as to remuneration having been guaranteed, the right to this benefit remained guaranteed to those members of the Indian Civil Service who were entitled to it before the Constitution."

The Court thought that the absence of definition of 'remuneration' in the Constitution did not make a difference, and held that the word

---

[45] *C.A.D.* Vol. X, pp. 33-53. It was Art. 283-A in the Draft Const. In the original draft the guarantee did not find a place. It was included at the instance of Home Ministry. But the draft as suggested by the Home Ministry was much wider in scope than Article 314. It included within the ambit of the guarantee not only the Secretary of State's Services but also the then members of the two newly formed All-India Services. See the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Secretary of Constituent Assembly, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[46] *Accountant General, Bihar* v *N. Bakshi*, AIR, 1962 SC 505; *R.P. Kapoor* v *Union of India*, (1964) 5 SCR 431.

[47] AIR 1962 SC 505.

[48] *N. Bakshi* v *Accountant General*, AIR 1957, Patna 515.

[49] *Supra f.n.* 48.

[50] *Ibid.*, 510.

'remuneration' in Article 314 of the Constitution included everything given to a person in consideration of his services.

In the High Court, it was argued that Article 314 guaranteed only those rights of the former Secretary of State's Services, which were consistent with the changed conditions, and that the right to the benefit of overseas passage was inadmissible in the changed circumstances. Ahmad J., rejecting the argument, observed that the phrase "as changed circumstances may permit" in Article 314 qualified only the rights as respects disciplinary matters and did not affect the conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension. He said:[51]

> "In case the phrase 'changed circumstances' is read to qualify the entire subject matter including 'the conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension' then the very purpose of providing such a provision in the Constitution will be lost and all conditions of service, including those like remuneration, leave and pension, which undeniably originally constituted the essential terms of contract of these services, will stand exposed to an arbitrary variation as and when circumstances change or are claimed to have changed."

However, even the rights relating to disciplinary matters which Ahmad J. had held to be qualified by the phrase 'as changed circumstances may permit', had not been disturbed, much less destroyed. Indeed, the phrase had been given a very limited meaning. In *R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India*[52] the Supreme Court held that the phrase referred only to the changes brought about by the transfer of power in 1947 and the adoption of a new Constitution in 1950. Wanchoo J. said: "These words do not mean that, as time passes, circumstances change and therefore new rules may be framed to meet the new circumstances.[53] In this case the contention of appellant, who was formerly a member of the I.C.S., was that the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 were violative of Article 314, insofar as they affected his right of appeal after suspension. Rule 3 enumerates the penalties which can be imposed on a member of any of the All-India Services. These are: (*i*) Censure; (*ii*) Withholding of increments or promotion; (*iii*) Reduction in rank, including reduction to a lower post of time scale, are to a lower stage in scale; (*iv*) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders; (*v*) Compulsory retirement on proportionate pension; (*vi*) Removal from service, which shall not disqualify for future employment; and

---

[51] *Supra f.n.* 49; *AIR* 1957 Pat. 515, 523.

[52] (1964) 5 SCR 431.

[53] *Ibid.*, 442.

(*vii*) Dismissal from the service which shall ordinarily disqualify for future employment. Under Rule (4), while the first four penalties may be imposed by the Government under whom a member of the service was serving, at the time of the commission of the act or omission, for which the penality is to be imposed, the last three punishments can be imposed only by the Central Government. And, even in case of the first four penalties, an appeal lies to the Central Government under Rule 10. Thus unlike under the 1030 Classification Rules, suspension is not one of the penalties under the 1955 Rules and therefore, there is no provision for appeal against suspension. However, under Rule 7, there is a provision for interim suspension, which can be ordered by the Government under whom the person is serving. There is no provision for appeal against such an order. But under Rule 20 there is a right to submit a memorial to the President against any order of the Central Government or State Government. The contention of the appellant was that formerly there was no power in any authority to order interim suspension, though suspension could be ordered as penalty, against which he had a right of appeal. He further contended that, by removing suspension from the list of penalties and by providing for interim suspension instead, the 1955 Rules had merely taken away his right of appeal, which he formerly enjoyed. The High Court of Punjab rejected[54] both these contentions. Dulat Ag. C. J. said that it was inconceivable that "under the old rules a civil servant could never be suspended, while an enquiry into his conduct was pending, for that would mean that, whatever the nature of the charge against him, he could not be prevented from performing his ordinary duties of office, which in certain circumstances would have had the effect of creating an intolerable situation".[55] He observed that the right to suspend during the pendency of an enquiry was an inherent right of the employer. The Court also held that the right of presenting a memorial to the President under Rule 20 was, in the circumstances, as effective as the right of appeal to the Secretary of State.

In the Supreme Court, it was held that, before Independence, an order of interim suspension against a member of any of the Secretary of State's Services might be passed by the Governor-General or a Governor, as the case might be, in the exercise of statutory authority under Section 247 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and by the Secretary of State in the exercise of his inherent right as an employer. It was further held that a public employer had as much an inherent right to order suspension as a private employer "with this modification that, in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government, the employer

[54] *R. P. Kapoor* v *Union of India*, AIR 1963 Punjab 87.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

in the case of government, must be held to be the authority, which has the power to appoint the public servant."[56] But it was also pointed out that Article 314 preserved the rights which existed at the time of the commencement of the Constitution and not those which existed at the time of Independence. And the position at the time of the commencement of the Constitution was different from what it was at the time of Independence. The reason was that Indian (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 substituted a new section in place of the old Section 247 of the Act of 1935. The new Section omitted the provision relating to suspension. Consequently, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, a member of any of the Secretary of State's Services could be suspended during the pendency of an inquiry only by his employer in the exercise of his inherent right. On the question as to who was the appointing authority, who could be considered to be the employer, in case of persons such as the appellant, the Court was divided. The majority held that the Governor-General was the appointing authority in cases of all members of the Secretary of State's Services, including those who were serving in connection with the affairs of a province. The main reason for taking such a view was that the negotiations for the transfer of the responsibility for the Secretary of State's Services were carried on by the Central Government with His Majesty's Government. On the other hand, Raghubar Dayal J. held that the Governor was the appointing authority in case of such members of the Secretary of State's Services as were serving in connection with the affairs of a Province. He referred to Article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947[57] and said that the 'deemed' appointment contemplated by the Article must be by the authority competent to appoint, and under Section 241 of the Act of 1935, the Governor was the appointing authority for persons employed for purposes of the affairs of a Province. He also doubted whether His Majesty's Government had laid the entire responsibility for the maintenance of the existing rights of the Secretary of State's Services on the Central Government. In substance, while the majority held that the suspension of the appellant could be ordered only by the Central Government, Raghubar Dayal J. took the view that the State Government was competent to do so. It is submitted that the view of the dissenting Judge is to be preferred. The argument that, in the structural hierarchy of government service, the appointing authority is deemed to be the employer is a sound principle, insofar as it is

[56] *R. P. Kapoor* v *Union of India*, (1964) 5 SCR 431, 445.

[57] Art. 7(1) was as follows : "Subject to any general or special orders or arrangements affecting his case, any person who, immediately before the appointed day, is holding any civil post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Governor-General or Governor-General in Council or of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly appointed to the corresponding post under the Crown in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India or, as the case may be of the Province."

applied for locating the right authority among a multiplicity of officials of the same government. But its application to the case of two separate entities, independent of each other, like the central and state governments, is exposed to serious objections. Possibly, the very existence of an All-India Service in a federal Constitution is an anomaly. But it had been held in the past that it was the State Government which was the employer of a person in the position of the appellant. In *Sardar Kapoor Singh vs. Union of India*, Shah J. said:[58]

> "There is no foundation for the submission that members of the Indian Civil Service, because they hold office during the pleasure of the President since the commencement of the Constitution, are employees of the President. They are and continue to remain employees of the Union or the State under which they are employed."[59]

CONCLUSION

The interpretation adopted by the Courts that Article 314 imposed a restriction on the legislative power of Parliament and the State legislatures had been in accordance with the broad objective behind the insertion of the provision in the Constitution. Whether the insertion of the provision itself was desirable, may be open to debate Perhaps, there were certain compulsions inherent in the circumstances when we attained Independence, which did not leave us any room fo manoeuvrability. It is for a political moralist to decide whether it wa proper for us to have abolished the guarantee after having solemnl assured the services and the Britishers about it. As far as a studen of public administration is concerned, he cannot fail to notice tha many of the obnoxious privileges, formerly enjoyed by the Secretary o State's Services, had already come to an end with the passing of th Indian Independence Act. Many others are enjoyed also by the othe members of the All-India Services, even though there is no constitu tional guarantee about them.[60] Thus there were left only a few privi leges which were still enjoyed by the remaining few of the former mem bers of the Secretary of State's Services as a special class. Their aboli tion by the constitutional amendment has only ended some thin which even otherwise would have ended after a few more years.

---

[58] (1960)2SCR 569,578.

[59] The correctness of this view was doubted by Sarkar J. in *R.P. Kapoor* v *Prat Singh Kairon* and others, (1964)4 SCR 224,240. But he alone raised this doubt. 'Th point in issue was whether a State Government could initiate an inquiry under th Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850 against a member of an All-India Service servi under it. The majority answered the question in the affirmative.

[60] For example the powers of the State Governments in matters of appointing non-cadre officer in a cadre post and keeping a cadre post vacant are strictly circu scribed. *See* the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 and the Indi Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954.

MANAGEMENT CADRES AND PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT

LESSONS FROM COOPERATIVE EMPLOYEES' COMMISSION OF SRI LANKA

K. K. Taimni

THE prevailing circumstances and the personal experience of the pioneers when the modern cooperative movement took birth, were such that, it was only natural to give a special status and a role to the personnel in cooperative organisation quite distinct from the one in a capitalist enterprise. The striking characteristics of this special relationship between the cooperative and its personnel were : participation in the benefits, and model working and wage conditions. In a way, it was also natural to expect this, for had not the cooperatives emerged on the economic landscape to help mitigate hardships resulting out of the exploitation of labour by those who provided capital? It may be pertinent to recall that in the western European countries, cooperatives were the first to introduce an eight-hour day work, sharing of profits with the workers, and workers' participation in management, "long-before trade unions had the necessary strength to introduce such claims in the capitalist sector".

But in the developing countries, the cooperatives were foisted, as it were, by the state largely to buy peace in the rural areas, disturbed by periodic riots, famine and deaths. Thus cooperative leadership came from the ranks of state officers and therefore, the entire decision-making apparatus within the cooperative movement, constituted as it was, remained totally insulated from the working class movement, which otherwise was the inspiring force behind the cooperative movement in all the European countries.

This position did slightly change in those countries where popular democratic parties came into power, but again the cooperative movements that emerged, are largely part cooperative, part capitalist and part political in character as against the cooperative movement in European countries, which are semi-cooperative, semi-trade union/farmers' movements. This explains a major difference in the orientation of the cooperative movement in European and most of the developing countries.

Consequently one observes that the decision-making process, insofar as the cooperative personnel in developing countries are concerned, is not always socially informed and in tune with cooperative ideals. Various studies have revealed that personnel in the cooperative sector do not get a fair deal although, as the National Commission on Labour, appointed by Government of India observed "Labour employed in the cooperative sector naturally has the same aspirations as other labour has; indeed it should have even higher expectations, because of the in-built social values the cooperative movement stands for."

Because of poor working and other employment conditions, it has been difficult for the cooperatives to attract, train and retain talented personnel and as such the general level of efficiency and management has remained poor in most of the cooperative organisations, much to the detriment of its planned programme for growth in these countries.

In India, in particular, both the leadership and the Government have been acutely aware of this serious shortcoming in the cooperative structure and therefore demands are periodically made for creating and developing cadres of trained personnel within the cooperative movement to man the key-managerial positions in cooperative organisations. Not much headway has, however, been made so far because of the many practical difficulties involved in creating such cadres. It is in this context that one should analyse and review the recent developments in Sri Lanka, where a Cooperative Employees' Commission has been constituted under an Act of Parliament.

SOME RECENT CHANGES IN COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE OF SRI LANKA

Until 1971 the cooperative societies—most of these were village level multi-purpose cooperatives—were very small, as is to be found in most of the countries in this part of the world, with small turnover, offering limited range of services. Their main activities were confined to the distribution of essential consumer goods, procurement of food-grains and other agricultural commodities on behalf of the State under the Guaranteed Price Scheme, granting of loans, supply of fertiliser, etc. Although on paper these were the activities listed for the cooperatives, yet a few actually provided all these services. Of the total number of 5815 cooperatives, nearly 17 per cent were defunct and nearly 50 per cent were working at loss.

The main reasons for this abysmal state of development of the cooperatives were: limited role assigned to these cooperatives by the government; its anxiety to cover the entire country with a network of

cooperatives and insistence on using them for distribution of controlled, scarce and rationed commodities at an extremely low margin and for advancing agricultural credit under various Agricultural Credit Schemes. Thus a net work of pigmy non-viable primary societies emerged in the country. True to cooperative traditions, federal organisations were also organised, but the entire edifice remained weak. Lately, when the state took a policy decision to route the entire distribution of free rice, textiles and other controlled and essential commodities through the cooperatives, the administration was quick to realise that the cooperative framework, as it was constituted, was just not capable of withstanding the pressure likely to be created by the flow of fresh business. The Commissioner for Cooperative Development and the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Sri Lanka, asked for and was given the authority to carry out a major operation and to restructure the whole cooperative set-up so as to make it capable of meeting the new challenges. Three major steps were taken in this context:

(1) The entire cooperative movement was restructured, by a process of amalgamation and liquidation of cooperative societies;

(2) A new cooperative societies' act was enacted; and

(3) A cooperative employees' commission was constituted.

The Registrar was given fresh powers to carry out a major kind of surgical operation. Accordingly, 5818 Primary Cooperative Societies were converted, by a single stroke, into 372 large Primary Multipurpose Cooperative Societies. The "chief criterion in organising these new societies was the financial viability of the society and its capacity to engage better type of persons having the capacity to man the multipurpose cooperative society".

Reviewing the working of the cooperatives prior to 1971, the Commissioner for Cooperative Development and Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Sri Lanka wrote:

> "The long queues one sees at a Cooperative Store and the frustration of the community as a whole were not created overnight. Similarly, the corruption that is seen at the cooperative level, which may be negligible when compared with the corruption that the cooperatives themselves have to tolerate in their day-to-day dealings, may be with a Government Department or a Corporation or with its immediate surroundings, is the result of this apathy. The discourtesy at a Cooperative is nothing but a reflection of the frustration of an employee who is paid a below subsistence salary, working in substandard, ill-lit and ill-ventilated premises. A

magic wand is necessary if one were to convert the very same co-operatives into efficient organisations overnight. An effort has to be made and the magic wand is knowledgeable membership, an enlightened and responsible Board of Directors, an efficient and trained General Manager and staff and an understanding financier. Proper costing has also to be introduced so that the Cooperatives receive adequate operational margins in respect of those activities which they have to undertake on behalf of the Government."

Apparently in addition to the restructuring of the movement and the enactment of a new Cooperative Societies' Act, it was felt that some concrete measures would have to be taken in order to ensure that qualified and competent personnel could be employed in the cooperatives. Realising that it was possible only if suitable working conditions were to be created in the cooperatives, and security of job was to be assured, the Parliament of Sri Lanka, at the behest of the government constituted the Cooperative Employees' Commission (Act No. 12 of 1972), to look into all these aspects.

COOPERATIVE EMPLOYEES' COMMISSION

The Cooperative Employees' Commission (CEC) has the following powers as per the Act:

(1) To determine all matters relating to methods of recruitment to, and conditions of employment of employees of cooperative societies, and the principles to be followed by such societies in making appointments and in making promotions from one post in a cooperative society to another post in the same society;

(2) To conduct examinations for recruitment as employees of cooperative societies or to appoint boards of examinations and to charge fees from candidates presenting themselves for examinations;

(3) To determine the qualifications necessary for appointment to any such post, to fix the scales of salaries to be attached to any such post or posts in any class or grade, to revise or adjust such scales of salaries from time to time, in consultation with the Commissioner and to establish such consultative machinery as the Commission may deem necessary to assist it in determining the remuneration and conditions of service of cooperative employees;

(4) To require cooperative societies to pay salaries in accordance with the salary scales fixed by the Commission for any post in any class or grade;

(5) To determine the procedure or procedures to be followed by any cooperative society in exercising its rights of disciplinary action against its employees, to call upon any cooperative society to complete disciplinary inquiries against its employees within a time stipulated by the Commission, and to hear appeals arising out of any disciplinary orders made by any cooperative society;

(6) To call upon any Cooperative society to keep the prescribed records relating to employees of that society;

(7) To call upon any cooperative society to furnish before a specified date such files, other documents or information as the Commission may require in respect of any employee of that society;

(8) To nominate a panel or panels of officers to make such inquiries as are necessary on appeals that are referred by the Commission to such panel or panels and to report thereon to the Commission;

(9) To require any cooperative society to carry out such instructions, including instructions relating to reinstatement, as may be given by the Commission in regard to any employee of such society, where the conduct of the employee has been the subject of an inquiry and the employee had appealed to the Commission against the decision of the society;

(10) To determine the general principles in accordance with which gratuity or other benefits may be granted to employees on the termination of their services;

(11) To advise the Minister, in consultation with the Commissioner in regard to the exemption of any cooperative society or class of cooperative societies from the operation of this Act; and

(12) To exercise such other powers in relation to cooperative societies and their employees as may be vested in the Commission by order made by the Minister and published in the Gazette.

But, in the exercise of the powers vested in the Commission by sub-section given above, the Commission may modify, vary or revise or set aside any decisions or determinations made by the Commission.

The Commission is to consist of three members and is to be constituted by the Minister in charge of Cooperation in the Cabinet. All the expenses of the Commission are to be met by the State.

Some Features of the Commission

> Article 15 of the CEC Act stipulates: "All directions given by the Commission in regard to any employee of any cooperative society, subject to certain provisions shall be final and binding upon such employees as if such directions were given by such society."
>
> Article 17 empowers "the Commission to recall any employee to satisfy itself, by examination or otherwise, of his proficiency and fitness to hold that office, provided this provision shall apply only to such category or categories of employees as may be prescribed."

Again if the holder of an office to which the above sub-section, applies, fails to satisfy the Commission of his proficiency and fitness to hold such office, the Commission shall endeavour to place him, with his consent, in an office which, in the opinion of the Commission, is commensurate with his abilities, and in default of such placement, the Commission may, in its absolute discretion, require that his employment be terminated by his cooperative society in accordance with the terms and conditions of service then applicable to him or where no such terms exist, after giving him reasonable notice.

Where the holder of an office to which, above sub-section applies opts to accept the terms and conditions of service prescribed by the Commission, he shall not be entitled to such terms and conditions of service, unless and until he has satisfied the Commission.

Deputation of Government Personnel

The CEC Act states: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, the Commission may with the approval of the Minister and with the consent of the person and the cooperative society concerned, appoint to any office in the cooperative society, a person in the service of the Government seconded for service in that society for that purpose, for such period and on such terms and conditions as the Commission may approve."

For the purposes of this section, 'Minister' means the Minister in charge of the Government department where the person is employed.

Working Conditions

(1) *Dismissal and punishment of employees* : Article 23 of CEC Act stipulates: No employee of a cooperative society shall be dismissed or otherwise punished by any cooperative society except in accordance with the provisions of this Act or any regulations made thereunder.

(2) *Security deposits* : (*a*) A cooperative society shall not require any employee to furnish by way of security an amount in excess of such sum as the Commission may prescribe. (*b*) Any such security furnished by any employee of a cooperative society shall be invested in a bank in the name of the society, and any interest accruing thereon shall be paid to that employee.

(3) *Regulation relating to employees* : Article 25 lays down: Regulations may be made (by the Commission) (*a*) in respect of the recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer, resignation and termination of services of employees of cooperative societies; (*b*) prescribing such terms and conditions of employment of such employees as providing for salary scales, the payment of allowances and gratuities, the grant of advances, promotion, leave, the interdiction of officers, the termination of appointments, dismissals or the imposition of any other form of punishment to such employees and any appeal therefrom; and (*c*) in respect of such other matters relating to the terms of employment or the conditions of service of such employees as are deemed necessary.

Every regulation made in respect of these matters shall be binding on all cooperative societies and their employees.

Employees will Remain the Employees of Cooperatives

Article 28 states : For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that all employees whether employed prior to the appointed date or after, are servants of, employed by and owe their loyalty to the society by which they are employed.

Role of the Powers of the Commissioner for Cooperative Development and Registrar of Cooperative Societies

Article 29 lays down : That the Commission shall grade the societies for the purpose of fixing scales of salaries for posts in cooperative societies. It also stipulates that no cooperative society shall employ any person in contravention of the determination of such grades made by the Registrar.

Article 30 lays down : The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Commissioner of cooperative development determine the qualifications necessary for appointment to any post in cooperative societies, fix the scales of salary to be attached to any such post or posts in any class or grade and revise such scales of salaries from time to time.

Offences

Article 35 lays down : Every cooperative society or person which or who commits any offence referred to in the Act, shall on conviction after summary trial before a Magistrate, be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees.

Where any offence under this Act is committed by a cooperative society, every officer of that society shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

On the conviction of any cooperative society for failure to carry out any such instructions given by the Commission as requires the reinstatement of any employee, such cooperative society shall be liable: (*i*) to pay, in addition to any punishment that may be imposed on such cooperative society under sub-section (2) a fine of fifty rupees for each day on which the failure is continued after conviction thereof; and (*ii*) to pay such employee the remuneration which would have been payable to him if he had been in such service on each day and on each day of the period commencing on the date on which he should have been reinstated in service according to the instructions of the Commission and ending on the date of the conviction of such cooperative society, computed at the rate of salary or wages to which he would have been entitled if his services had not been terminated.

Any sum which a cooperative society is liable to pay under paragraph (ii) of this sub-section may be recovered on the order of the court by which it was convicted as if it were a fine imposed on it by that court and the amounts so recovered shall be paid to the employee.

Miscellaneous

Article 34 lays down : "Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, a cooperative society may in the interests of its efficient operations: (*i*) engage the services of an expert or any specialist for any defined term on a contractual basis with the prior approval of the Commission; or

(*ii*) engage casual or daily paid employees, or employees paid on a piece rate basis, provided, however, that no permanency of tenure of the office shall be granted to such employees without the concurrence of the Commission."

Article 39 lays down: "Nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act shall apply, or be construed or deemed to apply, to or in relation to the Commission or any cooperative society in its capacity as employer or in relation to any employee in the employment of any cooperative society, provided, however, that the preceding provisions of this section shall not be deemed to affect any industrial dispute pending, on the day immediately preceding the appointed date, before an Industrial Court, or a Labour Tribunal, or an Arbitrator appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Support from the Cooperative Societies Act

The draft cooperative societies' bill for the development of co-operative societies issued on July 14, 1972 has a clause which provides that the provisions of the Company's ordinance and the trade-unions ordinance and of any enactments amending those ordinances will not apply to societies registered under this law. It obviously implies that the cooperative societies have been exempted from the application of the normal trade-union laws.

Some Implications for the Cooperatives and their Character

(1) *Wage determination without any reference to productivity* : Once this Commission has been constituted, it shall follow that it has the power to decide the wages and other compensation policies for the employees not necessarily after taking into consideration their productivity, capacity of the cooperative to pay, and contribution of the employees to the overall performance of the organisation. This may create a burden which the cooperative organisation may find difficult to carry and may, therefore, suffer heavy costs on the wages which are not related to the employees' performance or to the volume of business handled.

(2) *Unionisation of all cooperative employees in one union :* The Cooperative Employees' Commission, may, with the passage of time, provide the rallying point for all the employees working within the cooperative movement to join hands for promoting and protecting their collective interest. For it will be this agency which shall determine the working conditions for all employees and therefore may spur the employees to form a single trade-union of all the cooperative employees working in the country. Such a single organised trade-union in such a

vital sector as the distribution system for essential commodities to the community, may create problems both for the economy as well as for the cooperative organisations in the country.

(3) *Political interference :* Since the Minister in charge of cooperation has been empowered to exempt any of the cooperative societies from the provisions of this act, it may, in certain circumstances, bring the political overtones in the decision-making process and in identifying societies for granting exemption or otherwise.

(4) *Possibilities of exploitation :* Since the Act exempts the societies from the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, it shall follow that the employees will not be entitled to approach an independent judicial body for the redressal of their grievances as may result from the decisions either of the cooperative society on the Commission. It may, therefore, pave the way for systematic exploitation of labour which may also go out of the general labour movement, because of this feature in the Act.

(5) *Close identification with the State :* Since the Act provides the constitution of a Commission by the Minister, and which will take decisions in all matters relating to the working conditions of the employees, the State shall have a decisive say, in the affairs of the co-operative movement, as was indeed demonstrated at the time of re-structuring of the movement. This may make the cooperatives another type of State undertaking, to perform the functions as may be determined by the State authorities for them. To that extent the cooperative will cease to be genuine democratically controlled, people's own organisations.

Relevance to India

(1) *Similar conditions in Sri Lanka and India :* For some time past, a general debate is going on in the country to find ways and means to ameliorate the working conditions in the cooperatives so that talent can be attracted, recruited and retained in the organisations so that the new challenges which the cooperatives face today can be squarely met. The conditions in Sri Lanka and India, insofar as the cooperative movement is concerned, are almost akin. Also in both the countries, the cooperatives are expected to provide the strength of an organisation to the weaker and valuable sections of the community and to bring about a socio-economic change especially in rural areas of the respective countries. Employees are expected to play a crucial role in cooperative organisations in both the countries.

(2) *Demand for creating management cadres* : It was in 1968 that the conference of the Chief Ministers who met in Madras to review the working of the cooperative movement in the country, had decided to create management cadres for the key managerial positions in four important sectors of the cooperative movement, *viz.*, Agricultural Credit, Marketing, Processing and Consumers' Business. Not much headway, however, could be made because of variety of reasons; stiff resistance from the individual cooperative organisations, dominance over the cooperatives by vested interests; difficulties in attracting suitable candidates to be included in such cadres, etc.

The need for such cadres, however, is widely shared. If an honest attempt were to be made in this direction, some appropriate lessons from the working of the Cooperative Employees' Commission in Sri Lanka can be surely drawn.

(3) *Professionalisation of management* : Before a meaningful solution is offered to the problem now facing the country, it will be pertinent to list the difficulties which have been encountered in creating management cadres and in professionalising the management in cooperatives in India, as also to discuss the ways and means to overcome the difficulties which the CED is likely to create in Sri Lanka, if a modified CEC type of enactment is to be of any practical utility to this country.

Difficulties in Creating Management Cadres and Professionalised Management

(1) *Resistance from individual cooperatives* : A cooperative society, by definition, is an autonomous body and the real influence that an external agency can have, in the absence of relevant legal support, in the decision-making process is limited. This autonomous character of the cooperative society has been the single most important hurdle in frustrating all attempts, to create cadres for management in cooperatives. Apparently an enactment on the model of the Cooperative Employees' Commission can help meet the situation. After all the autonomy of every cooperative cannot be so absolute as to take it away from its goals.

(2) *Growth of vested interest* : Many cooperative societies, especially at the primary level over a period of time, have become closed shops, that are used by a handful of persons mostly belonging to the dominant and affluent sections of the community, for personal benefit. These elements are naturally reluctant to have on their pay roll officers who may belong to a cadre to be governed by an independent

agency. They are also reluctant to rely on the paid, professional managers for running the cooperatives, for it will rob them of the power to use the cooperative for self-aggrandisement. Again a law passed by the legislature can blunt this resistance.

(3) *Difficulties in meeting the costs:* Another major factor responsible for forestalling the move to create management cadres has been the plea of the cooperative organisations that it may not be always possible for them to meet the expenditure which they will have to incur on account of the employment of personnel from such cadres. Unless some outside agency agrees to subsidise these organisations, it may not be possible for them to fall in line and agree to have managerial personnel from a common cadre.

This is a genuine difficulty and can be met only if the resources of all the cooperative organisations in a given cooperative sector like banking, marketing, processing, etc., were to be pooled together and utilised for the common good of the entire sector.

Possible Way Out

Such are the difficulties and the nature of problems and if a Cooperative Employees' Commission were to be constituted in India—and there is real need for one at the moment—it will have to be within the cooperative movement, or else the cooperatives shall cease to be cooperatives and the larger purpose of the community will be defeated, even if we may build up better cooperatives with state intervention at every stage. Therefore, if the powers of the Commission are given to the respective federal organisations at the state level for each sector, instead of an independent Commission to be constituted by the Minister of persons from outside the movement, it can help achieve the twin objectives which the cooperatives in India have in view, *i.e.*, creation of management cadres and professionalisation of management. It will help cooperatives to retain their distinct character, insulate these from the vagaries of Government interference and control, help an individual cooperative unit to meet the increased cost by drawing upon the resources of the federal organisation, which shall look into all these aspects before determining the working conditions in that particular organisation.

It will also imply closer integration between the federal organisation and the primary level organisation, greater reliance on the professional managers in the decision-making process and above all, a limited role for the Registrar of Cooperative Societies who is otherwise too dominant in the present set-up.

Moreover, if the powers of the Commission are vested in a federal organisation, the implications as have been listed earlier for the cooperatives in Sri Lanka will not remain relevant.

The enactment of such a law will surely imply a continuous process of education of cooperative leadership. Once this process starts, such an enactment is unlikely to encounter any real difficulty, except from the handful of people, who stand to lose personal prestige and power to extend patronage to friends and relatives. Such persons will oppose any move to change the *status quo*, any way.

Some Pre-Conditions for Success

(1) *Strengthening of state/national level federal organisations:* The most crucial pre-condition for the success of any attempt to enforce certain minimum working conditions at the primary level cooperatives, will be: the strengthening of the federal organisations which are financially sound, have the necessary managerial resources and have superior technical expertise at their command. They should also have the capacity and the resources to take over the sick primary units, once they start showing symptoms of ill-health or prove operationally inefficient.

Obviously the strength of the federal organisation will flow from the resources that it shall have at its command as also the confidence that it shall enjoy among the members and the primary cooperatives. For this latter aspect, it will be necessary to introduce a system which, as is done in many cooperative movements in the European countries, makes it possible to elect the board of directors even of the federal organisations, directly by the members of the primary units. It is only through this and similar steps that integration between federal and the primary level organisations can be achieved.

(2) *Redefined role of the Registrars:* Hitherto State Registrars of the Cooperative Societies have enjoyed enormous powers in matters relating to the management and operations of the cooperatives. In some States, it is the Registrar who appoints the Chief Executive and, in many others, the appointment of senior executives in the cooperative organisation is done with the prior approval of the Registrars. Such powers will have to be taken away and it will be necessary to redefine the role of the Registrar, once powers to determine working conditions are vested in the federal organisations as suggested above.

(3) *Changes in the cooperative societies acts:* Both of the above aspects are crucial but are unlikely to materialise unless necessary

changes are made in the relevant laws, rules and bye-laws governing the cooperatives in the country, in the light of the changed role assigned to various institutions.

It will also be necessary to consider each sub-sector of the cooperative movement like Credit, Marketing, Processing, Consumers, Industrial Cooperatives, etc., as separate movements and separate cooperative laws should be enacted for each sector, keeping in view its specific requirements. Only when such conditions are created, the employees will get a fair deal and the first step towards professionalisation of management would have been taken.

INSTITUTE NEWS

The Annual Meeting of the General Body of the Indian Institute of Public Administration was held on October 31, 1973 at IIPA headquarters which was attended by about 125 members.

Shri D.P. Dhar, Union Minister for Planning and Chairman, Executive Council of IIPA in his presidential address outlined the role of IIPA in the present difficult phase of economic planning, particularly in the context of tuning our administrative system to new developmental tasks. He was of the opinion that for resolving controversies like that of generalists and specialists, IIPA was best suited. While making a mention of IIPA's contribution in the past pertaining to changes in the process of administration and legislation, he desired that the Institute should pay some attention to the grassroots level. He suggested that the Institute's facility of providing training opportunities to top and micro level officers should also be extended to those working at District and even lower levels in order to enable them to undertake new responsibilities in a meaningful manner.

*   *   *

Dr. Gopal Swarup Pathak, Vice-President of India, has been elected President of the Institute for 1974.

*   *   *

The Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Members of IIPA was held on October 30. The subject of the Conference was "Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government". *Prof. V. K. N. Menon*, the first full-time Director of the Institute presided over the Conference which was attended by several members, academicians, administrators and others interested in public administration.

The two discussion papers presented to Conference were: (*i*) Organisation for Public Policy in Government by *Prof. Ishwar Dayal*, Director of IIPA, and (*ii*) Investment Decisions in Government by *Prof. M. J. K. Thavaraj* of IIPA.

Other papers presented by IIPA members were:

(1) Decision-making Process in the Government by *Shri Arvind Koratkar*, Lecturer, V. V. Evening College, Hyderabad.

(2) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government by *Shri S. Krishnamurthi*, Staff Member, IIPA.

(3) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in Government and Public Enterprise—A Transactional Analysis by *Shri W. G. Naidu*, Training Officer, Heavy Electricals (I) Ltd., Bhopal.

(4) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in Government by *Shri P. K. Sardana*, Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta.

(5) Higher Civil Services and Policy Formulation: Third

Pay Commission View by *Dr. Sudesh Kumar Sharma*, Reader, Department of Public Administration, Panjab University, Chandigarh.

(6) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government by *Shri J. K. P. Sinha*, Assistant Director, Institute of Public Administration, Patna University, Patna.

(7) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government by *Dr. V. P. Varma*, University Professor of Political Science and Director, Institute of Public Administration, Patna University, Patna.

(8) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government by *Prof. H. Pathak*, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Punjabi University, Patiala.

* * *

The following papers could not be presented as the authors were not present:

(1) Decision-making by Educational Administrators by *Dr. (Mrs.) I. P. Sharma*, Lecturer, M. G. N. College of Education, Jullundur City.

(2) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government by *Shri V. S. Murti*, Head of the Department of Public Administration, Nagpur University, Nagpur.

(3) Policy Formulation and Decision-making Process in the Government—The Other View by *Shri Kalyan Biswas*, Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Calcutta.

The Executive Council, in its one hundred and fifth meeting held on October 31, re-coopted the following members for another year (1973-74): *Prof. R. B. Das, Dr. S. M. Hasan, Shri Asoka Mehta, Shri P. L. Tandon*, and *Shri B. Venkatappiah.*

Composition of other reconstituted committees having one year term is as follows:

Standing Committee: (1) Shri B. Venkatappiah (Chairman), (2) Shri P. P. Agarwal, (3) Shri M. K. Chaturvedi, (4) Prof. Shanti Kothari, (5) Shri B. C. Mathur, (6) Prof. M. V. Mathur, (7) Shri C. A. Rama-Krishnan, (8) Shri M. V. S. Prasada Rau, (9) Shri V. Subramanian, (10) Shri P. L. Tandon, and (11) Director, IIPA.

Committee on Case Studies: (1) Shri Govind Narain (Chairman), (2) Prof. A. Avasthi, (3) Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, (4) Shri P. R. Dubhashi, (5) Shri R. N. Haldipur, (6) Prof. M. V. Mathur, (7) Dr. B. D. Sharma, (8) Dr. Ram K. Vepa (Director of Case Study Programme), (9) Shri K. Venkataraman (Member-Secretary), and (10) Director, IIPA.

Consultancy Sub-Committee: (1) Shri P. A. Menon, (Chairman), (2) Prof. Shanti Kothari, (3) Prof. M. V. Mathur, (4) Shri W. G. Naidu, (5) Shri M. Subramanian, (6) Shri P. L. Tandon, (7) Shri K. Venkataraman, and (8) Director, IIPA.

Training and Research Committee: (1) Dr. R. S. Arora, (2) Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, (3) Shri G. R. Dalvi, (4) Shri R. N. Haldipur, (5) Prof. M. V. Mathur, and (6) Shri K. Venkataraman.

Screening Committee of Local Members for Admission of New Members: (1) Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, (2) Prof. Shanti Kothari, and (3) Dr. B. D. Sharma.

The Council also nominated Shri K. Venkataraman, Member of the Executive Council, on the Committee for Administration of IIPA Contributory Provident Fund for one year.

* * *

In the IIPA's Prize Essay Competition for the year, the second prize of Rs. 500 has been awarded to *Dr. S. C. Jain*, Employment Adviser to the Government of Gujarat, for his essay on "Social Science Research and Administration". No entry was considered fit for the award of the First Prize.

* * *

The Institute, as per the survey made by the Director at the time of its Annual General Body meeting, has taken up about 20 studies—most of these are to be completed by the end of the current academic year. These are broadly classified as follows:

(1) Studies that would enhance our understanding of the administrative system, how it operates, the blocks in the achievement of the basic purpose of the organisation, the kind of leadership required for different kinds of administrative tasks and the nature of changes that might help in creating more viable administrative systems. The studies included in this category covered researches in field level administration, administration during emergency, study of organisations with different task systems, etc.

(2) Studies relating to the understanding of the process of change in large and complex systems in India. Certain large and successful bureaucratic systems were being studied in order to understand how changes have come about in these organisations. It may be possible to generalise from these studies how change can be planned in work systems.

(3) Certain specific studies in significant areas of public administration, *e.g.*, those relating to the civil service structure, public response to administration, long-term planning, etc.

The scope of some of the studies now on hand would be expanded considerably based on results of pilot studies.

The IIPA's training programmes, according to the survey, would be greatly aided by research findings. For this purpose, a programme of case research, collection of live material for exercises, problems and the like for class-room teaching had been started. For the benefit of the faculty, an internal programme of research methods and a case study workshop were held.

Two experimental courses, using primarily experience-based methods of class-room teaching had been conducted during the year, which mainly relied upon case-teaching, small group exercises, and certain laboratory type situations, together with a considerable package of reading material. A substantial revision in training methodology in several other courses was also being attempted.

In the field of consulting, the Institute had obtained several assignments, including reorganisation of large enterprises, developing a computerised system for controlling a vast client network, long-range planning, performance budgeting and management information system, etc.

Other activities, initiated at the Institute, were monthly lectures and extension programmes for the members and the public in Delhi.

* * *

The Institute has brought out a pamphlet entitled *Perspectives and Plans of IIPA*. It describes in detail

the main features of the reorganisation of academic work of IIPA as finally accepted by the Executive Council. According to it the following are the tasks of the Institute:

(1) Research in the field of administration and application and use of knowledge relevant to the administrative roles of government, social, voluntary organisations and the industrial sector.

(2) Mid-career training of administrators and managers at all levels.

(3) Training of instructors and researchers in administration and preparing teaching material to improve upon the quality of instruction and research in the field.

(4) Help improve the administrative systems in the government, its subsidiary organisations and the industrial sector where findings of research are applicable.

(5) Help improve the planning for change and action programmes to develop strategies for social transformation from the traditional to modern societies.

Task responsibility has been assigned to the six task heads for research, training and consulting activities and Sentient Groups have been set up for professional growth and development of the members of the faculty.

* * *

The Institute has put up a proposal to the Union Government for an advanced course in public administration for nine months for civil servants of 8-10 years' services. The possibility of awarding a master's degree for this course is being explored.

* * *

During the three quarters—April to December—the Institute conducted the following courses mainly for senior and middle level officers of Union and State Governments, Union Territory Administrations, Municipal Corporations, Public Sector Undertakings, etc.

(1) Special Course in Performance Budgeting, April 20—May 2 (Ootacamund); (*Shri K. K. Shah*, Governor of Tamil Nadu inaugurated the course which was specially organized for Tamil Nadu Government officers, at their Government's request.)

(2) Sixth Course in Personnel Administration, April 30—May 12 (New Delhi); (It was inaugurated by *Shri Mohan Dharia*, Minister of State for Planning, Government of India.)

(3) Third Course in Municipal Personnel Administration, May 7-19 (New Delhi);

(4) Third Course in Introduction to Computers, May 21-26 (New Delhi);

(5) Course in Research Methodology, May 21-June 30 (New Delhi); (It was designed for those engaged in research work in Universities—including research students—institutions and Government to provide to them a foundation to social research methods.)

(6) Special Course in Network Techniques and Performance Budgeting for Central Water & Power Commission, May 28-June 11 (New Delhi);

(7) Third Course in Records Management, June 11-16 (New Delhi);

(8) First Course in Introduction to Operations Research, June 20-30, (New Delhi);

(9) Second Course in Municipal Management, July 9-21 (New Delhi);

(10) First Course in Training Methodology, July 23-27 (New Delhi);

(11) Fourth Course in Municipal Budgeting, August 6-18 (New Delhi);

(12) Special Course in Network Techniques and Performance Budgeting for Bharat Aluminium Company, August 22-29 (Korba);

(It was designed for senior and middle level technical officers of the Company drawn from the field.)

(13) Seventh Orientation Course on Materials Planning, August 23-29 (New Delhi);

(14) Fourth Course on Introduction to Computers, August 28-September 7 (New Delhi);

(15) Eighth Course in Budgeting and Financial Control, September 10-26 (New Delhi);

(16) Fourth Course on Work Study in Municipal Administration, September 10-29 (New Delhi);

(17) Seventh Course on Administrative Leadership and Behaviour, September 17-29 (New Delhi);

(18) Second Course on Computers in Management, October 10-20 (New Delhi);

(A Panel Discussion on "Successful Implementation of a Computer System" was also arranged during the course for participants benefit.)

(19) Ninth Course in Development Administration, October 10-20 (New Delhi); (*Shri Mohan Dharia*, Minister of State for Planning in the Union Government held a discussion with the participants on "Decentralized Planning for Development" on October 17. The course included a Panel Discussion on "Role of Generalists and Specialists".)

(20) Special Course on Network Techniques and Performance Budgeting for Public Sector Undertakings, November 5-21 (New Delhi);

(21) Fourth Course in Records Management, November 12-17 (New Delhi);

(22) Fifth Course in Social Policy and Administration, November 24-December 7 (New Delhi);

(A panel Discussion on "Values and Social Policy with Special Reference to Social Policy" formed a part of the course.)

(23) Fourteenth Course in Municipal Administration, November 26-December 22 (New Delhi);

(24) Seventh Course in Personnel Administration, December 3-15 (New Delhi);

(25) Eighth Course in Project Formulation, December 17-22 (New Delhi); and

(26) Course on Organisational Development (for Officers of the Government of Uttar Pradesh), December 19-22 (New Delhi).

A Case Workshop was arranged for IIPA's academic staff from May 7-11. It had two phases: First one was devoted to 'case as a teaching method' and the other was on 'getting the cases written'.

Besides these courses, the following seminars were also organized during April-September:

(1) *Seminar on Environmental Pollution and Urban Administration, April* 27 & 28 (New Delhi).

Dr. J. N. Khosla, former Director of IIPA and now U. N. Adviser on

Public Administration to the Government of Ethiopia, inaugurated the seminar which was attended by over 35 local government officials, scientists and engineers actively involved in the field of environmental pollution. The purpose of the Seminar was to identify the role of urban local bodies and their limitations and capabilities in the prevention and control of pollution.

The Mayor of Baroda, *Shri Thakur Bhai Patel*, presided over one of the business sessions while the concluding session was chaired by *Shri Satish Chander Khandewal*, Acting Mayor of Delhi.

(2) *Seminar on Network Techniques and Programme Budgeting for CW&PC*, May 25 & 26 (New Delhi).

Twenty officers in the top echelons of Central Water & Power Commission and Union Ministry for Irrigation & Power participated in the seminar in order to have a broad exposure of the subjects and to have an awareness about their value and importance.

The seminar was followed up by a course on the subjects for senior and middle level officers of CW&PC.

* * *

Four public lectures organized at IIPA headquarters during the past three quarters were:

(1) "The Relevance of Holding Company in the Indian Context" by *Shri Mohan Kumaramangalam*, Union Minister for Steel & Mines, April 27;

(2) "Takeover of Wholesale Food Grain Trade" by *Prof. V. M. Dandekar*, Director, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, May 22;

(3) "Comments on India's Development Planning" by *Dr. John P. Lewis*, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University (USA), July 21; and

(4) "Ecology of Administration —Revisited" by *Prof. Fred W. Riggs*, Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii (USA), November 2.

The Institute started a series of Extension Programme Lectures to disseminate amongst the citizens the expanding knowledge of theory and practice of public administration, and to promote discussion on contemporary issues and problems connected with public administration. The subjects covered during the past three quarters are:

(1) "Modern Techniques in Government Budgeting" (August 22-28),

(2) "Modern Trends in Project Management" (November 5-9), and

(3) "New Trends in Employer-Employee Relations in Government and Public Sector" (December 10 and 11).

A human relations laboratory session for members of faculty and research staff of the Institute was conducted at IIPA on September 5 by *Dr. Jaideep Singh* (member of IIPA Faculty). The pilot experiment was aimed at achieving increased self-knowledge and harmonious inter-personal relations based on trust.

* * *

The following VIPs visited the Institute during April-September and held discussions with the Director on matters of mutual interest:

(1) A group of State Information Officers stationed here (they came at IIPA's invitation) (April 24);

(2) *Dr. (Miss) Muriel Brown*, Lecturer in Social Administration at the London School of Economics & Political Science (April 24); she spent a couple of hours at the Institute on April 26 also and gave a talk on "Administration of Social Development Programme in the context of National Development";

(3) *Prof. Jose V. Abueva*, of University of the Philippines (May 10);

(4) *Mr. A. S. Cooley*, O. B. E., Chairman of Commonwealth Public Service Board (he came with Australia's Prime Minister, *Mr. Edward Gough Whitlam* at the time of latter's state visit to India) (June 5);

(5) *Mr. Mohammad Sanaullah Alefi*, Deputy Director of Research in Afghanistan's Civil Service Department (July 16 to 18);

(6) *Dr. Nathan Glazer*, Professor at the Harvard University; he also spoke to the IIPA faculty on "Urban Problems and Government Solutions" (September 3);

(7) *Mr. Michael Hirsch*, Assistant Administrator for Environmental Protection, New York City; he also addressed the Faculty on "Environmental Protection Administration: The Need to Have a Coordinating Agency in the Fields of Air, Water and Sanitation" (September 11);

(8) *Mr. Tomijiro Negishi*, Chief, Current Affairs Division of the Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo (September 14);

(9) Two senior officers—*Shri S. H. Khan* and *Shri R. C. Mohanty*—from National Police Academy, Abu (September 24);

(10) *Mr. W. N. Wamalwa*, Chairman, Public Service Commission on Kenya (November 23); and

(11) *Mr. Ato Abdela Abdurahman*, Vice-Mayor of Adis Ababa (Ethiopia) (November 22 and December 14).

* * *

Prof. M. J. K. Thavaraj, Professor of Financial Management has been placed in the selection grade with effect from August 8.

New appointments effected in IIPA's faculty during the three quarters, *i.e.*, April-December are:

Dr. S. K. Goyal, Professor of Economics & Economic administration;

Dr. A. P. Barnabas, Professor of Sociology & Social Administration;

Dr. Shriram Maheshwari, Professor of Political Science & Public Administration;

Dr. S. P. Verma, Professor in Behavioural Sciences;

Dr. Kuldeep Mathur, Professor in Behavioural Sciences;

Dr. Jayanta Kumar Ray, Professor in Behavioural Sciences;

Dr. Kanti Swarup, Professor in Operations Research;

Dr. Jaideep Singh, Reader in Behavioural Sciences;

Shri N. S. F. B. Tyabji, Reader in Operations Research;

Dr. K. N. Kabra, Reader in Economics;

Shri Alok Jain, Lecturer in Economics (he resigned the post in August); and

Shri Sudipto Mundle, Research Associate in Economics.

Shri Mohinder Singh, the new Librarian, assumed his office on July 20.

* * *

Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, your Editor, took over his new assignment on September 24 as Executive Director, Indian Investment Centre, New Delhi. Till recently, he was Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration.

* * *

Smt. Usha Baneriee (former Research Fellow at IIPA), who completed her thesis under the supervision of *Prof. V. Jagannadham* of IIPA, was awarded Ph.D. by Delhi University on April 19. The topic of her thesis was "Social Services Administration in an Urban Metropolis—A Study of Delhi Municipal Corporation with Special Reference to Health and Family Planning".

* * *

The theme of the next Special Number of the *Nagarlok* is "Municipal Management". This quarterly is being brought out by IIPA's Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration for the past five years and is devoted exclusively to disseminate information on urban local government and administration and allied urban problems. Its earlier special numbers were on "Reforms in Municipal Administration" (Vol. II, No. 4), "Municipal Finances" (Vol. III, No. 4), and "Welfare Services in Urban Local Bodies" (Vol. IV, No. 4).

The Institute has brought out the following publications:

(1) *Financial Control and Delegation by M. J. K. Thavaraj and K. L. Handa* (Pages 166, Rs. 15.00);

(2) *Building Bye-Laws—Zoning and Sub-Division Control* (Pages 64, Rs. 4.00);

(3) *Municipal Personnel Systems* (pages 88, Rs. 6.00); and (Publications at serial No. 2 and 3 contain proceedings of seminars on respective subjects which were organized by IIPA.)

(4) *Case Studies in Industrial Administration* (page 174, Rs. 21.00).

Besides these, the following has been published by M/s Laxmi Narain Agarwal of Agra under the auspices of the Institute:

Study of Public Administration in India: proceedings of *a Seminar conducted by* IIPA on the subject in 1971 edited by *Shriram Maheshwari* (pages 199, including index, Rs. 25.00).

* * *

Another IIPA Regional Branch for Goa was inaugurated by *Shri K. C. Pant*, Minister of State for Home Affairs, on June 4 at Panjim; and two new Local Branches started functioning at Sholapur and Dharwar during April-September.

The following lectures/symposium/seminars were organized by IIPA's branches:

Branch & Date	*Subject*	*Speakers*
REGIONAL BRANCHES		
MAHARASHTRA		
April 18	Talk on Problems of Administration.	*Shri S.A. Sapre*, Manager of Government Central Press, Bombay.
May 8	Talk on "Reform of World Monetary System"	*Prof. Seymour H. Knox*, Professor of Economics at the Yale University (USA).
June 19	Lecture on "The Administrative and Political Profile of the Nation"	*Prof. Shanti Kothari*, Visiting Professor, IIPA.
August 27	Lecture on "People's Participation in Scarcity Relief Programme of the Government of Maharashtra"	*Shri V. S. Page*, Chairman, Maharashtra Legislative Council.
RAJASTHAN		
August 4	Symposium on "People, Poverty and the Fifth Plan".	*Sarvashri Asoka Mehta, Piloo Modi*, and *P.K. Choudhary* took part and *Shri R. C. Padhi*, Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan, presided.
August 21	Lecture on "Administrative Reforms—How to Implement them".	*Shri Morarji Desai*, M.P.
	Lecture on "Systems Improvement in Administration".	*Prof. Ishwar Dayal*, Director, IIPA.
	Lecture on "Rule of Law"	Chief Justice *Shri B. P. Beri* of Rajasthan High Court.
	Lecture on "Management Techniques"	*Prof. Nitish De* of Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta.
TAMIL NADU		
April 6	Lecture on "Jail Administration"	*Thiru S. Madhavan*, Minister for Industries, Government of Tamil Nadu.

Branch & Date	*Subject*	*Speakers*
September 28	Lecture on "Trends in Manpower Management"	*Prof. T. A. A. Latif*, Chief (Training), Institute of Applied Manpower Research, New Delhi.
October 22	Talk on Problems of Administration.	*Shri N. S. Ramaswamy*, Director, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.
WEST BENGAL		
June 30	Seminar on "Bureaucracy and Development Planning"	*Dr. R. C. Ghosh*, Centenary Professor of Public Administration, Calcutta University, led the discussion and *Dr. S. R. Saha*, Head of the Department of Public Administration, Rabindra Bharati University, presided.
LOCAL BRANCHES		
DHARWAR		
September 25	Talk on "Rationale and Activities of Forward Markets Commission"	*Prof. S.V. Kogekar*, Member, Forward Markets Commission.
PATNA		
September 22	Lecture on "Some Recent Conceptual Developments in Public Administration"	*Dr. V. P. Varma*, Director, Institute of Public Administration, University of Patna.

The *Maharashtra* Regional Branch constituted a small group to review the important provisions of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, and to make suggestions for amendments therein. The group's recommendations are to be forwarded to the Government for consideration by the State Level Committee set up to evaluate the 'Act'.

The *Maharashtra* Regional Branch brought out a 136-page Special Number of its periodical *The Public Administrator* on the occasion of the Independence Day.

The *Rajasthan* Regional Branch has organized an Essay Competition on "Administration of Law and Order". The amount of prize for the best essay is Rs. 700 and that for the second best Rs. 400. The branch also brought out a monograph on *Administrative Levels and Functional Differentiation: A Comparative Study of India and the U. S.* by *Dr. Ramesh K. Arora* of University of Rajasthan.

The *Tamil Nadu* Regional Branch on July 24, organized for its members a film show on "Management by Objectives."

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The Supreme Court on April 24 upheld the power of Parliament under 24th constitutional amendment to abridge the fundamental rights provided the amendment did not alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.

The document signed by nine of the thirteen judges said that the view of the majority was: (1) Golaknath's case is overruled; (2) Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution; (3) The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, is valid; (4) Section 2(A) and 2(B) of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, is valid; and (5) The first part of Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, is valid. The second part, namely, "and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy" is invalid.

However, all the 13 Judges signed the order of the Court which stated: "The Constitution Bench will determine the validity of the Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971, in accordance with law."

* * *

The Rajya Sabha passed the Indian Railways (Amendment) Bill, on September 4, which imposes death penalty or life imprisonment on people found guilty of deliberately causing a train wreck, which results in the death of passengers. The Bill imposes imprisonment up to 10 years for damage to railway property worth Rs. 100 or more, and a minimum of one to six months' imprisonment for smaller offences, like chain-pulling and ticketless travelling.

* * *

A new service, called the 'Indian Posts & Telegraphs Accounts and Finance Service (Class I)' has been formed in the P & T Department.

All the posts on the accounts and finance wings of P & T, which were in general Central Services (Class I), have now been encadred in the new Service.

* * *

The Union Ministry of Heavy Industry is being reorganised to push forward its management-oriented activities. As a first step, a post of an Additional Secretary has been created.

* * *

A special cell has been created in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs to expedite implementation of the Law Commission's report.

Out of the 10 Reports (45th to 54th) submitted so far by the reconstituted Law Commission since its inception in 1971, three concerning the Law Ministry are in various stages of implementation. Action on the remaining seven pertaining to other ministries is yet to be initiated.

* * *

The Ministry of Railways have decided to set up a new Railway Service Commission at Muzaffarpur in

Bihar to meet the requirements of the North-Eastern Railway. The decision flows from the Ministry's review of the workload of the existing Service Commissions and the tasks they might be called upon to undertake in the light of the expansion programmes in Fifth Five Year Plan. The Ministry have also decided to set up a Sub-Office at Ranchi (in addition to the one at Danapur), in the heart of the Adivasi belt, under the control of the Service Commission at Calcutta to help attract scheduled tribes candidates in larger numbers to Railway Services through publicity and vocational and educational counselling. It has also been decided to take steps for ensuring due share to those groups which are not adequately represented in Railway Services.

* * *

The Union Ministry of Heavy Industry has set up a 'Complaint Cell' headed by a senior officer.

The Cell will receive all complaints in connection with the industries—both private and public sector under the Ministry. It will ensure prompt action with regard to rectifying defects as well as providing satisfactory consumer service.

* * *

A high-level Study Team is looking into the decades-old rules and regulations as laid down in the Postal Manuals. The Team will suggest remedial measures for prompt despatch and delivery of mails, booking and handling of registered articles and money orders and to simplify accounting procedures.

* * *

Shri S. V. Sohni, former Chief Secretary of Bihar, was sworn in as Lokayukta of Bihar on May 28. He will have the Status of Chief Justice of a High Court. He is the first Lokayukta to be appointed in the State following the recommendations of the All-India Administrative Reforms Commission.

* * *

The Government of *Bihar* have decided to add two more districts—Katihar and Gopalganj—to the existing number of 29.

* * *

The Government of *Gujarat* has, by an Act of the State Legislature, constituted a Gujarat Civil Service Tribunal. The purpose is to secure, in a more effective and satisfactory manner, the just claims and interests of the State Government and Panchayat servants holding non-gazetted posts with respect to their rights.

* * *

The Government of *Gujarat* have amended the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961. The main amendments relate to direct elections of Sarpanch and members of the Taluka Panchayat and those of State Panchayats replacing the system of having them partly through indirect elections and partly in *ex officio* capacity.

* * *

The Government of *Haryana* have reconstituted the Haryana State Public Relations Committee as Haryana State Public Relations and Grievances Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of the Home Minister of the State. The 14-member (five officials and 9 non-officials) Committee will advise the State Government on general policy matters relating to Public Relations and Grievances Departments. It will also devise ways and means to further the publicity of the various departments. The term of office of the Committee is two years.

* * *

In order to ensure an impartial and clean disposal of establishment matters, the Government of *Madhya Pradesh* has decided that the employees dealing with establishment

matters in Establishment Sections of different departments in the Secretariat and in the Offices of Heads of Department would be transferred to other sections after a period of three years positively.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra* has sanctioned a Pool Officers' Scheme for utilization of high level manpower available for employment in positions appropriate to their level of employment. The scheme extends to the faculties of engineering and technology, agriculture and veterinary education, science and commerce. Any person with a Master's Degree or Doctorate in the selected discipline from a statutory university is eligible to be enrolled as a Pool Officer.

The Government has also appointed a high-power committee, headed by the Chief Secretary, for guiding the Planning Department which will be in overall charge of the implementation of this scheme. The committee will also ensure purposeful utilization of high level manpower.

The Regional Universities, through the University Bureaux, will select generally the personnel for the pool of officers. The four agricultural universities will select the agriculture and verterinary personnel.

Each Pool Officer will get a fixed stipend of Rs. 200 per month during the period he remains in the pool. In addition, the attached organisation may pay him emoluments on the basis of the job assigned to him.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra* has set up a State level Publicity Coordination Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of State for Home, Publicity, etc. Setting up of such a committee in each state was recommended by the Eleventh Conference of State Ministers of Information held in New Delhi in December 1972.

Besides the Chairman, the committee has 10 officials as members, including the Chief Secretary (who is Vice-Chairman) and four Secretaries. The Committee is authorized to co-opt additional members as and when necessary.

The terms of reference of the Committee include coordination of the activities of the media units of the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on the one hand and the publicity agencies of the State Government on the other. It has to define major schemes of publicity and lay down broad outlines of publicity campaigns for achievement of mutually accepted communication goals in socio-economic spheres and to evolve measures to strengthen co-operation and collaboration in the field of information between the Government of India and the State Government.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra* has with effect from August 15, 1973, constituted a Maharashtra Development Service under the administrative control of its Rural Development Department to make available, in adequate numbers, persons with proper aptitude, training and experience in rural developmental work. Class I of the new Service includes posts of Deputy Chief Executive Officers, Planning Officers and Administrative Officers at the district level attached to the Zila Parishads and the Block Development Officers (Higher Grade) in Panchayat Samitis having Tribal Development Blocks. Class II of the new service includes Revenue Officers at the district level attached to the Zila Parishads and the Block Development Officers in other Panchayat Samitis. As soon as possible, it is intended to include in the Class I (super-time-scale) of the new

service some posts of Chief Executive Officers of Zila Parishads after the posts are decaderised by the Government of India from the Indian Administrative Service—Maharashtra Cadre.

Most of these superior, executive, non-technical posts included in Class I and Class II of the Maharashtra Development Service were, since the formation of Zila Parishads, manned by officers temporarily drawn from time to time from various other gazetted services of the State Government.

Twentyfive per cent posts in the Class I and Class II of the Maharashtra Development Service will be available for absorption of willing and experienced officers of the other services as the Government may decide. Remaining officers of other services of Government, at persent working in those posts, will be withdrawn gradually in a phased programme. Employees of Zila Parishads, who were so for not eligible for appointment by selection to the lowest gazetted cadres of the State Government, will get adequate opportunities for such appointment in the new service.

* * *

Mysore State has been renamed 'Karnataka' with effect from November 1, 1973.

* * *

The Revenue Department of the Government of *Punjab* has compiled "The Punjab Flood and Other Emergency Relief Manual", giving self-contained and up-to-date instructions to the district authorities for dealing with situations like floods, drought, fire, hailstorm, locusts, etc., within the shortest possible period. The steps to be taken before, during and after such an emergency have been described in three parts of the manual in great detail.

* * *

The Government of *Punjab* has decided to take out of the purview of the Public Service Commission the recruitment of some posts in the Public Relations Department. These include public relations officer, photo and cinema officer, art executive, technical executive, senior photographer, director cameraman, publicity secretary to the Chief Minister, exhibition officer, information officer and sound and production managers.

* * *

Rajasthan legislation creating the 'Lokayukta' and the 'Up-Lokayukta' in the State empowers the former to investigate any complaint of corruption against Minister (Chief Minister excluded), Pramukha of a Zila Parishad, Pradhan of a Panchayat Samiti, Chairman of a Municipality or a Secretary or other public servant defined in the Act. The investigation shall be conducted in private and the identity of the complainant and that of the public servant affected by the investigation shall not be disclosed. The legislation provides for punishment—imprisonment up to three years and fine—to a person wilfully making malicious complaint in this regard.

The Governor of the State shall make the appointment of 'Lokayukta' after consulting the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Leader of Opposition in the Assembly.

* * *

The Government of *Rajasthan* has constituted (March 12, 1973) a District Public Grievances-cum-Vigilance Committee in each district headed by the Collector. The other members of the Committee are the Superintendent of Police, two members of the Assembly, one member of the Zila Parishad, and the Additional Collector.

The Committee, meeting once in a month on a fixed day, shall deal

with complaints relating to corruption and public grievances such as delays in grant of power connections, registration of criminal cases, registration of mutations, grant and execution of contracts in various departments, etc.

The Committee shall be free to identify persons/organisations which have a corrupting influence on Government servants and report the same to the Government.

* * *

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* has created a new cadre, called the Provincial Medical and Health Service, with effect from June 26, 1973 in place of the existing two Services, *viz.*, Provincial Medical Service and Provincial Health Service. As many as 80 permanent and 1976 temporary posts have been included in the cadre.

The incumbents in the new cadre will be entitled to the non-practising pay/allowance at the same rate as is admissible, according to the Government order of March 31, to the members of the PMS and PHS in the same cadre.

* * *

As per orders issued recently, the Governor's power of inflicting minor punishments on Officers of Class II Services of *Uttar Pradesh*, whose appointing authority is the Governor, will also be exercisable by the Heads of Departments under whom those officers are serving. The punishments include: (*i*) censure; (*ii*) withholding of increments, including stoppage at efficiency bar; or (*iii*) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders.

* * *

For the purpose of efficient formulation of development schemes and implementation thereof, the Government of *West Bengal* has modified and redefined the duties, functions and responsibilities of its officers at various levels of administration—Divisions, Districts, Subdivisions and Blocks—according to the changed circumstances.

At District level, a coordination Committee of district level officers from all departments will now review the progress in implementation of development schemes, particularly those included in the Plan, and coordination efforts of various departments to reduce difficulties encountered therein. The District Magistrate will be the chairman of the Committee. It will meet at least once a month on a fixed day.

* * *

The main recommendations that emerge from the Third Pay Commission Report, made available to Parliament on April 2, 1973, include, among others: A minimum remuneration of Rs. 185 per month for a whole-time employee, keeping the maximum at the present level of Rs. 3,500; Reduction of pay scales from over 500 to 80; Improvement in pension rates and retirement benefits; Retention of the age of retirement at 58; Filling up of a certain proportion of senior posts—even in the administrative cadres—by direct recruitment of outside candidates; and, a half-hour increase in working for administrative offices.

In devising its pay structure, the Commission has kept in view the tests of 'inclusiveness', 'comprehensibility' and 'adequacy'.

The Commission has recommended that a common wage policy should be evolved for public sector undertakings and an effective coordinating machinery should be established to ensure that the pay scales of any public sector undertaking do not go seriously out of line with those in other public sector

undertakings and under the Government. The Commission has fixed the pay scales of various posts under the Government with reference to their duties and responsibilities, difficulty and complexity of the task, qualifications, etc.

Liberalisation of travelling and daily allowance rules, facilities for travel with leave and for education of children of all Government Servants (as in the Railways), enhancement in the interest of provident fund accumulations, and introduction of insurance cover of Rs. 5,000—on payment of a contribution of Rs. 5 per month—have also been suggested.

Payment of additional dearness allowance has been recommended as and when the 12-monthly average of index rises by 8 points instead of a 10-point increase as at present. Employees getting pay up to Rs. 300 should get DA at 3.5 per cent of pay subject to a minimum of Rs. 7 and a maximum of Rs. 10 and those getting pay above Rs. 300 should get DA at 2.5 per cent of pay subject to a minimum of Rs. 10 and a maximum of Rs. 20. DA allowance at these rates is to be given to all employees getting pay up to Rs. 900 p.m. Employees getting higher pay should be paid DA when the price rise is of a greater order.

The Commission recommended that the system of special pay should be used as sparingly as possible. It has recommended continuance of the existing rates of special pay.

The Commission has recommended continuance of payment of Compensatory (City) Allowance in various towns. For purposes of payment of this allowance, it has introduced the concept of urban agglomeration as adopted for the population Census of 1971. The house rent allowance is to be paid at the rate of 15 per cent of pay subject to a maximum amount of Rs. 400 in A, B1 and B2 Class cities. In 'C' Class cities, the allowance is to be paid at 7½ per cent of pay subject to a maximum amount of Rs. 200. The Commission has recommended that production and verification of rent receipts should be made compulsory in all cases where house rent allowance at the new rates is to be paid.

The maximum qualifying service for pension has been increased from 30 years to 33 years and the maximum pay for earning pension from Rs. 1800 to Rs. 2500. While the maximum amount of pension has been recommended to be raised from Rs. 675 p.m. to Rs. 1,000 p.m., the maximum amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity has been recommended to be raised from Rs. 24,000 to Rs. 30,000. Improvements in the rates of family pension to the families in cases where a Government employee dies while in harness are also suggested. The minimum family pension has been increased from Rs. 40 to Rs. 60 and the maximum from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 p.m.

The Commission has also recommended that in the case of death of an employee after a minimum service of 7 years, the family pension at a higher rate should be paid to his family for a guaranteed maximum period of 7 years or till he would have attained the age of 65 years, whichever is less. Some improvements have been suggested in the amount of terminal gratuity to temporary and quasi-permanent employees. In case of death attributable to service conditions, family pensionary awards have been recommended to be rationalised and improved.

Another recommendation is that the system of overtime allowance should be withdrawn in respect of

categories of establishments to which the practice was extended subsequent to the recommendations of the Second Pay Commission. Payment of overtime allowance under the provisions of the Factories Act, the Hours of Employment Regulations, etc., should, however, continue. A system of compensatory leave and payment of honoraria has been recommended to be introduced in cases of over-stayal during periods of unusual activity or due to unforeseen circumstances.

The Commission has not accepted the demand for encashment of leave. However, in cases of death in harness, such encashment of leave has been permitted subject to a maximum period of 120 days. In regard to medical facilities, the Commission has recommended extension of the Central Government Health Scheme to other cities and towns on a priority basis and for improvement of these facilities. A system of selective review of medical reimbursement claims has been recommended to be introduced. It has also been recommended that all Government employees should be subjected to a compulsory medical examination at the age of 40, 45 and 50 years not with a view to retiring those unfit but to improve medical care by remedial action at an incipient stage.

The Commission has suggested that its recommendations should be made effective from 1st March 1973.

The pay fixation formula recommended by the Commission provides that an amount equal to 5 per cent of pay, subject to a minimum of Rs. 10 and a maximum of Rs. 50 should be added to the existing emoluments and the pay then fixed in the revised scales at the same stage or the next higher stage.

The Commission has also recommended setting up of a permanent machinery for systematic collection of reliable and comprehensive data regarding pay scales, fringe benefits, service conditions, etc., of employees not only in the Government but also in the public and private sectors. The creation of a standing body on pay and cadre management has been suggested to advise the Government on matters like cadre review, evaluation studies, pay revision of any class of employees based on the results of job evaluation studies, creation of new scales, etc.

Given below are some of the typical scales of pay (without efficiency bar) suggested by the Commission for civilian employees and some of the categories of employees to whom these apply; (1) Rs. 185-2-193-3-220: Peons, Unskilled workers, Gangmen (Railways); (2) Rs. 190-3-208-4-240; Daftries, Jamadars, Cooks, Leverman Grade II, Pointsman B (Railways); (3) Rs. 200-3-212-4-240-5-280; Artisan (Semi-skilled); (4) Rs. 260-6-326-8-390-10-400: skilled workers, Lower Division Clerks, Staff Car Drivers, Ticket Collectors; (5) Rs. 330-10-380-12-500-15-560: Upper Division Clerks, Qualified Pharmacists and Compounders, Assistant Station Masters, Higher Secondary Trained Primary School Teachers, Senior Commercial Clerks, Librarians with a Diploma in Library Science; (6) Rs. 425-15-560-20-700: Head Clerks, Economic and Statistical Investigators, Junior Engineers, Junior Scientific Assistants, Junior Chargeman, Engineering Supervisors in the P & T, Draftsman, Grade III; (7) Rs. 425-15-560-20-700-25-800: Assistants and Stenographers (Central Secretariat), Income-tax Inspectors, Inspectors of Central Excise, Examiners and Preventive Officers (Customs); (8) Rs. 550-20-650-25-750; Some Station Masters, Commercial/Claims/Transportation Inspectors

(Railways), Senior Chargemen in workshops, Communication Assistants, Aerodrome Assistants, Technical Assistants in Civil Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police; (9) Rs. 500-20-700-25-900: S.A.S. Accountants; (10) Rs.550-25-750-30-900: Senior Economic and Statistical Investigators, Senior Scientific Assistants, Senior Engineering Assistants (AIR), Selection Grade for Engineering Supervisors (P & T), and Junior Engineers in C.P.W.D., Inspectors, Delhi Police, Post-graduate Teachers, Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices and R.M.S.; (11) Rs.650-30-740-35-880-40-1200: Assistant Engineers, Superintendents, Central Excise/Appraiser Customs, Incometax Officers, Class II, Section Officers (Central Sectt.), Headmasters of High Schools and Vice-Principal of Higher Secondary Schools, certain Scientific, Technical and Medical officers; (12) Rs. 700-40-1100-50-1300: Junior Class I posts in the All India Services, Scientific, Engineering and other Class I Central Services; (13) Rs. 1050-50-1600: Senior Class I for Central Services and posts except those at S.No.14; (14) Rs.1100-50-1600: Senior Class I scale for organized Engineering Services recruited through the Combined Engineering Services Examination, Indian Police Service, Indian Forest Service and some of the Scientific posts; (15) Rs. 1200-50-1300-60-1900-100-2000): Senior Scales of Indian Administrative Service; (16) Rs. 1500-60-1800-100-2000: Deputy Secretaries (Central Sectt.) Junior Administrative Grade posts in most organised Class I Services, Principal Scientific Officer (Defence), Scientists/Engineers, Grade SE in Atomic Engergy, Superintending Engineers, Supertime Grade II of Central Health Service; (17) Rs. 2000-125/2-2250: Directors (Secretariat), Selection Grade of I.A.S. and organised Class I Engineering Services, Deputy Inspector General of Police; (18) Rs. 2250-125/2-2500: Level II Heads of Departments; (19) Rs. 2500-125/2-2750: Joint Secretaries, Directors (Railway Board), Level I Heads of Departments; (20) Rs. 3000-100-3500: General Manager (Railways), Deputy Comptroller & Auditor General, Financial Adviser (Defence Services), Chairman, Board of Direct Taxes and Board of Customs & Central Excise, Engineer-in-Chief, C.P.W.D., Chief Economic Adviser, Ministry of Finance, Inspector General of Forests, Chief Project Officer, Adviser (Petro-Chemicals), Chief of the Refineries in the Ministry of Petroleum & Chemicals; (21) Pay range from Rs. 3000 to Rs. 3500: Outstanding Scientists, depending upon individual merits; and (22) Rs. 3500 (fixed): Secretaries to Government, Chief Secretaries of States, Chairman and Members of Railway Board, Director, Intelligence Bureau, Director General, Health Services, Director General, Ordnance Factories.

The Union Government has accepted the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission pertaining to Class II, III, and IV employees with some modifications; decision on recommendations relating to Class I employees would be taken later.

Important modifications in the recommendations of the Pay Commission are : raising minimum wage from Rs. 185 to 196, revising five pay scales (from Rs. 185-220 to 196-232, Rs. 190-232 to 200-240, Rs 190-240 to 200-250, Rs 200-260 to 210-270, and Rs. 200-280 to 210-290) in the process; improvement in pay-fixation formula; cent per cent neutralization of dearness allowance up to the pay of Rs. 300, and 75 per cent between Rs. 300-900 on every increase of 8 points in the 12-monthly average of the index; and changing date of enforcement of new pay scales, dearness allowance, and retirement benefits from March 1 to January 1, 1973.

Before taking decision, the government held detailed discussions with the staff representatives of the National Council of the Joint Consultative Machinery. The government conceded that, on grounds of social justice, there was still need for providing some more benefits to Class III and IV employees.

The government will have to incur, recurringly, an additional expenditure of Rs. 61 crores owing to improvements in the recommendations; there will also be a non-recurring expenditure of Rs. 25 crores.

* * *

Lok Sabha Speaker, *Shri G. S. Dhillon*, announced (on August 16) the appointment of a parliamentary committee to examine the pay structures of the officers and staff of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha secretariats as the Third Pay Commission had not made any recommendations regarding Parliament Secretariat Staff.

Shri K. N. Tiwari, Chairman of the Estimates Committee, is the Chairman and the other members are: *Shri Joytirmoy Bosu*, Chairman, Public Accounts Committee; Finance Minister, *Shri Y. B. Chavan*; Parliamentary Affairs Minister, *Shri K. Raghuramaiah*; *Shri Jaisukhlal Hathi* and *Shri Mahavir Tyagi*, both members of the Rajya Sabha.

The Committee would advise the Speaker and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha about the changes considered in the structure of pay and allowances, leave and pensionary benefits to the officers and all categories of staff of both the Houses in the context of the Government's decisions on the Third Pay Commission report.

* * *

The Government of India, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Banking Commission, has set up a Committee under the chairmanship of *Prof. V. R. Pillai* for standardization of scales of pay, allowances and perquisites, etc., of officers (other than award staff) in the 14 nationalized banks. The Members of the Committee are *S/Shri K. P. J. Prabhu, S.M.Joshi,. J. M. Lalvani* and *R. Rajamani.*

The Committee will recommend the principles that should govern the structure of pay scales of officers of nationalised banks and the changes which might be necessary to bring about standardisation. Among other things, it will also look into the allowances, amenities, facilities or benefits in kind for the various grades of officers.

* * *

The Government of *Assam* have accepted the first part of the Pay Commission report submitted recently. The following are the salient features resulting from the acceptance: (*i*) Minimum salary will now be Rs. 180 p.m.; (*ii*) The maximum salary has been fixed at Rs. 2100; (*iii*) The pay-scales have been rationalized by bringing it down to 32 scales against the existing 43 scales; and (*iv*) The revision will take effect from January 1, 1973.

* * *

The Second Pay Commission, appointed by the Government of *Jammu & Kashmir* in June 1972, has recommended reduction of the number of pay scales from the existing 52 to 28.

Accordingly, the minimum starting pay would be Rs. 170 and the maximum starting pay would be Rs. 1800 per month.

The various Departments of the State Government, their hierarchy

and pay structures are discussed in different sections of the Report.

* * *

A 3-member committee has been formed by the Government of *West Bengal* to go into the pay structure and allied matters—*viz.*, revision of pay scales, granting interim relief, dearness allowance, retirement benefits, etc.—of the employees and workers of various municipal bodies in the State. *Shri N. K. Raichaudhury*, a retired ICS officer, is to head the Committee.

The Committee will suggest classification of Municipalities (other than Howrah Municipality), Notified Area Authorities, and Town Committees into groups having regard to such factors as size, population, financial resources and regional importance.

* * *

The Union Government has decided to constitute a wage cell in the Labour Ministry for analysis of the wage structure and collection of data to evolve a national wage policy. Recently, *Shri Sukhmoy Chakravarty*, Member of Planning Commission, is reported to have submitted his report to the Government on national wage policy.

Minimum wages of unskilled, semi-skilled and highly skilled workers employed in agriculture have been increased, according to a Central Government notification. The payment of wages to agricultural workers is governed by the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

The existing wages (notified in May 1969) of such unskilled workers (ranging between Rs. 2.50 and 3.70 per day) would now range between Rs. 3.50 and 5.15 per day according to areas of work.

Workers in the agricultural farms of the Ministry of Defence, and agricultural and horticultural workers under the Ministries of Agriculture, Works and Housing, and the Archaeological Survey of India (Ministry of Education), etc., will be benefited by the wage revision.

* * *

The Union Labour Ministry, in a circular letter, has advised employers' organizations to pay a minimum bonus of 8.33 per cent for the accounting year beginning on any day in 1972. The Government have taken this decision in view of the delay in submission of the final report on the bonus question by the tripartite bonus reviewing committee.

* * *

In response to representation made by trade unions, on the ground of rising prices, the Union Government is to pay in cash the entire amount of bonus for 1972-73 to the employees. The present position, according to the amended Bonus Act, is that bonus payable above the 1971-72 level, if it is over 8.33 per cent, should be deposited in the Provident Fund account of the employees.

* * *

The Union Government have granted a raise of Rs. 7 to 10 per month in the Dearness Allowance to its employees drawing salaries below Rs. 575 per month. Necessitated by increase in consumer price index, it will be effective from May 1, 1973.

The Union Government, after submission of the Third Pay Commission Report, granted second raise in the dearness allowance to its employees with effect from August 1, 1973 with the price index average touching 216 points in July.

* * *

Employees of the Government of *Gujarat* will get an interim relief ranging between Rs. 10 and Rs. 25 a month with effect from May, 1973. The benefit of the interim relief would also be available to panchayat employees, teachers of primary and non-government secondary schools and attendants with fixed salary. The interim relief has been recommended by the State's Pay Commission (Desai Pay Commission).

* * *

The Government of *Kerala* has granted to its employees additional dearness allowance at the same rates as were granted to the Central Government employees with effect from August 1, 1973. The additional DA would vary between Rs. 7 and 10 for employees drawing a salary up to Rs. 575 a month.

* * *

The Government of *Madhya Pradesh* has sanctioned additional dearness allowance, ranging from Rs. 7 to Rs. 10 per month, to its employees drawing salaries up to Rs. 696 per month. The increase is equivalent to the one recently sanctioned by the Central Government to its employees and with effect from last May.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra* has decided to introduce the Maharashtra Provident Fund Rules for the employees in the recognised and aided non-Government secondary schools and special schools in the State.

* * *

An additional dearness allowance ranging from Rs. 7 to Rs. 10 per month has been sanctioned, *w.e.f.* May 1, 1973 to the employees of the Government of *Uttar Pradesh* local bodies and aided educational and technical institutions drawing revised monthly salaries up to Rs. 740. The raise is in accordance with the recommendation of the U.P. Pay Commission and will cost the State Government Rs. 9.46 crores annually.

* * *

The Government of *Kerala* has introduced the system of direct payment of salaries to teaching and non-teaching staff of private arts and science colleges in the State as a measure to improve their service conditions.

* * *

The Union Government has decided to set up a National Labour Institute in Poona. Apart from training, considerable attention will be paid by the Institute to improve labour research, the results of which would be handy to the Governments for policy formulation in the labour field as also to industry and workers for knowing the practices and procedures followed in different sectors of the industry.

* * *

Public sector banks will provide various training facilities to about 10,000 officers and 24,000 clerks during 1973. The Board of Directors of each public sector bank will undertake a quarterly review of the progress of the training programme.

This has been decided by the Committee of Directors set up by the Government in September 1972, under the chairmanship of *Shri N.C. Sengupta*, Secretary, Department of Banking. The Committee has emphasised the need for preparation of personnel inventory in banks, optimum utilisation of training facilities and setting up of Management

Department Cells in public sector banks.

* * *

To provide training to its officials at different levels, the Government of *Kerala* has decided (April 19, 1973) to set up an "Institute of Public Administration" at Trivandrum. The Institute will conduct the following type of courses: (1) Foundational courses of 2 or 3 months' duration for officers of the subordinate service of the State, particularly of the technical departments and departments like Revenue, Agricultural Income-tax, Excise, Panchayat and Local Administration and General Subordinate Service; (2) Refresher Courses of 3 to 6 weeks' duration for the supervisory officers of Revenue State Service, Treasury Service and Middle Management Personnel of all Departments; (3) Work Study/ O & M Course for officers to be put in charge of the O & M Cells in the office of the Heads of Departments: (4) Special Course for I.A.S. Probationers; (5) Seminars and colloquiums for senior officers; (6) Training on Vigilance; (7) Refresher Course for stenographers; (8) Training course for Secretariat Assistants; and (9) Training in Administrative Law.

The State Government may later on consider the suggestion of setting up three regional Centres under the auspices of the Central Institute for its large number of officers in different grades working in the departments, especially in the ministerial cadre.

* * *

The Union Government has decided to protect the seniority, pay, pension and other benefits of those Central Government employees, who have decided to opt for permanent service in the public sector undertakings. Optees from state government services, however, will not be covered by this decision.

The seniority of officers opting for service in an enterprise will be fixed in a particular grade with effect from the date of their original deputation to that grade.

* * *

The Government of *Haryana* has amended its leave rules to the effect that, save in exceptional circumstances, no State Government servant shall be granted leave of any kind for a continuous period exceeding five years.

* * *

The Inspector-General of Police, *Haryana*, has been empowered to compulsorily retire any police officer (other than an officer belonging to Indian Police Service and Haryana State Police Service) who has completed 25 years qualifying service on grounds of inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption or infamous conduct, without any special compensation for this retirement. The affected officer shall, however, be given an adequate opportunity of making representation against the proposed action.

* * *

The Committee, appointed by the Government of *Kerala* to revise the service Rules, in its report relating to Government Servant's Conduct Rules, has recommended granting of 'right to political activity' to civil servants of the State. This recommendation of the Committee is more or less on the lines of Britain's Masterman Committee (1948).

In making the recommendation, the Committee has divided the civil servants into three horizontal groups —the top level officers, the middle level officers and the last grade

officers. According to the Committee, the top level officers, being associated with policy making, will not be allowed to take part in politics. The middle level officers will be given limited political freedom and allowed to contest elections to local bodies, while the last grade officers will be free to take part in political activities and seek election to Parliament and the State Legislatures. The Committee has also recommended liberalization of restrictions on the government servants' taking part in literary activities.

* * *

In order to mitigate the hardships and suffering caused to the family of a Government servant who dies while in service, the Government of *Madhya Pradesh* has announced substantial *ex gratia* payment to such families. The payment should be equal to six months' salary of the employee, subject to a minimum of Rs. 2,500 and a maximum of Rs. 12,000 and is admissible to all the employees in the regular employment of Government.

* * *

According to a decision taken by the Government of *Mysore* on September 1, the age of retirement of Mysore State Government employees is to be reduced to 55 years uniformly in all cases, including teachers and the judicial service. The decision is part of the Government's plans to reduce unemployment and also to infuse new blood into the Government service.

Earlier, out of the nearly three lakh Government employees, about 36 per cent enjoyed the benefit of a higher superannuation age, which was considered discriminatory.

* * *

The Government of *Orissa* has decided to extend free medical facilities to all retired Government employees and their family members.

* * *

Headed by *Prof. V. K. R. V. Rao*, the 11-man Committee for Socio-Economic Studies on Family Planning will coordinate research on various socio-economic and demographic aspects of population growth and family planning in the country. It will also review the progress of research centres engaged on population studies with financial assistance from the Union Ministry of Health and Family Planning. The term of the Committee is two years.

* * *

A high-level monitoring and evaluation organisation, which would report directly to the Prime Minister on the implementation of projects in key areas like steel, power, oil, irrigation and fertilisers, is being set up in the Planning Commission. The purpose is to speed up the process of decision-making in crucial areas of economy on the basis of an analysis of the relevant factors.

Another new organisation being evolved would look after the optimum utilisation of the potentials of big irrigation projects in different parts of the country.

* * *

Establishment of a national agency for construction to look after, in a coordinated manner, the interest of the nation with respect to materials of construction has been recommended by the Planning Group on Materials of Construction, constituted by the National Committee on Science and Technology.

The Group said that in the plan outlays, more than 50 per cent is spent on constructional activity, such as buildings, roads, communications and irrigation. Of the Fifth Plan

outlay of around Rs. 50,000 crores, expenditure on such construction would be about Rs. 25,000 crores out of which Rs. 18,000 crores would be on materials of construction.

* * *

The Government of *Gujarat* has decided to create a post of an Employment Adviser to associate an expert economist at the stage of planning and formulation of employment schemes so as to evolve an organised employment programme for the State as a whole.

* * *

The Government of *Gujarat* has set up a 6-member State Planning Board with the State Chief Minister as Chairman and the State's Minister for Finance and Planning as Deputy Chairman. The remaining four members of the Board would be part-time members.

This full-fledged, full-time planning machinery will devote itself exclusively to problems of planning in the State, such as assessing human and material resources, assigning priorities, advising State government on drawing up of plans, undertaking comprehensive evaluation of all plan schemes, etc. The State so far had only a State Planning Advisory Board on part-time basis.

Each district in *Gujarat* State is to have a Planning Board, consisting of the President of District Panchayat as Chairman, and all M.Ps., M.L.As., Municipal Presidents of the District, the Collector, and Development Officer of the District, as members.

The functions of the Board would be: (1) to study continuously economic and social conditions of the district; (2) to help in preparing the Five Year Plans of the Districts; (3) to prepare realistic schemes and programmes for the balanced development of the district in various spheres; (4) to suggest measures to increase the financial resources of Panchayats of all the three tiers; (5) to suggest model schemes for implementation from the funds of the Panchayats; and (6) to evaluate regularly the implementation of programmes and policies of all district level schemes.

District Development Consultative Councils, designed to serve as sounding boards for ascertaining the views of the people in regard to the development of the districts and their felt needs, have been set up in all the districts of *Maharashtra*, except Greater Bombay. The councils will consist of the elected representatives of the people in Parliament and State Legislature, and those of various interests, like industry, trade, commerce, universities and social welfare institutions.

The Council will advise the District Planning Board in the formulation of the perspective, five year, and annual plans of the districts and associate itself with the review of the district plan from time to time.

The District Planning Board, in consultation with the concerned development authorities will take action on the recommendations and suggestions made by the Council.

* * *

A State Planning Board, with Chief Minister as its chairman, has been constituted in *Rajasthan*. The Board, consisting of experts in irrigation, dairy development, agriculture administration and economics, will meet at least once in every month and advise the Rajasthan Government on perspective planning, overall strategy and area development.

* * *

The Report of the Sixth Finance Commission was submitted to the President of India on October 28. The award of the Sixth Finance Commission covers the period of the Fifth Plan commencing from April 1,1974.

Headed by *Shri Brahmananda Reddy*, the 6-member Commission was constituted by the President on June 28, 1972. It was charged with the duty of making recommendations regarding : (*a*) distribution between the Union and the States and the States *inter se* of the net proceeds of central taxes, like taxes on income other than corporation tax, and Union excise duties; and (*b*) the the principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India.

Two issues referred to the Commission for the first time included the assessment of the non-plan capital gap of the States on a uniform and comparable basis for the five years ending with 1978-79, and a review of the policy and arrangements in regard to the financing of relief expenditure by the States affected by the natural calamities.

The Commission was also asked to recommend the principles for distribution of the net proceeds of estate duty on property, other than agricultural land, and grants in lieu of tax on railway passenger fares and the net proceeds of additional excise duties on cotton, woollen, rayon and artificial silk fabrics, sugar and tobacco which are levied in replacement of States' sales taxes thereon.

It was also asked to suggest the basis of allocation of grant on account of wealth tax on agricultural property.

* * *

The Public Accounts Committee of Lok Sabha has expressed serious concern over the "alarming increase" in the excesses in Government expenditure over the voted grants and charged appropriations and has called for immediate steps to improve the system of expenditure estimation. The 96th report of the Committee on the Appropriation Accounts of the Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, Defence and Civil Services for 1971-72, containing the above mentioned observation was presented to Lok Sabha on September 3.

The excess expenditure during 1971-72 was as high as Rs. 223.81 crores as against the aggregate amount of excesses recorded under voted grants and charged appropriations from 1965-66 to 1970-71 which ranged from Rs. 3.78 crores to Rs. 55.76 crores.

The Committee has suggested an in-built system which would serve as a self-regulatory apparatus in the various Ministries to analyse the reasons for the excesses and to take timely remedial measures.

The excesses for 1971-72 included an amount of Rs. 46.45 crores under "relief and resettlement of evacuees from Bangladesh" and another amount of Rs. 84.95 crores relating to "defence services, effective Army". The Committee felt that the budgetary procedure should be rationalised to facilitate closer estimation of the additional requirements during an emergency.

The Committee took a serious view of the persistent excess in expenditure on "maintenance of national highways". The excess touched an "all-time high" of Rs. 2.58 crores in 1971-72, with Assam and West Bengal accounting for a major portion of the excess expenditure.

* * *

The Prime Minister, *Smt. Indira Gandhi*, has issued an 8-point directive to her cabinet colleagues to enforce economy and give a lead to

help create a climate of austerity. Based on the Union Cabinet's decision on slashing down wasteful expenditure, it makes the following suggestions: (1) Official entertainment should be modest and restricted only to visiting foreign dignitaries of the rank of minister or above; (2) Use of staff cars should be confined to the minimum and to strictly official business and a ceiling set on the petrol allowed for this purpose; (3) STD facility should be barred on telephones except one or two telephones in the direct use of ministers; (4) Travel on official accounts should be cut down to the barest minimum necessary for essential and unavoidable engagements; (5) Visits abroad be heavily curtailed; (6) All ostentatious expenditure on renovation and repairs of buildings and furniture and furnishings should be avoided; (7) The expenditure on contingency should be reduced to the barest minimum and no purchases on government accounts be made unless their essentiality is established after a close scrutiny; and (8) Austerity should be observed in the consumption of electricity, both in normal use and on special occasions.

* * *

Parliament is fully competent to vary the rate of tax on non-agricultural income after reckoning the assessees' agricultural income, according to the 49th report of the Law Commission. Presented to the Rajya Sabha on May 7, the report says that there is no need to amend the Constitution for this purpose.

* * *

Total of overtime allowance granted to central employees during 1971-72 was Rs. 41.53 crores. This included Rs. 15.51 crores to the civil establishment of the Defence Ministry, Rs. 10.17 crores to Posts and Telegraphs employees, and Rs. 9.06 crores to railway employees.

* * *

A Cell has been set up in the Union Finance Ministry to work out the outlines of a viable fiscal policy in the context of the Fifth Plan. Located in the Economic Affairs Department, it would be an inter-ministerial working group and study in depth all aspects of taxation, including the possibility of making it more progressive, equitable and elastic.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra* have implemented the newly prepared Land Revenue Manuals in order to streamline revenue accounting systems as well as maintenance of land records at village, taluka and district levels. The new Maharashtra Land Revenue Manuals were prepared as a result of the work of a three-man committee appointed for the purpose.

* * *

The President of India has given assent to the Tamil Nadu Levy of Ryotwari Assessment on Freehold Lands Bill (now an Act), 1972. The Government of *Tamil Nadu* is now empowered to abolish all freehold lands in the state to bring them under the normal ryotwari pattern of paying annual revenue with cess. So far, such lands were either exempted from land revenue after payment of 20 times the annual assessment due on them or were liable to pay only concessional rate of assessment.

* * *

The Rajya Sabha, on May 18, passed the Coal Mines (Nationalization) Bill, 1973 vesting ownership of 711 non-coking coal mines with the Government. The Bill had earlier been passed by the Lok Sabha.

The nationalization will facilitate reorganization and reconstruction of coal mines to ensure rational, coordinated and scientific development and utilization of coal resources.

Another 214 coking (metallurgical) coal mines in Bengal-Bihar region were nationalized earlier.

The Government has also decided to establish a high-power Coal Mines Authority on the lines of the Steel Authority to ensure coordinated development of coal mines and their modernization to step up output. The new authority will have under it all coal mines except the Bharat Coking Coal and the Singareni coal fields.

Patterned on the National Coal Board of U. K., it is to be registered as a holding company with headquarters in Calcutta; its various regional organizations will be set up in eastern region, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra as its subsidiaries but with wide powers. The National Coal Development Corporation will form its headquarters in the eastern region.

The Authority and its subsidiaries will have considerable autonomy in the selection of personnel, planning and execution of its projects with a free hand to spend the allocated funds.

It will have eight full-time directors and four part-time directors. A full-time director will be taken from each of the three divisions and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute (Ranchi), besides a director each in charge of finance, marketing and personnel administration. The four part-time directors will represent the Department of Mines, the Ministry of Finance, the labour unions and the Bharat Coking Coal.

On the concluding day (September 9) of the three-day conference on Mahatma Gandhi's concept of trusteeship in industry, a six-point guideline for the socio-economic development of the community was evolved by consensus. The conference was convened by Sarvodaya leader, *Shri Vinobha Bhave* at his Wardha Ashram.

The consensus statement released by Shri Bhave stated: (1) In accordance with the Government's industrial policy, both the public and private sectors should continue to be given adequate scope to play their respective roles within the overall framework of planned economic development; (2) Since India was committed to establish a socialist democratic society, Indian socialism must be evolved in accordance with the nation's innate culture and traditions; and (3) Concerted efforts would have to be made to increase production, particularly of commodities for mass consumption, and to ensure their equitable distribution at reasonable prices. Various difficulties in this regard would have to be resolved expeditiously through consultations between the Government and representatives of agriculture, trade and industry in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and goodwill.

The conference appointed a coordination committee of representatives of Government, industry and trade to take follow-up action.

* * *

The Department of Company Affairs of the Union Government had undertaken a study of product concentration among units registered with the Directorate General of Technical Development in respect of 36 priority industries covering 349 selected products.

The study revealed that out of the 349 products, 312 products showed high concentration (*i.e.*, the top three undertakings manufacturing the product accounted for 75 per cent or more of production in 1970). The main industries having such high concentration were automobiles and ancillaries, agricultural machinery and implements, industrial and mining machinery, basic metals, construction and earth moving equipment, industrial explosives, drugs and pharmaceuticals, rubber goods and scientific and industrial equipment.

Viewing the matter in the light of Sec. 20(a) of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1969, 17 new interconnected sets of undertakings which were not described as large industrial houses in the Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (the Dutt Committee) have come to notice.

* * *

The Union Government had decided to set up a Study Team, to be headed by *Shri B. Sivaraman*, Member of the Planning Commission, to go into the problems of the handloom industry in the country.

The Study Team is to recommend measures in the context of handloom oriented textile policy. It may also examine possibilities of setting up a national body to deal with different problems and aspects of the handloom sector. The Team will submit its report within three months.

* * *

An implementation cell has been set up in the Bureau of Public Enterprises to ensure expeditious implementation of recommendations of the action committee on public enterprises.

Recommendations in respect of a dozen undertakings have been finalized so far. In these, the committee found more often that the managements or the organizational structures were the weak areas and needed strengthening or restructuring.

The action committee, headed by the Planning Commission Member, *Shri M. S. Pathak*, was set up a year ago to identify and assess deficiencies in the public sector undertakings.

* * *

The Union Government have decided to conduct the first ever country-wide census of small scale industrial units during the year 1973-74 with a view to determining the requirements of small-scale sector and frame policies appropriate to further development of the sector. It will cover small units with an investment in plant and machinery not exceeding Rs. 7.5 lakhs (in case of ancillaries up to Rs. 10 lakhs) which are within the purview of the Small Scale Industries Development Organization.

The Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, New Delhi, will be in overall charge of planning and coordination of the census. The actual field work, however, will be done under the direction and control of the Directorates of Industries of the respective States/ Union Territories. Later, a 'National Register of Small Scale Units' covered by the census will also be prepared.

* * *

The procedure for expeditious clearance of import licences has been further streamlined. As a result of directions issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, the import applications, complete in all respects are expected to be cleared within 30 days. Applications involving capital goods would be disposed of within 60 days. New directives have been given to the licensing authorities to deal with incomplete

applications for import licences, whose scrutiny involves avoidable delays. Time limit has been prescribed for each step to be taken in such cases.

The simplified procedure of processing applications for replenishment exports from registered exporters has also been liberalised.

* * *

A Committee, constituted by the Government of India, is currently reviewing the entire organisational structure and functions of the Civil Aviation Department. Headed by *Shri J. R. D. Tata*, it has been asked to make proposals for its reorganisation in the light of the rapidly growing requirements of modern aviation.

* * *

The Government of *Bihar* has decided to set up a corporation, on the pattern of the one in Uttar Pradesh, for development of sugar cane as well as modernisation of co-operative and state-run sugar factories. In view of the gradual takeover of sugar factories by the State Government, setting up of the proposed State Sugar Corporation had become necessary to ensure easy availability of finances and expert guidance to them. At present, of the 30 factories in the State, only 19 were working satisfactorily, seven were sick and four were closed.

The Board of Directors of the proposed corporation, to be nominated by the Governor, would include experts in the fields of engineering, sugarcane development and marketing and sugar production.

* * *

The Government of *Bihar* has decided to take over all private electricity supply companies in the State in phases. The process of the take-over would be completed by the end of 1986.

According to the takeover programme, licences of the existing ten private electricity supply companies would not be renewed on their expiry; they would be merged with the Bihar State Electricity Board. The Patna Electricity Supply Company would, thus, be merged with the Board in February 1974.

* * *

Industrial units in the *Gujarat* State employing more than 500 workers, will have to set up joint management councils within 90 days, according to an amendment of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules 1966, approved by the Government on August 6.

The amended rules provide for representation of workers in the joint management councils through elections which would be supervised by officials of State's Labour Department. The number of representatives of the workmen on the council would not be less than the number of representatives of the employer.

Gujarat is the first state in the country to take legal steps to provide for the representation of workers in the management affairs of the industrial units.

* * *

Following its decision to develop the electronics industry, the Government of *Uttar Pradesh* has formed an Electronics Corporation with a share capital of five crore rupees for necessary survey and development of an infrastructure for the growth and development of the industry and also give consultancy to entrepreneurs. It may take up production works in

the field where investment is large and the gestation period is long.

The Government has also formed a steering committee, consisting of representatives of the Electronics Commission of the Government of India, representatives of Bharat Electronics, representatives of the Corporation, and electronics experts to chart out their plan of work and identify the areas where work has to be started immediately.

* * *

The Planning Commission have accepted the observations made in March by the task force report on agrarian relations and have accordingly issued detailed guidelines on land reforms to be taken up by the State Governments during the Fifth Plan period.

Besides taking up necessary legislative measures for plugging loopholes in the existing tenancy laws and conferment of ownership rights on tenants and share croppers, according to a time-bound programme (in accordance with national guidelines announced in July last year) simple and quick preparation of records of tenancies, etc., the following important measures have also been suggested by the Commission: (1) Setting up a land reform organisation, parallel to the district revenue administration, charged with exclusive responsibility for implementing land reform measures with direct accountability to its own hierarchy right up to the Cabinet Ministers; (2) Constitution of special and reform tribunals for speedy justice; (3) Conferring power on the Land Reform Commissioner in each State to revise any order of the special tribunals either on the motion of the affected parties or on his own; (4) Providing free legal assistance to beneficiaries of land reforms where their rights are endangered by litigation started by landowners; and (5) Constitution of village committees to advise the Government on land reform implementation, comprising five to seven elected members from amongst landless labourers, share croppers and small holders of the village, owning less than two acres of land.

* * *

Pursuant to a recommendation made by the Heble Commission, all commercial activities of the Agriculture and Cooperation Department of the Government of *Maharashtra* have been transferred to a newly-established Corporation called "Maharashtra Agricultural Development and Fertilizer Promotion Corporation" (MAFCO). Earlier, a review of such activities had revealed that these were causing losses to Government every year.

* * *

An expert committee under the chairmanship of the Planning Secretary, who is also Additional Development Commissioner, has been set up to enquire into the causes of under-utilisation of the irrigation potential already created in *Maharashtra* and to suggest measures for fuller utilisation as also to review the pre-plan and other plan projects in order to modernise them for better service to the present-day agriculture.

* * *

The Government of *Mysore* has decided to have its own Food Corporation to take over food procurement. Starting with an initial investment of Rs. 5 crores, it will handle transactions worth Rs. 60 crores.

* * *

The Government of *Punjab* has decided to set up a Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation to look

after procurement and distribution, at reasonable prices, of essential commodities in the State to the public. The aim is to remove shortages.

The Corporation would not replace the existing bodies, like the 'Markfed' or the Civil Supplies Department. For the present, the Corporation without having monopoly, would procure and distribute 15 essential commodities, namely, atta, maida, suji, rice, pulses, sugar, gur, khandsari, vanaspati, kerosene oil, washing soap, salt, matches, coarse cotton cloth, and mustard oil.

* * *

The Government of India, on July 27, constituted a high power Committee to streamline transport and distribution arrangements to ensure efficient and regular supplies of coal to consumers, including power plants and industries. The Deputy Minister for Steel and Mines, is the Chairman of the 9-member Committee.

A seven-member committee appointed by the Union Ministry of Shipping and Transport has been asked to recommend proposals within which a statute for National Waterways could be contemplated. It will undertake a study of Ganga-Bhagirathi-Hooghly rivers and recommend whether they should be declared as National Waterways, which was recommended by the Bhagavati Committee on Inland Water Transport. Headed by *Shri P. H. Trivedi*, Director, Ministry of Shipping and Transport, it will also have one representative each of the Governments of U.P., Bihar, Assam and West Bengal.

* * *

The Union Ministry of Shipping and Transport has decided to set up a Committee to suggest ways and means for ensuring construction of national highways and other roads according to proper specifications and designs and to see that these are adhered to in actual execution. The Committee is also to look into the overall economies of construction and maintenance of roads. The Director-General (Road Development) and Additional Secretary, Ministry of Shipping and Transport, *Shri S. N. Sinha*, will be the Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee would establish coordination with the State Governments who are the executive authorities for the construction and maintenance of roads.

A Central organisation, called the Highway Research Board, was set up in New Delhi on October 24 to give impetus to road research and to coordinate the activities of various road research organisations in the country. It will also ensure effective application of the results of research in the field to effect as much economy as possible in the work of road construction.

* * *

The Law Commission of India, in its 50th report, has recommended enlargement of the definition of the expression 'public servant' in the Indian Penal Code. This has been necessitated owing to an important judgment of the Supreme Court pertaining to a university examiner (a senior lecturer in a Gujarat government college) who allegedly accepted a bribe of Rs. 500 for showing undue favour to an examinee.

In the case, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Gujarat High Court that the accused was not a 'public servant' for he was not holding any office in Government as indicated in the ninth clause of Section 21 of IPC.

The Law Commission, in its 42nd report on the Penal Code, has already recommended the insertion of a provision for punishing private employees who take bribes including those performing the duties of an examiner in examinations conducted by government, local, private or other bodies.

* * *

With a view to examining the existing set up of legal services at different levels in the state and making recommendations to effect institutional and qualitative improvements, the Government of *Rajasthan* has constituted a committee. *Shri L. M. Singhvi*, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, is its Chairman. The Committee is to submit its report within six months.

* * *

A high-level Committee, named as "Crime Committee", has been set up in the *West Bengal* Police, consisting of the I.G.P., two Additional I. G.Ps., D. I. G. (C. I. D.) and the Special Superintendent of Police (C. I. D.). The Committee meets every Thursday and reviews different aspects of crime in the State, excluding Calcutta, and issues instructions for streamlining the investigation and prosecution work in courts.

* * *

Pursuant to a resolution of the University Grants Commission, the Government of India has constituted a Committee to work out a viable scheme for instituting 'autonomous colleges' as a step to improve collegiate education. The Committee would determine the criteria, guidelines and the pattern of assistance to these colleges.

* * *

An Educational Technological Centre is being set up in Delhi. It will be concerned with development of curriculum, preparation of and basic scripts for films, radio and television lessons, multipurpose kits, models and other audio-visual instructional materials. Educational Technological Cells are also being created in various States in a phased manner.

* * *

The Government of *Haryana* has decided to affiliate all 101 colleges in the State to the Kurukshetra University from June 30, 1974. At present, all the colleges in the State are affiliated to the Punjab University, Chandigarh. There are 90 private colleges and 11 government colleges in the State.

* * *

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* has constituted a high-power committee to consider the takeover of secondary education in the State and to prepare a detailed scheme in this regard in accordance with the constitutional provisions.

The 16-member committee, headed by the Education Secretary, *Shri P. N. Chaturvedi*, is to report within six months.

* * *

The Experts Committee on Unemployment in its report released on May 15, has recommended creation of a National Commission on Employment and Manpower Planning, with adequate authority and professional competence. The Commission will make a comprehensive assessment of the employment and manpower situation in all its agencies so as to be able to advise on the technical and policy measures necessary for tackling the situation.

The Committee also felt that at the national level, an agency like the Department of Employment and Manpower Planning be created by merging the Directorate General of Employment & Training in the Ministry of Labour and the Employment & Manpower Cell in the Cabinet Secretariat. This Department would have: (*a*) a number of divisions or sections like manpower budgeting and forecasting, development of employment services, surveys and studies, occupation and job analysis, and (*b*) executive and coordinating-cum-advisory units.

Other main recommendations called for: (1) undertaking massive programme of rural works including irrigation, road construction and house construction, (2) discouraging indiscriminate mechanisation of farming, (3) providing tax concessions in respect of export of specific items of labour intensive industries, (4) providing insurance against loss of employment, (5) adoption of rural employment guarantee scheme of Maharashtra, (6) creating reserve fund of 30 per cent for units in backward areas, (7) having double and triple shifts in industry, (8) legislation to ensure employment to engineers and technicians on the basis of production in each industry, (9) vocationalisation of secondary education and diversion of 50 per cent students at higher secondary stage, (10) providing five lakh jobs every year in the field of education and training, (11) providing employment opportunities for 1.50 lakh teachers, 1200 assistant inspectors of primary schools every year, (12) adopting 21 as marriage age for boys and 18 for girls; and (13) adopting 42 weekly hours and seven-day week for factories.

* * *

The Third Report of the Joint Committee on Offices of Profit (Fifth Lok Sabha) has opposed the practice of MPs holding membership/directorship of certain bodies constituted by central and state Governments as the daily allowance/sitting fee/honorarium payable to the non-official Directors thereof exceeds the compensatory allowance, as defined in Section 2(a) of Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, *i.e.*, Rs. 51 per diem. Besides, the Board of Directors of these bodies exercise executive and financial powers.

The Committee has, however, listed names of some such bodies which are exempted from the purview of their objectives.

* * *

The Government of India has set up a 14-member (both officials and non-officials) Committee to step up implementation of programmes for development of children; the Committee is to formulate policies towards this end and coordinate them. It will also evolve a machinery of coordination between the Government and voluntary organizations in the field of child welfare. *Shri P. N. Luthra*, Additional Secretary, Union Department of Social Welfare, is the Chairman of the Committee for a period of three years.

* * *

Defaulters in paying employees' contribution to the provident fund will be liable for imprisonment up to six months, according to the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund (Amendment) Bill passed by the Lok Sabha on August 16. It is the first time that imprisonment was provided for defaulters of provident funds.

* * *

According to the decision of the Lok Sabha on May 7, 1973, the

former rulers who happen to be members of the House will be addressed with the usual prefix 'Shri' or Shrimati' and the name of their former States will not be suffixed to their names.

The decision is in direct contrast to a recent Government decision which permitted the former rulers to add the name of their former States to their names.

* * *

The *Bihar* Cabinet adopted a 'code of conduct' on August 14 for Ministers as formulated by the Union Home Ministry. According to it: (1) Every Minister at the time of taking oath of office, would submit to the Chief Minister a statement of his properties, including value of shares, debentures, cash and jewellery; (2) The Ministers would sever all connections with the conduct of any business and would not buy or sell any immovable property from or to the Government, or accept contributions either personally or through members of his family; (3) Any purse presented to the Minister would be deposited to the Government account concerned; and (4) Ministers, while on tour, would stay in Government buildings, receive no gifts, and discourage lavish parties.

* * *

The Government of *Kerala* launched on October 2—Gandhi Jayanti Day—the scheme of starting another 250 rural dispensaries to complete the process of having at least one dispensary in each of the 1,000 Panchayats in the State. When the scheme is fully implemented, Kerala would perhaps be the first state in the country to take modern medical facilities to the door of every Panchayat. The State Government would spend about Rs. 69 lakhs this year on these new dispensaries for which the necessary buildings and other facilities would be provided by the Panchayats themselves. The Centre had allotted Rs. 21.5 lakhs for the purpose.

The State Government has also decided to register an autonomous and non-profit making body for mainly undertaking construction of 720 'pay-wards' in the 10 major hospitals of the State through, securing institutional loan from the State Bank of India.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra,* while recruiting candidates under its various schemes of Special Employment Programme for the Educated Unemployed (1973-74), is to show special consideration for absorbing all graduates belonging to the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, nomadic tribes, vimukta jatis and all matriculates from the scavenger community, who are on the live registers of the local employment exchanges, subject to their availability and suitability for the schemes.

Similar special treatment in recruitment is also to be given to war widows and disabled educated persons who are on the live registers of local employment exchanges.

* * *

The Government of *Maharashtra,* in order to provide employment to disabled defence services personnel and to one member in each of the families of such defence personnel killed in action, has announced relaxations in age limit and medical fitness requirements for its class III posts which are filled through Maharashtra Public Service Competition Examination. The State government has also directed that 15 per cent of vacancies in Class III services, within the purview of the

Service Commission, would be reserved for *ex* servicemen. This percentage of reservation is inclusive of 80 per cent reservation made by the Government for persons belonging to the weaker sections of the community.

Educationally qualified *ex* servicemen would be granted the benefits of concessions pertaining to reservation of vacancies in Class III which are within the purview of the Service commission. The age-limit may be relaxed up to 45 years in the case of such disabled *ex* servicemen.

* * *

A three-year pilot project for integration of health services (it will provide health services to a population of over 2 lakhs in a district) has been approved by the Government of *Maharashtra.*

The project is designed to determine how best an infrastructure can be evolved out of the existing services and facilities and utilise them in the provision of family planning and maternal and child health services and medical care.

* * *

The high-power committee on Harijan welfare, with the Chief Minister as chairman, has recommended to the Government of *Punjab* to reserve 10 per cent of Class I and II posts for promotions to Harijans. The State Government is to instruct semi-government bodies, including municipal committees and universities in the State to give similar concessions to Harijans.

DIGEST OF REPORT

Gujarat. Report by a Team of Senior Officers on District Planning Machinery, Gandhi Nagar, Government of Gujarat, p. 245.

The Government of Gujarat constituted a state level team of senior officers on June 27, 1972, under the leadership of the Development Commissioner, for strengthening of district level machinery for accelerating the planning process and plan implementation.

The observations and recommendations of the study team among others are as follows:

OBSERVATIONS

(1) The average size of a district in the Indian Union covers a territorial area of 9,215 sq. kms and a population of 15.30 lakhs whereas, in Gujarat State, the average area of a district is 10,315 sq. kms. with an average population of 14.05 lakhs.

(2) In India, the district has been accepted as the most convenient geographical unit for public administration. The machinery of Government comes into closest contact with the aspirations and needs of the people at the district level.

(3) The Collector today is Head of a District Organisation, more complex and more rapidly changing than at any time before. He is in much closer contact with the elected representatives of the people today than at any time in the past. He exercises powers under different statutes numbering over 75 and as District Magistrate under about 39 different Acts and Rules. The amazing variety in work provides dynamism and strength to the office of the Collector.

(4) The main function of the Collector is to assess qualitatively the working of the district offices and find out the extent to which it has met genuine requirements of the district. The main purpose of his coordination visit to the district office is to eliminate delays, reduce public grievances, etc.

(5) The District Development Officer is not only a coordinator but also an executive. He is involved in processes of decision-taking and in their implementation. His success as a coordinator and as an executive is dependent on the levels of equilibria struck between him and other non-officials such as Presidents, Pramukhs of Panchayats, etc.

(6) Supervision of technical officers in District Panchayat

and their coordination in decision-taking by the District Development Officer have brought about wide awareness among the non-officials and public workers. A large number of non-officials and public workers have started appreciating the value of district machinery in speedy and efficient implementation of plan schemes.

(7) The existing machinery for coordination of plan matters and review of the progress of plan schemes at the district level leaves much to be desired. There has been a substantial increase in the workload of senior, middle and junior management levels in the district. There has been a relative failure in inducing adequate knowledge, skill and understanding at the middle and junior management levels. As such, plan implementation is being hampered in many ways. The committee also noticed that there is only one Statistical Assistant in the Collectorate to assist the Collector in performing what is really high level function, *viz.* plan coordination. It has not been possible for the Collector to ensure periodical supervision of the maintenance of the progress registers by each technical officer.

(8) The knowledge, skill and understanding needed for effective participation in the process of social and economic planning are nearly absent in the offices of all the technical officers. Plan matters are treated purely as budgetary-cum-account matters and are handled by the Head Clerk or Accountant in each technical office.

(9) The Collectors do not have adequate administrative and technical support in making their coordination visits purposive from the point of view of accelerating the planning process in the district. The span of control of the Collector has been increasing with an increase in the number of plan schemes at the district level retained by the Government.

(10) There is need for a high degree of resilience, receptivity and skill for assimilation of newer ideas on the part of the Collector, District Development Officers and other district/regional state level technical officers.

(11) The Planning machinery within the District Panchayat is highly inadequate for ensuring effective supervision over plan implementation and plan review. The District Heads dealing with agriculture education, health and cooperation appear to have been severely handicapped for want of sufficient assistance from qualified statistical personnel.

(12) The staff needed for preparation of plans and estimates at the district level is highly inadequate which further impedes and creates inordinate delays in revising plans and in furnishing revised estimates whenever there is escalation of prices.

(13) The line losses in the rural areas can be reduced by

toning up the organisational structure of the Gujarat Electricity Board at the regional levels.

(14) Very often, schemes are formulated at the level of the Heads of Departments and thrust on the district officers for implementation. Insistence on the implementation of plan schemes in areas which have certain peculiar local difficulties or meet with resistance of some sort or other results in poor performance. There is also not adequate dialogue between some of the Heads of Departments and their counter parts in the district.

(15) Formulation of schemes should have relevance to the pattern of resource endowments which are changing from district to district and from region to region. Planning expertise or planning capability is called for from every major discipline which has important contribution to make towards an inter-disciplinary endeavour.

(16) Induction of the right sort of knowledge and understanding for effective participation in the plan process would call for the organisation of a series of training programmes, symposia, seminars and conferences at different levels and for different groups.

(17) Multi-level planning is the sheet anchor of a strong, diversified, adequately decentralised planning machinery at the State regional and district levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(18) The district should cover a territorial area of 7,000 sq. kms and a population of 12 lakhs.

It is not only important that the Collector should send the proforma containing his findings of the coordination visit to the concerned Heads of Departments, Administrative Departments of Secretariat and the General Administration Department but also his observations should be taken note of and acted upon by the concerned Heads of Departments, and the Administrative Department of the Secretariat: otherwise, the very purpose of his coordination visit is likely to be defeated.

(19) To improve the image of the Collector, there should be delegation of appropriate powers to the Collector by various administrative departments to make his control legally effective over subordinate staff at district offices whenever occasion demands it.

(20) It is necessary to ensure that the delays regarding the communication of budget allocations to the district heads are reduced to a minimum.

(21) The reluctance of some of the higher technical officers in not getting the work done on a departmental basis particularly in inaccessible or interior areas, should be viewed seriously by Government and the tendency solely to depend on contractors must be wholly discouraged.

(22) There should be heart to heart dialogue between Heads of Departments and their counterparts in the district in plan formulation.

(23) The regional planning and district planning are inter-related and as such the machinery conceived at the regional level for formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of regional plans should be meaningfully dovetailed with the district planning machinery.

(24) The regional planning/district planning should be conceived in terms of strategy for planning at the grass-roots level. This again may be conceived in terms of locating a series of growth poles/centres at pre-determined points on the basis of a careful analysis of physico-geographical features of each region. The growth centre concept should be used as a basic tool of micro level planning for an integrated and balanced development of a region.

(25) With a view to helping the Divisional Commissioner in discharging his duties as an effective coordinator in plan formulation, implementation and evaluation, an inter-disciplinary team of officers such as one Agronomist, one Poultry Officer, one Geographer be created in each Divisional Commissioner's Office. These Officers may be taken on a contractual basis for a period of three years. Some of the Technical Officers can be employed even on a part time basis.

(26) The Divisional Commissioner should have an Institutional device of a non-institutional agency in the form of a Divisional Development Council through which popular elements get associated with policy formulation and evaluation at the regional level. There should be a planning set-up for the office of each Divisional Commissioner, consisting of one Divisional Planning Officer under whom one System Analyst, two Programmers, four Research Officers and other non-gazetted staff would be working.

(27) The District Collector may have to assist the Divisional Commissioner substantially in evaluation work. A Statistical Officer, four Planning Assistants and two clerk typists should be appointed in each Collectorate.

(28) With a view to implementing the Fifth Five Year Plan speedily and efficiently there is need for a high level whole time officer trained in the techniques of planning who may be designated as the District Planning Officer. He may be drawn from the ranks of Revenue Officers. Development Officers, Economists, Statisticians and graduates from Indian Institutes of Managment and Indian Institutes of Technology with adequate experience in project formulation,

evaluation and implementation.

(29) The District Planning will have to play an active role in the formulation and implementation of the plan schemes. The staff that would be directly attached to him in addition to the existing set-up of the District Statistical Office, will consist of one Deputy Planning Officer (Class I), two Planning Assistants, two Statistical Assistants and other non-gazetted staff. He should also have a technocrat in support of an interdisciplinary team composed of experts in agriculture, animal husbandry, poultry, dairy and allied subjects with one technical assistant each in the concerned discipline: there should also be a water management specialist and expert in the field of sociology and economics.

(30) With the acceleration of the tempo of planning process at the regional/district levels, a good deal of spade work will have to be done at the taluka level. There should, therefore, be a separate Statistical Assistant with a peon attached to him at each Taluka Development Officer's office exclusively for plan statistics.

(31) In view of the growing complexity of urban planning, it is felt by the Committee that there should be a Planning Officer in every Municipal Corporation and at least one Planning Officer for six Municipalities. He should be assisted by suitable statistical personnel.

(32) The Committee have carefully examined the organisational outfit for handling planning matters in the office of subject matter specialists like District Agriculture Officer, District Health Officer, District Registrar of Cooperative Societies, District Education Officer.

(33) It has recommended one post of Plannnig Assistant each in the Panchayat sector/State Sector.

(34) The designing of monitoring system at the state, regional and district levels should be done on the basis of a feasibility report by a management consultancy organisation.

(35) The evaluation organisation at the state level should be closely linked with the planning section of the General Administration Department. Quarterly progress review which has been recently transferred from the evaluation organisation to the planning section should be tightened. Evaluation of plan schemes at divisional and district levels should be done by the Divisional Commissioner. At the district level, the Collector should assist the Divisional Commissioner in initiating and completing evaluation studies.

(36) A series of meaningful and imaginatively conceived programmes will have to be drawn up for officers at the top, middle and junior levels. Symposia, seminars and conferences will have to be organised periodically for officers and non-officials at

different levels. The seminars and conferences should serve to initiate a series of useful dialogues and improve the knowledge, skill and understanding of different segments of the Governmental machinery in accelerating the planning process.

(37) The officials and non-officials on a selective basis, should be sent out on educational tours to important projects throughout the country. Such tours will go a long way in widening the outlook of the key personnel who participate in the planning process.

(38) A series of incentives, both monetary and non-monetary (awards, medals, trophies) will have to be evolved to inspire the different classes of Government servants to give out their best in the participatory planning process.

(39) Unless there is an adequate strengthening of technical machinery at the district and regional levels for formulation of plans and estimates, it would not be possible to draw up a comprehensive contingency plan or to prepare a shelf of projects in relation to dams, bandhs, minor irrigation schemes, rural roads, afforestation, soil conservation measures, etc.

(40) On the basis of detailed study more adequate powers must be delegated for quickening the tempo of plan implementation. With an increase in administrative and operational efficiency, there should be allround cost reduction and wide spread cost consciousness. The Committee has recommended that cost accountants should be associated with the formulation and evaluation of major plan schemes.

(41) There is need for evolving comprehensive human resources development policy. As regards manpower planning at the top management level, there should be a careful dovetailing of the personnel policy with human resources development policy.

(42) It is recommended by the Committee that an Administrative Reforms Commission should be set up on a permanent basis for an objective study and analysis of an overall administrative and operational efficiency of different agencies of Government at different levels.

BOOK REVIEWS

Case Studies in Panchayati Raj; By IIPA's Committee on Case Studies, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1972, p. 161, Rs. 12.00.

New Challenges in Administration; By IIPA's Committee on Case Studies, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1972, p. 203, Rs. 12.00.

Administrators in Action; By IIPA's Committee on Case Studies, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1972, p. 298, Rs. 15.00.

The Case Studies' Project, undertaken by The Indian Institute of Public Administration in 1961 through an assistance by the Ford Foundation, marks a pioneering effort in the country by making Indian case studies available as a teaching tool. The studies published in these three volumes cover a wide range of subjects, thoughtfully selected by the Case Study Project for a critical study of those areas which have assumed considerable importance during the post-Independence period.

The first volume—*Case Studies in Panchayati Raj*—includes 11 studies on Panchayati Raj institutions and the problems which arise in the administration of these selfgoverning local bodies. Even though the Constitution incorporated organisation of village Panchayats as a directive principle of State policy and some States did enact Panchayat Laws in the late forties, it was much later that these institutions were regarded as the primary tier of the panchayati raj hierarchy comprising the Village Panchayat, the Block or the Kshetra Samiti and the Zila Parishad as the local self-governing bodies responsible for development at the district level. Indeed, the experiment was considered synonymous with democracy at the grassroots.

In the initial stages, there was an element of distrust as between the officials and the elected non-officials at the various levels and case studies like "Allotment of PWD Quarters to Panchayat Staff in Rampur District" and "Where is the Fun if We don't use Power" only go to prove that a false sense of prestige on either side lead to no end of difficulties. It is true that in some cases difficulties arose because of lack of clarity in the Government orders in the initial stages but in a few other cases as in "District Panchayat Asserts for Autonomy" difficulties arose because certain old rules and procedures were not adapted to the new needs of the situation. "Utilisation of small Irrigation Tanks in Sunder Shehar Taluka" is an excellent study to show how interpretation of rules motivated solely by public welfare can lead to relief and beneficial results.

"Where is the Fun if we don't use Power", however, symbolises a situation at the other end of the spectrum where legal and rational norms enshrined in tested Rules and Procedures were undermined in haste without due appreciation.

"Asking Government to Pay for Water Supply Schemes", "Building Water Works in Two Villages of Chandnagar District", "Setting up of Primary Health Centre at Amarpur", "Location of a Primary Health Centre in Kekawada" are studies to show how decision-making in Panchayati Raj gets influenced by political considerations. Herein comes the need for the officials of the Panchayati Raj Administration to see how elected leaders are educated—without their feeling as such—in the establishment of norms and procedures without sacrificing public interest. It is true that political support could prevent delays as typified by the case study on "Water Supply Schemes of Kabirpur Village", but this should not lead one to the conclusion that political support would necessarily expedite decision-making.

Indeed, the case studies "Setting up of a Primary Health Centre at Amarpur" and "Building Water Works in Two Villages of Chandnagar District" reveal in no uncertain terms that wherever officials and non-officials cooperate in a selfless effort, things move with considerable speed and without any difficulty.

Uninformed criticism has often been levelled against Panchayati Raj that "those who make a hue and cry get the benefit and those who remain silent don't". The distribution of subsidy to the Adivasis is a good case in point but fortunately such cases are not many—thanks to the socio-political consciousness of the people under the Panchayati Raj system. If any thing, Panchayati Raj is the most significant single factor in the development of political consciousness in the villages and it augurs well for the nascent Indian democracy.

And yet, complacency has to be avoided. If Panchayati Raj has really to succeed, the elected and non-elected units of administration have to cooperate and to rise above the local factions, and above all the binding noose of rules and procedures but in public interest. In-built devices have to be provided to see that benefits flow to the depressed and the underlings particularly where felt needs of the people are concerned. It is in recognition of these minimum felt needs that the Fifth Plan proposes to launch the Minimum Needs Programme on a national scale. It can succeed only if the Panchayats are fully involved in the process both of formulation and implementation of this vital programme.

Let it not be said that when the country recognised the needs of the poorest and the lowliest, the Panchayats failed them. Herein lies an opportunity and a challenge.

The first volume covers only the State of Gujarat. The experiment of Panchayati Raj has thrown up new problems in different States and it would have been advantageous if other States had also been covered. Perhaps, because this was the first Study, only three workers were assigned to do the eleven selected cases. It is refreshing to see that in the subsequent studies, the Institute was able to enlist the support of a larger number of participants.

The second volume *New Challenges in Administration*, covering 9 studies is a distinct improvement over the first though, strictly speaking, "Reorganisation of District Administration in Andhra Pradesh" could have formed part of the case study on Panchayati Raj because the sujbect has a direct relevance to the Panchayati Raj Administration in Andhra Pradesh.

This volume refreshingly covers new problems of industrial management and development of backward

classes. "Of Logs and Men" and "Management of a Tribal Development Corporation" show how energetic and committed young men can combine administrative efficiency, with a sense of social justice. These two studies have highlighted the various ways whereby the ignorant and innocent are exploited by unscrupulous traders, merchants, sometimes with the connivance of the lower staff. "The Managment of the Tribal Development Corporation" highlights the imperative need to provide debt relief in tribal areas and there is no doubt that in this matter Andhra Pradesh has led the rest of the country. Indeed, several other States are proposing to take similar legal measures for the amelioration of the lot of the Tribals.

The States have been vying with each other to get Central industrial projects located within their States. One could quote any number of instances and "Korba Fertiliser Project" is one of them where unfair concessions were asked for and given, thereby distorting the economics of the Project. After all, these concessions also flow from the Public Exchequer even though they may belong to the States and a stage has come where it is necessary to decide whether projects should be located purely on objective criteria based on economic factors or whether they should be governed by unfair concessions and undue political influence. The other problem which has been thrown up and is highlighted in the study "Ball Bearing Project" or for that matter the "Korba Fertiliser Project" itself, that unduly long gestation periods not only provide a bad economic start but also blur the image of the public sector industries. Inextricably linked with this is the problem of management. Some steps have recently been taken but the need for a systematic approach in matters of recruitment and training of professional managers for the public sector undertakings merits closest study and the highest priority.

"Municipal Taxation"—two case studies—is an excellent piece to highlight the already established adage that "Administration is an art of the person administering it". The initiative, clarity and determination of the local body administrator in one case led to the acceptance of certain proposals for the improvement of resources of the local body in question. In the other case, where this was wanting, the proposals just did not click. This study also highlights the need for taking into confidence the political executive in order to achieve quick results.

Even though one hopes that the number of such examples have considerably reduced, if not altogether eliminated, it is unfortunately a fact that the case study "Transfer of the Collector of Matsyapura" exemplifies how conscientious and energetic young officers become *persona-non-grata* of the powers-that-be for failing to kowtow the line of the local politicians particularly during an election year. In a democracy, what is important is the impartiality and fairness of elections and this can be ensured only if cases like Matsyapura are not repeated.

The third volume of case studies is a presentation of situations (barring one) covering altogether new activities initiated in the post-Independence era.

In the development process, cooperatives always had an important role to play but the induction of the cooperative sector in the field of industry, particularly sugar industry, has been a matter of pride in States, like Maharashtra. The study on the Palakol Sugar Factory clearly

reveals the importance of harmonious working of the members of the management Board. The pity, however, is that an excellent administrative service officer who retrieved the factory from liquidation was moved away to another job within a year. This is one of those phenomena which calls for immediate attention. If someone did well, he should have been groomed to assume still higher responsibilities in the public sector undertakings. This is how management is developed. Lack of personnel planning has already caused considerable damage to the public sector industries and a time has come when, irrespective of background, a manager, who has done well, should be given every facility to gain professional expertise through a well-thought out career planning and training.

The study on "Nizam Sugar Factory" is another instance to prove that it is an officer with an experience of man-management, general awareness and deep understanding who alone can deliver the goods. But for the appointment of a whole-time administrator, this sugar factory would also have gone the way of the Palakol Sugar Factory. A connected study relates to the raising of capital for this factory and the main point brought out is that finances actually are no constraint if the management is sound and resourceful. But soundness of financial management depends not only on obtaining working capital but also on establishing perfect understanding with the producers—the suppliers of raw material in this case—peaceful industrial relations, removal of dead wood in the form of surplus employees and production in terms of increased capacity, besides of course, economy in expenditure. The Deposits Scheme started by the management was novel and imaginative and this along with the other steps led to the financial and commercial revitalisation of the Unit.

Another study in the industrial sector relates to "Forging an Industrial Project". This, I must say, exhibits considerable depth and foresight in the treatment of all the important aspects of the situation. The licence for the Project was issued in 1956 and after innumerable vicissitudes,—including possibility of the whole project being scuttled at one stage—the Industrial Development Corporation managed to bring the Unit into production in 1968 and according to indications available, this Unit is now poised to attain a high degree of success. But how do we cut short the interminably long gestation period in the commissioning of the public sector projects. This problem continues to fox every one. The delays throw up additional problems both financial and administrative and not only lock up the much-needed capital without yielding results but also lead to escalation of costs, etc. In fact, it is common experience that project costs have almost always been revised twice or thrice if not more. This is a problem which should receive the earnest consideration of planners, technologists and administrators.

There are three studies covering the agricultural sector. "The Expansion of Agricultural Education in Maharashtra" is exceedingly informative but rules and procedures indicated in Annexure I have since been revised and, in fact, in the Fifth Plan, agricultural education is receiving due emphasis in the light of the decision of the group of Ministers on Administration, to provide technical expertise to the lowest rungs of agricultural administration while maintaining the chain of command.

But the principle regarding a single line of command can really turn out to be an over-simplification

of the issue as the case study on "The High Yielding Seeds Production in Maharashtra"—indeed a very thoughtful study—shows. Any agricultural programme, or for that matter developmental programme, involves operations of a multiplicity of agencies which are not always amenable to the application of the principle of unity of command. The fact that, under the Fifth Plan, new administrative agencies—like the Command Area Development Authority, Drought Prone Areas Programme Authority, etc.—are sought to be created so that powers of decision making may be delegated to the field officers to enable them to implement the programmes with speed and authority, shows that a balance between the two styles has to be sought.

The case study on "Fertiliser Distribution" and "Implementation of the Family Planning Programme" may be good narratives but they smack of too much of self-panegyric and one suspects that the case study writers themselves were the officers to carry out the said programmes. While personal knowledge can at times be useful, it grossly violates against objectivity and the Case Study Project would do well to assign case studies to objective research workers.

On the whole, the three volumes bring together considerable case study material to stimulate the interest of young administrators and also provide useful material for teachers in public administration. The Director, Case Study Project and the Indian Institute of Public Administration fully deserve to be congratulated for their magnificent effort.

—R. K. TRIVEDI

Social Change in India; By B. Kuppuswamy, Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1972, p. 356, Rs. 40.00.

The phenomena of the social change has from times long past attracted the attention of philosophers, literary authors and social scientists. The effort to understand social change, therefore, has been there for over a period of time. The concept, however, has yet to develop clarity. Some insights have been gained but one has yet to traverse a long distance before the process of social change can be understood or analysed in a fuller manner. One could compare the effort of the social scientist in this area to "the desire of the moth for the star". There have been sweeping statements or wide speculations and generalisations. However, there seems to be a little more specificity now than before which is a result of an attempt at anlaysing social change more systematically.

The problems in studying social change are manifold. It is difficult to define it. The suggestion that "significant alterations in behaviour" be considered social change, raises questions about the definition of "significant", 'by whom is it to be judged as significant,' 'to how many should it be significant', etc. Another difficulty is that the social structure and social change are so inter-related, that a question is asked as to whether the social change can be studied *per se* apart from social structure. Time dimension is another important variable in the study of social change. Most studies on change tend to be unilinear, which means that the base from which change has occurred has to be constructed either according to the opinions of the respondents or the imagination of the scholar.

Notwithstanding these complications, some major trends in the study of social change may be indicated. Among these are, the factual objective study of change, concentration on social, cultural and psychological factors, study of specific societies, recognition of the need to analyse social change as a complement to social structure, a multi-dimensional approach, relation between values, meaning and social change, problems in planned directed change, etc.

It is in this context that any book on social change has to be looked at. As indicated, the desire for understanding the phenomena of social change is strong among the social scientists. The present book is an effort by B. Kuppuswamy, whose major interest is in social psychology, to look at the process of the social change in India. He tries to provide a perspective to the understanding of the social change in India in the first two parts of the book which is divided into three parts. In the first part, an attempt is made to trace the developmental theories of social change. The contributions of Courte, Spencer, Marx, Hobhouse, Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin, Pareto, MacIver, Weber, etc., have been described. The types and directions of social change have also been indicated. The social values and the traditions of India, which have a bearing on social change, have been stated. In part two, the various factors which are considered as causations of social change are analysed. Among the factors indicated are demographic, technological, the economic, the cultural, planning and legislation. In these chapters also, the author has traced the views of various thinkers of the world over as well as contributions made by Indian scholars in the understanding of a particular factor as responsible for social change. It is in the third part that the author describes the various areas in which social change has taken place. The areas that he has covered are the caste system, the position of the Harijans, the problem of the Girijans, the change in the status of women, changing position of labour, the educational expansion, urbanisation and social mobility, expansion of mass media, equality, national integration and secularism. The author has said in the preface that the volume is an attempt to assess the social change in the country during the last quarter of a century. Judged by this criterion, each of the chapters stand up well.

In the chapter on the position of the Harijans, he has made an effort not only to assess the social changes taking place in the position of the Harijans only after Independence but goes back far beyond. It is necessary to have the historical context of any situation to understand social change. After briefly indicating the positions of the untouchables of Shri Narayana Guru, Ambedkar, Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Jagjivan Ram, he describes the controversy between Gandhi and Ambedkar with regard to the separate electorates. He also indicates the provisions of the Simon Commission Report as well as the deliberations of the first and second Round Table Conferences held in London with particular reference to the position of Harijans. The author is of the opinion that the British courts and the British administration put tremendous obstacles to remove untouchability even when the people were in favour of it. Various legislations that have been passed during the 1937 ministries as well as the provisions made in the Constitution after Independence are mentioned. The findings of the Elayaperumal Committee have also been given. The change in status of the Harijans in education, in recruitment to services have also been shown. "In conclusion,

It may be pointed out that big social change has come among the Harijans on the basis of temple entry legislation, the reservations of seats in Parliament and the State Legislature, the provision of educational facilities and employment opportunities." He, however, further states that it must be recognised that the stigma of the caste is there. He further says that while the Harijans in urban areas have improved their status "in the villages it is impossible for them to experience any change in status".

It will be seen from this summary that the author has given a comprehensive description of the process of change among the Harijans from earlier times up to the present. He has brought to bear some of his own insights, of the values of the Hindus, his psychological training, his own experiences and his empirical studies on the description. Nevertheless, there is no clear integration between the three parts of the book. They can stand apart by themselves. The reader himself could try to make an assessment on his own regarding the various factors at interplay in the process of change in these areas on the basis of the earlier chapters. As mentioned in the beginning, the analysis of the phenomena of the social change is extremely difficult. Parsons said some time ago that our knowledge at present in social change is enough only to explain social change rather than to theorise on it. Dr. Kuppuswamy's book, in a sense, affirms this view. The descriptions of the many areas in which change is taking place have been very painstakingly done. There is a wealth of material, which becomes available at one place.

However, there is no effort at conceptualisation, *i.e.*, to find correlations between changes taking place and factors of causation. There is also no linking of the views of theorists mentioned and the phenomena of social change in India. The book has chapters on various areas of concentration on the study of social change as stated earlier but then the wideness of coverage is both the weakness and the strength of the book. A choice has to be made between macro descriptions and micro analysis. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. The fact that there is no indication of cause-effect relation is not to deny that descriptions and explanations make a substantial contribution to the understanding of social change.

—A. P. BARNABAS

Social Security Measures in India; By Dr. Vivek Bhattacharya, Delhi, Metropolitan Book Co., 1970, Rs. 25.00.

The subject of Social Security lends itself to be approached differently by different authors and organisations. Though the term 'social security' had its origins in the United States, many ideas and measures which preceded it had their origins in Germany and other European countries. The author's conception of social security is reflected in the definition quoted from *Encyclopaedia Americana* (Vol. 25, p. 186). According to that definition, the term "social security" is usually employed to indicate "specific government programmes designed primarily to prevent want by assuring to families the basic means of subsistence".

The broad scope of the definition approvingly quoted by the author explains the wide sweep and coverage of problems of social security in India as indicated on page xii.

Besides tracing early history of social security, the author studies such problems as unemployment, health, housing, problems of child welfare and the care of the old, the problems of the weaker classes, the protection of labour, social security for rural India, beggary, social defence and protection of the blind, the role of voluntary organisations and so on. A separate chapter is devoted to the financial implications of social security. Difficulties in the implementation of the social security measures, with particular reference to the underdeveloped countries, are dealt with in a separate chapter. All these topics are of interest in themselves but there is no binding thread or conceptual unity behind the analysis and description of these problems except that each one of them is directly or indirectly connected with the prevention of want. One finds an overlapping approach between social security and social welfare in the book.

The book contains a Foreword by Shri A. K. Sen, to whom it is dedicated. When Shri Sen was Minister of Law and Social Security in the Union Government, the author used to discuss with him problems concerning social security in India. Prof. A. Dasgupta, Head of the Department of Business Management (now retired) has written a preface to the book. The present book is a modification of the author's Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Business Management and Industrial Administration of the University of Delhi, entitled, "Towards Democracy and Social Justice—Some Aspects of Social Security Measures in India". The author is of the view that in the field of business management and industrial relations, the concept of social security is novel. The book contains twelve chapters spread over 264 pages and four appendices and bibliography from pages 265 to 309.

Two features which mark the book under review are: (1) the broad matter covered, and (2) references to the ideas and institutions in foreign countries. Also, there are references to the policies and programmes of the United Nations Organisations, such as the I.L.O.

The broad coverage makes the subject matter in the book relevant to social security in its encyclopaedic rather than its academic sense. In its present form, the book is useful to lay readers seeking to understand the magnitude of social problems in the contemporary world, particularly India.

When one is dealing with a book of such broad scope as the present one, it is needless to pick out for emphasis either merits or shortcomings of the subjects. But the figures relating to the costs of social security, as given by the ILO for 1956-57, are not called for. The references to what India could learn from Hitler's experiments in Germany as outlined on pp. 36 and 37 as well as the section on "Language Difficulty" on pp. 246-247 in the context of education and human resources seem to be farfetched. There are, however, useful identifications and suggestions. For example, on page 259, the author rightly observes, "Social security administration involves a process whereby social values are transformed into social policies and their organisation in the form of services". His plea for "self sufficiency in food" as a pre-requisite to any planned development sounds very prophetic and currently relevant. He has drawn attention to a neglected area in the last part of his book, namely, "Research and Business Management" (p. 256). His plea for "Better Opportunities for Business Management Training" on page 261 is understandable in the light of the faculty which promoted his thesis.

For one aspect, Dr. Bhattacharya deserves our congratulations. As a member of the Central Information Service, he has taken the trouble to wade through literature on a wide variety of subjects and present the policies, issues and programmes in the broad social field. Seldom do Government officers care for academic pursuits; much less to degrees. Dr. Bhattacharya is an exceptionally devoted and painstaking person who has studied a variety of social problems in India and abroad.

—V. JAGANNADHAM

BOOKS RECEIVED

Abad, Antonio De Juan, *Governmental and Administrative Organization in the Field of Scientific Research*, Brussels, Institute of Administrative Sciences, p. 140, (US) $4.50.

Arora, Ramesh K., *Comparative Public Administration*, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1972, p. 192, Rs. 30.00.

Ascher, Charles S. (General Reporter) *and* Chapel, Yves, *The Administration of Publicity-Aided Housing*, Brusssels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1971, p. 215, $ 9.00.

Bergstrom, Gary L., *Resource Utilization in Indian Manufacturing: A Mathematical Analysis*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, 1973, p. 171, Rs. 24.00.

Bhalerao, C. N., *Administration, Politics and Development in India*, Bombay, Lalvani Publishing House, 1972, p. 511, Rs. 35.00.

Blase, Melvin G., *Institution Building; A Source Book*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1973, p. 336, $ 10.00.

Braj Kishor, *India's Foreign Exchange Reserves* (*Commerce Pamphlet*-63), Bombay, *Commerce* Publications Division, 1973, p. 25.

Buch, Henri, *The Participation of Users or Directly Interested Persons in National Education Administration: General Report*, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1972, p. 99, $ 2.80.

Christopher, K. J. & C. H. Shankariah, *From Auto-Slums to Autonagar*, Hyderabad, Small Industry Extension Training Institute, p. 75, Rs. 7.50.

Dagli, Vadilal, *Growth for Whom*? Bombay, *Commerce* Publications Division, p. 24.

Dagli, Vadilal, *India's Foreign Trade*, Bombay, Vora & Co. 1973, p. 452, Rs. 50.00.

Das, Tushar K., *Operations Research in Banking* (*Commerce Pamphlet*-65), Bombay, *Commerce* Publications Division, p. 27.

Davar, Rustom S., *Modern Marketing Management in the Indian Context*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, 1973, p. 746, Rs. 28.00.

Davar, Rustom S., *The Management Process*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, Bombay, 1973, p. 707, Rs. 21.00.

Dharampal, *The Madras Panchayat System Vol. II: A General Assessment*, Delhi, Impex India, 1972, p. 232, Rs. 35.00.

Government of Gujarat, *Approach Paper on the Fifth Five Year Plan*, (1974-79), Gandhinagar, General Administration Department (Planning), Government of Gujarat, p. 106.

Gulati, R. L., *Indian Joint Ventures Abroad* (*Commerce Pamphlet*-61), Bombay, *Commerce* Publications Division, 1973, p. 25.

Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited, *8th Annual Report* 1971-72, Calcutta, Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited, 1973, p. 72.

IIPA, *Building Bye-laws—Zoning and Sub-division Control: Proceedings of the Seminar held on March* 11-12 1969, New Delhi, IIPA, 1973, p. 64, Rs. 4.00.

International Labour Organization, *Directory of Labour Relations*, Geneva, International Labour Office, 1973, p. 248, Swiss Franks 17.50.

International Labour Office, *Labour Relations Institutes: Structure and Functions*, Geneva, International Labour Office, 1973, p. 169, Swiss Franks 15.

Jacob, K. K., *Personnel Management in India—A Study of Training and Functions of Personnel Officers*, Udaipur, SJC Publications, 1973, p. 212, Rs. 28.00.

Jha, Braj Kishore, *Indo-Nepalese Relations* (1951-1972), Bombay, Vora & Co., 1973, p. 174, Rs. 25.00.

Jitendra Singh (ed.), *ASCI Occasional Papers: Management of Scientific Research—Proceedings of the National Seminar on Management of Scientific Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, 10-12 October*, 1970, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1973, p. 311, Rs. 50.00

Journal of Public Economics, (Editor A. B. Atkinson) Vol. 1, No. 1, Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, p. 167.

Kathuria, G. *and* Chandrasekharan C., *Elements of Agricultural Finance*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, 1973, p. 244, Rs. 18.00.

Kidder, David K., *Education and Manpower Planning in India: A Case Study of Calcutta Region*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, 1973, p. 182, Rs. 24.00.

Kulkarni R. S., *Industrial Adjudication with Special Reference to Reinstatement*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, 1973, p. 347, Rs. 28.00.

Lallan Prasad, *Personnel Management and Industrial Relations in the Public Sector*, Bombay, Progressive Corporation, 1973, p. 252, Rs. 28.00.

Laxmi Narain, *Managerial Compensation and Motivation in Public Enterprises*, Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., 1973, p. 157, Rs. 25.00.

Maheshwari, S. R., *Study of Public Administration in India*, Agra, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1973, p. 199, Rs. 25.00.

(Editor Raj K. Agarwal), *Management Jodhpur Journal* (Vol. 1, No. 1), Jodhpur, University of Jodhpur, p. 96, Rs. 10.

Marsden, R. P., *Bibliography of Public Enterprise*, Leeds, University of Leeds, p. 97.

Nair, A. Balkrishnan, *Parliamentary Control over Administration*, Trivandrum, The Kerala Academy of Political Science.

Nayar, C. P. Somanathan, *Chit Finance: An Exploratory Study on the Working of Chit Fund*, Bombay, Vora & Co. 1973, p. 190, Rs. 30.00.

Odegard, Holtan P., *The politics of Truth Towards Reconstruction in Democracy*, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, p. 439, $ 13.50.

Public Affairs (*Gokhale Annual*), Bangalore, Gokhale Institute of Public Affairs, p. 144.

Raheja, B. D. *Urban India and Public Policy*, Bombay, Somaiya Publications, 1973, p. 323, Rs. 50.00.

Ray, Jayanta Kumar, *Democracy and Nationalism on Trial: A Study of East-Pakistan*, Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1968, p.400, Rs. 28.00.

Ray, Jayanta K., *Portraits of Thai Politics*, Delhi, Orient Longman, p. 225, Rs. 20.00.

Royal van Gorcum Ltd., *Planning and Development in the Netherlands: Traffic Towards the year* 2000, Assen (Netherlands), Royal van Gorcum Ltd., p. 88.

Sarswathi S., *The Madras Panchayat System*, Vol. 1: *A Historical Survey*, Delhi, Impex India, p. 327, Rs. 45.00.

Stassen, Jacques (General Reporter), *Building Permits: A Comparative Study*, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1973, p. 364, $ 13.50.

Teacher Today: Education in the year 2000, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 244, Rs. 2.50 (per copy).

Ursekar, H. S. *Law and Social Welfare*, Bombay, Lalvani Publishing House, p. 276, Rs. 30.00.

Venu S., *Environment and Economic Growth* (*Commerce Pamphlet* 64), Bombay, Commerce Publications Division, 1973, p. 30.